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
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HISTORY

OF THE

CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

BY

THE COMTE DE PARIS.

TRANSLATED, WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE AUTHOR,

BY LOUIS F. TASISTRO.

EDITED BY

HENRY COPPÉE, LL.D.

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THE
CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

VOL. II.

BOOK I.—RICHMOND.

CHAPTER I.

WILLIAMSBURG.

WE concluded the former volume with the narrative of the first year of the war, having brought down our review of the campaigns which were being prosecuted in the East and West to within a few days of the anniversary of the bombardment of Fort Sumter. Those campaigns were but the prelude to the far more extensive operations and sanguinary conflicts which we are about to relate.

We shall begin by speaking of the army of the Potomac, of which we have described the slow formation during the autumn and winter of 1861, and of its first movements in the spring of 1862. Whilst the armies of the West have already overrun several States and fought great battles, the former has not yet had an opportunity to seek revenge from the conquerors of Bull Run. In the last chapters of the preceding volume the reader has seen the difficulties of every kind which embarrassed its movements, prevented it from taking the field at an earlier day, and jeopardized the success of the plan of operations so happily conceived by its chief. Nevertheless, after the unlooked-for evacuation of Manassas by the Confederates, after the combats which kept in the valley of Virginia troops that would have been more useful elsewhere, after Mr. Lincoln's interference in reducing his force to strengthen the

garrison of Washington, that army finally embarked at Alexandria, in the last days of March, for the great expedition which was to transfer the seat of war to the vicinity of the enemy's capital; and General McClellan, when he landed upon the peninsula of Virginia, notwithstanding all these drawbacks, had still a fine army under his command—a numerous army, however imprudently reduced, composed of ardent, vigorous, brave, and intelligent men, although without experience. Recruited among all classes of society, the ranks of this army contained many men of military ability, as yet unknown to the world, and even to themselves, some of whom were about to be sacrificed before they could have a chance of asserting their full worth, whilst others were to be called to direct its long and painful labors. Consequently, despite the mistakes of the government, this army could hope to run a brilliant career upon the ground, classic in the history of the United States, where it was at last to encounter the *élite* of the slavery troops. It was, in fact, in the peninsula where the soldiers of Washington and Rochambeau completed the glorious work of American emancipation. It was around Yorktown, already made celebrated by the capitulation of Lord Cornwallis, that the army of the Potomac was about to fight its first battles; and if it may be permitted to an obscure member of that army to indulge here in a personal reflection, it was the remembrance of the victory achieved by France and America conjointly upon this very soil which caused a throb in the heart of the exiles so generously received under the shadow of the flag of the young republic.

Notwithstanding the historical associations which cluster around it, this locality was but little known; and in view of its peculiar configuration, we deem a detailed description necessary to a proper understanding of the operations we are about to relate. Fortress Monroe, situated at the extremity of the peninsula, lies one hundred and fifteen kilometres from Richmond, in a direct line. The route which the army of the Potomac had to follow was all laid down; it stretched out, bounded on the south by the James River—which is a river (*fleuve*) at Richmond, and a vast estuary at Newport News—and at the north, first by an arm of the sea called York River, and then by the Pamunky, its principal tributary. The region lying between these water-courses may be

divided into two parts. The first, by far the more important, forms a real peninsula between the salt tide-waters which ascend York River as far as West Point, and the James beyond City Point. This flat country, which is both sandy and marshy, intersected by countless bays, extremely wooded, poor, and thinly peopled, forms the peninsula of Virginia. The second, extending, between the Pamunky and the James proper, to a distance far above Richmond, very undulating, covered with magnificent forests, a little better cultivated than the former, and enlivened here and there by the residences of a few wealthy planters, is divided longitudinally by the Chickahominy, a river rendered famous in the annals of American colonization by the romantic adventures of the traveller John Smith and the Indian maid Pocahontas. This water-course, of little importance from its ordinary volume of water, flows through wooded swamps, where impenetrable thickets alternate with groves of tall white oak, a tree admirably adapted for naval construction, the feet of which are buried in the ooze, while the trunks, as straight as the mast of a ship, rise to extraordinary heights. After a rain-storm, the Chickahominy not only overflows its wooded banks, but, spreading over the adjacent plains, forms a sheet of water which at times is a kilometre in width. This, therefore, was a formidable obstacle in the way of military operations. The river runs parallel with the Pamunky, and cutting off a corner of the peninsula, empties into the estuary of the James at an equal distance from City Point and Newport News. The James on one side, the York River and the Pamunky on the other, form two magnificent lines of communication. The former is navigable as far as Richmond, but the *Virginia* debarred the Federals from using it. The latter may be ascended as far as White House, a plantation which had formerly belonged to Washington, and was now the property of General Lee. But at the entrance of York River, the two banks of this arm of the sea draw closer, forming a strait commanded by the guns of Yorktown, and batteries erected opposite, at Gloucester Point. Hence the importance which has always attached to the little place of Yorktown, around which some slight undulations covered with rich turf still indicate the trace of the parallel thrown up by the French and American

soldiers in 1781. The peninsula itself upon which Yorktown stands is narrowed by a swampy stream, Warwick Creek, which, taking its rise at less than two kilometres from the old bastions of this town, empties into the James perpendicularly to its course. It was here that nature had marked out for the Confederates their true line of defence. Having control of James River, thanks to the *Virginia*, and of York River, owing to the batteries of Gloucester Point, they could not be turned by the Federal navy. The two rivers supplied them with provisions, instead of furnishing the means of attack to their adversaries, and so long as they preserved the line of Warwick Creek, Yorktown could not be invested. All these points, therefore, supported each other mutually. Thirty-two kilometres separated Yorktown from Fort Monroe. Sixteen kilometres farther, another contraction of the peninsula occurs, even narrower than that caused by Warwick Creek, formed by two streams called College Creek and Queen's Creek; one running toward the James, the other toward York River. Near this place stands the oldest university in America, *William and Mary College*, founded during the reign of William the Third, the spacious buildings of which, of red and gray brick, together with the court-yards and pavilions, remind one of the English edifices of the eighteenth century, and have an air of antiquity seldom met with in the New World. Around the university is grouped the pretty little town of Williamsburg, the houses of which are surrounded by gardens and shaded by beautiful trees. It was for a time the capital of the colony, when Virginia was richer and had a larger population than at the present day.

Between Fort Monroe and Richmond there is but a single line of railway, which, starting from the latter city, crosses the upper Chickahominy, then the Pamunky at White House, and terminates at West Point, where the latter river and the Mattaponi both empty into the salt waters of York River.

Such was the new ground upon which the army of the Potomac was about to fight. The transportation of this army was a difficult task, and was accomplished in a remarkable manner. The first vessels were chartered on the 27th of February; on the 17th of March the first soldier was embarked; and on the 6th

of April, all the troops which had not been withdrawn from General McClellan's command were landed upon the peninsula. During this short period of time, four hundred ships, steamers, and sailing vessels, had been collected and taken to Alexandria, and had transported a distance of eighty leagues, 109,419 men, 14,502 animals, 44 batteries, with all the immense *matériel* which generally follows such an army, leaving nothing behind them except nine stranded lighters and eight drowned mules.

McClellan had not waited for the end of this operation to take the field. Out of the one hundred thousand men, or thereabouts, he was to have under his command,* he found on the day of his arrival fifty-eight thousand, accompanied with one hundred cannon, in a condition to march. The remainder had either not landed or were without the necessary transportation to take part in a forward movement. Many teams were yet wanting for the numerous wagons, without which troops could not venture among the marshy roads which they were to encounter.

The army was put in motion on the 4th of April, and arrived before Yorktown and Warwick Creek the next day without having seen the enemy. The latter had hastily abandoned the few works erected at Big Bethel, in the firm belief that the Federals, who had control of the sea as far as Yorktown, could easily turn all those defences. This first march was not accomplished without some difficulty. The roads were in a deplorable condition. The maps were bad, which was even worse than not having any. They had relied upon those which the officers stationed at Fortress Monroe had taken all winter to prepare, and the several columns, thus misled by false information, could hardly preserve their order of march. Deceived by these incorrect charts as to the direction of

* This was the status of the army April 1, 1862:

	Present for active service.	On special service or on sick list.	Absent.	Total.
Second corps, Sumner.....	26,778	1,129	3,130	31,037
Third corps, Heintzelmann.....	33,047	2,795	3,010	38,852
Fourth corps, Keyes.....	32,924	1,874	3,112	37,910
Regular infantry.....	3,905	237	623	4,765
Regular cavalry.....	2,001	170	370	3,141
Reserve artillery.....	2,731	175	210	3,116
Of different corps.....	910	73	161	1,144
Total.....	102,896	6,453	10,616	119,965

Warwick Creek, General McClellan was led to believe that Yorktown could be easily invested. On the 5th, when his right wing appeared before that place, his left encountered the unforeseen obstacle which imparted so much strength to the position of the Confederates. The latter, under General Magruder, had long been preparing for the defence of the peninsula. The fortifications erected by Lord Cornwallis around Yorktown in 1781, within which he had defended himself with a tenacity worthy of the English army, were still in existence. These works were not revetted with masonry, but their profile was considerable. They had been put in order, enlarged, and completed. They were mounted with fifty-six guns, some of very heavy calibre. Batteries had been erected, some along the water's edge and others on the hillocks commanding the river, all of which crossed their fire with that of a large redoubt occupying the sandy promontory of Gloucester Point.

The bastioned fortifications of Yorktown completely enclosed that small town. The line of Warwick Creek which Magruder had selected at the last moment was not so well fortified by art as by nature. The source of this brook lies at twenty-four hundred metres from the bastions of Yorktown, the space between these two points (for the most part open country) being commanded by a *lunette*, a few breastworks, and an unfinished redoubt. The course of Warwick Creek is bordered throughout by dense forests, through which wind tortuous roads difficult to find, laid out on a spongy and broken soil. The upper part of this stream is slow and muddy, about twenty metres in breadth, with marshy banks, and commanded on both sides by slight undulations in the ground. It was intersected by five dams, two of which were formerly used to collect the water for milling purposes, the three others having been constructed by Magruder. They produced, by retaining the waters, an artificial inundation, which is the best of all defences. In the rear of each of these dams, the only accessible points to an assailant, rose a small redan. The lower part of the Warwick, subject to the influence of the tide, was surrounded by a triple enclosure of hardened mud, impenetrable canebrakes, and swampy forests, which forbade approach even to the boldest hunter. This line presented all those peculiarities which render offensive war so difficult in America;



HARPERS FERRY AND SOUTH MOUNTAIN



but Magruder was not in a condition to dispute its possession for any length of time with the powerful army which had at length encountered his pickets on the 5th of April. The division with which he had been charged to protect the peninsula since the preceding autumn numbered only eleven thousand men. The military authorities of the Confederacy had not guessed or known in advance, as it was pretended at the time, the change of base of the army of the Potomac, or they were singularly careless and improvident, for after McClellan had embarked the greatest portion of his troops at Alexandria, Johnston with all his forces was still waiting for him on the Rapidan. Disturbed by the same fears which had beset Mr. Lincoln, the cabinet of Mr. Davis dared no more than he to uncover their capital; so that on the arrival of McClellan before Yorktown with his fifty-eight thousand men, not a single soldier had as yet been sent to reinforce Magruder. These facts, which have been officially proved since the close of the war, afford the most conclusive evidence in favor of the plan which the commander-in-chief of the army of the Potomac had undertaken to carry out. If the line of defence selected by Magruder was naturally strong, it was too much extended, since the Confederate general had only eleven thousand soldiers to occupy about twenty kilometres. He had placed six thousand men at Gloucester Point and at Yorktown, and in a small work situated on the James, so that he had only five thousand left to defend the whole course of Warwick Creek. Consequently, the Richmond authorities, being fully convinced that he would not be able to maintain himself in that position, sent him a formal order to evacuate Yorktown and to abandon the entire peninsula. But Magruder's obstinacy was proverbial among his old comrades. He refused to obey, and prepared to resist the enemy by placing his troops near the dams and among the few clearings adjacent to the stream, so as to deceive the Federals regarding his real strength. The latter, being received by a well-sustained fire on their appearance, imagined themselves confronted by the skirmishers of an army concealed by the forest; and General Keyes, commanding a column of more than twenty-five thousand men which had thus unexpectedly encountered Warwick Creek, did not consider himself strong enough to force a passage. General

McClellan, equally deceived by appearances, thought he had again found behind those mysterious forests the Confederate army which had evacuated Manassas one month before, and did not dare to thrust his sword through the slight curtain which his able adversary had spread before his vision. A vigorous attack upon either of the dams, defended by insignificant works, would have had every chance of success. The enemy could have been kept in suspense by several feints; there were men enough to attempt three or four principal attacks at once; it was easy, in short, to harass him in such a manner that his line of defence would inevitably have been pierced at the expiration of twenty-four hours. In that case Magruder would have paid dear for his audacious resolution, the defenders of Warwick Creek would have been scattered, and Yorktown invested on every side. This place could have been masked until a vigorous bombardment should have compelled it to surrender, and by pressing Magruder close, the whole peninsula would have fallen into the possession of the Federals in a few days. This is what General McClellan would not have failed to do if he had known the situation of his adversaries as their published reports have revealed it since. But at that critical moment no information was received either from spies or from other sources to convey to him the faintest idea of their weakness. The line of defence they had adopted rendered it impossible for him to feel his way before assaulting them seriously. He could not compel them to show themselves except by crossing the narrow dams which intersected Warwick Creek. To attempt this operation he had deemed it proper to wait for the arrival of McDowell's three divisions, which were to turn the enemy's line by the left flank of York River. But on the very evening he reconnoitred the positions of his adversaries he was apprised of the deplorable decision by which the President withdrew from him this entire army corps. An independent command, comprising Fort Monroe and the very country in which the army of the Potomac was then operating, had been created a short time before in favor of General Wool. Finally, the naval force which had been relied upon to assist in the attack on the batteries of Yorktown declared that the necessity of keeping a watch over the *Virginia* did not permit the detachment of a sufficient number of vessels for that service. This

was, indeed, a succession of disappointments, and at a time when it was too late to draw back. It may be urged that this should have been considered as an additional reason for hastening operations, as the chance of obtaining an important success was well worth the risk that might be incurred. The army needed a daring stroke (*coup d'audace*). Its *morale* would have suffered less from a sanguinary check than from the fruitless fatigues of a prolonged siege; such a success, in short, would have secured to General McClellan the efficient co-operation of his government. But he would not compromise the young army entrusted to his care in an enterprise which he considered too hazardous. Thinking that the national cause could endure delays and slow movements, but not such another disaster as that of Bull Run, he preferred to rely upon the superiority of his artillery in order to dislodge the enemy from his lines.

The Confederates, always under arms, exhausted by continuous service, did not understand what could delay an attack the issue of which they had such good cause to dread. In the mean time, behind the trees which limited their view, on the southern bank of the Warwick, the whole Federal army was at work, erecting batteries and constructing long solid corduroy causeways through the marshy forests, to make a practicable passage for cannon. But the time which was thus spent was entirely to the advantage of the Confederates. In fact, Magruder's disobedience had been at once acquiesced in. Johnston, leaving the large Federal garrison of Washington to prepare for imaginary combats, quitted the borders of the Rapidan, sending a portion of his forces into the peninsula, while he concentrated himself with the remainder around Richmond.

Some regiments, assembled in haste, had already been forwarded to Yorktown, and Magruder had begun to receive his first reinforcements two days after the arrival of the Federals before that place. When, therefore, after eleven days of reconnaissances and preparatory labors, McClellan determined at last to attack him, his forces were doubled, and his line of defence completed. The numerical disproportion between the two parties, however, was nearly as great as before; for the one hundred thousand men embarked at Alexandria were at last assembled on the narrow ex-

tremity of the peninsula, and the President had just informed General McClellan that one of the divisions of McDowell's corps was restored to him; this was Franklin's division, which had been earnestly asked for, and granted as a kind of compromise between the various campaign plans which had been urged upon the acceptance of Mr. Lincoln.

On the 16th of April General McClellan decided to attack the one of the three dams constructed by the enemy which was the lowest on Warwick Creek. Situated at a distance of about one thousand metres above Lee's Mills, it formed the centre and, according to the avowal of the Confederates, the weakest point of their line. A general cannonade was opened, from Yorktown to Lee's Mills, so as not to draw the enemy's attention exclusively to the point where it was intended to begin by silencing his artillery. But instead of making the assault immediately after, the cannonade was prolonged for six hours, and thus Magruder was given ample time to prepare for defence wherever he might be menaced. At last, towards four o'clock, four companies of the Third Vermont, supported by the fire of twenty-two cannon which had already dismounted two of the three guns in the enemy's work, bravely rushed to the assault of that work. The Federals, crossing Warwick Creek with great boldness below the dam, took possession of the breastworks which commanded it, after an engagement in which they put to flight two regiments of the enemy, the Fifteenth North Carolina and the Sixteenth Georgia. The most difficult part of the task was accomplished, a foothold having been obtained on the other side of the creek; all that remained to be done was to take advantage of the surprise of the enemy to push regiment after regiment as rapidly as possible across the ford, to pass beyond the breastworks, to take possession of the redoubt, and thus to pierce the enemy's line; but the generals of various grades who had organized this demonstration had failed to agree beforehand as to the importance it was to assume, and much precious time was lost.

For an hour the foremost assailants exhausted themselves without receiving any other reinforcement than five or six hundred men of the Fourth and Sixth Vermont. The enemy took advantage of this delay to mass all his available forces upon the point menaced: that

is to say, more than two divisions. The small body of Federal troops could not attack the redoubt, where the Confederates were increasing in number at every instant, but they made a stubborn defence in the breastworks they had conquered. Being finally overwhelmed by numbers, they were obliged to retire, and recross the river after losing more than two hundred in killed and wounded.

Although the Confederates were in a much better condition to repulse that attack on the 16th of April than they would have been on the 6th or the 7th, still, if the Federals had followed up the success of the Third Vermont, they would probably have pierced the line of Warwick Creek, and compelled Magruder to fight, without any point of support, the forty thousand men they could have massed on that strip of land.

This unfortunate affair produced a sad impression on the mind of the soldiers who had seen their comrades sacrificed without any orders being given to go to their assistance. It was moreover the signal for new delays. On the following day, General McClellan decided to resort to the sure but slow means of a regular siege. The surroundings of Yorktown alone afforded means of approach well adapted for this kind of attack; and on the 17th of April, the first parallel was opened at the head of a ravine situated about two thousand metres from one of the bastions. The inventive and laborious genius of the Americans had there an opportunity to signalize itself. The whole army set to work to cut roads, to construct bridges, to prepare *places d'armes*, to establish wharves, to dig trenches, and to erect batteries. Nothing was to be seen except manufactures of gabions and fascines. The siege equipage was landed, by dint of patience and exertion; cannon weighing as much as 10,000 kilogrammes, and thirteen-inch mortars, were placed in position. These immense labors, superintended in detail by the general-in-chief, who gave himself up entirely to his old specialty as an engineer officer, were prosecuted with the greatest activity. The woods and some undulations in the ground concealed them from the Confederates, whose shells, thrown at random, generally passed above the workmen, shattering the tall trees of the forest in their career.* Nevertheless, in spite of all their diligence, the time was passing away, precious

* For one month the headquarters of the army were within reach of the ene-

time for military operations, for the winter rains were over, and the great summer heat had not yet set in. The army was impatiently waiting for the moment when all the guns which had been placed in position with so much trouble should finally break the silence, and, crushing the enemy with their fire, compel him to a precipitate retreat. The commanders contemplated the new works which were being thrown up as if by magic along the whole Confederate line, by great gangs of negroes and soldiers; they thought of the assault which would probably follow the bombardment, and were measuring with some uneasiness the vast space of ground swept by the fire of the adversary, which their young soldiers would have to pass over.

The decisive moment was drawing near, and both sides seemed to be preparing for it with equal ardor. Indeed, the combat of Lee's Mills had fully vindicated Magruder in the councils of the President of the Confederacy, and notwithstanding the advice of Lee, his chief of staff, and of Johnston himself, who were in favor of waiting for the enemy in front of Richmond, Mr. Davis had sent the last-mentioned general into the Peninsula with all his army, where he was to hold out at least until all the valuable *matériel* accumulated in Norfolk could be placed in safety.

On the other hand, Franklin's division had rejoined McClellan on the 22d of April. It had at first been intended for the investment of Gloucester Point, but instead of attempting a sudden assault in that direction, McClellan had preferred to leave it for a few days on board the transports which had brought it over, in order that it might take advantage of the effect of the bombardment to ascend York River at the first signal. Everything was to be ready for the 5th of May; but the day before, at dawn, the Confederate army had disappeared: it had evacuated Yorktown during the night. This movement had been determined upon since the 30th of April, at a council of war held in Yorktown by Jefferson Davis, Lee, Johnston, and Magruder. The evacuation of Norfolk, which followed as a result, was to be effected at the same time.

my's projectiles. The latter tried in vain to discover their locality, and during that entire month but one single Confederate cannon-ball whistled above the tents of the general staff.

To ascertain the range of some one-hundred and two-hundred pounders which had just been placed in position, a few projectiles had been thrown into Yorktown. The sight of the damage they had caused was a wholesome warning to the Confederate chiefs, who, knowing themselves to be on the eve of a bombardment, had no desire to wait for its effects. When this decision had been adopted, Johnston emptied his magazines, moved away his *matériel* and wagons, and established at the halting-places designated in his line of retreat such provisions as his army would need every evening after a rapid march. In order to conceal his movements, he had sacrificed his heavy artillery, which had kept up a continuous fire upon the besiegers to the last moment, the intensity of which had even been doubled on the evening of the 3d of May so as to deceive them more thoroughly. Seventy-one guns of various calibres were the only trophies abandoned to the Federals. The only thing which detracted from the merit of this able retreat was the commission of certain barbarous acts which the usages of war do not justify. Bombshells and infernal machines were placed in the huts and storehouses, so that they would explode under the feet of the first persons who might be drawn thither by curiosity. A few unfortunate individuals having been killed in this manner, General McClellan very properly employed the Confederate prisoners in ridding Yorktown of these dangerous snares.

When the Federal artillerists beheld the first rays of the sun lighting up the abandoned entrenchments, they felt for a moment stupefied. So much labor should at least have ended in a fight, and they had not even the satisfaction of trying those new guns from which they had expected such powerful effects. It was a serious disappointment to all. They were compensated, however, by the immediate prospect of a forward march and a campaign which promised to be thenceforth full of activity.

In evacuating Yorktown the Confederates abandoned York River to the Federals. The latter, therefore, had control of one of the flanks of the peninsula, and were able, by means of a landing, to demolish all the defences by which the enemy might have attempted to stop them between Yorktown and West Point. The army of the Potomac could not allow Johnston to escape a

second time, as he had already done at Manassas. It was important to overtake him at all hazards, in order if possible to turn his retreat into a rout, or at least not to allow him leisure to interpose a new barrier against the Federal army on its march upon the Confederate capital. The peninsula is so narrow that in many places the roads, which pass through it longitudinally, are merged into a single road—a road where wagons can only proceed in single file, and where, as it is impossible for more than four men to march abreast, the troops are obliged to break by the flank. To make an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men, accompanied by immense *matériel*, follow this single road, was a simple impossibility; the head would have reached West Point before the rear had left Yorktown; it became necessary to take advantage of the opening of York River to transport a part of the army by water. Franklin's division was already embarked, and the numerous transports which performed the victualling service for the army took three others on board, to land them near the mouth of the Pamunky in York River, so as to menace seriously the line of retreat of the Confederate army. The land route was reserved by McClellan for the remainder of the army. The advance-guard consisted of Stoneman's division, comprising a little over four regiments of cavalry, two of which were regulars, and four batteries of regular horse artillery. Hooker's division followed on the direct road from Yorktown to Williamsburg, while Smith, crossing Warwick Creek at Lee's Mills, struck into a cross-road to the left leading to within sixteen hundred metres of Williamsburg, where it again joined the main road. Kearny's division held itself in readiness to follow Hooker, and those of Couch and Casey to march in rear of Smith.

Meanwhile, the retreat of the Confederate army, which had been carefully planned, was conducted with the greatest order. A large quantity of the *matériel* had been transported to West Point by water, whence it could be forwarded to Richmond by rail, and a considerable portion of the army was one or two days' march in advance of the rear-guard. The task of covering this retreat had been entrusted to Longstreet's corps, whose chief had already given token of those remarkable qualities which made him the best of Lee's lieutenants. The Hampton legion closed up

the march; this name was given to a brigade of cavalry, accompanied by a few pieces of artillery, which had been raised in South Carolina by the general whose name it bore. The small space of ground on which Williamsburg is built was designed by nature to have an important bearing on the retreat of the Confederates. It was a narrow gate, easily kept closed, through which the whole army had to file in a single column, and which it was necessary to guard against the seizure of the enemy until the last man had passed.

Defensive works of considerable strength had been constructed there. The two streams, College Creek and Queen's Creek, which, as they wind through the dense woods, form numerous ponds in their course, take their rise at a distance of one kilometre from each other. The swamps by which they are surrounded soon render them impassable even for infantry. The space intervening between these two water-courses was for the most part occupied by a cultivated clearing. The woods had been cut down, and the skirt of the forest, being thus extended farther to the south-east by this abatis, described a concave arc of a circle enveloping this small open plateau at the south from one stream to the other. It was here that the two roads from Lee's Mills, on the south, and from Yorktown, on the east, met. A large work closed at the gorge, called Fort Magruder, rose at a distance of three or four hundred metres in the rear of this intersection; it commanded both roads and the entire isthmus. To the north-east and to the south-west the Confederates had constructed, on the west bank of the two streams where the forest had been cut down, a chain of small redoubts, which defended the few passages practicable for infantry. These passages consisted of three dams, two on Queen's Creek and one on College Creek, so narrow that a few men lying in ambush would have barred their approaches to a whole column.

Longstreet, after evacuating Yorktown during the night of the 3d-4th of May, proceeded rapidly toward Williamsburg, situated two thousand seven hundred metres beyond Fort Magruder, on the road to Richmond, for he intended to make there his first halt on the journey. The Federals allowed him to gain a precious advance during the first hours of that difficult retreat, for they

were not early risers in the Union armies. The disappointment was so great at the sudden departure of the Confederates that at first it could not be believed; and when the evidence was conclusive, everything had to be organized for an advance, which had not been contemplated. The troops had eaten nothing; the rations had not been distributed; many regiments had sent their wagons to a distance of several leagues to obtain them. In short, the cavalry division only took up its line of march between ten and eleven o'clock, Hooker at one o'clock, Smith a little later, and the other three divisions only at the close of the day. With a little more celerity the Confederate detachments which fell back upon Williamsburg from Lee's Mills would have been intercepted by the Federal cavalry before they could have reached that town.

In spite of all his activity, Stoneman was unable to repair the delay, which could not be imputed to him. Stimulated by certain indications which revealed to him the recent passage of the enemy, such as bivouac fires still burning, he hurried the march of his division; but the Confederate troops who followed the Lee's Mills road had too much the start. They were overtaken only by a small detachment led by the Duc de Chartres, which was not strong enough to check the enemy's column; the Federal cavalry, however, had the good fortune to pick up a few prisoners on its flanks. Whatever might have been Stoneman's diligence in other respects, he could not have seriously embarrassed Longstreet's march; for unforeseen accidents supervened to delay still further the infantry destined to sustain him, and thus deprived him of the last chance of overtaking the enemy in time. There was an entire ignorance of the country at the Federal headquarters, the ground already occupied, of which the engineers had made some rough sketches, being the only section known; consequently, mistakes were unavoidable. Having reached the forks of one of the numerous roads which pursue their winding course from clearing to clearing, Smith's division, which kept to the left, took a wrong direction, and struck again into the principal road between Yorktown and Williamsburg. It thus passed in front of Hooker's division, to which this road had been assigned, stopped its heads of column, and threw confusion into the march of the troops who were hud-

dled together with their artillery and baggage on a single road. From this moment it became impossible to compel the enemy to fight in front of the pass he had fortified; for while the Federal columns were advancing very slowly along the crowded road on the right, on the left the advance guard, consisting of Emory's brigade of cavalry, having no infantry to support it, was forced to watch the enemy at a distance. The latter, plunging finally into the forest which connected Queen's and College Creeks, reached Fort Magruder and the chain of adjoining works. The artillery of the Hampton Legion, together with a few regiments of infantry which formed the rear-guard, finding this formidable line of defences very convenient, hastened to occupy it in order to hold the Federals in check, who were pressing them very close; and when the latter appeared on the edge of the forest, they were received by a tremendous fire. In the mean time, the Sixth cavalry, having discovered a fordable crossing of Queen's Creek, vigorously charged upon the Confederates, drove them from their advanced positions, and captured their first redoubt; but the latter, having taken refuge in the second, soon obliged the assailants to fall back. The sight of the numerous works occupied by the enemy was a real discovery to the Federals; they had no more idea of their existence than they had of Warwick Creek a month before. The Confederates, on their part, fearing, no doubt, to be taken in flank by the landing of troops on York River, had not thought at first of availing themselves of these works; they had made no preparations for defending them, and it was only when Hampton was closely pressed that, finding them in his path on the evening of the 4th, he occupied a portion of them in order to retard the march of the Federals. As will be seen presently, the Confederate generals whose duty it was to cover the retreat were themselves very little acquainted with the position and importance of some of these entrenchments.

Stoneman had lost about forty men by the fire of the redoubts, and one of his guns remained immovable in the swamp. He had retired on this side of the forest to wait for the infantry, which was slow in coming up; General Sumner, whose rank gave him the command, had stopped this infantry within five kilometres of Fort Magruder, not being then aware that the enemy was

so near him. When the din of battle struck the ear of that old and valiant soldier, he immediately pushed forward Smith's division; but it was already getting dark, and before these troops could be deployed for battle the increasing darkness compelled them to postpone the fight till the next day. Sumner himself having insisted, despite the obscurity of the night, upon reconnoitering the enemy's positions in person, fell among their pickets, was fired upon at short range, became lost in a swamp, from which he was unable to extricate himself, and passed the entire night at the foot of a tree between the two hostile lines. In the mean while, Hooker, finding the road he followed obstructed by Smith, took the one to the left, which had originally been assigned to the latter. His intention was to turn the enemy's works and enter Williamsburg the same evening. But after marching a considerable distance in the night, he was obliged, like the rest, to halt his columns to avoid going astray.

The dawn of the next day, the 5th of May, was sad and gloomy. Torrents of rain had during the whole night deluged the bivouacs of the young Federal soldiers, most of whom were without rations and covering. The wet roads had become frightful mud-holes. On the left the division of Hooker, on the right that of Smith, with Stoneman's cavalry, were in the presence of the enemy; but these troops had waited in vain during the entire night for orders from Sumner, their common chief, of whose misadventures they had no knowledge; the three divisions of Kearny, Couch, and Casey, designed to support them, could only communicate with them through an almost impassable road from twelve to fifteen kilometres in length; finally, the remainder of the troops were slowly embarking at Yorktown under the direction of the general-in-chief. Such was the situation of the army of the Potomac on the morning of the 5th of May.

The Confederates had all the advantage of position on their side. Longstreet had been made aware of the error he had committed in not occupying and strengthening the lines of defence around Williamsburg by the engagement of his rear-guard on the evening of the 4th. During the night he countermanded the march of his whole corps and brought it back into these lines; this time he was determined to dispute their possession with the

Federals with the utmost vigor, and to keep the latter in check sufficiently long to place the rest of the army out of reach of their attacks.

Only a portion of his troops had arrived and taken position inside of the works, when, toward seven o'clock in the morning, Hooker, emerging out of the Lee's Mills road, attacked his right. Longstreet's artillery, posted inside of Fort Magruder and in the adjacent redoubts, crossed its fire with that of the Confederate infantry over the narrow open space which the assailants had to cross. The latter, being actually afraid to manœuvre under such a fire, had deployed their batteries before crossing the forest. But the thickness of the undergrowth having broken their ranks, they no longer possessed that compactness which is required for a vigorous charge; and instead of pushing forward, they halted on the edge of the wood. Unable to overcome this obstacle, they ambushed themselves in the abatis, from whence they opened fire upon the enemy. The three batteries of the division came to their assistance and boldly took position at the point most exposed, which was at the outlet of the road; but the enemy's missiles were soon concentrated upon them, overthrowing gunners and horses before they were able to fire a single shot. The Federals were not discouraged on this account; willing hands came forward to serve the guns; they even succeeded in gaining an advantage over the Confederate cannon and in silencing the fire of Fort Magruder. At this juncture the Confederates seemed to be wavering; but Hooker's soldiers, who had been more under fire than they, had suffered too seriously to take advantage of this momentary hesitation. The remainder of Longstreet's corps reached the scene of action and assumed the offensive in its turn. In order to preserve his position, Hooker was obliged to engage his very last man. A desperate struggle took place in the abatis; the two hostile lines wavered in front of each other; the Federals were driven back several times, but their lost ground was as often recovered. It was now one o'clock. Hooker had been sustaining the fight alone since morning; no reinforcement had reached him, no order, no message; while along the rest of the line the utmost silence prevailed. To the left he had sent Emory with his cavalry and three regiments of infantry to try to attack the Confederate line by

crossing the dam which intersects College Creek; but Emory, afraid of going astray, proceeded with the utmost caution, and wasted the whole day without reaching the enemy. On the right of Hooker, Smith's division was drawn up across the Yorktown road, in the rear of the wood, very narrow at this place, which intercepts the view of Fort Magruder; but although this division was only separated by fourteen or fifteen hundred metres from that which is engaged, there was no connecting link between them; the wood which stretches between the two roads they had followed remained unoccupied, and even unexplored.

Smith had not yet fired a single shot. The three corps commanders of the army of the Potomac, whom chance had brought together, had established their headquarters alongside of his division; they held a conference; and as is almost invariably the case under similar circumstances, they secured no concert of action to the Federal army. There was but one movement ordered to be made in the course of the morning. Having been informed of the existence of one of the dams which obstruct the passage of Queen's Creek, they sent to seize it one of Smith's brigades, commanded by General Hancock, a young officer but little known at the time. There yet remained Smith's two other brigades, his artillery and that of the cavalry division, about six or seven thousand men, with thirty pieces of cannon. Notwithstanding the constantly increasing din of battle in which Hooker was engaged on the left, despite the urgent messages of the latter, Sumner refused to bring his troops under fire, and confined himself to hastening the arrival of those already on the march. Doubtless he had then but a very small force at his disposal to cover the outlet of the Yorktown road—an outlet which it was essential to defend at all hazards; for the least symptom of a retreat would have thrown the long column which crowded upon that road into indescribable confusion. But the surest way of maintaining his ground would have been to engage the fight along the whole line, thereby dividing the forces of the enemy, instead of allowing his adversary to concentrate his troops, to crush one of his wings, as he was actually doing. Indeed, the repeated efforts of the Confederates succeeded at last in shaking the confidence of Hooker's soldiers, who felt themselves unsupported; they lost the abatis

where they had held out so long, and, while still fighting, slowly fall back across the woods which they had occupied in the morning. Two batteries, the horses of which have all been killed, are left upon the ground. In falling back Hooker uncovers the left flank of the troops who had remained under arms on the Yorktown road while he was fighting. The woods by which they are surrounded shut out the enemy from view, but the balls whistling among the trees and dealing destruction in their ranks announce his approach. Consequently, a certain amount of disquietude is manifested among those young soldiers who are preparing for battle under the blows of an adversary yet invisible.

The situation was becoming serious; but the critical moment was selected by fortune for a sudden change. Stimulated less by Sumner's pressing orders than by the sound of cannon which called him to the field, Kearny comes at last to Hooker's assistance. Pushing his division along the road, which is encumbered with wagons, he has turned to the left, like the latter, and after making his men, fatigued by a long march, throw off their knapsacks, he deploys them with as much precision as if on a drill-ground. Of a character difficult to manage, of a quick temper, of a sharp and satirical turn of mind, this admirable soldier became a different man as soon as he found himself in the presence of the enemy. His calmness, his piercing glance, his clear voice, his orders, always precise, inspired the confidence of all those who served under him. Deploying two brigades in line of battle, and holding the third in reserve, he allows Hooker's soldiers to pass between the intervals of his battalions, and takes up the battle in the wood in their place. He arrives in time to rescue one of the two batteries abandoned a moment before, which the enemy was about to seize. The latter, after a stubborn resistance, is driven back as far as the abatis; but he maintains himself a long time on that difficult ground, being supported by the fire from his own works. A final effort on the part of the entire division wrests at last a portion of the abatis from the Confederates, at the very time that the darkness of the evening is beginning to spread over the long-contested battle-field.

On the right the Federals have at last decided to take part in

the battle. Toward four o'clock, just as Kearny was coming to Hooker's assistance, the head of the long column which followed the Yorktown turnpike emerges into the clearing where Smith's troops are drawn up. Peck's brigade, which is the first to make its appearance, enters the wood and vigorously attacks the left of the forces opposed to Hooker and Kearny, thus making a valuable diversion in favor of the latter. The first to reach the scene of conflict at this opportune moment are the Lafayette Guards; encouraged by their commander, Colonel de Trobriand, and sustained by their French animation, they have overcome all the obstacles in the road. They penetrate into the wood, reeking with a damp smoke, where the balls whistle through the thick foliage of the forests, and gaily rush forward in search of that baptism of fire the honor of which is reserved to all, but for which many among them will have to pay with their lives. In the mean while, on the extreme right, Hancock with his brigade had crossed Queen's Creek in the morning, and finding a small redoubt unoccupied on the other bank had planted himself in it. This redoubt was a link in the chain of works of which Fort Magruder was the centre. Finding no enemy before him, Hancock fearlessly advanced with his three or four thousand men; a second and a third redoubt, likewise deserted, are passed, when he arrives at last in sight of the left flank of Fort Magruder and the whole Confederate army. If he had been at the head of a division, he might have fallen suddenly upon the enemy, and probably obtained a decided success. But his force was not strong enough to attempt such a bold stroke, being so far from the reach of any reinforcements. The utmost that he could do was to hold the position of which he had so unexpectedly taken possession, and to wait for the arrival of a sufficient force to avail himself of the advantages which it offered. But the reinforcements he asked for were refused, as they had been to Hooker, the only replies to his urgent appeals being repeated orders for him to fall back. Feeling how important it was to hold a position which took all the enemy's defences in the rear, and which would probably cost waves of blood to reconquer, he contented himself by merely evacuating the foremost redoubt, and determined to defend the others at all risk. Fortunately for the Federals, if their general staff was de-

ficient, that of their adversaries was even more so, and the connection which such a corps ought to preserve between all sections of an army was entirely wanting in the Confederate ranks. In consequence of this defect of organization, Longstreet was not apprised of Hancock's movement, nor of the menacing position which the latter had taken upon his flank. It is certainly strange that the Confederates should have allowed those four Federal battalions to remain in peaceful possession during a whole day of a redoubt by which their entire line of defence could be turned; but is it not more singular that none of them even thought of occupying the works they had constructed with their own hands in anticipation of such a struggle?

It is already four o'clock; Hooker has been driven back into the woods, and the approaches to Fort Magruder are entirely free; it is at this juncture that Longstreet turns his attention, for the first time, toward his left, and perceiving Hancock, thinks of dislodging him. He sends against him Early's brigade, the commander of which was destined, like his young adversary, to play an important part during the remainder of the war. Seeing the Federals fall back upon the farthest redoubt, Early's soldiers imagine that they are already in flight and rush upon them; but being received at point-blank range by a well-directed fire, they are driven back in disorder. The Federals, urged on by the valiant Hancock, pursue them sword in hand. It is now five o'clock—the moment when Kearny comes into line at the other extremity of the battle-field.

General McClellan at last arrived among the combatants. While a salvo of musketry and the hurrahs of Hancock's brigade announced to him this brilliant passage-at-arms from a distance, the Federal troops, massed in various places along the road, who had felt most keenly the absence of all direction during the battle, received their chief with acclamations. The Confederates, on their side, satisfied in having held their ground around Fort Magruder, did not attempt another attack against Hancock. Night came on while the various Federal corps recently arrived were taking their position, and the left was forming a connection with the right; the continuation of the battle was therefore adjourned to the next day.

Recognizing at first glance the importance of the position so fortunately maintained by Hancock, McClellan saw at once that all the Confederate defences were turned, and that the troops assembled around him would suffice to make them fall. Besides, the obstruction of the road over which he had just passed had convinced him that the two divisions whose embarkation he had suspended at the moment of his departure, to forward them to the scene of action, would not arrive in time if the battle was renewed. He therefore ordered them back to the transports which were to convey them to West Point. He was not, however, without some uneasiness regarding the issue of the next day's fight; for with such young soldiers a panic was always to be feared; and having desired to take the offensive, he thought the enemy might try to forestall him by an early morning attack. But Johnston, who had only halted for the purpose of covering his retreat, and who was aware of his great numerical inferiority to the Federals, saw that a longer stay in front of Williamsburg with Hancock on his flank might compromise the very existence of the troops who had been in action the day before. During the night he ordered Longstreet to evacuate all the positions he had so vigorously defended, and hastily resumed his march in the direction of Richmond with all his troops. This was a wise decision; for at Williamsburg he could have made but a short resistance, the Federals having it always in their power to land troops higher up York River and menace his line of retreat. Besides, it never had been his intention to prolong the struggle in the peninsula. It was only through necessity, and in order to resist the persistent attacks of Hooker, that he had been finally induced to impart the proportions of a pitched battle to a simple affair of the rear-guard. This battle was a first ordeal to most of the troops engaged on both sides; it showed how much the spirit of the two armies had been improved since the beginning of the war. Early's brigade, which, while charging Hancock's troops, cried out to them ironically, "Bull Run," learnt to its own cost that it had committed an anachronism. Differing widely from the encounter of which the Manassas plateau had been the scene the preceding year, this bloody and undecided battle, continued during an entire day on a narrow space of ground, marks, in fact, the real commencement of

the long struggle between the two large armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia, which, after unheard-of sacrifices on both sides, terminated in the annihilation of the latter at the end of three years.

The town of Williamsburg was full of Confederate wounded. The spacious halls of the college, which had been converted into a hospital, presented a painful sight to the uninitiated. But the most cruel sufferings were reserved for those soldiers of both parties who had fallen in the midst of the abatis. Hidden under the branches of the felled trees, they escaped for a long time the most active search, and on the third day after the battle some were taken out who had yet a spark of life. During the evening of that same day the dry wood was set on fire by accident; the conflagration spread rapidly, and stifling the agonizing cries of those who were perhaps still waiting for the succor of their friends, swept away the last traces of the victims of the struggle.

The Confederates had three thousand men disabled, and left six hundred unhurt prisoners in the hands of the Federals. The latter lost two thousand and seventy-three men in killed and wounded, and six hundred and twenty-three prisoners. Two-thirds of these losses fell to the share of Hooker's division, at the evening roll-call of which one thousand five hundred and seventy-five combatants were missing, one thousand two hundred and forty of whom had fallen by the fire of the enemy. These telling figures show that it had borne the whole brunt of that day's fight.

The Federals had lost six guns, but they picked up six others, which the enemy abandoned in the suburbs of Williamsburg. Everything bore evidence that the retreat of the Confederates had at first been precipitate and disorderly. The road was strewn for miles with cannon, wagons, and equipments. In these trophies the army of the Potomac beheld the most substantial proof of its success; and on entering the forts and the town of Williamsburg the day after the important battle, it had no need to inquire whether the enemy intended to dispute any further the possession of those places. Consequently, although that battle had, in reality, been undecided, its effect upon the *morale* of the two armies was entirely to the advantage of the Federals. Unfortunately

for the army of the Potomac, it was unable to turn it immediately to account. The difficulty in obtaining supplies kept it for several days around Williamsburg. The only road from Yorktown, softened by the rain, obstructed by cavalry, by the reserve park, by a part of the artillery of the divisions which had been embarked, and by baggage of every kind which follows an army, did not suffice for the passage of the wagons containing the necessary rations for sixty thousand men who were assembled in Williamsburg on the 6th and 7th.

It was found necessary to establish a temporary victualling base near that town. In one day the wooded banks of Queen's Creek are cleared and rude wharves built, where transports come to deposit their cargoes of salt pork, biscuit, rice, and forage, which the army-wagons, lightened by several days' consumption, proceed to distribute among the various regiments. In exchange, the vessels receive a sad but precious cargo, consisting of all the wounded able to bear transportation, who, after a first dressing of their wounds, are forwarded to the large Northern cities, where they will meet with the care, comfort, and pure air which will solace their sufferings.

We left four divisions at Yorktown the day after the evacuation of that place, ready to embark in order to reach the extremity of the long estuary of York River. If conducted with speed, this operation might be productive of brilliant results. It assured a new base of supplies in advance of the army, thus enabling it to march by longer stages; by taking Williamsburg in the rear, it rendered all resistance on the part of the Confederates useless; for if they had lingered there, it would have placed them in a most perilous position. In fact, while Johnston, with a portion of his army, was checking the progress of the Federals in the lines of defence at Williamsburg, the remainder was disposed *en echelon* on the Richmond road; the four divisions thrown on the flank of this road could either occupy it before the Confederates, or surprise them on the march, throw their columns into confusion by harassing them, or at least deprive them of all the advantage of the start which had cost them so dear by fighting the battle of Williamsburg.

Unfortunately, notwithstanding the presence of the general-in-

chief, this opportunity was lost in consequence of delays not yet accounted for. Two days after the evacuation of Yorktown, on the evening of the battle of Williamsburg, these forces had not yet embarked, and Franklin's division, which had never left the transports, was waiting in vain for the signal of departure. The orders and counter-orders of which we have just spoken caused fresh delays on the evening of the 5th of May; and leaving the rest of the troops behind, this division started alone during the night. It reached the mouth of the Pamunky River on the 6th, at a place called Eltham, not far from the little village of Bartramsville. Newton's brigade, together with some artillery, was landed before sunset on the right bank of the river, and the process of disembarkation was suspended until the following day.

On the morning of the 7th this operation had just been ended when Franklin's division was fiercely attacked by the Confederates. The whole of Johnston's army had started early on the 6th, just as Longstreet was leaving Williamsburg, and his heads of column had to bivouac that evening in the vicinity of Bartramsville. On learning that the Federals were landing troops in the neighborhood, the Confederate general sent Whiting's division to surprise them in the midst of that delicate operation, to prevent them from menacing his flank, and to try to drive them into the water. Franklin had landed in a vast field surrounded by woods on three sides. The pickets occupying these woods were suddenly attacked by Whiting and driven back, the combat extending to the very verge of the forest. The Federals, shut up within a narrow space of ground, and exposed to the fire of an enemy not yet visible, had some cause to dread a renewal of the Ball's Bluff disaster. But a battery that had been landed on the day previous, and the artillery of the gunboats which accompanied Franklin's expedition, opened their fire upon the skirts of the woods, where the enemy was beginning to show himself, and soon threw his ranks into confusion. In the mean time, a brigade of Sedgwick's division having been landed, the Federals resumed the offensive, and easily repulsed their adversary. They did not venture, however, to follow in pursuit. They had one hundred and ninety-four men disabled.

Hastily falling back upon Richmond after this action, the Con-

federates completely escaped all further attacks of the army of the Potomac. The Federal cavalry, despite its utmost endeavors, was hardly able to keep within sight of their rear-guard, so greatly is the character of that country opposed to offensive warfare when large masses of men have to be moved. Three days after the battle of Williamsburg the first columns of the Federal infantry left that town, and on the 10th of May the whole army was receiving its supplies from the dépôt established near Eltham. A new phase of the campaign was about to begin. Notwithstanding many miscalculations and delays, General McClellan had succeeded in removing the seat of war from the vicinity of Washington to that of Richmond. He had left the peninsula for a richer and more open country, where he could have plenty of elbow-room, and nothing but a battle delivered in open field could prevent him from appearing before the works which had been erected during the winter around the Confederate capital.

Being free in his movements, how was he going to manœuvre to attack it? For a few days his route lay entirely along the Pamunky, which for him was a prolongation of the York River line, through which he had up to that time received his supplies. The ships which the enemy had sunk on the bar were soon raised, and the whole fleet of transports entered that river, the slow and muddy waters of which pursue their winding course between banks of prodigious fertility. On their passage the silence of a still virgin nature was temporarily succeeded by a show of life, or, more properly speaking, of buoyant activity; at night all these vessels, like so many fantastic apparitions, threw a glare of light across the foliage of the tall trees whose feet were bathed by the waters. In this way the army reached the neighborhood of Cumberland, then that of the White House, where the Pamunky becomes difficult of navigation, and a small railway line leading from West Point to Richmond crosses from the left to the right side of the river. In order to continue the campaign, McClellan had only to follow this road by repairing it, so as to make it useful in victualling the army; he could thus march upon the enemy's capital while still preserving his base of operations on the Pamunky. But just as he was preparing to make this movement

an unlooked-for opportunity offered for adopting another plan, which, although apparently more hazardous, promised, nevertheless, to be surer and more decisive.

As we have said before, the Confederates had only deferred the evacuation of Yorktown in order to secure that of Norfolk. General Huger, who occupied that place with his division, had succeeded, like Magruder, in deceiving his adversaries in regard to his numerical weakness, and the Federal authorities had not dared to send Burnside's corps, then stationed at Roanoke Island, in North Carolina, against him. There is no doubt but that these troops would only have had to make a simple demonstration, without even going entirely through so difficult a country, to precipitate the evacuation of Norfolk, and thus deprive the Confederates of all the *matériel* which they had not yet been able to transfer to Richmond. As soon as Huger was informed of Johnston's retreat, he sent away all his troops, remaining almost alone in Norfolk, ready to destroy the docks, the workshops, the hulks and all that was left of the arsenal, as soon as the evacuation should be completed. This operation could have been speedily accomplished by water, thanks to the protection of the *Virginia*, which kept a watch at the entrance of the port. Her presence alone defended the Confederate transports ascending the James against the whole Union fleet.

By the 8th of May, Huger had completed his final preparations for the work of destruction. Some fugitives immediately carried the news to Fortress Monroe. As we have already stated, old General Wool, who was in command of that place, was no longer under the orders of General McClellan, and the first use he had made of his independence had been to retain upon the *glacis* of the fortress the whole division which had occupied the extremity of the peninsula during the winter. When he saw the two hostile armies penetrate into Virginia after the battle of Williamsburg, he was desirous to give employment to these troops, but was afraid, at the same time, lest they should again be placed under the orders of McClellan, so that, instead of leading them into action by the side of their comrades in arms, he conceived the idea of making them gather cheap laurels among the ruins of the Norfolk arsenal. The occasion was the more

favorable as the President, accompanied by the Secretary of War, had arrived at Fort Monroe on that very day; they had set out on hearing of the capture of Yorktown, and were coming to congratulate the army of the Potomac upon that success. Being apprised by the columns of smoke which rose in the horizon that the propitious moment had arrived, Wool proposed to the President to undertake an expedition against Norfolk. Max Weber's brigade was speedily embarked, and, to protect his descent, Commodore Goldsborough's fleet was ordered to escort it. But the Confederate batteries, not having yet been abandoned, fired a few shots in reply, while the *Virginia*, which, since the wounding of the brave Buchanan, had been commanded by Commodore Tatnall, showed her formidable shell (*carapace*), and the expedition was countermanded. Two days more were consumed in waiting. Finally, on the morning of the 10th, Weber disembarked east of Sewall's Point. This time the enemy's artillery was silent. There was found an entrenched camp mounting a few guns, but absolutely deserted; General Wool reached the city of Norfolk, which had been given up to its peaceful inhabitants the day previous, and hastened to place a military governor there. The President, who had made his entrance into the newly-conquered city with Wool, announced this cheaply-bought success to the American people in a special bulletin, while he forgot the words of encouragement so justly due to the soldiers who had just fought important battles.

Meantime, the evacuation of Norfolk was followed by an event destined to influence military operations to a considerable extent, of which the President was yet ignorant, and the merits of which General Wool could not appropriate to himself. The *Virginia* was no longer in existence. That formidable vessel had been abandoned and destroyed by her crew. On the 9th of May she was the last to come out of that port of Norfolk, whence, during two months, she had held the whole Federal fleet in check. Was she to make a desperate attempt to steam into Hampton Roads, and thence either to gain the open sea or run the risk of being surrounded by the *débris* of that fleet and perish? Or was it not better to reascend the James River, so as to keep the Federal navy away from Richmond? Tatnall adopted the latter course.

In order to get over the sand-banks of the river more easily, he lightened the ship, in pursuance of his pilot's advice, by landing the guns, ammunition and all the war *matériel* he had on board. But when on the 11th, this operation completed, he wished to go up the James, the same pilots declared that, in consequence of a westerly wind, the tide was not sufficiently high to enable the *Virginia* to get over the banks. The vessel was disarmed; her hull, rising higher than the water-line and the iron covering, was no longer proof against Goldsborough's cannon-balls. The latter might arrive at any moment. Tatnall was perplexed; and without attempting to remedy the error of the previous day, he set fire to his ship. The James River was open. The Federal gunboats hastened to steam into it, and ascending the stream with speed appeared on the 15th within less than twelve kilometres of Richmond.

There was great excitement in the Confederate capital. The excessive confidence inspired by the success of the *Virginia* two months before caused her loss to be severely felt. There were cries of treason. People expected every moment to see the broadside of the little *Monitor* bear upon the edifice where the delegates of all the Southern States were in session. The rich were preparing for flight and the poor for plunder. Courage and determination were displayed side by side with the most abject fears. The cannon spoke out at last, and the whole day was spent in listening to its solemn voice from a distance. It ceased to speak; evening came, and the gunboats did not make their appearance. Richmond was saved. The Federal flotilla had encountered a large battery known as Fort Darling, perched upon the summit of a steep acclivity called Drury's Bluff. A stockade rendered it impossible to pass this battery rapidly, which was manned with cannon of heavy calibre, while an angle in the river prevented the vessels from perceiving it afar off. On the 15th of May the *Monitor*, accompanied by the *Galena*, a lightly-sheathed gunboat of which we have already spoken, and two wooden vessels, made an unsuccessful attack upon Fort Darling. The *Monitor* could not give sufficient elevation to her guns to reach the heights occupied by the enemy, and the two wooden vessels had not the requisite strength to sustain the conflict. The *Galena*,

commanded by the intrepid Rogers, persisted in her efforts for a considerable length of time; but she finally withdrew, after having experienced severe losses and without having done any damage to her adversaries. The advantage of elevated positions in defending a river, which had already been demonstrated at Fort Donelson, in this instance received a new and striking confirmation.

Thus the James River, which had been closed until then by the presence of the *Virginia*, as York River had been by the cannon of Yorktown, was opened by the destruction of that ship, just as York River had been by the evacuation of the Confederate fortress. But it was only open as far as Drury's Bluff; in order to overcome this last obstacle interposed between Richmond and the Federal gunboats, the support of the land-forces was necessary.

On the 19th of May, Commodore Goldsborough had a conference with General McClellan regarding the means to be employed for removing that obstacle. The headquarters were at Tunstall's station, on the railway from West Point and Richmond. The whole army was placed *en echelon* within reach of this road, between the Pamunky and the Chickahominy. The latter river had been struck at Bottom's Bridge, over which the old mail route from Williamsburg to Richmond passes. The enemy had not disputed its passage. Only a few cavalry pickets had been seen. He was evidently reserving his entire force for the defence of the immediate approaches to his capital. General McClellan, as we have stated above, might have continued to follow the railway line, and preserved his dépôts at White House on the Pamunky, which would have led him to force the passage of the Chickahominy above Bottom's Bridge and attempt an attack upon Richmond on the north side; but he could also now go to re-establish his base of operations on James River, which the *Virginia* had hitherto prevented him from doing. By crossing the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, and at some of the fords situated lower down, between that bridge and the extreme point reached by the tide, he was sure of encountering no resistance. The army, by carrying in their wagons a sufficient quantity of provisions, could have reached the borders of the James in two or three days, where its transports would have preceded it. This flank march, effected

at a sufficient distance from the enemy and covered by a few demonstrations along the Upper Chickahominy, offered him great advantages without involving any risk. It enabled him to advance afterward as far as Richmond, by following the course of a navigable river, open at all times, instead of obtaining his supplies by railway, exposed to the attacks of the enemy; it avoided the formidable obstacles which the Chickahominy interposed on the north side, and by assaulting the city on the south side it threatened to separate it from the rest of the Confederacy.

But to adopt this plan McClellan should have been able to count upon an enlightened concurrence on the part of the government at Washington. Indeed, he could only have executed it by withdrawing the imaginary protection which his army was supposed to afford to the capital of the United States from a distance. Instead of recognizing the fact that the best way of defending the capital was to keep all the enemy's forces occupied elsewhere, the Federal authorities fancied that the safety of Washington depended on the position of the army of the Potomac before Richmond. Impressed with this idea, they offered McClellan important reinforcements, provided he would place himself to the north of the enemy's capital. The day before Goldsborough proposed to him to invest Richmond on the south, he had received a despatch from Mr. Lincoln informing him that McDowell's corps, reinforced and numbering nearly forty thousand men, was at last about to leave the banks of the Rappahannock to co-operate with him against Richmond. This corps, with a view to avoid enormous expenses, as well as for the purpose of covering Washington, instead of embarking, was to march directly southward, so as to form the right of the army of the Potomac. It was placed under the orders of McClellan, although an absurd restriction revealed the old mistrusts and fears, as we know, and did not permit the general-in-chief to separate it from the direct road from Richmond to Washington. In thus imposing upon McClellan the necessity of operating by way of the north, the President did not appreciate the advantages of a march along the line of the James, which Grant's last campaign so clearly demonstrated four years later. If McClellan could have foreseen how deceptive were the promises of reinforcement made to him at the time, he would undoubtedly

have declined the uncertain support of McDowell, to carry out the plan of campaign which offered the best chances of success with the troops which were absolutely at his disposal. But the formal assurances he was receiving did not permit him to pursue such a course, and he subordinated his movements to those which the President directed in person. The project of marching upon the James was abandoned, and the army, penetrating into a country bristling with obstacles, commenced a series of operations which only brought forth doubtful and dearly bought successes. Resting its left on Bottom's Bridge, which it already occupied, and deploying its right, it took a position higher up along the north side of the Chickahominy, to join hands with McDowell, whose arrival was long waited for in vain, but who never made his appearance.

This army had passed through the first ordeals of the war. It had worked in the presence of the enemy; it had fought; it had marched; it had shown itself laborious, patient, intelligent. In battle the soldiers had displayed great personal bravery and tenacity. It was owing to these qualities that the mismanagement of those in command at Williamsburg had not been productive of the fatal results that might have been apprehended. The regiments which had suffered most in battle, if temporarily disorganized, had promptly recovered their equanimity. On the march they had been less successful. It is true that the roads were few, narrow and in a bad condition; but this difficulty did not quite justify the extreme slowness of their movements and the confusion into which their columns were more than once thrown. The American soldier had yet much to learn in this respect; the history of the war will show that he became in the course of time, if not the equal of the best foot-soldiers in Europe, at least a sufficiently good marcher to undergo, when necessary, one of those long marches upon which the success of a battle frequently depends.

But before following the army of the Potomac any further, we must relate the events that were taking place in other parts of Virginia at the same time, and which were destined to exercise so great and so fatal an influence on its subsequent operations.

CHAPTER II.

FAIR OAKS.

THE departure of General McClellan had left a clear field for the strategic experiments of Mr. Lincoln and his military advisers. They had at once proceeded to alter all the arrangements that had been made by the commander of the army of the Potomac for the safety of Washington. Instead of confining themselves to such points as were of importance for the defence of the capital, and considering the rest as the enemy's country, given up to the guerillas of both parties, they sought to extend the Federal rule over the whole region comprised between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, and to make a political conquest of them before having achieved the victories which alone could secure it. With this object in view, the numerous troops they had kept back under the pretext of protecting Washington were scattered over so extended a line that they possessed no power of resistance. McDowell's corps had been sent as far as the Rappahannock. Shields' division, detached from Banks' corps, had come to replace under McDowell's command that of Franklin, which had been sent to Yorktown. It had left the valley of Virginia in the second week of May to join its new corps commander, who already occupied Fredericksburg with the three divisions of Ord, McCall and King, and who was watching an enemy reduced in reality to a thin line of mounted scouts. Geary, with a few regiments, equivalent to a small division, occupied Manassas. Banks, instead of remaining on the defensive, after having successfully repulsed Jackson at Winchester, had followed his adversary step by step into the great valley watered by the Shenandoah; and the President, encouraged by this easy success, had urged him to push on to Harrisonburg, one hundred and ten kilometres from Winchester, without troubling himself

about the dangers which such an advanced position involved. Once there, he had suddenly withdrawn from him, as we have just stated, Shields' division, thereby reducing the number of his forces to six or seven thousand men. More to the west, Fremont with the army of the Mountain, so called, occupied West Virginia, which the Confederates had entirely abandoned since the end of January. One of his brigades, commanded by Crook, was posted on the banks of Greenbrier River, while the remainder of his troops were encamped at Moorefield, and Franklin in some of the numerous valleys which stretch between the ridges of the Alleghanies. The President, after taking away Blenker's division from the army of the Potomac, in order to place it at Manassas, had sent it to Fremont, thus increasing the number of his forces to six brigades, amounting to thirteen or fourteen thousand men. These armies, being so scattered as to be unable to give each other mutual support, were all independent of one another; McDowell, Geary, Banks and Fremont received their orders direct from Washington. The Secretary who directed the movements of these armies in the name of the President from the recesses of his office, was thus preparing an inevitable defeat for them. Jackson was not the man to neglect such an opportunity.

Yorktown had just been evacuated. All the Confederate forces which were in Virginia were assembling around Richmond to swell Johnston's army. It would have been easy for the several Federal armies to make a corresponding movement. McDowell could by a few days' march have joined McClellan on the borders of the Chickahominy. Fremont occupied the two slopes of the Alleghanies; the Confederates, who had contested their possession with so much fury the preceding autumn, had abandoned to him the sources of the Potomac and the Greenbrier; he could by pushing his outposts into the valley of the Shenandoah have connected with Banks, and, combined, they would have menaced Staunton near the important passes which open into the valley of James River.

The Richmond authorities felt that it was necessary to prevent this concentration of troops at any price, and that the surest way was to rouse the fears of the government at Washington by a

bold stroke. Nothing further would have been required but to wait with confidence for the errors which those alarms would be sure to make the Federals commit. Jackson, who had never ceased to urge an invasion of the North, and had obeyed the order directing him to evacuate the valley of Virginia with great reluctance, was entrusted with this task. The Richmond government, shrewder than its adversary in the distribution of its forces, gave him at once the means he needed. General Edward Johnson, who had defended Camp Alleghany during the winter, joined him with one brigade, while Ewell brought him a fine division from Gordonsville. Jackson had thus twenty thousand men under his orders; he started at once. Leaving Staunton, where he had organized his army, he sent Ewell to watch and detain Banks, while, with the remainder of his forces, he went to attack Fremont in person, in order to prevent the junction of his two adversaries.

The commander of the Mountain army was at Franklin, and had detached Milroy's brigade to occupy the last ridges bordering on the Virginia valley on the west, known by the name of Shenandoah Mountains and Bull Pasture Mountains. Milroy had taken his position in the village of McDowell, situated at the foot of the western slope of the last line of heights. On the 7th of May, Jackson drove in his outposts, which had penetrated into the valley of Virginia, and was crossing the Shenandoah Mountains with nearly ten thousand men. By a forced march he reached the second chain, Bull Pasture Mountains, on the 8th, and his heads of column, rapidly ascending those acclivities, took possession of them before the Federals were strong enough to defend them. Once master of these heights, he had the village of McDowell at his feet, where Milroy had allowed himself to be taken completely by surprise. The latter, discovering too late the error he had committed, made a vigorous effort to recapture a point called Sutlington's Hill, which was the key to this position. He failed in the attempt. He was soon joined by General Schenck's brigade, which had been sent to his assistance by Fremont as soon as he was informed of Jackson's appearance, and which had arrived after a march of fifty-five kilometres in twenty-three hours. Schenck, who assumed the command, had only three thousand five hundred men to de-

fend, against eight or nine thousand assailants, a place commanded on every side, and from which he could only extricate himself by passing through a narrow defile. To remain in such a place was to be captured. To leave it in the daytime was to run the risk of being routed. He determined to hold out until evening, and by means of well-directed attacks concealed his weakness from Jackson, who does not appear to have shown on this occasion his habitual *coup d'wil*; or it might be that his soldiers were too much fatigued to attempt a serious attack. At nightfall Schenck fell back in good order with his small force upon Franklin. The engagement at McDowell had cost him two hundred and forty-six men, while Jackson lost four hundred and sixty-one; among the wounded were General Johnson and three colonels.

Jackson, after taking possession of Franklin, which Fremont had evacuated to wait for him in the rear of the town, did not go in search of his adversaries in this new position. He contented himself with the important result he had just obtained; for in fact, if the army of the Mountain had suffered but little, it had received such a repulse that it was no longer able to join hands with Banks. It was against the latter that Jackson was now about to turn; and for this purpose he resumed his march rapidly through the valley of Virginia in the direction of Staunton. There he found Ewell, but no longer Banks, who, on being informed of the fight at McDowell, had fallen back from Harrisonburg as far as Strasburg, eighty kilometres lower down the valley.

Before following the two adversaries thither, we must describe the configuration of this singular valley, which has been so often ravaged by the fluctuating fortunes of the war. It extends two hundred kilometres in a straight line from the sources of the Shenandoah, a little below Staunton, to the confluence of this river and the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. Its breadth, between the two chains of hills which enclose it, is everywhere from forty to fifty kilometres. Terminated at the north by the Potomac, which intersects it perpendicularly, it may be said that it is similarly terminated at the south by the James, as this river flows a few kilometres from the sources of the Shenandoah, from which it is separated

by only a slight undulation in the ground. A series of small parallel ridges follows the line of this valley in the direction of its length. The highest form a group called the Massanutten Mountains, extending from Harrisonburg to Strasburg. East of these mountains flows the South Fork, the principal branch of the Shenandoah, which runs past Staunton, descends into a narrow valley not far from Luray, where it drains the waters of the other branch, called North Fork, at Front Royal. This last stream waters the western slope of the same mountains, and, after flowing through a larger valley than that of South Fork as far as Strasburg, turns abruptly to the right. A little below Staunton it assumes already the proportions of a deep unfordable river, which is crossed by three bridges. The first, up stream, is that of Port Republic, over which passes the road leading from Harrisonburg to Richmond through Brown's Gap; the second is at Conrad's Store, on the road from Harrisonburg to Gordonsville through Swift Run Gap. The third is the White House bridge, constructed for a cross road, which, branching off from the main valley road at New Market, ascends the Massanutten Mountains, and runs in the direction of the important defile in the Blue Ridge called Thornton's Gap, by way of Luray. The principal road follows the larger valley of North Fork from Harrisonburg to Strasburg, through Woodstock, and thence down to Winchester direct. Below Strasburg and Front Royal the undulations in the ground disappear almost entirely, and the Shenandoah, hugging the base of the Blue Ridge, leaves to its left the magnificent plain watered by the small stream of the Opequan, in which lie the towns of Winchester, Martinsburg and Charlestown. There are but two small lines of railroad to be found in the valley. One connects Harper's Ferry with Winchester; the other is the one used by Johnston on the 21st of July, 1861, to take his troops to the battle-field of Bull Run. By following this unfinished track from east to west, starting from Manassas Junction, we find that it crosses the Blue Ridge at Manassas Gap, above Front Royal, descends into the valley, crosses the Shenandoah road, and, ascending the North Fork through Strasburg as far as Woodstock, terminates abruptly at Mount Jackson. It was to have been continued as far as Staunton.

This description will enable the reader to understand the importance of the villages of Strasburg and Front Royal, which close up the two outlets of the valley, communicating with Winchester on one side and with Washington on the other, by way of Manassas Gap and the railway. But these were not positions the defence of which could be entrusted to a small force; for Strasburg was approachable on every side, and Front Royal was at too great distance from the encampments of Manassas Junction to be within reach of help, being at the same time commanded by heights which were easy of access. Without taking into consideration the peculiarities of this position, a single regiment, the First Maryland, had been stationed at Front Royal for some time for the purpose of holding the partisans of the enemy in check, and Banks occupied Strasburg with the five thousand men composing his small army corps.

On the 20th of May, Jackson left New Market at the head of an army of twenty thousand men. Instead of bearing down directly upon Strasburg by the main road and the broad valley of North Fork, which Banks was carefully watching, he crossed the Massanutten Mountains and re-entered the narrow valley of South Fork, where he was protected both by that river and the mountains. He thus left Luray behind, while his advance-guard encamped unnoticed, on the 22d, only sixteen kilometres from Front Royal. On the 23d the small Federal garrison, consisting of about nine hundred men, with two pieces of artillery, was taken completely by surprise. By a strange coincidence the regiment placed at the head of Jackson's column bore the same name as the one he was about to attack, the First Maryland. This unfortunate State of Maryland, convulsed by conflicting passions, inflamed by its neighbors of the North on one side and by those of the South on the other, supplied combatants to both armies. The encounter of these two namesake regiments—sad consequence of the civil war!—was fearful and sanguinary in the extreme, for a mutual recognition took place at first sight. The people of the South regarded Northern soldiers as legitimate enemies; but Marylanders, belonging to a slave State, when found fighting under the Federal flag, were nothing but traitors in their eyes. The Federals of Maryland, on the contrary, regarded their fellow-citizens who had

enlisted in the Southern army as twofold rebels: first, against the Union, next, against their own State, which had never officially separated from the government at Washington.

The situation of the small band of Union troops had been desperate from the beginning of the fight. Overwhelmed by numbers, it tried to escape from the enemy by placing the two branches of the Shenandoah between them; but it had not time to destroy the bridges. Pursued through the open country, the Federals dispersed in groups, which were successively surrounded, with the exception of fifteen fugitives only. The remainder were either killed, wounded or captured; but the defence of this handful of men had been highly creditable, and their chief, Colonel Kenly, fully atoned by his courage for his want of vigilance in allowing himself to be surprised. He was only captured after being seriously wounded.

The fickle fortune of war decreed that on the same day a body of troops detached from Jackson's army should experience nearly as bloody a check in the mountains of West Virginia. On leaving these mountains, Edward Johnson had entrusted to General Heth the task of watching with three regiments the brigade of Colonel Crook, which occupied the beautiful valley of the Greenbrier, with its station at Lewisburg. Carried away by his zeal, Heth crossed the river to attack his adversary in that position. He was repulsed after a bloody struggle, in which he had more than one hundred men disabled, and left four hundred prisoners in the hands of the Federals. The remainder of his brigade, reduced by nearly one-half, was indebted for its safety solely to the Greenbrier River, the bridges of which it succeeded in destroying in its rear. But this advantage was of no benefit whatever to the Federals; for Crook was not sufficiently strong to venture among the difficult mountain passes which separated him from Jackson's base of operations, and which it would have been necessary to traverse in order to menace the latter.

Meanwhile, Jackson had not lost a moment's time, after the combat of Front Royal, in following up his success; the very evening after the battle found him already on the left bank of the Shenandoah, above the point of confluence of the two branches. He thus menaced the line of retreat of Banks, who

was at Strasburg in a state of dangerous security. In fact, less distant from Winchester than Banks, he could occupy that place before him, cut him off from the northern route, and thus compel him to take to the mountain after abandoning his supply-train, his artillery and probably a portion of his troops. The news of the disaster at Front Royal reached Strasburg during the night of the 24th. Banks saw the danger, and as early as two o'clock in the morning his army was on the march in order to outstrip the enemy on the road to Winchester. The train of wagons was placed in front, for it was upon the rear of the column that the attack of Jackson was expected. The cavalry, which was to form the rear-guard, remained at Strasburg until the following day.

Jackson also resumed his march on the morning of the 24th, but the repose he was compelled to allow his worn-out soldiers that night was to make him lose the valuable prize he was so near seizing. The two roads converging upon Winchester from Strasburg and Front Royal form two sides of an equilateral triangle. Banks took the first, Ewell the second; Jackson, with his cavalry and the remainder of his infantry, separated from the latter, and followed cross-roads which enabled him to strike the flank of the enemy's column. Only a few mounted Confederates arrived in time to meet the head of the long train of wagons which led the march of the Federal army. Their appearance threw the train into inexpressible confusion, but they were easily dispersed, and order once more restored, the wagons continued their march, accompanied by the main body of the army, which had been compelled by this panic to pass from the rear to the head of the column. When the whole Confederate cavalry, led by the fiery Ashby and closely followed by Jackson, finally struck the road, it was only able to seize a few of the wagons in the rear of Banks' train. Ashby's soldiers, inured to plunder as much as to fighting by their partisan life, allowed themselves to be detained by this meagre booty, instead of following their chief, who was urging them to the pursuit of the enemy. The instant when a panic, easily engendered, would have been fatal to Banks slipped rapidly by, and Jackson tried in vain to seize once more the lost opportunity by intercepting the Federal cavalry, which

formed the rear-guard; the latter fell back toward Strasburg and precipitated itself among the mountain roads; it was thus enabled to overtake Banks' army on the banks of the Potomac.

Evening came on before Jackson had been able to come into serious contact with his adversary, and the latter, favored by the darkness, reached Winchester in the middle of the night. The Confederates had not yet made their appearance; from this moment his retreat was assured. But the rest which the Federals had found at last, after so painful a march, was not destined to be of long duration. At daybreak the firing of musketry made them aware that Jackson had arrived and was attacking the surrounding heights, which command Winchester from south-east to south-west. While he was driving off without trouble the Federal sharpshooters, General Ewell, following the road to the right from Front Royal, had reached the eastern approaches of Winchester, and was only waiting for the signal of his commander's cannon to engage the battle on that side. Banks' position had again become most critical. In danger of being surrounded with his five thousand men by eighteen or twenty thousand of the enemy, he could not follow the shortest line of retreat, that of Harper's Ferry, which would have exposed his flank to Ewell's attacks. Besides, it was not an easy matter to evacuate a town situated in an entirely open plain in the presence of so numerous an enemy. Without intending to maintain himself there for any length of time, the most important thing for him to do was to retard as long as possible the threatening progress of his foe. The Federal soldiers went into the fight with a great deal of spirit for men who should have been exhausted or discouraged by such a retreat. Banks' small army, deploying outside of Winchester, rushed to the assault of the principal height, situated to the south-west, while his left made head against Ewell's division on the east side. For a moment the hill was swept by the fire of Colonel Gordon's sharpshooters, and the Confederate guns were silenced. But when the Federals attempted to occupy the ground, they were taken in flank and driven back. The same success attended them at first on the left, where they put one of Ewell's regiments to flight. But there also, overwhelmed by numbers, their whole line gave way, and they rushed pell-mell

into the streets of Winchester. To increase the confusion, the inhabitants fired upon them from all the windows, and it seemed as if nothing could save them from a complete disaster. Fortunately for them, Jackson, despite all his ardor, did not push his soldiers forward with sufficient alacrity to take advantage of this disorder; he believed the Federals to be much more numerous than they really were. His infantry was completely exhausted, while his cavalry had again failed him at the moment when it might have rendered him essential service. He had alienated the two generals who were in command of that arm. One of these, General Stuart, refused to obey him; the other, Ashby, hurt by the reproaches he had received from him the previous day concerning the plunder of the Federal wagons by his soldiers, held back at this moment. The Confederates came to a halt eight kilometres from Winchester, and the Federals, being no longer pursued except by small squads of cavalry, retired without difficulty to the banks of the Potomac, which they reached at Williamsport on the evening of the 25th of May. They had marched eighty-five kilometres in less than forty-eight hours, leaving only fifty-five wagons behind them out of five hundred, and saving all their cannon. The loss in supplies was considerable; that in men on the 24th and 25th amounted to thirty-eight killed, one hundred and fifty-five wounded, and seven hundred and eleven prisoners. But if the losses were trifling, the moral effect of this reverse was great. In forcing Banks to recross the Potomac, Jackson had forced him back into the positions toward which he should have retired on the day on which his army was reduced by the departure of Shields. But if his whole corps had been annihilated, the excitement at Washington could not have been greater. The Confederate general, therefore, had dealt a telling blow; and if he made fewer prisoners than he had a right to expect from his successful manœuvres, he had nevertheless attained the principal object of his diversion. Confusion was at its height in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, and the army of the Potomac was deprived of all the reinforcements it had been promised.

Meantime, Jackson, in spite of his desire to invade the Northern States and the ardor which seized him as soon as he drew near to Maryland, was preparing to slip away from his adversa-

ries by a speedy retreat before the latter had time to concentrate a superior force and crush him in the hazardous position he had just taken. In fact, Mr. Lincoln, while fervently addressing an eloquent appeal to the Northern States for the protection of the capital, which he thought in danger, had at the same time conceived the idea of "catching Jackson in a trap," to use his own words, by shutting him up in the valley of Virginia. He personally directed by telegraph the movements of every division which was to co-operate in carrying out this chimerical project. His plan was to make three independent corps converge upon a point situated in the enemy's country, from which they were all three far more remote than the adversary whom it was intended to forestall.

Fremont was ordered to march from west to east, from Moorefield, where his quarters now were, to Strasburg; Banks to follow close upon the tracks of Jackson; Shields, who had only joined McDowell at Fredericksburg two days before, to retrace his steps from east to west, to join hands with Fremont at Front Royal, and thus cut off Jackson's retreat. In vain did McDowell protest against this order, the fatal consequences of which he foresaw; in vain did he allege that his soldiers would reach the valley too late to overtake Jackson, and that the surest way to protect Washington against the dangers which seemed to menace the latter city was to press the enemy in front of Richmond. The fatal order was adhered to, and all the campaign plans agreed upon a few days before were upset.

Mr. Lincoln had visited McDowell at Fredericksburg on the 24th of May, when it was decided that this general should march upon Richmond. He was to start with his army corps, more than forty thousand strong, with one hundred pieces of artillery; and it may be asserted without exaggeration that his junction with McClellan would have proved the decisive blow of the campaign. The fate of Richmond trembled in the balance; Jackson's column, thrown at a lucky moment into the plateau, saved the Confederate capital. On the 25th, Shields' division, instead of moving forward, turned its back upon the real objective of the campaign, and regaining the valley road started on one of those fruitless expeditions which American soldiers call in trapper lau-

guage a "wild-goose chase." The next day McDowell was ordered to send a second division, and finally to march himself with a third, upon Front Royal. He obeyed with great reluctance; for notwithstanding his unpleasant relations with McClellan, he had too much good sense and patriotism not to see and to deplore the irreparable mistake he was being forced to commit.

Jackson, concealing his preparations for a retreat, appeared determined to follow up his successes in the north without troubling himself about what might take place in his rear. His cavalry had followed Banks as far as Williamsport, where the latter had hastened to cross the Potomac. He at once turned against Harper's Ferry, and on the 28th appeared in front of that position. He could have had no serious intention of occupying it; for in order to do so, it would have been necessary for him to have control of the other bank of the Potomac; he simply wished to dislodge the Federals from it, and on the morning of the 29th he took possession of the heights commanding that position south of the Shenandoah. By this bold movement he confirmed all the alarms and anxieties into which his opponents had been thrown by his late successes in menacing Maryland and Washington; he magnified the number of his forces in their imagination, thus relieving Richmond, and securing for his soldiers the repose they needed before undertaking a retrograde movement, which was becoming unavoidable; for on the 29th, while he was preparing to attack Harper's Ferry, he learned that the Federal armies were at last moving from every direction to cut off his retreat, and he set about at once the duty of excelling them in speed.

It was high time. His army had been reduced by marching and battles to fifteen thousand men.* The Washington authorities, being totally ignorant of the difficulties of the campaign, had fixed upon the 30th as the day when the trap which they had set for catching the imprudent Jackson was to be sprung. As we stated before, the Confederate general was to be intercepted by the simultaneous arrival of Fremont at Strasburg and of Shields at Front Royal. If their calculations had been correct, Jackson's

*He had only lost four hundred men by the fire of the enemy. The five thousand that were missing must therefore have been stragglers, men on the sick-list, and probably a few deserters.

small army was lost indeed. It only evacuated Winchester on the 31st, carrying off, in the midst of the inhabitants who were filled with consternation at this sudden departure, the valuable spoils of the Federal storehouses, which formed a train of nearly twenty kilometres in length. Despite the presumptuous incapacity of those who directed the operations against Jackson from Washington, this general might yet have found himself in great jeopardy. Shields, punctual to the rendezvous, had reached Front Royal on the 30th, with a brigade, before which the small Confederate garrison had retired. But the plan of the Federals was too complicated to succeed. It was Fremont who caused its failure by allowing Jackson to reach Strasburg before him by a forced march; finding himself thus placed between his two opponents, he prevented them from acting in concert and paralyzed all their movements. While McDowell was uniting two of his reduced divisions at Front Royal, Fremont, encamped on the neighboring heights of Strasburg, waited, without stirring, for Jackson to attack him, instead of coming down to bar his passage, or at least to dispute it. The Confederate chief found it easy to occupy his attention by means of a few demonstrations, and thus gave his long column time to escape. At last, on the 1st of June, he was rejoined by the whole of his rear-guard, and quietly resumed his march toward Harrisonburg by the turnpike. His adversaries had been so entirely separated that neither of them felt strong enough to attack him singly; and while each party was waiting for the support of the other, they suffered their prey to escape them. As soon as they became aware of the fact they tried to redeem their error by a vigorous pursuit. They might yet possibly intercept Jackson farther on, and, at all events, turn his retreat into a positive rout. Fremont, who was ascending the valley of the North Fork, was sufficiently near him to retard his march, while Shields' vanguard, by following the parallel valley, had some chance of reaching the right bank of the South Fork in advance of him, and of burning the bridges of that deep river before they could be occupied by the Confederates. If the whole of Shields' division should arrive in time, it could even cross the river in its turn, so as to attack the Confederates in flank, and finally form a junction with Fremont. But Jackson was too

active to be thus caught by an enemy whose designs he had already so many times frustrated. He took possession of the bridge at White House, and did not hesitate to destroy it in order to render the junction of Shields and Fremont impossible. Whilst one of his detachments was performing this operation, the remainder of his army continued its march up the valley of the South Fork; and although his progress was delayed by the heavy wagon-train he carried as a substantial token of his victory, he reached Harrisonburg on the 5th of June. He had not, however, yet entirely escaped from the Federals, who were pressing him on both flanks, and who, without having been able to effect a junction, still menaced his line of retreat. Fremont's vanguard, consisting of Bayard's cavalry brigade and some infantry under Colonel Cluseret, had harassed him with great boldness since leaving Strasburg. These two officers made up by their activity for the want of alacrity on the part of their chief. The next day Jackson learnt that they had succeeded in outflanking him with their right, and that, preceding him in the direction of Staunton, they had cut down the bridges along the road leading to this town. With a view of retarding their pursuit, he was obliged to engage all his cavalry in front of Harrisonburg. These brave troops dismounted and covered Jackson's retreat by an energetic resistance; but they lost in the action their commander, Turner Ashby, one of the best officers in the Confederate army. The Federals, on their side, left in the hands of the enemy Colonel Percy Wyndham, an Englishman, who had entered the volunteer service at the beginning of the war. Jackson, in the meantime, struck into a cross-road on the left for the purpose of gaining Port Republic, crossed the Shenandoah at that point to reach Brown's Gap, in the Blue Ridge, where he well knew his adversaries could no longer follow him. But at Port Republic his flank was exposed to the attacks of Shields, whose heads of column had already reached Conrad's Store, while Fremont, having resumed his march, was pressing him in the rear.

Jackson's situation was again full of peril. Leaving Ewell to keep Fremont in check, he reached the neighborhood of Port Republic with the remainder of his forces on the 7th of June. But before he had time to cross the river and occupy the town,

Shields' first brigade, commanded by General Carroll, comprising about one thousand men and a battery, appeared on the opposite side, repulsed his skirmishers, entered the town and took possession of the bridge. This bridge had played an important part in the campaign plans forwarded direct from Washington to the Union generals. They had been alternately directed to destroy and to save it. Colonel Carroll, having been ordered to preserve it, held it for nearly twenty minutes; adhering strictly to the letter of his instructions, he suffered the opportunity to escape which presented itself for preventing the Confederates from crossing the Shenandoah; and when the enemy's cannon, whose fire had been quickly concentrated upon him, compelled him to abandon the bridge, he did not even attempt to destroy it. The result of his blind obedience was to leave Jackson in possession of a sure means of retreat at the moment when he was on the point of being thrown upon an impassable river. Once master of Port Republic, the Confederate general had nothing more to fear, and his only object in holding his adversaries in check was to intimate to them that all pursuit was at an end. He determined, however, to take advantage of their separation to deal them successively a last blow.

On the 8th, Ewell, with five thousand men, was waiting for Fremont at Cross Keys, a point of junction of several roads in the neighborhood. The six Federal brigades were prompt in attacking him. But Fremont, being under the impression that he had the whole of Jackson's army before him, allowed himself to be held back a long time by the resistance which the Confederates offered in a difficult country, where clearings alternate with woods. At last, after a brisk musketry engagement, which cost him many men without securing him any marked advantage, he had just ordered a general attack, when, seeing a German brigade borne back by the enemy, he suddenly abandoned his project and gave the signal for retreat. The battle of Cross Keys cost the Federals from six to seven hundred men, while the Confederates lost three hundred. The latter, by holding the enemy in check during an entire day, had accomplished the object they had in view.

In the mean time, Jackson, crossing the bridge which had been

so wonderfully preserved, was emerging from Port Republic with the remainder of his army, and, taking advantage of his vast numerical superiority, was driving Carroll's brigade before him, which was the only one left of McDowell's army at that important point. But during the afternoon Tyler's brigade effected a junction with Carroll's; and although they had only three thousand men under their orders, they prepared to make a stand against Jackson if he should attack them. They had not long to wait for him; Jackson, encouraged by his success and the hesitation of his opponents, had conceived a bold plan. He proposed to crush the inferior forces he had found before him at Port Republic, recross the Shenandoah immediately after, and march with his whole army to meet Fremont, in order to give him battle in his turn, and finally to resume the Brown's Gap route, leaving nothing but vanquished foes behind him. To this effect he had brought back Ewell to Port Republic, leaving only Patton's small brigade, numbering scarcely eight hundred men, in front of Fremont. He had ordered Patton to deploy all his men as skirmishers in case of need, to retard the advance of the enemy as long as possible, promising to join him with his army at ten o'clock in the morning. Then he marched directly against Tyler.

The latter, posted three or four kilometres from Port Republic, rested his right upon the Shenandoah and his left upon a hill with uncovered slopes. The summit of this hill, crowned by a wood, was the key to the entire position. Jackson, leading his old brigade in person, made a vigorous attack upon the Federal right; but his soldiers were repulsed, and fled in disorder, abandoning a battery, one of whose guns fell into the hands of the Federals. He had more than twelve thousand men under his command, while only three thousand were arrayed against him; it was easy, therefore, for him to repair this check. But deceived by the valor of his opponents, and believing them to be stronger than himself, he abandoned the project he had conceived of marching against Fremont. He recalled Patton's brigade in great haste; and setting fire to the Shenandoah bridge immediately after, he placed the river between himself and Fremont. Meanwhile, the combat, which was raging along the right wing of the Federals, had obliged the latter to weaken their positions on the left.

Jackson pushed one of his brigades to the assault of these positions, and after a desperate struggle the Confederates took possession of them, together with three pieces of artillery which were found in them. Being turned on this side, Tyler was obliged to fight in retreat, and fell back in good order toward the hamlet of Conrad's Store, occupied by the remainder of Shields' division. His soldiers, who had been recruited among the pioneers of the West, and especially in the State of Ohio, had fought with great determination; they had inflicted a loss of six hundred men upon an enemy three or four times their number.

The battle of Port Republic ended the pursuit of Jackson. Fremont had witnessed its termination from the other side of the Shenandoah without being able to cross the river in time to participate in it. He withdrew, and Jackson, being master of the battle-field, gave some rest to his troops before entering on a new campaign. This time his course lay in the direction of Richmond; turning his back upon the theatre of his early successes, his opportune arrival enabled Lee to take advantage of the mistakes which his bold manœuvres in the valley of Virginia had caused the military authorities at Washington to commit.

In the mean time, his adversaries were dispersing. Fremont returned to his Mountain department and Banks to Strasburg, while McDowell with difficulty united his divisions at Fredericksburg, exhausted and discouraged by so many fruitless marches and countermarches; although they had seen the enemy but once, they sustained more losses than if they had fought a pitched battle.

Returning to the peninsula of Virginia, we find the army of the Potomac still without the reinforcements it had so long been expecting, and left to its own resources. We left General McClellan on the 19th of May master of the Chickahominy pass at Bottom's Bridge. Free to seek a new base of operations on James River, or to continue resting on York River, he had just chosen the latter alternative, notwithstanding its dangers, in the vain hope of being able to keep in communication with McDowell's corps. Before resuming his march he had introduced some changes in the composition of his army corps; for the experience acquired at the battle of Williamsburg had shaken whatever con-

fidence he might have reposed in the capacity of the three commanders who had been forced upon him by the President at the opening of the campaign. The army corps had been reduced to five in number, each with two divisions, and an effective force of from fifteen to nineteen thousand men. This subdivision rendered them more manageable, while the command of the new corps fell, by right of seniority, upon Generals Franklin and Fitzjohn Porter, two officers for whom he entertained a particular regard.

The ground on which he was about to operate may be described in few words. It presents but a single obstacle, the Chickahominy—a serious one, it is true. This river, after passing within seven or eight kilometres of Richmond, turns off, continuing to flow in a south-easterly direction, so that Bottom's Bridge lies about eighteen or twenty kilometres from that city. Taking its rise to the north-east of the capital of Virginia, it winds through a valley regularly enclosed on both sides averaging eight or nine hundred metres in breadth. Following its downward course, we find Meadow Bridge first, over which passes a wagon-road and the Gordonsville railway; lower down, the bridge of Mechanicsville, commanded on the left bank by the hamlet of that name, is situated at the point where this river runs nearest to Richmond. Here the surrounding hills on each side are destitute of trees, and presently, on the road between Richmond and Cold Harbor, we come to New Bridge, which connects the hamlet of Old Tavern with the Gaines' Mill heights. One kilometre below this bridge the forest again enfolds the banks of the Chickahominy, and does not leave it for ten kilometres lower down, at the bridge of the West Point railway, which is situated one kilometre above Bottom's Bridge. The only tributaries of the Chickahominy are, on the left bank, a small stream called Beaver-dam Creek, between Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill, and, on the right bank a vast wooded swamp, known as White Oak Swamp, the waters of which empty into the river a few kilometres below Bottom's Bridge. This swamp, which has its origin in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, is absolutely impassable, except at two or three points, where it becomes narrow, affording passage to a few cross-roads.

The Confederate army was encamped around Richmond, where

it was receiving reinforcements forwarded in haste from every section of the country. Huger arrived with twelve thousand men from Norfolk; Branch, whose defeat at Newberne by Burnside we have noticed, brought nine thousand from North Carolina, and others were yet to follow. The reconnaissances of the Federal army had revealed the fact that the abandonment of Bottom's Bridge was the last step in Johnston's retreat. The latter was preparing for the defence of Meadow Bridge and New Bridge. The nature of the ground was perfectly adapted for this purpose, and the Federal general was the less likely to think of carrying this pass by main force because he could turn it by the lower course of the river, of which he had control. Everything, therefore, urged him to push his attacks by following the right bank between Bottom's Bridge and Richmond. On the 24th of May his left wing, composed of the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman, was firmly posted on the other side of the Chickahominy, and placed *en echelon* along the road between Richmond and Williamsburg, from Bottom's Bridge to the clearing of Seven Pines, eleven kilometres from Richmond. The rest of the army remained on the left bank of the river. The centre, consisting of Sumner's corps, was encamped in the neighborhood of the railroad-bridge; the two corps commanded by Porter and Franklin, forming the right wing, were posted in the vicinity of Gaines' Mill and Mechanicsville. The army had occupied these positions without any difficulty, having only met some weak detachments of the enemy at Seven Pines and Mechanicsville, which were easily repulsed. But it found itself thus divided into two parts by the Chickahominy, without any other communication between its right and left wings than the railway-bridge at Despatch and Bottom's Bridge; these two passages were far remote from the extreme points of Seven Pines and Mechanicsville, which were the most exposed to an attack from the enemy. It would undoubtedly have been infinitely better, under every aspect of the case, to have transferred the entire army to the right banks of the Chickahominy; but McClellan had been obliged to occupy both sides of the river and to push his right wing to the vicinity of its source, as much for the purpose of keeping up communication with McDowell's vanguard, whose arrival he was still constantly prom-

ised, as to cover his dépôts at the White House, and the railroad through which he obtained his supplies. The faulty disposition of his army was therefore forced upon him by circumstances from the moment he had abandoned the idea of seeking a new base of operations on the James. We shall see presently how, in consequence of unforeseen accidents and too long delays, he remained in this dangerous position for more than a month.

It was on the 24th of May that McDowell had received an order from the President's own mouth to march upon Richmond. The next day being Sunday, his departure was fixed for the 26th. He had a march of seventy-two kilometres before him between Fredericksburg and Richmond, through a difficult country, as Grant was to find out two years later, but in which, owing to the position occupied by McClellan before Richmond, the Confederates could not have offered any serious resistance to the Federals. This region has two railroads. One, running north and south, leads from Aquia Creek to Richmond, through Fredericksburg and Bowling Green, and crosses to the south of the latter town the two branches of the Pamunky, called the North Anna and the South Anna, near Jericho Bridge and Ashland. The other railroad, from Gordonsville, intersects the first between these two branches, and passing the second near Hanover Court-house crosses the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge to enter Richmond more to east than the Aquia Creek road.

The Confederates had placed Anderson at Bowling Green with twelve or fifteen thousand men for the purpose of holding McDowell in check, and Branch's division between the Chickahominy and Hanover Court-house, that it might be within reach of Richmond or Bowling Green, as circumstances should require. On announcing McDowell's departure, Mr. Lincoln requested General McClellan to make a movement on his right to cut the communications between Bowling Green and Richmond, and to seize the two railroad bridges on the South Anna, in order that he might the more easily assist the troops who were on their way from Fredericksburg. This order was promptly executed, and on the 25th, Stoneman's cavalry was at work destroying the Gordonsville railroad between Hanover Court-house and the Chickahominy. But on this very day the *mirage* which had attracted

McClellan to the north side of Richmond was vanishing entirely away. McDowell had received fresh instructions; Shields was on his way to Front Royal; great excitement prevailed in Washington, and Mr. Lincoln telegraphed to the commander of the army of the Potomac that if he could not attack Richmond with the forces at his disposal, he had better give up the job and come to defend the capital.¹ The next day the President urged him to send out the proposed expedition on his right, but with a very different object from that which had at first been contemplated, and to destroy the bridges on the South Anna, which two days before he was desirous to preserve at any price. Jackson had thus succeeded beyond his expectations; for it was for the purpose of cutting off the pretended reinforcements which, according to the Washington authorities, were to be forwarded to him from Richmond, that the Federals sought to destroy with their own hands the road which would have enabled them to concentrate their forces in front of the enemy's capital.

Tired out by such constant vacillations, McClellan prepared to execute this fatal order without offering any comments; but he determined to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered to exercise his right wing by striking an unexpected blow at Branch's division, which might threaten his dépôt while he was engaged in a great battle before Richmond. On the morning of the 27th, Porter, with Morell's division, Warren's brigade and three regiments of cavalry, two of which were regulars, little less than ten thousand men in all, left Mechanicsville and Cold Harbor and proceeded toward Hanover Court-house. After a fatiguing march of twenty-two kilometres, his vanguard, consisting of the cavalry and two regiments of infantry, encountered Branch, who, on being apprised of this threatening movement, had taken position at the intersection of the Hanover and Ashland roads. The Confederates thus covered the two railroad-bridges on the South Anna; but they were vigorously attacked, and Butterfield's brigade, arriving in time, put them completely to flight. Branch lost in this first engagement one cannon and a large number of prisoners. Continuing his route, Porter, after

¹ "Either attack Richmond, or give up the job and come to the defence of Washington."

having joined Warren's brigade, sent the latter to destroy the bridge of the Gordonsville railroad, while that of Martindale proceeded to cut the other railroad line at Ashland. Warren had picked up whole companies of the enemy, which, deprived of all direction, surrendered without a struggle. After a slight skirmish, Martindale had also accomplished his task, and was on his way back to rejoin his chief at Hanover, when he suddenly fell in with the remainder of Branch's troops debouching by the same road which the Federals had followed in the morning. The Confederate chief, having, in fact, been surprised and forced into the preceding combat before he had time to collect all his forces, had been turned by the Federal detachment, which had passed on his right, and had thus been driven upon the banks of the Pamunkey, near Hanover. In order to extricate himself from this difficult position, he described a large arc around the Federals, which would have brought him back to the Richmond and Ashland turnpike, when, just as he was about reaching the road, not far from the scene of the first fight, his heads of column fell in with Martindale's small brigade. The latter fought the superior forces of the enemy with great spirit, until Porter, informed by the noise of cannon, came back from Hanover with the remainder of his division, and attacking the Confederates both in front on the road, and by the flank through the woods, drove them in disorder toward the south.

The double combat of Hanover Court-house had cost the Federals fifty-three men killed and three hundred and forty-four wounded or taken prisoners. It was a brilliant and complete success. The enemy had left more than seven hundred prisoners and one gun in Porter's hands. Branch's division, dispersed among the woods, was entirely disorganized. The *morale* of the Federals was restored by so fortunate a result. But in Washington the tidings of this success afforded no compensation for the alarms caused by Jackson, which filled the minds of all men. Mr. Lincoln replied to McClellan's despatches with complaints that the order for the destruction of all the bridges on the South Anna had not yet been executed. On the following day the general-in-chief was able to inform him that his instructions had been scrupulously carried out, and on the 29th Porter's troops,

quitting the scene of their glorious but fruitless victory, returned to take position at Gaines' Mill. Everything indicated that the banks of the Chickahominy were soon to be ensanguined by a desperate struggle.

The Confederates were in fact collecting all their disposable forces for the protection of Richmond. The civil government as well as the *personnel* of the administration, who in that capital, as at Washington, fancied that all the interest of the war was centred in the defence of their bureaus, had passed from the utter discouragement caused by the loss of the *Virginia* to the most absolute confidence. On the 28th and 29th of May, considerable reinforcements came to join Johnston's army, Anderson's division among the rest; this officer, on seeing McDowell rushing in pursuit of Jackson, instead of following in his tracks, had quickly brought back his troops from Bowling Green to Richmond.

The position of the army of the Potomac seemed, on the other hand, to invite an attack. Its left, thrown over the unfriendly bank of the Chickahominy, and inactive for the last seven days, occupied a position which was at once menacing to the Confederates and dangerous to itself. Its front extended between the Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp. This latter water-course is composed of a succession of swamps running in a parallel direction with the former for a considerable distance, but the unequal width of which at certain points reduces the space comprised between them to four or five kilometres; at the elevation of Bottom's Bridge, the swamps give place to a stream which, inclining to the left, carries their muddy waters into the Chickahominy, a few kilometres below. The Williamsburg road and the West Point railway, after crossing the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge and at Dispatch, follow a parallel course in a direct line to Richmond. The bridge at Dispatch could not be thoroughly repaired before the 30th of May; all the troops posted on the right bank of the Chickahominy obtained their supplies, therefore, by the turnpike; and to facilitate the distribution of rations most of these troops were encamped in the successive clearings through which this road passes. On the left, dense woods, traversed only by narrow paths, stretch out as far as the impenetrable thickets which cover the stagnant waters of White Oak Swamp with eternal

verdure. The road forks within ten kilometres of Richmond, at a place called Seven Pines. One branch continues in the original direction, and approaches the capital by following the course of the James. The other, turning to the right, intersects the railroad at Fair Oaks station, emerging afterward into a large clearing, in the midst of which, at Old Tavern, it again connects with the Richmond road to New Bridge and Cold Harbor. This is the Nine Mile road. The railway, forming an almost straight line, runs along the summit of a slight undulation which separates the waters of White Oak Swamp from those of the Chickahominy. After rising upon the right bank of this water-course by passing through a deep cut, it crosses the woods without meeting with any work of importance to mark its course. There are three stations along the section of the line then occupied by the Federals—Dispatch, in the vicinity of the bridge; Fair Oaks, the nearest to Richmond; and between the two, Savage Station, situated in a large clearing at the intersection of several roads. These forest roads are very numerous; they form so many connecting links between isolated plantations, farms or country-houses, each standing in the centre of a cleared space surrounded by woods on every side; most of them are perpendicular to the Williamsburg turnpike, and run as far as the Chickahominy; but among these dense copses they constitute an inextricable labyrinth for those who are not familiar with the locality in all its details.

In order to approach Richmond, General McClellan was desirous of gaining ground gradually on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and after each step taken on that side to connect his two wings by throwing new bridges over this dangerous river. Sumner's corps, which occupied the left bank as far as the neighborhood of Gaines' Mill, had already constructed two bridges in conformity with this plan, one at three thousand five hundred metres, the other at six kilometres, above the railroad-bridge. In executing this work he had been able to cross to the opposite bank without meeting the enemy, and had completed it in a few days, thanks to the skill and ingenuity of his soldiers. The river, by a multitude of sinuous turnings, formed a swamp three or four hundred metres wide, lying in the shadow of gigantic trees, whose trunks rose to a height of fifty metres above the

waters, while the roots were buried in a muddy bottom impracticable for men and horses. It was found necessary to open a passage across this forest, and to lay the flooring of the bridge, formed of unhewn pieces of timber bound together by cords or bind-weed, sometimes on piles sunk into the bed of the river, sometimes on the stumps of the trees, which were cut down to a proper height. No survey had been made of the country beyond the shores of the river. Higher up still, in the neighborhood of New Bridge, two trestle-bridges had been constructed and almost entirely placed in position. It only remained to lay the flooring. But the open space in which they stood exposed them to the fire of the enemy, which had soon interrupted the work, and it could only be completed by the aid of an aggressive movement on the right bank.

The Federal left wing was composed of four divisions, each from six to eight thousand men strong. Casey, who commanded the newest regiments in the whole army, had very imprudently been placed at the most exposed point of the whole line, and occupied a clearing about one kilometre in advance of Seven Pines, where he had erected two small redoubts mounting a few field-pieces. His pickets had been pushed only one thousand metres beyond that point. Couch, with his division, was at Seven Pines, near Fair Oaks station, situated sixteen hundred metres to the north, and along that portion of the Nine Mile road which connects these two points. At a distance of two kilometres from Seven Pines, where the Williamsburg road emerges from a large clearing to enter a wood, there was a line of breastworks and small redoubts occupied by Kearny's division. The fourth, Hooker's, had been sent a considerable distance south to watch the passes of White Oak Swamp.

The army of the Potomac was thus unfortunately scattered; its divisions, posted in front of Seven Pines, at White Oak Swamp and Mechanicsville, could not afford each other mutual support, and they formed a vast semicircle of nearly forty kilometres in extent. General McClellan estimated that it would have taken two days' march for Franklin's division to reach Casey's encampments. The Confederates, on the contrary, occupying the chord of the arc, could as easily move to the front of

one as of the other ; and after having menaced the extreme right of the Federals at Meadow Bridge, they had only eleven or twelve kilometres to march to reach Fair Oaks and fall upon their extreme left. Johnston was not the man to leave his adversary in so perilous a situation without turning it to account. His army, assembled around Richmond, consisted of four large divisions, each comprising five or six brigades, under Generals Longstreet, G. Smith, D. H. Hill and Huger ; it numbered about sixty thousand effective soldiers.

On the 30th he gave the necessary instructions for battle on the morrow. Huger, following a road called the Charles City road, was to pass to the right of White Oak Swamp, and then cross this marsh, so as to attack Keyes' positions in flank, on the Williamsburg road, whilst Hill, debouching by this road, was to charge them in front. Longstreet, following in Hill's rear, was to sustain his attack. Smith's orders were to proceed to Old Tavern, in order to cover the left wing of the army in case the Federals should attempt to cross the Chickahominy near New Bridge ; otherwise, to come and take part in the battle by entering into line to the left of Fair Oaks station.

During the evening a tropical storm burst upon the two armies, and in the midst of profound darkness poured torrents of rain upon the ground on which they were to measure their strength. On the morning of the 31st this clayey soil was half submerged ; the passage of a single vehicle was sufficient to turn the roads into inextricable mud-holes ; the smallest streams were swelling as one looked at them, while the Chickahominy, assuming a reddish tint, was beginning to overflow its banks and to spread over the plains adjoining, which were already very muddy. Far from allowing the obstacles which the condition of the ground was about to interpose to turn him from his purpose, Johnston only saw in it an additional motive for giving battle, being convinced that the mud and the overflow would be more fatal to the Federals, scattered along a line too extended, than to the army which was compactly gathered around him.

At break of day that army took up its line of march in the presence of the whole population of Richmond, which had come out of the city to encourage those to whom its defence was entrusted. It

would have been difficult to find a single inhabitant of the Confederate capital who had not a relative or a friend in the ranks of the army. Curious persons and newspaper correspondents followed it as far as the battle-field. The three divisions of Hill, Longstreet and Smith, after some strenuous efforts, arrived in position toward eight o'clock; they had been obliged, however, to leave their artillery behind—a bold resolve, which the Federals were not wise enough to imitate. But Huger's troops, which had started at the same time as the former, did not make their appearance in the positions which had been assigned to them. It is probable that the latter general may have found the fords at White Oak Swamp utterly impassable. Be that as it may, he did not reach the field of battle during the whole of that day, nor did he even notify his chief of the cause of his delay; his absence, so fatal to the success of the Confederates, was made the subject of bitter reproaches on the part of those whose plans had thus been frustrated. Finally, about noon, Longstreet, who had been waiting for him up to that moment, gave Hill the order to attack. Without sending any skirmishers ahead, that they might take the enemy more completely by surprise, the Confederates advanced, some in line across the woods, others in deep columns along the road, sweeping before them Casey's pickets, together with a regiment which had been sent to reinforce them. The foremost works of the Federals, which were as yet unfinished, being simply abatis or breastworks, whose profiles could afford no protection to soldiers, were occupied by Naglee's brigade. The latter made a vigorous resistance, while the division artillery, under Colonel Bailey, an old regular officer, caused great havoc in the ranks of the assailants. Meanwhile, the combat extended along the line. Hill had deployed all his troops and brought them into action; his left had reached Fair Oaks, where Couch was making a stand with a portion of his division. Casey's two other brigades had hastened to the assistance of Naglee, and, despite heavy losses, they held out against the Confederates, whose numbers were constantly increasing. Longstreet's division now entered into line and was supporting Hill's soldiers, who were becoming exhausted. Attacking the Federal position by the right, some of his regiments penetrated into the woods which separate White Oak Swamp from the

clearing defended by Casey. The Federal works were attacked in the rear, and their defenders decimated by enfilading fire. These young soldiers, who had hitherto been sustained by the excitement which springs from danger and the very exhaustion of a fierce struggle, no longer possessed the requisite coolness to resist this unexpected attack. They were driven back in disorder upon Seven Pines. Besides, the number alone of their adversaries would have been sufficient to crush them. Some few, however, persisted in defending the redoubts, but soon disappeared among the ranks of Hill's troops, who, having returned to the charge, hemmed them in on every side. Bailey was killed by the side of the guns he had just spiked, and seven pieces fell into the hands of the assailants. It was three o'clock. Precisely at this moment Peck's brigade of Couch's division was arriving from Seven Pines, led by Keyes, who had been informed somewhat late of the serious character of the fight. The Lafayette Guards, which formed part of this brigade, having deployed into line among the *débris* of Casey's division, allowed the fugitives to pass without moving, then rallying around them this floating mass, among whom the bonds of discipline had disappeared, but not personal courage, they made a vigorous aggressive movement. Despite their efforts, they could recapture neither the redoubts nor the lost cannon; but the enemy was checked, the remainder of Casey's artillery saved, and the Federals had time to rally. Regiments after regiments from Couch's division were sent to sustain the fight; for if the Federals were losing ground, they now contested it foot to foot. On the right Couch commanded at Fair Oaks in person, where, with the rest of his division, he held in check the left wing of Longstreet, whose main efforts were still concentrated upon the position of Seven Pines.

The struggle lasted four hours, and yet, strange to say, only two divisions had taken part in it on either side. Keyes' corps alone, numbering about twelve thousand effective men, had been engaged on the Federal side, and while Longstreet and Hill's columns were being decimated by the enemy's artillery, Huger, on their right, was still lost in the White Oak Swamp; Smith, on their left, continued inactive around Old Tavern. In short, the

two generals-in-chief were both unconscious of the battle in which their respective soldiers were engaged. McClellan, who was sick at his headquarters near Gaines' Mill, had heard nothing from Heintzelman, to whom the command of the entire left was entrusted. The telegraph which connected the various sections of the army was silent. Heintzelman himself, although posted at Savage Station, only a few kilometres from Seven Pines, had only heard of the enemy's attack several hours after the first musket-shot was fired. Johnston's ignorance was still more unaccountable, inasmuch as he was the assailant. Leisurely posted at Old Tavern, he was still waiting for the booming of cannon on the Williamsburg road to put Smith in motion. But the storm of rain and wind which followed the gale of the previous day carried the sound in a different direction, and the general-in-chief, who had ordered the attack to be made in the morning, remained until four o'clock listening in expectation of this signal, without sending a solitary aide-de-camp to ascertain what was passing on his right. He was, however, separated by less than four kilometres in a direct line from the Williamsburg road, and a man on horseback, leaving Old Tavern, would have had no more than ten kilometres to ride, without leaving the main road, to reach Longstreet in the midst of the soldiers whom he was bringing without delay into the thickest of the fight. Although taken by surprise, the Federals had not lost quite so much time. The booming of cannon, which Johnston did not hear, had reached McClellan's tent. The high wind made it impossible for the balloon, which had been brought there at great expense, to make an ascension to reconnoitre the movements of the enemy; it had met the fate of all complicated machines, which, although useful at times, should never be relied on in war. An order, however, was immediately sent to Sumner to hold himself in readiness to march. The latter, also hearing the cannon, was not satisfied with simply obeying the letter of his instructions; but putting his two divisions in motion without delay, he placed each of them near one of the bridges he had constructed, ready to cross the river at the first signal. On his side Heintzelman, on learning the state of affairs about two o'clock, at once recalled Hooker from White Oak Swamp, despatched Kearny to the support of Keyes, and notified McClellan, who

immediately ordered Sumner to cross the Chickahominy and take part in the battle.

At half-past three o'clock Kearny, who, from the moment that he heard the sound of cannon, knew no obstacles, arrived at Seven Pines with two of his brigades, Berry's and Jamison's, and his timely presence retrieved for a moment the fortunes of the day. But at the same time Johnston was also roused from his inactivity. He sent at last an aide-de-camp to ascertain the movements of Longstreet; and learning from him that a fierce battle was raging on his right, he determined to bring Smith's corps into line. A portion of this corps, under Hood, marched directly upon Fair Oaks by way of Nine Mile road to support Longstreet's attack. The remainder, under the personal lead of the general-in-chief, bore to the left, and reached the large clearings extending from Fair Oaks to the Chickahominy; by this movement Johnston hoped to strike the right flank and rear of the Federals who were defending Seven Pines. It was four o'clock. Hood arrived at Fair Oaks with his fresh troops, and swept everything before him. He cut the Federal line in two. Couch, with a few regiments, was driven back north of the railroad, while the remainder of his division, already scattered and mixed up with the *débris* of Casey's, was no longer able to defend Seven Pines, and was forced back on the Williamsburg road, while Kearny's brigades, which had resolutely defended their positions on the extreme left, finding themselves separated from the rest of the army, were obliged to make a large *détour* across the woods to rejoin their comrades.

It was a critical moment. The Federals, who had struggled vigorously against the ever-increasing numbers of their adversaries—for they were only eighteen or nineteen thousand against more than thirty thousand—were in a condition in which the least mischance might lead to an irreparable disaster. Brigades, regiments, and even companies, were mixed up. The relative commands no longer existed. In their efforts to restore order among the troops the officers gathered around them, by their words and their example, men from the regiments, and marshalled them in haste and almost at random behind the breastworks erected a few days before near the camp occupied by Kearny, two kilome-

tres in the rear of Seven Pines. One moment more, and Smith, falling upon the extreme right of this weak line, would give the signal for a new attack, which would probably consummate the destruction of all the Federals south of the Chickahominy.

It was six o'clock in the evening, and the Confederates had more than two hours of daylight before them to complete their victory; but all of a sudden a brisk fire of musketry broke out in the wood to the right of the railroad. The hollow sound of howitzers loaded with grape was soon mingled with it. Smith had encountered a foe entirely unexpected. It was Sumner, who arrived in time to check his progress and resume on this side the game which had been lost on the Williamsburg road. The warrior's instinct, which prompted him to push his divisions forward and mass them in the vicinity of the bridges when ordered to keep under arms, had enabled him to gain an hour, and that hour secured the safety of the army. The new order directing him to cross the Chickahominy to participate in the battle reached him about two o'clock. At that moment the river was already rising as far as the eye could see, seeming to conspire with the enemy to prevent him from going to the assistance of his comrades. The lower bridge had been carried away; the other was entirely submerged, while the unhewn timbers which constituted its flooring, being only held together by ropes, floated about amid the waters, whose impetuous current tossed them in their foam. Sumner himself, despite his inflexible will, was beginning to think that not a single company would ever be able to reach the other side of the river. Nevertheless, he pushed the head of column of Sedgwick's division over this bridge. The first soldiers who crossed found it difficult to keep steady on the moving platform, which was shaking under their feet. But the weight of those who followed soon restored its stability; it soon settled on the piles from which it had been wrenched. The whole of Sedgwick's division crossed it, the officers on horseback; the artillery followed, but most of the guns sunk in the mud in the marshy plains which extend beyond the bridge. Kirby's regular battery alone succeeded in getting safely over. Richardson, who, after having tried in vain to restore the lower bridge, had been compelled to cross at this same point, followed in rear of Sedgwick, but his troops only

reached the opposite shore at nightfall. Sumner had not waited for his arrival to move forward with his first division. He had just overtaken Couch, who had been driven back on the right of Fair Oaks with a portion of his troops, and had barely time to deploy to receive the shock of Smith's corps, which was about to debouch in the large clearing. Kirby's battery enfiladed an open space leading to Nine Mile road; Sumner placed one brigade and a half on the right, fronting Old Tavern; on the left the remainder of Sedgwick's division was disposed *en potence* parallel to the railroad, which the enemy had just occupied. Even before these dispositions were fully carried out, the battle was furiously engaged. Smith was in haste to make up for lost time, and believed himself sure of success; Whiting, who commanded three brigades of this corps, debouched on the salient angle formed by the Federal line; but being received by a terrible fire from Kirby's guns, he halted on the skirt of the wood. After a brisk fire of musketry, the Confederates made a new attempt to carry this battery, which occupied the key of the position, and had interrupted their turning movement. Johnston, rushing in person into the thickest of the fight, hurled Pettigrew's brigade against it. It advanced fearlessly up to the cannon's mouth; but the Federal gunners, anxious to avenge the memory of Bull Run, where this same Johnston had captured their pieces, coolly waited for the assault of the Confederate brigade, which they decimated at short range. It was driven back in disorder, leaving in the Federal hands its wounded commander, Pettigrew, and the ground strewn with dead bodies. Availing himself of this chance, Sumner assumed the offensive with his left, and drove the enemy back in the direction of Fair Oaks. Smith brought his reserve brigades into action in vain; he could barely hold the ground he occupied, and his forward movement was definitively checked. The Confederate army was, moreover, paralyzed at this moment by the loss of its commander-in-chief; Johnston had just been severely wounded and carried into Richmond. It was seven o'clock in the evening. Along the whole line the battle had degenerated into a musketry fire, which was continued pretty well into the night, but each party remained on the defensive. The check of Smith had, in fact, crippled the success of Longstreet on the Williamsburg road. The lat-

ter, arriving in front of the small works where the Federal forces were massed, was afraid of attempting to carry them by assault with worn-out troops whose ranks were fearfully thinned. His opponent, reinforced by a few fresh regiments, made a bold stand while the fugitives were rapidly coming back into line. Longstreet was waiting for assistance, either from Huger on his right or from Smith on his left, before making the attack, and thus allowed the last hours of daylight to pass away.

A dark and rainy night came on at last to put an end to the slaughter, but not to the sufferings, the fatigues and the anxieties, of the two armies. The losses had been equally heavy on both sides. During the whole of that night long wagon-trains of wounded men, carrying into Richmond the unfortunate victims of a fratricidal war, told the inhabitants of the capital how dearly bought was the success which had been prematurely announced to them. All the vehicles in the city, omnibuses and carts, were despatched to the field of battle to find the wounded and the dying, whom they brought back in the midst of a dense and silent crowd. As for the dead, there was no time as yet to think of them. On the side of the Federals the ambulances, camps and railway-stations were not less encumbered.

On both sides the generals were filled with anxiety. Smith had assumed the command, but in succeeding Johnston he could not replace that experienced chieftain. The Federals had undoubtedly sustained a severe check; but if their left wing had been defeated, it was not destroyed, as was hoped in Richmond. The attack had been wanting in unison; the absence of Huger, together with the prolonged inaction of Smith, had thrown all the burden of the battle upon one-half of the army. Finally, the encounter with Sumner had not only roughly interrupted the success of the operation, but had revealed the existence of communications which the Confederates had not suspected. It gave them to understand that, notwithstanding the rise in the Chickahominy, they might on the following day have to measure themselves with the whole Federal army. Consequently, they determined upon a retreat.

On the side of the Federals the anxiety was not less. They had always wished during this aggressive campaign for an oppor-

tunity to fight a defensive battle, thinking that this kind of fighting was better adapted to the character of their soldiers; they had been attacked, and, so far from coming off victorious, their left wing had been so crushed that Sumner's success afforded no compensation for the reverse. The Chickahominy was constantly rising, and it was easy to foresee that on the following morning all the new communications established by Sumner between the two wings of the army would be interrupted by the freshet. It was known that the enemy had not brought all his forces into action. There were more than sixty thousand men around Richmond and within reach of Fair Oaks. General McClellan thought there were eighty thousand. The Federal troops who were about to find themselves almost isolated on the right bank of the Chickahominy did not amount to forty-five thousand men, while one-third of them at least, disorganized by the great struggle of the 31st of May, would have found it difficult to come into line the day following.

This numerical inferiority should not have existed; and if the Confederates had cause to complain that some of their generals had compromised the success of their operations by not appearing on the field of battle or by arriving too late, the Federals had an equal right to say that the inaction of half their army had prevented them from turning the battle of Fair Oaks into a great victory. Sumner's success was sufficient proof of this. At the time when the latter was ordered to cross the Chickahominy, General McClellan felt how important it would be to support him by a movement of his whole right wing. From his headquarters at Gaines' Mill he could see the smoke, which rose above the tree-tops, tracing the undulations of the line of battle and marking the steady progress of the enemy. He had two army corps in hand; before him the Chickahominy, which, although swollen, was still passable; two bridges already in an advanced state of construction could be completed in a few hours; on the opposite hill, commanding the approaches to the river, no work had been erected by the enemy; only one or two regiments were seen moving about with suspicious ostentation along the most conspicuous points of the plateau. By leaving one division to guard the large park of artillery and the dépôts, McClellan could have crossed

the river with three others in the vicinity of New Bridge, and fallen upon the flank of the Confederates; such an attack would have made them pay dear for their first success. He had already made every preparation for this movement, when, the two corps commanders having represented to him that the condition of the valley would not admit the passage of their artillery unless causeways were constructed for that purpose, he consented to defer the movement until the next day. This was a great misfortune, for he thus lost an opportunity unexampled in the whole course of the campaign. Nevertheless, while abandoning the idea of crossing the Chickahominy at New Bridge, he could bring back his right wing to the rear, in order to cross the river over the same bridge as Sumner. This bridge was situated only about four miles and a half from the encampments of the right wing; and if the troops had been put in motion at the time Sumner received the order to cross, they would have arrived in time to follow him over the bridge, which withstood the flood until noon the next day. In this case, five fresh divisions, instead of two, could have resumed the offensive in the morning. But General McClellan, knowing that a single defeat might involve the loss of his whole army, isolated as it was in the enemy's country, and ruin the Federal cause for ever, was not willing to weaken his right wing. Fearing lest the enemy might debouch by way of Meadow Bridge and cross the Chickahominy, he did not dare to entrust to a thin line of troops the guard of his communications and the immense park of artillery, which the condition of the roads prevented from being removed; and he left nearly fifty thousand men inactive on the plateau of Cold Harbor. We cannot blame his prudence, but it may be asserted that if he had known what was passing among the Confederate bivouacs, and at the camp-fires around which the generals in command of the enemy's troops were trying to find shelter from the penetrating dampness of that night, he would have acted very differently. Indeed, their new commander-in-chief had no idea of throwing himself on both banks of the Chickahominy, in the position which had so nearly proved fatal to the Federals. He did not believe it possible to complete the manœuvre which had been interrupted by Sumner against their left wing. It must be acknowledged, however, that the chances were

greatly in his favor. Huger had made his appearance after the battle, and Generals Holmes and Ripley had just arrived in Richmond from North Carolina with eight thousand men. This timely reinforcement would perhaps permit them to resume the attack with greater hope of success, as the rise in the river rendered the position of the Federals more difficult. But in the absence of Johnston, who had alone conceived the plan of battle, prudence prevailed, and Smith would have given the signal for retreat that very night, if he had not been obliged to give his soldiers a few hours' rest, and his officers time to rally and reorganize their troops. Consequently, when day dawned upon the two armies no sound disturbed at first the silence which reigned over the battlefield; and it was the Federals who renewed the conflict on the morning of the 1st of June. During the evening Hooker had again struck into the Williamsburg road, while Richardson had joined Sedgwick near Fair Oaks. These two divisions, advancing to the front line, attacked the Confederates, who were already in full retreat. Notwithstanding this reinforcement, the troops composing the left wing of the Federals were not in a condition to push into a woody and unknown region, in pursuit of an enemy whose prowess they had just experienced. A movement of this kind could not have been seriously undertaken unless Franklin and Porter, prompted by the same instincts which had inspired old Sumner the day before, should join them on the field of battle. It is true that General McClellan had strongly recommended to his two lieutenants that they should cross the Chickahominy in front of their encampments; but the river had increased in volume since the preceding day; the bridges, which the artillery would have found it difficult to cross on the 31st of May, had become impassable on the 1st of June; and these generals, availing themselves of the latitude which McClellan usually allowed them in the interpretation of his orders, made no movement with their troops. They thus suffered victory to escape them, and their vacillations saved the Confederate army from imminent disaster. Indeed, it has been asserted by eye-witnesses that its retreat was not made without disorder, and that if the Federals had pressed with a sufficient force, even without artillery, the three brigades of Huger's corps, which, under Pickett, Pryor and Ma-

hone, were defending every inch of ground, they might probably have been able to enter Richmond with them.

The combat of the 1st of June, in which but a few thousand men were engaged on either side, had notwithstanding the proportions of a great battle. On the left it was marked by a brilliant charge of Sickles' brigade along the railway track; on the right by a sharp encounter between an Irish brigade in the Federal service, commanded by General Meagher, and Pickett's troops. Before noon the Federal outposts took possession without a blow of the works whose capture had cost so dear to the Confederate army, and suffered it to disappear among the dense woods without molestation. This brilliant army, which had gone out the day before almost in triumph for the purpose of delivering Richmond from the grasp of the invader, returned to its cantonments on that same evening, with only four flags, ten cannon and twelve hundred prisoners, more as an evidence of its valor than as a token of success.

The undecided battle, which had drenched the vicinity of Fair Oaks with blood during two entire days, was attended with a loss of nearly four thousand five hundred men to the Confederates, and five thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven on the part of the Federals. The heaviest losses on both sides were sustained around Seven Pines; those of Longstreet and Hill amounted to more than three thousand, and those of Keyes to three thousand one hundred and twenty men.* After such a struggle the two armies, composed of soldiers but little inured as yet to the hardships of war, were equally in need of rest.†

A very remarkable work just published by General Johnston explains how McClellan is mistaken in attributing a loss of two

*The official reports give the following figures for the army of the Potomac: Sumner, one hundred and eighty-three killed, eight hundred and ninety-four wounded, one hundred and forty-six prisoners; Heintzelman, two hundred and fifty-nine killed, nine hundred and eighty wounded, one hundred and fifty-five prisoners; Keyes, four hundred and forty-eight killed, one thousand seven hundred and fifty-three wounded, nine hundred and twenty-one prisoners; total: eight hundred and ninety killed, three thousand six hundred and twenty-seven wounded, and one thousand two hundred and twenty-two prisoners. For the army of Northern Virginia: Longstreet and Hill, a little over three thousand; Smith, one thousand two hundred and thirty-three men disabled.

† See Note A in the Appendix to this volume.

thousand five hundred men more than they really sustained, to his opponents. In this work Johnston severely blames the generals who succeeded him in command for not having followed up on the 1st of June their success of May 31st. He complains, moreover, of not having been informed beforehand of the approach of Holmes and Ripley, whose arrival he would have waited for before giving battle, if he had known of their being so near. As General Johnston's official report, addressed to the Confederate government, contains none of these reproaches, now embodied in a book which has appeared since the close of the war, we may infer that President Davis is chiefly responsible, in the estimation of General Johnston, for the mistakes he refers to in his later publication.

CHAPTER III.

GAINES' MILL.

THE alarms occasioned by Jackson's success did not prevent the battle of Fair Oaks from producing a great sensation in the North. The army of the Potomac was essentially national in its character, and there was not a village in the free States that had not furnished to it some young men; consequently, a greater interest was everywhere manifested in its labors than in the pretended dangers of the Federal capital. The government, still cherishing a secret jealousy against General McClellan, seldom communicated to the public the tidings it received from him, but after such a battle it was no longer possible to keep silent; accordingly, a despatch from the commander-in-chief was for the first time published. The latter, unfortunately deceived by Heintzelman's report, threw undue blame upon Casey's division. This despatch was corrected in Washington, but in such a manner as to aggravate the painful effect of the error it contained. The unmerited censure was allowed to stand, while the eulogies which McClellan bestowed upon Sumner were suppressed. The general-in-chief soon set forth the truth, and it became known that the army had been saved by the stubborn resistance of Naglee and Bailey, the ardor which Kearny had infused into Jamison's and Berry's brigades, and, finally, by the indomitable energy of old Sumner.

Mr. Lincoln learned at last that he could no longer delay sending the reinforcements which the army of the Potomac needed in order to continue the task, which threatened to be difficult. The garrison of Fort Monroe and a few other regiments, eight or nine thousand men in all, were assigned to General McClellan, who distributed them among the different brigades of the army. He was again promised the co-operation of McDowell as soon as the

latter could gather together the detachments he had sent forward in pursuit of Jackson. This promise, no less vain than that of the preceding year, was to exercise on the operations of the Federals against Richmond even a more baneful influence than the first breach of promise. Still afraid of exposing the capital, the President refused to send more than one division of McDowell's corps by water. In notifying McClellan that the other three divisions would proceed from Fredericksburg to rejoin him by land, he again requested him to be ready to communicate with them on the South Anna, and thus caused him to miss the opportunity to repair his delays and the mistakes he had been led to commit. He could, in fact, have taken advantage of the confusion into which the Confederates had been thrown by the battle of Fair Oaks, to seek the new base of operations on the James River, the advantage of which we have pointed out elsewhere. This movement, to which, three weeks later, it was necessary to resort for the purpose of saving the army, would have given very different results if it had been executed then with an offensive aim.

The enforced rest which followed the battle of Fair Oaks was prolonged by the bad weather for two distressing weeks. The Chickahominy, the overflow of which exceeded anything ever witnessed by the oldest inhabitants, carried away all the bridges, and for several days the six divisions, encamped on the right side of the river, only obtained their supplies by the railroad and the viaduct, whose frail scaffolding trembled above the flood. The ground, which consists of alternate layers of reddish clay and quicksand, was nothing more than a vast swamp, and the guns which had been ranged in battery near the camps gradually sunk into the earth, from which they could not be extricated. Every morning a scorching sun, shining upon this damp soil, and decomposing the dead bodies of men and horses, which the rain had again brought to the surface, filled the hot air with poisonous exhalations. Every evening thick clouds gathered, the lightning flashed, the heat became suffocating, and all night long rain fell in abundance, which still further increased the inundation.

The inactivity to which the two armies were thus condemned, however, did not partake of the qualities of refreshing rest. The Federals, as we have stated, would probably have achieved an

important success on the 1st of June, if they had put in motion the troops encamped at Gaines' Mill, on the evening of the 31st, or during the night, so as to find themselves on the right banks of the Chickahominy at daybreak, with all the disposable portion of their army. This opportunity had been allowed to pass; but they were yet in time to change their base of operations, and mass all their forces between the Chickahominy and the James. General McClellan having given up this project in order to remain within reach of Fredericksburg, nothing was left for him to do but to carry out the plan which had been temporarily interrupted by the battle of Fair Oaks. This plan consisted in gaining ground gradually by capturing, one day a wood, another day a clearing, and thus advancing step by step until, by a succession of battles more or less fierce, Richmond should be so closely hemmed in that the enemy's army would either abandon it, or renew, under less favorable circumstances, the dangerous experiment of Fair Oaks. But even a slow operation of this kind required fine weather. It was necessary before joining battle to have facilities—in fact, to be able to move and victual the troops with ease; it was necessary before joining battle to conquer the treacherous waters of the Chickahominy, and to connect both banks by bridges numerous and always passable; it was necessary, finally, to be able to take to the battle-field that powerful artillery, without which the generals of the army of the Potomac were unwilling to lead their soldiers to the attack. These two weeks, therefore, were employed on the part of the Federals in repairing the roads which connected their several camps, in constructing new ones, in extricating from the mud the large supply-trains, which scarcely sufficed for the distribution of daily rations, in strengthening the bridges and increasing their number, and finally in covering the whole battle-field of the 31st of May with vast works.

About the middle of June the ground was once more practicable, and the Chickahominy, having again become a modest stream, did not appear inclined to renew its fatal freaks of violence. The army of the Potomac was at length firmly established, provided with excellent communications, and surrounded by strong entrenchments, which enabled it to concentrate without danger a

large portion of its forces at any given point along its front. But these results had been dearly bought. The soldiers, obliged to work in the mud in an unhealthy climate, had suffered severely. The camps, too long seated on a marshy soil, had become the foci of swamp fevers and typhoid fevers. To the painful monotony of throwing up earthworks were added continual watches and picket duty, which deprived the men of that rest which is necessary to health, without offering them in exchange the stimulants of an active campaign. In short, fatigue and disgust multiplied the number of deserters into the interior, whose crime was encouraged by a vicious system of recruiting, and especially by the bait of bounties, which they hoped to receive by re-enlisting in new regiments. Consequently, notwithstanding the reinforcements which had come from Fortress Monroe, and the arrival of McCall's division, detached from McDowell's corps and landed on the 11th and 12th at White House, the effective force of the army was reduced to little more than one hundred thousand men for duty. Its official morning reports acknowledged thirty thousand absentees, nine-tenths of whom were on the sick-list, or quartered in the hospitals, or sent to their respective homes on leave as convalescents.* The Confederates, on their side, had also made good use of the respite which circumstances had granted them. They had naturally opposed a line of entrenchments to those of the Federals. As McClellan's task was to capture Richmond, and not to defend the swamps of the Chickahominy, these delays all accrued to the benefit of his adversaries; and the more he fortified his position, the more the difficulties of the task he had to accomplish increased. The Confederate army was also receiving reinforcements; and, thanks to the plans which the Southern generals had caused the Richmond government to adopt, the

*The following was the morning report of the army of the Potomac on the 20th of June: Present, one hundred and fifteen thousand one hundred and two; sick, detached, under arrest, twelve thousand two hundred and twenty-five; absent, twenty-nine thousand five hundred and eleven; total, one hundred and fifty-six thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight. The garrisons of Fort Monroe and Yorktown should be deducted from the first figure. Sumner's and Franklin's corps had the least number of men unfit for service. On the 10th of July, out of thirty-eight thousand two hundred and fifty absentees, thirty-four thousand four hundred and seventy-two were on regular leave of absence, three thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight had deserted to the interior.

moment was approaching when it would be in a condition to venture upon a decisive struggle, with better chances than at Fair Oaks. General Lee had assumed the command made vacant by Johnston's wound. His first efforts in the war had not been more brilliant than those of Grant, his future opponent, and he was personally but little known to the troops he was about to lead into battle. But his companions in the Mexican expedition had not forgotten the eminent services he had then rendered, notwithstanding his inferior rank. Since the outbreak of the civil war, the Confederate authorities had had occasion to appreciate his wisdom and clearness of judgment in matters connected with military affairs. His fellow-citizens of Virginia respected him as the representative of one of the first families of the most aristocratic of the American colonies. He was looked upon by all as a true type of the soldier and man of honor. The regrets even he had experienced in forsaking the Federal flag no longer injured him in the eyes of the public, for the moment of the first ebullitions had passed. Once upon the scene, he will no more leave it, and he will always play, if not the first, at least one of the first, parts. We shall always find him a patient, persevering and prudent calculator, yet ready to risk much at the opportune moment; handling a large army with great dexterity in the midst of the thickest forests; understanding men, selecting them carefully, and securing their attachment by his equity; worshiped by his soldiers, obtaining from them what no other chief could have thought of asking them; respected and obeyed by all his lieutenants; humane, of a conciliatory disposition, one whose only fault as a general was an excess of deference to the opinion of his subordinates, which at times caused him to lose a little of that firmness which is so indispensable in the midst of a battle. Such was the new adversary of General McClellan.

Since he had assumed command he had reorganized his army and gathered new combatants from every part of the Confederacy. The conscription law, which was in force, had filled up his *cadres*, mixing young soldiers with those whom the war had already trained. The scattering system, which had prevailed at first, was abandoned; the garrisons along the coast were reduced to their minimum or entirely suppressed, and most of the troops compos-

ing them were sent on to Richmond. A few regiments had been brought from the West, where the operations had lost something of their importance since Beauregard had retired into the interior, leaving Corinth in the hands of Halleck.

But it was the co-operation of Jackson that Lee was expecting, in order to change the course of the campaign, and execute the offensive movement for which he was preparing. He counted upon his arrival, just as McClellan relied upon that of McDowell. He was not, however, destined to be the victim of the same deceptions which the commander of the army of the Potomac had to experience. Jackson's return to Richmond was the brilliant conclusion of the operations which the latter had so successfully conducted in the valley of Virginia. After having carried trouble into the councils of the enemy, after having thrown the latter on the wrong scent, and drawn a portion of the forces destined for the reduction of Richmond into the mountains, he had to effect his escape and double in his tracks, in order to go to the rescue of those who were making a stand against the large Federal army. No precaution was neglected to secure the success of this plan. Jackson, who had at first thought of invading Pennsylvania, eagerly accepted the new part assigned to him by Lee, the importance of which he understood.

The battle of Port Republic had terminated the campaign in the valley of Virginia on the 9th of June, and arrested the pursuit of the Federals. Jackson gave some rest to his troops at Weyer's Cave, not far from the field of battle, and made ostensible preparations to undertake a new offensive movement on the same ground. On the 11th, Whiting's division, nearly ten thousand strong, was detached from Smith's old corps, which had fought at Fair Oaks, and being placed on board a train of cars, which had been made ready with affected secrecy, proceeded from Richmond by the right bank of the James to the Lynchburg and Burkesville junction, so celebrated since. At a short distance from Richmond some apparently unaccountable reason caused the cars to be detained for several hours in front of Belle Isle prison, where were shut up a large number of Federal soldiers about to be exchanged in a few days. The passers-by expressed much indignation at the carelessness of the railroad employés in allowing the Federals to

take note of the powerful reinforcements which were being sent to Jackson, thus revealing to the enemy such important movements of troops. This was precisely what General Lee desired. On the 15th, Whiting left Lynchburg for Charlottesville, reaching Staunton on the 18th, where he landed his *matériel*, and seemed to be preparing to proceed down the valley to fall upon Fremont conjointly with Jackson; but on the 20th he speedily got on board the same cars which had brought him over, and returned to Charlottesville, where Jackson was awaiting him with the army that had fought at Cross Keys and Port Republic. By the movements of his cavalry, by his own words, and by means of letters written with the intention that they should fall into the hands of the Federals, he had confirmed all the fears which the movements of Whiting's division had excited in Washington. General McClellan had, in fact, notified the President on the 18th of the departure of these troops, and the intelligence received from Fredericksburg fully corroborated this information. On receipt of this news, General Fremont hastily fell back upon Strasburg, while McDowell, who had at last witnessed the return of Shields' division to his encampments, and who had already sent that of McCall to join McClellan by water, was waiting in vain for the order to set off on the three or four days' march which separated him from the army of the Potomac. The desire to form a new army, which was to achieve easy successes under the personal direction of the Secretary of War, had decided the government to detain this general on the Rappahannock. The safety of Washington, which Jackson could not seriously menace, had only been, it must be acknowledged, a false pretext for conferring the command of an army, which absorbed all the reinforcements promised to McClellan, upon General Pope, an officer as brave as he was inexperienced, who had become the favorite of the hour. McDowell's corps was designed to swell its numbers uselessly, at the moment when every interest called it to the borders of the Chickahominy.

Meanwhile, a bold reconnaissance had revealed to General Lee the weak points of his adversary. On the morning of the 13th a brigade of cavalry, about one thousand two hundred strong, and accompanied by a few pieces of artillery, left Richmond

under command of General Stuart. Its destination was a profound secret. Following the road to Louisa Court-house, as if on his way to reinforce Jackson, Stuart encamped in the evening at the railway-bridge of Aquia Creek, on the South Anna. Before daylight on the 14th, he turned suddenly to the right in the direction of Hanover Court-house, where two squadrons of the Fifth regular cavalry were performing picket duty. The first squadron, surprised by the appearance of the Confederates, was quickly dispersed. The second, taking advantage of the narrowness of the road, which compelled the enemy's troopers to march by fours, charged them vigorously without concern as to their numerical superiority. Being closely packed within this narrow defile, the two detachments were mingled, and fought with sabres. The Federal commander, Captain Royall, killed the commander of the first squadron of the enemy with his own hand, and was himself mortally wounded a moment after.* The weight of the Confederate column soon swept before it the handful of regulars who had attempted to check its progress. The Fifth regiment of cavalry, which before the war was numbered the *Second*, had long been commanded by General Lee, and his nephew Colonel Lee, who led one of the Virginia regiments under Stuart, had also served in it. He thus found himself called upon, as a sad result of the civil war, to draw his sword against officers who had been his comrades the preceding year—perhaps even against some of the soldiers whom he had commanded in the garrisons of the far West. Far from feeling any secret remorse in their presence, and carried away by the passion which inspired him for the cause of the South, he solicited of his chief the privilege of measuring swords with his late companions in arms. But there were no longer any enemies to fight; the two squadrons which alone had guarded the flank of the Federal army on that side were dispersed; and proceeding down the Pamunky, Stuart led his brigade as far as Old Church, at an unbroken trot. The task assigned to him by his chief was accomplished; he had turned the right wing of the Federals, he had made a survey, before reaching Old Church, of the course of a

* Captain Royall was severely wounded in several places, but recovered, and is still in the United States army.—ED.

swampy stream called the Tolopotamoi, a tributary of the Pamunky, which could easily have been covered with defensive works, and thus marked out the route which Jackson was to follow a few days after with his army.

The Confederate column was about sixteen miles from Hanover Court-house. It seemed natural that it should retrace its steps and go back to Richmond; but Stuart, who possessed all the instincts of a light cavalry general, determined to carry out a plan much more hazardous in appearance, but less dangerous in reality—to make the complete circuit of the Federal army, so as to enter Richmond on the south, which he had left by the north. By this movement he expected to throw the rear of his enemy into great confusion, so that amid the contradictory rumors which such a bold march would spread he would have a good chance to baffle the pursuit of his adversaries. None of the officers to whom he communicated his plan dared to approve of it; but he knew that all would obey him with courage and intelligence. After giving his brigade a moment of rest, and making careful inquiries regarding the Hanover Court-house road, which he pretended to wish to follow, Stuart ordered the bugles to sound “boots and saddles,” silently placed himself at the head of his column, and directed his horse toward New Kent Court-house. The soldiers followed with astonishment, but without hesitation, a chief who inspired them with a blind confidence. Yet every step they took seemed to interpose an additional barrier against all chances of return. On the right lay the whole army of the Potomac; on the left the immense dépôt of White House; in front of them the railway and the turnpike, along which the enemy’s troops were incessantly passing to and fro. The small band drew closer together, for there was danger on every side; this danger, however, was considerably lessened through the connivance of all the inhabitants. At each house Stuart received the minutest information regarding the Federal corps to be avoided, and the magazines which might be destroyed. Two boats on the Pamunky were burned, but Stuart dared not go as far as the White House, notwithstanding the temptation which so rich a prize offered him. He struck the railroad at Tunstall’s station; and after putting a small Federal outpost to flight, he went into ambuscade in order to capture the first train

which might happen to pass by. An instant after, a train of cars loaded with sick and wounded, bound for the White House, arrived at full speed, but instead of stopping to water as usual, continued right on, while the pieces of timber placed across the track for the purpose of throwing off the cars were scattered right and left by the locomotive. The surprised Confederates merely fired a volley into the train, which wounded many of the sick and frightened the passengers, some of whom jumped out of the cars; the danger, however, was of short duration, and the train, disappearing among the woods, spread the alarm along the whole line. Stuart, thus disappointed, had not even time to destroy the railway track, for he learned that McCall's division, on its way to join McClellan, was encamped in the neighborhood, that it was under arms and would soon make its appearance. He drew off, still pursuing his onward course, after having burned a few cars loaded with provisions and several camps, and after feeding his soldiers at the expense of the frightened sutlers whom he had stopped on the road. But night had come, and the fires kindled by his hand, flashing above the forest, were so many signals which drew the Federals upon his tracks. Fortunately for Stuart, his soldiers were well acquainted with the faintest path in the country through which they were passing; they were at home. Consequently, they reached the hamlet of Talley'sville without difficulty, where the column was allowed a few hours' rest and time to rally. Then, turning to the right, it proceeded rapidly toward the Chickahominy.

At daybreak the Confederate cavalry reached the borders of this river, considerably below Bottom's Bridge, at a place called Forge, or Jones' Bridge. But the ford on which they had depended was not passable; the bridge had been destroyed, and the Federal cavalry, which, under Averill, had been sent by McClellan to intercept these passes, was only a few miles distant from the place. Two hours more of delay, and Stuart would have lost his only chance of retreat; it was a critical moment. Efforts were made to repair the old bridge, and every man set to work to cut down trees for that purpose. A foot-bridge was soon constructed, which the men crossed on foot, swimming their horses alongside. Once on the other side of the river, the Confederates proceeded to enlarge the dimensions of the flying bridge, and, by dint of labor,

succeeded in getting their artillery over this fragile structure. Stuart had thus baffled all pursuit, and resumed his march on the Richmond road, having lost but one man killed and one caisson stuck in the mud, during this adventurous expedition.

The whole Federal cavalry had been started in pursuit of Stuart. As soon as he was known to be at Tunstall, McClellan had divined his purpose, and, as we have said before, despatched Averill with one brigade to intercept him at Jones' Bridge. But his orders, tardily transmitted, only reached the rest of his cavalry two hours after the passage of the Confederates. The latter arrived in Richmond that very evening. They had, in point of fact, committed but few depredations, but had caused a great commotion, shaken the confidence of the North in McClellan, and made the first experiment in those great cavalry expeditions which subsequently played so novel and so important a part during the war.

During the ten days which followed this alarm the Federals always fancied themselves on the eve of making a general attack upon the enemy; but each day, after having determined upon it, and made preparations for it, they would meet with some new and unforeseen difficulty, which caused them to defer its execution. Lee, knowing how important it was to gain time, so as to allow Jackson to join him, neglected nothing which could make him appear much stronger in the eyes of his adversary than he really was. By multiplying his pickets, by disputing every inch of ground and constantly provoking skirmishes, sometimes at one point, sometimes at another, he finally succeeded in his design. The Federal spies, the fugitive negroes and deserters, all aided him, through their exaggeration, in deceiving McClellan. On the 26th of June the latter believed that the arrival of Jackson would swell Lee's forces to one hundred and sixty thousand men, and that the fortifications around Richmond were bristling with two hundred guns of heavy calibre. The army he was about to face, the strength of which Lee had been constantly increasing during the last three weeks, did not, however, number more than one hundred thousand men, while the fortifications surrounding the Confederate capital were in reality slight breastworks, mounting only a few guns. The Confederates were undoubtedly working

to increase their strength ; but this work was chiefly carried on in those localities where they knew the Federals to be watching them with their spyglasses, and anxiously following their slightest movements. The opportunity for attacking Lee, while he was weakened by the absence of Whiting, thus passed by, and by degrees people became familiarized with the idea that siege operations might be advantageously substituted for a pitched battle. Many officers in the army of the Potomac imagined that by turning up large quantities of earth, and burning a great deal of powder, they would be able to escape that ordeal of terrible suspense when skill and prudence are equally powerless to decide the fate of the battle, and when torrents of blood must be shed to wrest victory from the hands of the enemy. This kind of tactics had just been applied in the West, where it had resulted in the evacuation of Corinth by the Confederates, and the general question now was whether, when the final charge was made, they should step upon the top of a parapet defended with the energy of despair or upon the ruins of a deserted city. Consequently, while wishing for a more decided success, the latter alternative was but too readily acquiesced in ; and the desire to spare the army a fearful sacrifice of life having made such an alternative appear probable, everybody felt disposed to wait patiently for this issue.

A movement, however, took place on the 25th of June which, although of no great importance, interrupted at last this long inaction. In order to make himself master of the approaches to the plateau of Old Tavern, McClellan, still manœuvring as if conducting the operation of a siege, became desirous of extending his left wing. To this effect, he despatched Hooker's division on the road from Williamsburg to Richmond, beyond the positions occupied by Casey on the morning of the 31st of May. Hooker had just dislodged the Confederates from a small wood called Oak Grove, lying across the road, after a desperate engagement, when an order, wrongly construed, rendered it necessary for him to fall back. This error, however, was soon detected and rectified. McClellan, hastening to the scene of action, personally assumed the direction of the battle, pushing forward the divisions of Kearny and Couch, with a portion of those of Casey and Richardson. Hooker, being thus sustained, re-entered Oak Grove

and planted himself firmly in it; he extended his lines as far as the extreme edge of this wood, whence he commanded an immense open space, in which were seen some small works, with a few abandoned tents. This battle, known by the name of Oak Grove, cost the Federals fifty-one killed, four hundred and one wounded and sixty-four prisoners.

They were not more than about four miles from Richmond, and yet the enemy, hitherto so stubborn, had exhibited too great a want of persistency in the defence of the wood not to have been the result of calculation. The fact is that the movement of the army of the Potomac lost all its importance in view of the great operations which were in preparation, and which it could no longer prevent. When McClellan decided at last to feel the enemy with his left, a terrible storm was gathering on his right.

On that very day, the 25th of June, a single horseman, without companions and without followers, had ridden through the deserted streets of Richmond at an early hour in the morning, had dismounted at Lee's headquarters, and had shortly after quickly resumed his journey in the direction of the north. Some passers-by asserted that they had recognized the famous Jackson in this mysterious personage, but no credence was given to their statement, for everybody knew that he was fighting on the borders of the Shenandoah, and that he was not the man to abandon his soldiers before the enemy. It was he, nevertheless, but he had left his army, whose every movement was wrapt in profound secrecy, at a few leagues only from that place, and, after having received his chief's instructions, was returning to meet his heads of column, then within a short distance of Ashland. A short conference had sufficed the two generals to determine all their plans, and they were going to join in striking a heavy blow against the right wing of the Federals. This wing was in fact the most exposed, since McClellan had massed the best part of his troops between Richmond and the Chickahominy. To cover the long line of railway which supplied his army as far as White House, he had been obliged to leave the three divisions of Morell, Sykes and McCall, which formed his right wing under Porter, north of the Chickahominy. They faced south, ranged parallel with the river. McCall occupied the extreme right at Mechanicsville and Beaver-

dam Creek ; Sykes and Morell were posted on the neighboring heights of Gaines' Mill, resting their left on the swamps of the Chickahominy just where it begins to become wooded. With the exception of some small breastworks and a few abatis on the left bank of the Beaver-dam, no works had been erected to protect these positions. General McClellan had always intended to abandon them as soon as the time had arrived for transferring his base of operations to the James River. He had never given up the idea of this change of base, so often projected and always postponed ; he had even begun making preparations for it within the last few days, by sending a certain number of vessels loaded with provisions into the waters of the James. Such, therefore, being his intention, he had deemed it useless to cover his right wing with defensive works like those extending along the rest of his front ; he soon had cause bitterly to regret this.

Two principal passages, each composed of two bridges thrown alongside of each other across the Chickahominy, connected the right wing with the rest of the army. The lower passage was formed by the bridge on which Sumner had crossed on the day of the battle of Fair Oaks, and by another constructed under the direction of Colonel Alexander, whose name it bore. They gave access to the extremity of the vast clearing, named after Doctor Trent, on the right side of the river, where the headquarters were. The other passage, situated two thousand five hundred metres higher up, and composed of the Duane and Woodbury bridges, named after two engineer officers, connected the positions occupied by Porter's left with Golding's clearing, which stretches beyond the former on the same side of the Chickahominy.

The Federal line extended from Golding to the border of White Oak Swamp, forming the arc of a circle, of which Bottom's Bridge was the centre. It was covered throughout by considerable works ; redoubts placed at intervals were connected by breastworks built of wood and earth, and by vast abatis ; and numerous clearings, which afforded a considerable field of fire to the artillery along the whole front, prevented the enemy from approaching under cover. Franklin's corps occupied the position adjoining the Golding clearing. Sumner, on his left, in front of the Courtenay farm, rested on Fair Oaks. Heintzelman's line,

thrown across the Williamsburg turnpike, extended from the railway to White Oak swamp. Keyes, who had been held in reserve since the battle of Fair Oaks, occupied the vicinity of Bottom's Bridge and the road which crosses the swamp near its entrance.

The Confederate army had opposed to these works a line of entrenchments which, although of no great importance, would enable it on the day of battle to reduce the defenders of Richmond to a simple *cordon* of sharpshooters. Being reinforced by a large number of soldiers drawn from the South, and, it is said, even from the armies of the West, it had been arranged into five divisions. Longstreet and A. P. Hill commanded two of them. Huger, despite his conduct of the 31st of May, as he possessed great influence at Richmond, had preserved his own. Magruder, who had distinguished himself by his energy at Yorktown, had command of another, and the fifth had been given to D. H. Hill. This army numbered nearly sixty thousand men; Jackson had brought it about thirty thousand. Huger and Magruder were opposed, the first to Heintzelman, the second to Sumner. To the left of Magruder, A. P. Hill, whose right was in front of Golding, extended along the river opposite Porter's positions, and one of his brigades, under Branch, detached on the upper Chickahominy, held a bridge situated above Meadow Bridge. Longstreet and D. H. Hill, placed in reserve, were encamped near Richmond, on the Williamsburg and New Bridge roads.

On the evening of the 25th, Jackson's heads of column arrived at Ashland. But notwithstanding the secrecy which attended his march, General McClellan was already informed of it. On the morning of the 24th he had learnt, through a deserter, that Jackson had left Gordonsville, and would probably attack him on the 28th. He could not believe, however, that the latter would thus be able to escape the three Federal armies which were exclusively engaged in pursuing him. But the next day, even while the battle of Oak Grove was being fought, he received positive information of Jackson's approach, the advanced cavalry of the latter having appeared at Hanover Court-house. There was no further room for doubt. The sixty or seventy thousand men assembled at Washington and in the valley of Virginia had neither been able to detain Jackson's army nor to follow it. They had not

even perceived its departure; and while McDowell, Banks and Fremont remained motionless, all the Confederate forces were massing in order to crush the army of the Potomac. In a few more hours the cannon would announce the commencement of the great struggle. As Mr. Lincoln candidly wrote to McClellan a few days after, even if they had had a million of men to send him they would have arrived too late. The commander of the army of the Potomac had no alternative but to fight with the resources at his command. He set himself immediately to work. Those only who have felt the weight of a heavy responsibility, who have long predicted the dangers incurred through the mistakes of others, and who, after having pointed them out in vain, find themselves suddenly obliged to face them, can form a conception of what was then passing in the mind of the Federal commander. But far from faltering, this ordeal suggested to him the finest inspiration of his entire career—to abandon his communications with York River, in order to establish a new base of operations on the James immediately after the battle which was now pending. Such was the bold and masterly plan conceived by McClellan, in response to the movement of his opponent, which he had divined even before it had commenced. Jackson's presence at Hanover Court-house had convinced him that Lee designed to fall upon his right wing, and oblige him to hastily evacuate the works which menaced Richmond, in order to save his communications with York River. This movement of retreat on his right was such as would most naturally suggest itself to the mind of the commander-in-chief of the army of the Potomac in the position he occupied; but it was also precisely the movement which his adversary expected him to make, and it thus afforded excellent chances of success to the Confederates, who must have made every preparation for turning, during this flank march, his retreat into an irreparable rout. In relinquishing the idea of covering the York River road, he deceived all the calculations of the enemy. The more the latter extended his lines on the right, the easier it became for McClellan to establish, by his left, new communications with the James. This done, he could concentrate the whole of his army on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and, if forced by circumstances, proceed in the direction of the

James by crossing White Oak Swamp, or, if a favorable opportunity offered, even take advantage of Lee's eccentric movement to march direct upon Richmond, and enter that city before him. Once established on the James, he was free to reascend this river in order to attack the Confederate capital, or to cross it to undertake a new campaign on the south side with greater chances of success. He could thus thrust after parrying; and if overwhelmed by numbers, he would at least have frustrated the combinations upon which his opponent seemed to rely for crushing him. It was necessary above all to secure to the army the means for subsisting and fighting, during the time it would be deprived of communications with its stores. The wagons of the several corps were loaded with eight days' rations and a large quantity of ammunition. A drove of two thousand five hundred head of cattle was collected together and parked under the shade of the beautiful foliage which gives the borders of the Chickahominy the appearance of an English garden. At the same time, the wounded, the sick, the lame and all the non-combatants (*bouches inutiles*) were sent to White House. The vast stores which had accumulated there were hastily reshipped, and several vessels loaded with provisions were already proceeding down York River, with directions to await further instructions at the entrance of the James. The execution of these measures, which had begun amid the silence of the night of the 25th-26th, was continued during the two succeeding days, despite the noise and turmoil of conflicts. From that moment the army of the Potomac, able to depend upon its own resources for a whole week, resembled a ship which, with its cargo and ballast on board, is only fastened to her mooring by a slender rope. It was destined to encounter many storms before casting anchor on the banks of James River. To venture thus with an army of more than one hundred thousand volunteers into a series of operations, in the midst of which, whether victorious or vanquished, it was destined for some time to see its communications cut by the enemy, was certainly one of the boldest resolutions which can be adopted by a general in war. It was in singular contrast with the circumspection which had hitherto characterized all the movements of the Federals; but despite appearances, it was the less dangerous

course to pursue, and this contrast was in perfect harmony with the American character, which can at times combine a temporizing prudence with the strangest rashness.

On the morning of the 26th the Confederate army was in motion. Jackson left Ashland with his three divisions, marching toward the west. He was to take in rear all the positions which the Federals might attempt to defend along the Chickahominy. Branch's brigade, which was encamped higher up the river, came down by the left bank, while A. P. Hill crossed it at Meadow Bridge, in order to appear before the strong positions of Mechanicsville, and attack them in front, as soon as Jackson's cannon should announce that they were turned on the left. D. H. Hill and Longstreet were waiting for the bridge at Mechanicsville to be freed by this movement, in order to cross it immediately in succession. The first, bearing to the left, was to join hands with Jackson, and thus unite for the battle all the Confederate forces into a single army. The second was to take position on the right of A. P. Hill, and follow the course of the Chickahominy, while the left wing, formed now by Jackson, and the centre by the two Hills, would continue to advance in order to attack the right wing of the Federals, which was expected to deploy beyond the White House railway. Magruder, with his own division and that of Huger, numbering altogether about twenty-five thousand men, was left to cover Richmond and watch McClellan's left wing.

The movements of the Confederate army were not punctually executed. Jackson and his principal lieutenants were not so well acquainted as the defenders of Richmond with the country in which they were about to operate; they found it difficult to move their troops through that region, covered with woods and traversed by sinuous roads, so unlike the wide open spaces in the valley of Virginia. These unavoidable delays which Jackson had to encounter, however, did not prevent him from following Lee's instructions. After having communicated, through his scouts in the vicinity of Meadow Bridge, with the army which was coming out of Richmond, and having assured himself that he was supported in the bold movement he had undertaken, he took the White House railway for his objective point, and following as

straight a line as possible, preceded by the whole of Stuart's cavalry, he started on his march; he expected to meet the enemy on the borders of the Tolopotamoi.

While Jackson was approaching this water-course, the banks of which he was to find deserted, Lee had also put his army in motion. General A. P. Hill had massed his division in front of Meadow Bridge for the purpose of forcing the passage of that bridge as soon as Jackson had turned it by extending his left beyond Mechanicsville. Having advanced at the appointed time, he had met with no resistance around the bridge itself, of which he took possession without striking a blow; but a serious engagement took place shortly after between his troops and those of McCall, forming the extremity of the Federal line on that side.

McCall had only left one regiment and a battery at Mechanicsville, and this detachment had fallen back upon the rest of the division, after having checked for a moment by its fire the columns which were climbing the bare slopes of the hill on the summit of which the village stands. In was on Beaver-dam Creek, in fact, that the Federal general was awaiting the enemy. This marshy stream, which runs into the Chickahominy through a ravine with precipitous sides, is only accessible by two roads, one, to the north, leading to Bethesda church and the Pamunky; the other, to the south, communicates with Cold Harbor junction by way of Ellyson's Mills. McCall had entrusted Reynolds' brigade with the defence of the first pass, while Seymour was directed to guard the second. His third brigade, commanded by Meade, was held in reserve. A. P. Hill, having reached the Mechanicsville heights, deployed his division, nearly fourteen thousand men strong, in front of the formidable positions occupied by the Federals. His namesake, D. H. Hill, followed in his rear for the purpose of extending to the left, with Ripley's brigade in advance. Lee directed in person all the movements which were to place his army in line. President Davis had come out of Richmond to witness the first act of this great conflict. The Confederates knew that it was easy to turn the position of the Federals by attacking it from the north. If McCall was supported on that side—that is to say, on his right—by considerable forces, Jackson could not fail to meet it on his route, and the noise of cannon would soon

apprise his chief of such an encounter. It was natural to infer, therefore, from the prolonged silence, that McCall was isolated, and that the army of the Shenandoah was about to take his position in rear without striking a blow; consequently, there was nothing to be done but to wait for the issue of this movement. But Lee, rendered impatient at the slowness with which his orders were executed, and stimulated, it may be, by the presence of the President, could not resist the temptation to hurl against the Federal positions the fine troops he was leading into battle for the first time. It is true that time was precious, and that no one among the Confederates who saw those magnificent regiments and witnessed the fervent zeal which animated them was doubtful of success. Pender's brigade, of A. P. Hill's division, reinforced by that of Ripley, attempted to cross the Beaver-dam at Ellyson's Mills, while a strong demonstration was made on the left upon the Bethesda road. But the Federals, being completely sheltered, received with a terrific fire of musketry and artillery the assailants, who were utterly unprotected against their shot. On the left a Georgia regiment advanced alone close to the Union lines; but a final volley drove it back in disorder upon the rest of the column engaged in this demonstration. At Ellyson's Mills, Pender and Ripley, after witnessing the destruction of one half of their brigades, without being even able to reach the enemy, were obliged to recross the stream with the remnant of their troops. Meanwhile, the Confederate chief, exasperated by this check, still persisted in attacking the Federal positions in front. Their whole line advanced, and was exposed to the fire of the enemy's cannon, while a new attack was attempted against the batteries which commanded Ellyson's Mills. Vain was the bloody effort. The assaulting columns were checked and driven back, the Federal shells striking the long lines of the Confederates fairly in the centre, and after four hours of fighting night put an end to the conflict, without a solitary inch of ground having been gained by the assailants. This imprudent attack had cost them nearly three thousand men, while the Federals had only two hundred and fifty wounded and eighty killed.

The battle of Beaver-dam Creek, where so many men had been sacrificed fruitlessly, was an unfortunate beginning for the

great operation of Lee. The number of victims was concealed from the army, and the Confederate generals waited to hear from Jackson, whose cannon had not been once heard during the whole of that day.

The latter, however, had executed the movement which had been prescribed to him. Crossing the Tolopotamoi, he had continually pushed forward, leaving the Chickahominy gradually behind him, but without meeting any of the enemy's forces, except Stoneman's cavalry, and night had overtaken him near the clearings of Hundeleys Corner, where he had bivouacked. Impressed with the purpose of his chief, in haste to outflank the right wing of the Federals and to seize the White House railway, the noise of cannon along the Beaver-dam, on which he had turned his back, had only the effect of hastening his march. McClellan, on his side, had been informed of Jackson's movement, both through Stoneman, who had been watching the march of the Confederate general since morning with several regiments of cavalry, and by the few words which had fallen from prisoners captured by McCall. As the latter all belonged to Lee's army, it was evident that Jackson was manœuvring on the extreme Federal right, and that his approaching arrival would be sufficient to cause the defences of Beaver-dam Creek to fall. McClellan was expecting this, and had instructed General Barnard, chief of engineers of his army, to select a new position, which covered the bridges of the Chickahominy, upon which the whole right wing was ordered to fall back on the 27th at daybreak.

This position was not very strong; the hills adjoining the Chickahominy, although quite steep on the river side upon which the Federals were resting, sloped down in slight undulations on the side where the enemy was expected, and presented no natural line of defence. Between Mechanicsville and the Alexander bridge, where the forest sweeps down to the edge of the Chickahominy swamps, the hills commanding the left bank of this water-course are for the most part under cultivation, and their crest alone is crowned with isolated clusters of trees. This open space stretches thus a distance of from five to six miles in length, while its width gradually increases from one and a half to three miles on a line with the Alexander bridge.

At the point where this breadth is greatest stands the building which gives its name to the important cross-roads of Cold Harbor. Among the roads crossing at this point, one connects at Bethesda with that from Mechanicsville to the Pamunky; another leads to Mechanicsville by way of the houses of New Cold Harbor and Doctor Gaines'; a third, passing by McGee's farm, at a distance of three or four hundred feet from Cold Harbor, descends toward the Chickahominy, to continue its course through the woods as far as Dispatch station. The causeway constructed by Colonel Alexander, leading to the bridge which bears his name, struck this road a little above the point where it penetrated into the marshy forest bordering the large clearing; and finally, a cross-road branched off from this same point, connecting it directly with New Cold Harbor, and running beside a long narrow wood belonging to this plantation.

The line of defence selected by General Barnard rested its left on the Chickahominy below the Gaines house. This portion of the line could have been effectively protected by the small stream called Powhite Creek, which runs at right angles to the course of the river, and on which Gaines' Mill is situated; but it had been laid out two or three hundred feet in rear, through a long strip of wood rather narrow and easy of access, which descended nearly to the river. It fronted westward. The centre of the line, placed at right angles and facing north, followed the New Cold Harbor road, resting upon the woods; thence it stretched over a considerable space of decidedly undulating ground, and crossed an open field, terminating on the other side of the same wood, the extremity of which it intersected. The right of the line, still more drawn back, was traced across McGee's farm on the road from Cold Harbor to Dispatch, resting upon the impassable swamps which border the large clearing on this side.

A little before daylight McCall left the position of Beaver-dam, which he had so well defended the day before. The brigades of Martindale and Griffin of Morell's division, which had come the previous evening to take position alongside of him, but had not been in action, remained to cover his retreat. The Confederates soon attacked them with as much fierceness, but with as little success, as on the preceding day. Taking advantage of a moment's

pause, while his adversaries were resting, Morell quickly abandoned the works he occupied, and hastened to join the rest of Porter's corps at Gaines' Mill without being pursued.

At noon on the 27th the twenty-five thousand men composing this corps awaited the enemy in the position we have described. All their baggage, all their *matériel*, their park of siege guns and their reserve artillery, had been transferred, during the night or early in the morning, to the other side of the Chickahominy; the difficult task entrusted to the right wing of the army of the Potomac was not to throw any obstacle in the way of the enemy to prevent him from extending his lines and cutting the railroad, but simply to bar his approach to the river. General McClellan, as we have before remarked, had no other object in view but to prevent his opponent from crossing this stream during the movement he was obliged to make in order to reach the James. But he was of opinion that to defend the right bank it was necessary to wait with firm attitude for the Confederates on the left bank; otherwise, they could have rapidly descended as far as Bottom's Bridge, or even Long's Bridge, and there finding crossings which the Federals could not guard, they could fall upon the seemingly less exposed flank of the long columns which were about to march in toward the James.

Porter placed Morell in the narrow wood which extends back of Powhite Creek. The three brigades belonging to this division were thus disposed: Butterfield on the left, in the flat lands adjoining the river; Martindale in the centre, occupying the edge of the Powhite wood; Griffin on the right, deployed across the forest of which this wood is only the extremity, and resting upon New Cold Harbor. The position of the last was a difficult one, for his line was not fortified by any depression in the ground, while the thickness of the surrounding foliage exposed it to all surprises of the enemy. Sykes' division formed the centre and the right of Porter's corps. The brigades were deployed in two lines each consisting of two regiments. McCall's division was placed in reserve; one of his brigades under Meade on the left, in rear of Morell's troops; the rest under Reynolds and Seymour, on the extreme right, observing the road to Dispatch station. Twelve batteries, half of which were regular artillery, sup-

ported the Federal infantry, but the undulations of the ground and the proximity of the woods destroyed much of their efficiency. A few squadrons of the Fifth regular cavalry, and two regiments of mounted volunteers, completed this force.

Master of the Beaver-dam passes, Lee had followed the Federals step by step, pressing them close, but being careful not to bring on an engagement. Indeed, he was far from having fathomed the designs of his adversary. Believing him still bent upon preserving his communications with the White House, he expected every moment to hear that Jackson had met the right wing of the Federals, and wanted to give his lieutenant time to feel the enemy before going into battle. Meanwhile, the whole of his army had been deployed as soon as he had obtained control of the Beaver-dam passes. Longstreet had come by Ellyson's Mills to take position on the right and rear of A. P. Hill; D. H. Hill, resting upon the left, had struck into the road leading from Mechanicsville to the Pamunkey, upon which he was to join Jackson.

About one o'clock the heads of column of A. P. Hill, who was following the Cold Harbor road, encountered the first line of Griffin's brigade at the entrance of the wood occupied by the Federals, whose fire, supported by numerous cannon, brought them to a full stop. Hill's artillery planted itself in vain within short range to support the attack; the Federal shells which swept the plateau soon reduced it to silence. In vain did Hill bring back his division to the charge several times. Fatigued and probably discouraged by the combat of the previous day, and the fruitless losses they had sustained, his soldiers were unable to break the Federal line. Three regiments, which for an instant struck it, were immediately repulsed, and the rest fell back in disorder. Hill's main attack had been directed upon the wood of New Cold Harbor, between that place on the left and a point on the right where this wood becomes narrower as it stretches down into the valley. This attack had been repulsed by the right of Morell's division and Sykes' left brigade, commanded by the young and valiant Warren; before the end of the first engagement these troops had been reinforced by Meade's and Seymour's brigades.

Lee had arrived on the field of battle; the unexpected resistance that Hill had met with showed that he had a considerable

portion of the enemy's army before him, and that, instead of extending his lines to defend his communications with the White House, the Federal commander had concentrated his entire force in the neighborhood of the Chickahominy. It was necessary, therefore, that Jackson, who was proceeding toward the left of Tunstall station, should return to the right to attack the flank of the Federals in the positions they had selected, and cut them off entirely from York River, which was the object of all the manœuvres executed during these three days. Cold Harbor was indicated to Jackson as the point of direction.

While waiting for the arrival of this powerful reinforcement, Lee made a new attempt between three and four o'clock to carry the Federal positions. In pursuance of his instructions, Hill returned to the charge near New Cold Harbor, and Longstreet, who had deployed on his right, made a strong diversion against Morrell's and McCall's troops, posted in the narrow section of the woods, while this movement was supported by all the available artillery. But Hill was not more successful this time than before, and Longstreet soon perceived that he would have to bear the whole brunt of the battle. Instead of making a simple demonstration, he determined to charge the Federal troops opposed to him, with his whole division.

Those troops received at the same instant an important reinforcement. Porter's three divisions, numbering about twenty-five thousand men, which until then had held out against the equal forces of Hill and Longstreet, had been engaged to the last man; at the solicitation of their chief, who felt himself pressed on every side, General McClellan had just sent Slocum's division of Franklin's corps to their assistance. It arrived just at the moment when Longstreet was charging the left wing of the Federal army with the greatest vigor. The latter resisted with difficulty. Porter always showed himself where the danger was greatest, encouraged his soldiers and re-formed their ranks in the midst of a shower of balls. The battle raged with equal violence along the whole line from New Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy. The brigades and regiments successively brought forward from the reserve, to fill the gaps caused by the enemy's fire, or to replace the troops who had exhausted their ammunition, had be-

come divided and scattered; McCall's soldiers had become mixed with those of Morrell in the woods, so that the generals, having no longer their troops in hand, could not direct them, and were reduced to giving the combatants examples of personal bravery wherever the chances of the conflict led them. Besides, it was impossible, amid the dust and smoke and the intervening clusters of trees which intercepted the view, to form a clear idea of the whole field. At this juncture Slocum made his appearance. His division was immediately parcelled out like the others; Bartlett went to the right to support Sykes; Newton got into line on the left to oppose Longstreet, by the side of Morrell's and McCall's soldiers. If, in thus sharing his division, Slocum had deprived himself of the means of uniting it again for a new effort, he had at least supplied with fresh troops all the points menaced by the enemy; he arrested the assailants, and inflicted upon them, for the moment, a bloody check. It was nearly five o'clock in the evening; Lee had not been able to effect a breach in a single one of the positions which since four o'clock he had attacked with so much vigor. The soldiers of Hill and Longstreet were exhausted.

Meanwhile, Porter, seeing that the enemy would not grant him a moment's rest except for the purpose of instantly returning to the charge, called for immediate reinforcements. General McClellan, informed by the occurrences of the preceding day, of the presence of Jackson, and of the crossing to the left bank of the Chickahominy by a portion of the Confederate army, knew that the enemy must have more than sixty thousand men on that side of the river. He had opposed to this force up to that time only thirty-three thousand or thirty-five thousand, under Porter at Gaines' Mill; he had yet a few hours of daylight before him to finish the battle, and could have availed himself of them to bring the largest portion of his army to the succor of his lieutenant, and face the Confederates with a force at least equal to their own. But convinced that Lee commanded an army of one hundred and sixty thousand men, he believed that nearly one hundred thousand of them had been left in front of his lines, from White Oak Swamp to Golding; he was unwilling to weaken his left wing in their presence, to strengthen his right. His corps commanders, being consulted by him, fully endorsed his views, saying that they needed all their

troops to defend their positions. Old Sumner alone had offered two brigades, which were forwarded to the battle-field, at the close of the evening.

While a decisive struggle was taking place on the left bank, and all the available forces of the enemy were being brought together, to attack the thirty-five thousand men forming the right wing of the army of the Potomac, seventy or eighty thousand Federals were thus kept back on the right bank by twenty-five thousand Confederates. Magruder, who was in command of the latter, succeeded, as he had done at Warwick Creek, in deceiving his adversary as to his real strength. He kept him constantly on the alert during the entire day; and just when the fire slackened on the other bank, he even made a vigorous attack upon Smith's division at Golding. He was repulsed with loss, leaving the greatest portion of a Georgia regiment, with its commander, Colonel Lamar, formerly a member of Congress, in the hands of the Federals. But he had thereby accomplished his object and prevented new reinforcements from being sent to the aid of the Federal right wing.

In the mean time, Lee was impatiently waiting for the arrival of Jackson, who had been delayed on his march, and who alone could henceforth secure him the victory. The commander of the army of the Shenandoah had joined D. H. Hill's division at Bethesda, and was approaching the field of battle with an army of forty thousand men, fresh and full of ardor. The firing of musketry, the repeated volleys of which burst forth on the side of Cold Harbor, on the extreme left of the Confederate line, soon proclaimed that he had at last met the enemy, and that the battle was about to assume a new aspect. Lee rushed to the sound, and meeting Jackson concerted with him a general attack. Whiting and a brigade of Jackson's old division proceeded to the right to support Longstreet and take position between him and the *débris* of A. P. Hill's division. The attack on the wood of New Cold Harbor on the left was entrusted to the remainder of Jackson's division; in the vicinity of Cold Harbor were deployed Ewell's forces first, then those of D. H. Hill, while Stuart's cavalry was drawn up still further to the left, as far as the forest.

Toward six o'clock this new army renewed the attack upon Porter's troops, already exhausted by five hours' fighting. D. H. Hill gave the signal of attack to the extreme left, and in less than a quarter of an hour the battle raged along the whole line from the borders of the Chickahominy to the front of Cold Harbor. The Federal artillery was reinforced, and concentrated its fire upon every point where the enemy's battalions could be seen. Nor was it made to falter by the advance of the enemy on its right, near McGee's farm, but poured grape-shot into the ranks of D. H. Hill, almost at the cannon's mouth. The latter captured a few pieces of cannon, only to lose them again an instant after. They had, however, gained some ground on this side, but in the mean while Ewell, who was posted between McGee's farm and New Cold Harbor, had seen all his efforts fail before the well-sustained fire of his adversaries. He nevertheless led the attack soldiers proved by all the marches and victories in the valley of Virginia, but he found before him the brigade of regulars, who make it a point of honor never to yield before volunteers, whatever may be their number. To support Ewell, Jackson ordered three brigades of his old division to advance successively against the wood of New Cold Harbor. This was the weakest point of the Federal line; for lying across the densest part of the forest, it was exposed to constant surprises, and could not be supported by artillery, as elsewhere. The brigades of Meade and Taylor of Slocum's division made a stubborn defence in this difficult position, but they were slowly driven back by the superior forces which attacked them. This advantage which the Confederates had gained in the centre exposed the angle of the wood at the point where it becomes narrow as it stretches down toward the Chickahominy. The Federal left had hitherto made an obstinate stand in this narrow section of the wood, against the assaults of Longstreet at first, and of Whiting after him. The latter finally availed himself of the confusion into which his adversaries had been thrown by the loss of the wood at New Cold Harbor, to take possession of it; but every time that his soldiers ventured beyond the curtain of trees the enemy's cannon compelled them to run back for shelter behind this protecting screen. Meanwhile, the Federal infantry, which had again formed into line near its guns, was becoming exhausted by so unequal a

struggle; the ammunition was giving out, no reinforcements arrived, and the moment approached when excessive fatigue would overcome the energy of the steadiest men. The regiments, of which more than one were reduced to a handful of men, drew together in isolated groups; the combat continued, but was carried on individually, by soldiers among whom all systematic connection had ceased to exist. Precisely at this moment Jackson came forward with his last reserves and ordered a general attack. The attenuated lines of the Federals were everywhere shattered. Whiting sent forward one of his brigades, composed of Texan soldiers, into the re-entering angle formed by the thick wood of Cold Harbor and the clusters of trees which extend its line toward the river. General Hood, who was then one of the most brilliant officers in the Confederate army, although he subsequently became a most indifferent general-in-chief, was in command of this brigade, to which he imparted his own martial ardor. In vain did the Federal artillery concentrate its fire to check him like the others as he emerged from the wood. The four Texan regiments advanced without faltering, under a shower of shells. As they closed up their ranks, which the Federal missiles were thinning more and more, their long line scarcely wavered. They paused for a moment to fire, but Hood instantly pushed them forward; they rushed onward with loud yells to the very mouth of the guns which had so mercilessly poured grape into them. The artillery horses hitched to the limbers either ran away with their drivers, or were driven off by them. The Federal soldiers, who up to this time had stood by those guns to support them, grew weak at last; not daring yet to take to flight openly, they began to desert the post of danger under pretence of carrying to ambulances the wounded, whose number was rapidly increasing. The most determined among them were soon hurried along in the retreat, which was accelerated more and more, and the few gunners who had persisted in remaining at their post to the last, also disappeared in the tide of Texans, which overwhelmed them in an instant, leaving nothing behind but corpses lying on the ground.

Longstreet has imitated this movement on the extreme left of the Federal line, and the greater part of Butterfield's brigade, being cut off from the rest of the army, barely escaped through

the Upper Duane bridge. The regular cavalry, led by a chief of great personal bravery, but more accustomed to the pursuit of Indians than to handling squadrons before a disciplined enemy, tries in vain to regain a portion of what has been lost. Placed at the bottom of the valley, General Cooke, in order to lead his men to the charge, makes them scale the steep, clayey acclivities, the summit of which is already occupied by the right wing of the Confederates; consequently, his horses are soon out of wind. The Federal cavalry, in confronting the enemy's lines, which are unflinchingly awaiting its approach, disperses into skirmishing squads, which resort to pistol-fighting, after the manner they had learned in the far West. Such a conflict could not last more than a few minutes. One-half of the mounted regulars are left upon the field, or in the hands of the enemy; the rest fall back to throw confusion into the Federal battalions, already in full retreat. The Confederates are carrying everything before them along the whole line. Two Federal regiments, which have bravely kept up the fight in the wood of New Cold Harbor when all was giving way around them, find themselves surrounded, decimated and compelled to surrender. Ewell and D. H. Hill also take advantage in their turn of the successes achieved by the right wing of the army. Their artillery succeeds at last in planting itself on the summit of the hill so long occupied by Sykes' division, and crushes that division with its fire. Being thus attacked in front and menaced in flank by the enemy, who has taken possession of the wood of New Cold Harbor, Sykes falls back, defending the ground foot by foot. But a portion of his artillery, the teams of which have been killed, remains on the field of battle. The regulars do not allow Hill to push his success along the road leading from Cold Harbor to Dispatch, by which he could have cut off the retreat of the enemy. Fearfully reduced as they are, they care less for the losses they have sustained than for the mortification of yielding to volunteers.

Meanwhile, the retreat of the Federals on the left and centre threatens to become a rout. The crowd of fugitives, with which are mingled artillery teams, followed at a distance by groups of brave soldiers who have rallied around their chiefs, has rapidly descended into a small ravine, beyond which rises another hill.

On the summit of this hill the two Cold Harbor roads form a junction to gain the Alexander bridge beyond, at the bottom of the valley, the only passage by which the Federals may yet be able to cross the Chickahominy. If the enemy succeeds in seizing this position, his two wings will unite for the purpose of driving the *débris* of the right wing of the army of the Potomac into the swamp, and crush them before they have been able to cross the narrow defile of the bridge. But at this critical moment fortune does not employ her final rigors against the Federals. The Confederates, fatigued by the effort they have just made, halt to re-form their lines. Hood's brigade alone has lost over one thousand men in the last charge. Stuart, near Cold Harbor, does not know how to make his excellent troops play the part which appertains to cavalry on the eve of a victory; he allows himself to be held back by the resolute stand of the regulars, and some few hundred men bearing the flags of Warren's brigade.

The retreat of the Federals, which was hastened by the declivity which they were descending into the ravine, is, on the contrary, slackened when they climb the other side. The battle has suddenly ceased; an effort is made to ascertain the condition of things; they halt. Twenty-two pieces of cannon have fallen into the hands of the enemy, but there yet remain forty or fifty. Most of these are again placed in battery, and open from a distance upon the lines of the assailants a fire which restores courage to the Union soldiers. The latter listen once more to the voices of their chiefs. Porter, Morrell, Slocum, Meade and Butterfield see increasing the groups gathering around them at random from every regiment. On the right the Federals have lost less ground and preserved better order in their retreat. At this instant Richardson* and Meagher arrive on the ground with the two brigades sent by Sumner. The second is composed exclusively of Irish-

* This is a slight error. The brigades were those of French and Meagher. See General McClellan's Report, page 127: "French's and Meagher's brigades now appeared, driving before them the stragglers who were thronging toward the bridge." And again: "These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by their example, as well as by the steadiness of their bearing, reanimated our own troops and warned the enemy that reinforcements had arrived." This praise of their conduct renders it the more important that it should rest where it was merited.—ED.

men, the green flag, ornamented with a golden harp, floating in their midst. They arrive, shouting vociferously and displaying all that vivacity and dash for which the children of this ancient war-like race are noted when marching to battle. Their comrades, on finding themselves thus supported, respond with loud hurrahs, by which they seek to gain fresh courage. In the mean time, the enemy has re-formed his ranks, and is again in motion; but instead of a routed crowd he beholds a body of resolute troops, who seem to be calmly waiting for him on the slopes situated on the other side of the ravine. At this sight he hesitates, and approaching night puts an end to the sanguinary struggle.

The losses were heavy on both sides. Out of thirty-five thousand men engaged, the Federals had nearly seven thousand killed or wounded. The assailants suffered even more, but they had achieved a signal victory. Twenty-two guns, a large number of prisoners, and most of the wounded, abandoned by the enemy on the field of battle, afforded substantial proof of their success. Their opponents had fought with great vigor, and it was no disgrace to Porter's soldiers that they had to succumb in such an unequal struggle. Besides, the success of the Confederates was not so decisive as they at first imagined. The resistance made by the Federals at Gaines' Mill, and their inaction on the other side of the Chickahominy, had led Lee and his generals to believe that they had just beaten the largest portion of the army of the Potomac, and that by driving it back to the river they had completely turned it by their manœuvres. Convinced that they had cut off the Federals from their only line of retreat, they already fancied that McClellan, hemmed in among the marshes of the Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp, was about to capitulate with all his forces, or that the great army of invasion, harassed on every side, exhausted by fatigue and hunger, would dissolve before them like a storm-cloud after thunder.

While they were preparing to gather the fruits of their victory, the Federals were collecting together and counting their numbers. Generals and colonels were trying to rally the scattered fragments of their brigades and regiments. Then, when order was completely restored, battalion after battalion passed over the Alexander bridge, occupied by a squadron of cavalry, which, during

the evening, had prevented the fugitives from approaching it. In the midst of the obscurity, the Union general Reynolds had been separated from his men by the enemy's pickets. But despite a few incidents of this nature, the retreat was ably conducted, and at daybreak not a single straggler, wounded man nor cannon remained on the ground which had been occupied during the night by Porter's troops. The regulars were the last to cross, after which they entirely destroyed the magnificent bridge which had cost so much trouble to construct.

The Federals had not succeeded in preventing the Confederates from occupying the left bank of the Chickahominy, but they had made them pay so dear for its possession that the latter did not feel disposed to make an immediate attempt to force a passage, for the purpose of disputing with them the opposite side of the river.

While the darkness of a short summer night was covering the mournful and silent march of the Federal soldiers who had just fought the battle of Gaines' Mill, a blazing pine-wood fire was crackling under the tall acacias which commanded the south entrance of the Alexander bridge. It was on this spot that the headquarters of the army had been situated during the preceding days. This camp had been broken up like all the rest, for the entire army was ready to march; but the tall flitting shadows, projected here and there by the flame upon the dark background of the surrounding trees, showed that its occupants had not yet deserted it.

In fact, General McClellan had assembled several of his generals around this fire, and was consulting with them regarding the dispositions to be made for the following day, upon which the very existence of the army of the Potomac seemed to depend. The idea was for a moment entertained of playing double or quits on the right bank of the Chickahominy the game which had just been lost on the other side. It was McClellan himself who, forgetting his habitual circumspection, and emboldened by the imminence of the danger, thought of taking advantage of the enemy's movement against his right wing to throw himself upon unprotected Richmond with all the forces that were left him. The Confederates, being separated from their capital by the Chickahominy,

would not be able to arrive in time to succor it, so that the defeat of the previous day might turn out to be only the prelude to a brilliant success. His lieutenants, however, Heintzelman especially, opposed this project, and found no difficulty in diverting his attention from it. It must be acknowledged that it would have been a desperate undertaking; for the condition of the army was such that, so far from justifying any rash movement, it imposed upon its chief the duty of sacrificing the most tempting combinations to the dictates of prudence. The day before, while Porter was keeping the largest portion of Lee's army engaged at Gaines' Mill, it might have been possible to concentrate the rest of the Federal army, and thus penetrate into Richmond. But the propitious hour had passed. That portion of the army which had just fought at Gaines' Mill had suffered too severely to be able to resume hostilities on the following day. All that Lee would have had to do in order to oppose this bold movement would have been to recross the Chickahominy near the field of battle, and fall upon the flank of the Federals, if they had come out of their entrenchments. Moreover, as usual, the Confederate forces were exaggerated in the councils of McClellan. But let us ask, Did this plan, the failure of which would have involved the destruction of the whole army, offer any tangible and lasting advantages in the event of success? Once master of Richmond, McClellan would soon have been besieged in turn by the conquerors of Gaines' Mill; he would thereby have sacrificed his communications by way of the White House, without having been able to secure a new base of operations on the James, the navigation of which above City Point could easily have been closed by the enemy's batteries placed on the right bank.

In these circumstances, even the capture of the enemy's capital would only have aggravated, by retarding for a few days, the dangers which threatened the army of the Potomac.

The retreat was decided on; the first siege of Richmond was raised.

CHAPTER IV.

GLENDALÉ AND MALVERN.

WE have stated that the army of the Potomac, by changing its base of operations a few weeks sooner, might have accomplished important results. But even if it had been entirely free to execute this movement, the configuration of the James would have compelled it to move away from Richmond, to rest upon that part of the river which the navy could reach without danger. This manœuvre, which had been in preparation by McClellan for several days, would not have assumed the character of a retreat if it had not been undertaken the day after a bloody defeat.

But on the evening of the 27th of June it had become a necessity. It alone, in fact, afforded the Federals the means of escaping a serious disaster. A few words, regarding the situation of the two armies, will enable the reader to appreciate the difficult position in which they found themselves, the resources they still possessed for getting out of it, and the rare ability with which General McClellan knew how to use them.

The Chickahominy, after running parallel to the James River and the Pamunky, at nearly an equal distance from these two streams, empties into the former about fifty kilometres below Richmond. The James in its numerous windings alternately approaches and recedes from this water-course. In the elbow called Turkey Bend, which lies twenty-three kilometres in a direct line from Richmond, the river, which is both wide and deep, waters the base of a large hillock, that rises on the left bank in a succession of bare slopes above the forest. From this eminence, named Malvern Hill by the early English settlers, to the confluence of White Oak Swamp and the Chickahominy below Bottom's Bridge, there is only a distance of twelve kilometres, but the tract which separates them is singularly difficult. The White

Oak Swamp, which we have described as covering the Federal left, and forming by its course an acute angle with the Chickahominy, was the first obstacle which the Federals had to encounter if they proceeded toward the James. There was but one road crossing it, which, connecting with the Williamsburg turnpike near Bottom's Bridge, ran due south for a distance of five kilometres, crossing the waters of the swamp, which, being shut in between two unwooded hills, presented only the appearance of a small stream, and reascended on the other side the cultivated slopes called Frazier's Farm. One or two kilometres beyond, this road joins that coming from New Kent Court-house—that is to say, from the east—which crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge. Thence it inclined to south-west, and at the end of a mile and a half, it entered a group of connected clearings known by the name of Glendale, the centre of which was occupied by the large farm of Mr. Nelson. Farther yet, the road took a southerly direction, under the name of Quaker road, and struck the northern slopes of Malvern Hill, five kilometres farther on, ascending them directly, and finally descending in an oblique line on the other side, to join the elbow of Turkey Bend at Haxall's Landing. A great number of smaller roads coming from Richmond debouched perpendicularly into the Quaker road, like so many radii connecting the arc of a circle with its centre. To the north of White Oak Swamp there was only one of these roads, the Williamsburg turnpike, the old line of attack of the Federals, while south of it there were three principal ones—the Charles City road, following the right bank of White Oak Swamp, the New Market road, near the left bank of the James, and the Central road, between the two. Before approaching Malvern Hill, however, the New Market road turned abruptly to the left, intersecting the Central road and merging into the Charles City road, to connect with the Quaker road in the Glendale clearings. Several smaller roads, less practicable for an army, wound about these three principal roads, connecting the New Market and Central road directly with Haxall's Landing and the Quaker road. Their numerous zigzags turned them into perfect labyrinths, calculated to lead a solitary traveller astray, or to misdirect the heads of column of an army on the march. With the excep-

tion of the clearings of Frazier's Farm and Glendale, and the cultivated slopes of Malvern Hill, the whole of this region was only a dense forest of oaks and magnolias, but the soil was generally sandy and solid. There was but one small water-course to be met with, the Western Run, which, skirting Malvern Hill, slopes north and east, and empties into the James below this hill.

All these topographical details were unknown at McClellan's headquarters, and, what is yet more extraordinary, they were no better known to the Confederate staff, who had never expected to make a campaign on that side. The information possessed by the Federals, regarding the country into which their army was about to be launched with its accompanying heavy trains, was extremely vague, and it may be truly said, that in making Turkey Bend the objective point of his march, General McClellan was combining a journey of discovery with the retreat of his army. He was therefore obliged, throughout the whole of this dangerous expedition, to assure himself personally of the direction indicated to each of his corps, and was thereby prevented from commanding in person at all the battles that were fought on the route, which subsequently drew upon him the most violent and undeserved reproaches.

During the night of the 27th-28th, Porter's corps, after crossing the Chickahominy, occupied the line of heights which command the course of this river on the right bank. Turned toward the north, these troops faced the hills where their adversaries of the day previous were posted. Slocum's division had taken post on their left, adjoining that of Smith, which with it formed Franklin's corps, and which was posted among the earthworks of Golding. The rest of the line of entrenchments facing Richmond was occupied by four divisions, disposed as follows from right to left: Richardson, who had just been joined by the two brigades sent to Gaines' Mill; then Sedgwick, both under the orders of Sumner; farther on, Hooker and Kearny, composing Heintzelman's corps; at the extreme left, Keyes, with the divisions of Couch and Peck, guarding the passes of White Oak Swamp.

On the other side, the conquerors of Gaines' Mill had slept on the field of battle, while Magruder kept a watch around Rich-

mond, very uneasy when he thought of the small number of troops he had at his command.

The retreat upon the James afforded McClellan the important advantage of releasing him from the defence of his line of communications with the White House, against which it was evident the Confederates at first intended to direct all their efforts. In the condition in which his army found itself after the battle, a retreat begun across a difficult country for the purpose of covering the White House would probably have only terminated under the walls of Yorktown. By abandoning his dépôts on York River he avoided this danger; but it then became necessary for him to carry along all that was needed to subsist his troops, until he could find new supplies on the James—that is to say, for five, or perhaps six, days. The foresight of the general-in-chief had fortunately provided beforehand all the resources which such an enterprise required. But while these indispensable resources rendered the march of the army practicable, they could not fail to impede and retard its movements. The soldiers received two or three days' cooked rations, additional provisions for three more days being placed in the wagons. A drove of two thousand five hundred head of cattle had been also on its way to White Oak Swamp since the evening of the 27th. This long line of bellowing cattle was in singular contrast with the warlike scenes through which it had to pass. At times these thousands of animals, utterly indifferent to their surroundings, would stop, despite the cries of the drivers, who escorted them on horseback, and persistently browse on the grass silvered by the full moon; again, they would precipitate themselves with blind fury across the bivouacs, where everything contributed to increase their fright.

Three days' rations for one hundred thousand soldiers and twenty thousand non-combatants, five days' forage for forty thousand horses, three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery—in short, the munitions of such an army—constituted a formidable train. It was the task of the army of the Potomac to protect this train as far as the borders of the James. Consequently, however urgent may have been the march of the army itself, it was compelled to remain motionless, until this interminable ribbon should be unwound along the only and narrow road which was open to

it. Keyes' corps alone received orders to march on the evening of the 27th. Being placed at White Oak Swamp, it was directed to take the advance, with injunctions to cover continually the right flank of the train. The other corps, unable to move out of their positions in consequence of the crowded condition of the roads, were not even able to put their division-trains in motion before the evening of the 28th, so long was the line of wagons belonging to the general administration.

Meanwhile, the work of destruction, the inevitable consequence of every retreat, was rapidly progressing. No portion of the enemy's cavalry having reached the railroad during the night, that line remained open, and advantage was taken of it to send back upon York River the greatest possible number of sick, wounded, non-combatants of every description, as well as a large quantity of *matériel*. The last train of cars was then loaded with powder and shell, and the locomotive was despatched, under a full head of steam, in the direction of the Chickahominy bridge, which had been burning for some few minutes. A terrible explosion announced the arrival of this dangerous cargo amid the flames, and the simultaneous destruction of the bridge, cars and ammunition. The telegraph, however, had not ceased to perform its functions, but still continued to be the connecting link between the soldiers of the army of the Potomac and all that was dear to them now left behind. General McClellan was thus enabled to send a last despatch to the government at Washington, giving an account of the dangerous situation of his army. As he said himself, in words full of sadness and dignity, if so many brave soldiers were to perish in vain, the fault rested with those who had so imprudently haggled about reinforcements at the critical moment. This was a responsibility which the Federal authorities were unwilling to accept at any price. In order to get rid of it, they resorted to a culpable stratagem. Far from letting the public know the truth regarding what was taking place around Richmond, the Secretary of War, forgetting that he had to deal with a free people who would not tolerate deception, gave out that the army of the Potomac had undertaken a strategic movement which would result in the capture of Richmond. Consequently, when, after waiting four days, it became known that this army had

reached Turkey Bend with considerable difficulty, the excitement was all the greater, because the people had been kept in ignorance of its dangers, and had anticipated a very different issue. McClellan's enemies, instead of rendering justice to the manner in which he had conceived and executed this strategic movement, censured him for it as being nothing but a rout, and sought to turn it into ridicule. It would be perhaps going too far to interpret this announcement of an impending victory, made by the Federal government at the very time when McClellan was informing them of the difficulties of his position, as a perfidious scheme, designed to excite public opinion against the commander of the army of the Potomac; it is certain, however, that the government sought to conceal the facts which made the chief responsibility for the defeat fall upon itself. It persistently refused to give the text of McClellan's despatches to the newspapers; and, what is worse, when the whole series of official documents was laid before the committee on the conduct of the war, the government permitted itself to mutilate the text of its correspondence with the general, without making any mention whatever of the omissions.*

On the other bank of the Chickahominy, as soon as the sun of the 28th began to shine over the battle-field so painfully conquered the day before, Lee and his lieutenants bethought themselves of gathering the fruits of their recent victory. Their army had suffered cruelly. It required time to reorganize the corps, to collect together their elements, which had been scattered during the conflict, to attend for the first time to the ten thousand or eleven thousand wounded who were lying on the heights of Gaines' Mill, and finally to see to the distribution of rations and ammunition. Nevertheless, the Confederate army, still full of ardor, despite the heavy losses it had sustained, was able to put part of its battalions in motion by midday. Moments were precious, for it was import-

* Thus the despatch of which we have spoken above, addressed to Mr. Stanton on the 28th of June, twenty minutes after midnight, closed with these words: "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army." This phrase was suppressed at the War Department, as any one may ascertain by comparing two official documents, McClellan's Report, p. 132, and that of the committee, first part, first volume, p. 340.

ant to forestall McClellan on his line of retreat, and turn into a rout the retrograde march which his check of the preceding day would no doubt compel him to undertake. Jackson's soldiers were not in the habit of resting the day after a battle; therefore they were soon in motion. Lee, however, had not understood the manœuvre of his opponent. From the moment he crossed the Chickahominy to join Jackson, we have seen him actuated by the desire of flanking McClellan's right wing, so as to separate him from York River. In order to accomplish this object, he had already caused the army of the Shenandoah to follow the eccentric direction which came near preventing it from reaching the battle-field of Gaines' Mill in time. In delivering this battle, he had proposed to cut off McClellan entirely from the road leading to White House. Consequently, after having won this battle, all the movements of his army during the 28th were intended to prevent the army of the Potomac from putting itself again in communication with York River. If McClellan had the design naturally attributed to him by his adversary, he had but two ways of carrying it into effect: he could have crossed the Chickahominy with his whole army between Gaines' Mill and Bottom's Bridge, and tried to force a passage through the positions occupied by the Confederates; otherwise, he should have endeavored to outstrip them in speed by pushing his way back of the river, to cross it at some point lower down, so as to fall back upon Williamsburg. But, as we have seen, these two alternatives had been both discarded by McClellan, and his sagacity had inspired him with a determination, the merit of which consisted in its not having been fathomed by his adversaries. Consequently, the Confederate generals, after having vigorously executed a well-conceived plan, were deceived by their own wishes; they too readily imagined that the Federal general would fall into the trap which they had been preparing for him.

A division of cavalry, cleverly directed by Stoneman, contributed to confirm them in their error. The latter, in fact, by slowly retiring toward New Kent Court-house, seemed as if intending to cover the lower passes of the Chickahominy, as well as the Williamsburg turnpike, and he thus drew a portion of the enemy's forces on his side. Whilst Longstreet and Hill, who had suffered

most the day before, continued to occupy the heights of Gaines' Mill, three of Jackson's divisions deployed along the Chickahominy, as if to defend the left bank against the Federals, who were massed on the other side; the fourth, Ewell's, was despatched to Bottom's Bridge, when it became evident that McClellan had no intention of forcing a passage near the battle-field of the preceding day. Magruder, on his side, retaining his position in front of the Federal lines, could easily perceive that the number of troops occupying them had not diminished. For an instant only toward noon he thought these positions were about to be abandoned. Smith's division evacuated a few breastworks which had been erected in front of the fortifications at Golding. Magruder at once launched the Seventh and Eighth Georgia regiments of Toombs' brigade against these works; but being received by the fire of Hancock's brigade, they were repulsed, leaving two hundred wounded and prisoners on the ground, one of whom was a colonel. This brisk discharge of musketry was the only thing that occurred to disturb the silence of that long day, the 28th.

Every hour that elapsed amid this silence afforded an additional chance to the Federals for reaching the James without serious interruption. Consequently, in the midst of the apparent quiet among the troops, the work of pushing forward the train, and opening a way for its passage, was carried on with the utmost activity, while at the headquarters astonishment was manifested at the inaction of an adversary hitherto so vigilant and enterprising.

The dust raised above the forest by Ewell's march toward Bottom's Bridge soon explained the error committed by the enemy. Although a yet thicker cloud of dust betrayed the movement of the Federal train on the opposite bank, its appearance failed to undeceive the Confederates. They persisted in believing that McClellan was proceeding in the direction of Williamsburg. It was only when Stuart, who had followed Stoneman step by step with his cavalry, had reached the last fords of the Chickahominy, without finding even a Federal vidette to guard them, that Lee understood at last the bold manœuvre by which McClellan was about to rob him of a success which he had considered certain.

It was too late to remedy his mistake; the whole precious day had been wasted. Stuart's cavalry, which might so effectually have harassed the Federal vanguard, and preceded it to the borders of the James, either through White Oak Swamp or the lower Chickahominy, had advanced so far into the peninsula that it did not again make its appearance during the whole of the campaign. Ewell's soldiers, who were brought back during the night and posted near the remainder of Jackson's troops, had been exhausted by a fruitless march, and it was necessary to grant them at least a few hours' rest.

During the whole of this same night, the trains of the army of the Potomac were on their way toward White Oak Swamp. The bridge situated in front of Frazier's Farm had been reopened toward noon, and Keyes with his two divisions had encamped at Glendale, in the neighborhood of Nelson's Farm. The topographical officers had, moreover, discovered another passage through the swamp above this bridge, leading directly from Savage station to Glendale—a precious discovery, although this road was too much exposed in flank to the enemy, to venture over it with the train. The moment had arrived for evacuating the works which had hitherto concealed the preparations for the movement. This was a most delicate operation. It would have been desirable to effect it during the night, but the length of the train had not permitted this. Fortunately, when day broke, instead of shedding a glaring light over the two armies as on the preceding mornings, it was darkened by a thick fog, which for several hours completely concealed the movements of the Federals from the enemy. Their retreat had commenced. Henceforth, until the friendly gun-boats floating on the waters of the James should greet their sight, they would have to fight by day, and march during the night, almost without rest. Nor was the train, which resembled an immense reptile, allowed to make any stop. When wagons were drawn aside to give the horses time to feed, other wagons took their places. This column, formed of four or five teams abreast, moved along quite regularly in the midst of whirlwinds of dust and a stifling heat. The troops marched on the sides of the road. Between the heavy vehicles of the commissary department there were light ambulances overloaded with

wounded men; around the train crept along a large number of other wounded and sick men, who had left the hospital to follow the army, falling at every step and presenting a lamentable spectacle. It had been found impossible to take along all those who had been wounded in the recent battles, and nearly two thousand five hundred of them had been left at Savage station, with some surgeons, and recommended to the humanity, already experienced, of the Confederates. Near them a small mountain of coffee, rice, biscuit and hams was burning as a sort of holocaust offered to the god of war.

The troops who had suffered so severely at Gaines' Mill were immediately to follow Keyes' corps toward the James. The task of covering the retreat was entrusted to the yet untouched corps of Sumner and Heintzelman, and to Smith's division. As between White Oak Swamp and Turkey Bend the army was to be exposed to flank attacks of the enemy, who could not fail to come down from Richmond by the three roads we have mentioned, the troops covering this march were ordered to remain stationary during the day, and to move on again at night; in this way they were to relieve each other successively, each gaining one stage in the journey before the sun allowed the enemy to renew the fighting. On the morning of the 29th, Porter's corps and the divisions of McCall and Slocum took position beyond White Oak Swamp, so as to support Keyes at Glendale, and occupy the difficult pass of the swamp in force.

During this time the works in which the army had passed three long weeks were quietly evacuated. General McClellan had indicated to Sumner the positions which the troops forming the rear were to occupy, and had gone to superintend in person the march of the remainder of the army; for it was by the right border of the swamp that the enemy could strike the most dangerous blows. The rear-guard, on the contrary, had its two flanks protected against all attack from Richmond, before reaching the bridge,—on the left by the swamp, on the right by the Chickahominy; and these two obstacles, drawing gradually nearer to each other, narrowed the space of ground it had to defend, in proportion as it fell back.

The main portion of the Confederate army was therefore sepa-

rated from the enemy by a river difficult to cross, and had an immense circuit to make to overtake him on the new line of retreat he had chosen. Huger, with a single division, numbering from eight to ten thousand men, had been ordered several days before to occupy the right bank of White Oak Swamp. It would certainly have been impossible for him to impede McClellan's march with such a small force, but he could easily watch his movements, and ought to have noticed the direction in which Keyes had been marching since the 28th. He did not, however, display more activity on this occasion than at the battle of Fair Oaks. Allowing some of his squadrons to be borne down by Averill's Federal cavalry, without affording them any assistance, he remained inactive on the Charles City road, while the Federals continued their march unmolested during the whole of the 29th, without having to fire a musket-shot south of White Oak Swamp. Longstreet and Hill returned on the 29th, crossing by New Bridge to take position in his rear in the vicinity of Richmond, ready to operate, as circumstances might require, on either side of the swamp. Jackson, with his four divisions, remained north of the Chickahominy.

Finally, toward eight o'clock in the evening, Magruder, perceiving the abandonment of the Federal works, pushed forward McLaws' division, which had been placed under his orders, together with Griffith's brigade of his own division. The Federals steadily awaited their approach.

Heintzelman's corps, posted across the Williamsburg turnpike, occupied the works before which the Confederates had stopped on the day of Fair Oaks, his lines extending as far as the railroad. On his right was deployed Sumner's corps, skirting the edge of a wood situated about two kilometres in advance of Savage station. Of the two divisions composing this corps, that of Sedgwick was placed between Heintzelman and the railroad, and that of Richardson on the other side of this line. Still more to the right and in the rear, Smith's division occupied the heights which overlook the Chickahominy, where Porter had encamped the day before.

Toward nine o'clock the Confederates began the attack on a point called Allen's Farm, where Sedgwick's right formed a junction with Richardson's left. The latter first, and then Sedgwick, had to sustain the whole brunt of the fight. But the enemy was

repulsed along the whole line; and seeing the fruitlessness of their assaults, the Confederates soon retired. The darkness, in the midst of which this engagement ended, which had commenced too late to lead to any serious results, was against the aggressors, who, not being able to combine their movements, unnecessarily lost many men, and among others General Griffith.

Meanwhile, Jackson had been ordered to cross the Chickahominy on the morning of the 29th, and to throw himself with all his forces upon the troops posted on the other side of the river, which he had thus far believed to be held in check by his mere presence. He at once set himself to work to reconstruct the Alexander bridge, designated in his reports by the name of Grape-vine bridge. This bridge opened at the foot of the hill where Doctor Trent's house stands. The Federals no longer occupied this position, Franklin having placed Smith's division lower down, so as to cover the approaches to Savage station, on the side of the Chickahominy.

As to Sumner, he was ordered to fall back until he should join Smith's left. He nevertheless remained for some time before Allen's Farm, thus leaving his right entirely unprotected (*en l'air*), and opening a vast space in the Federal line in front of the Trent house, precisely at the point upon which Jackson's heads of column could not fail to emerge. The Union generals, however, had quickly perceived this danger. Franklin had brought Smith back nearer to Savage station, in order to close up the Federal line. On being informed of this movement, Sumner finally determined to fall back likewise upon the position, of which Savage is the centre; and assuming command of the five divisions which were about to assemble at this point, he resolved to defend it to the utmost, agreeably to McClellan's orders.

Heintzelman, who with his army corps formed the Federal left, had received formal orders to halt at a short distance from the station and not to continue the retreat until dark; but instead of complying with these instructions, he proceeded with his two divisions in the direction of White Oak Swamp. McClellan had designated to him a road which, after following the line of this swamp for some distance, crossed it at Brackett's Ford, above the bridge, over which the remainder of the army was passing. He

entered this road at noon, thus uncovering the entire left flank of Sumner, who had not been apprised of his sudden departure.

The Confederates were not slow in taking advantage of such a blunder. They advanced by the Williamsburg road and along the railroad track, preceded by an engine, to which was attached an iron-plated car carrying a heavy gun. This strange machine, which was called the *Land Merrimac*, stopped from time to time to fire a random shot; but it does not appear that anybody was hurt by it. As we have before stated, Sumner's two divisions were deployed in the vicinity of Savage station; that of Sedgwick occupied the clearing between the railroad and the Williamsburg road; that of Richardson had fallen back so as to form a right angle with the line of the first, along the railway track, facing north. Sumner, believing his left to be covered by Heintzelman, had not occupied in force the wood bordering the Williamsburg road, and Franklin, finding no enemy in sight, had sent Smith's division to the rear. That of McCall was posted at Bottom's Bridge, guarding the passage of the Chickahominy.

Toward four o'clock in the afternoon the officers of the signal corps announce the approach of the enemy. Smith, being hastily recalled by his chief, has barely time to throw Hancock's brigade on Richardson's right, to extend his line by resting it upon a thicket, which the enemy will presently take from him, and at the same time to send Brooks' brigade to the extreme left. The latter general arrives just in time to occupy the wood stretching along the road, and to reinforce Burns' troops, of Sedgwick's division, who are keeping up an unequal fight from their position across this road. Magruder, in fact, taking advantage of the gap made by Heintzelman's unhopèd-for departure, has with his wonted vigor hurled his own and McLaws' division against the weakest point of the Federal line. He almost breaks it, when the opportune arrival of the reserve of Sumner, who had soon recovered from his surprise, checks him. Brooks re-establishes the battle on that side; but the struggle continues with fierceness along the whole line until after sunset. The Confederates, encouraged by their victory of Gaines' Mill, and finding that their adversary is about to escape them, are determined at all hazards to inflict another reverse upon him before night comes on to protect his retreat. The

Federal lines give way more than once under their repeated efforts, but each time they are speedily re-formed; and despite all his fire and the ardor of his soldiers, Magruder cannot effect a serious breach. Jackson, whose arrival on the field of battle might have proved fatal to the Federals, as it had done two days before, did not make his appearance. The construction of the bridge detained him the whole day, and it was only after sunset that his troops were at last able to cross the Chickahominy. Thus, although only two regiments had been engaged during the whole of the 28th, Lee was only able to bring two divisions at most into line on the 29th. Disconcerted by McClellan's unlooked-for manœuvre, the Confederate generals seemed to have lost that capacity for the initiative which had succeeded so well on former occasions. On the evening of the 29th, the brave Sumner was unwilling to abandon the ground he had so gallantly defended. Nevertheless, the safety of the army required that its lines should be extended as little as possible, and that in proportion as the heads of column drew near to the James the rear-guard should follow their movements. It required a positive order from General McClellan to determine Sumner to cross the White Oak Swamp; finally, on the 30th, at five o'clock in the morning, French's brigade, being the last to pass, destroyed the bridge which had been thrown over the stream near Frazier's Farm.

This day's operations were a great success for McClellan. The first and most difficult step in his retreat movement was taken, and with fortunate results. He had succeeded in placing White Oak Swamp between his army and the main body of his adversaries, and in surmounting this serious obstacle without losing either a cannon or a vehicle. All the efforts of the enemy to effect a rout in his rear-guard had been repulsed with loss. The following movement of troops took place on the right bank of the swamp during the afternoon of the 29th: Slocum, having crossed in the morning, had taken the position previously occupied by Keyes' corps at Glendale. The latter had started for Turkey Bend, on the banks of the James, with instructions not to stop until he had reached that place. Porter had passed Slocum, who was facing north, for the purpose of covering the road from Frazier's Farm to Nelson's Farm; and taking post at the

other extremity of the Glendale clearings, he guarded their approaches to the west on the side of the New Market road. He was ordered to remain there until evening, and to resume his march in the track of Keyes immediately after nightfall.

At daybreak on the 30th the approaches to White Oak Bridge and Frazier's Farm were occupied by Franklin, with the divisions of Smith and Richardson and Naglee's brigade. On the left was deployed Slocum's division, his right resting on the Charles City road. Heintzelman, who had crossed the swamp at Brackett's Ford the previous evening without being molested, had come during the night to take the position occupied by Porter a few hours before, beyond Glendale. McCall had left Frazier's Farm, and his troops were making coffee in the neighborhood of Nelson's Farm. Sumner soon joined him there with Sedgwick's division. Keyes, followed close by Porter, continued to lead the advance of the army, reaching Haxall's Landing, on the James, in the course of the morning. But both had been delayed on their march, and they had not informed the general-in-chief of their movements. The latter was utterly ignorant of their fate, merely presuming that, as he had not heard the sound of cannon, his two lieutenants had not had any serious engagement. The impossibility of exactly tracing in advance the movements of his troops, of knowing the country through which they had to pass, and of obtaining timely information regarding the positions they had occupied, rendered McClellan's task singularly difficult. The topographical officers who had been detached on the 28th to make a reconnoissance of the roads leading to the James had not yet returned, nor even sent a solitary guide to headquarters. Fortunately, in the midst of these uncertainties it became known that Keyes had accidentally discovered a road running parallel to the Quaker road, which had been abandoned for a number of years, half buried under the grass, wild vines and the trunks of fallen trees, but nevertheless easily reopened. It was a valuable discovery; for this road, lying to the left of the Quaker road for troops marching toward the James, offered a safe way for the train, the right flank of which would thus be covered by the whole army. The long file of vehicles, ambulances and baggage-wagons at once entered it.

In the course of the morning, when Keyes, followed by Porter, reached the James, the line of the army of the Potomac extended from White Oak Bridge to Haxall's Landing, a distance of thirteen kilometres. This line was too long to be everywhere defended by the Federals against a vigorous attack, nor could they shorten it; for in order to protect the train and prevent the enemy from placing himself on the left flank of the troops in the march, it was necessary to bar the passage of White Oak Swamp against him. The three principal points of this line had, therefore, to be occupied in force. The first was that portion of the bank of the James toward which the army was directing its course. At Haxall's Landing the river borders an immense clearing occupied by a few huts situated to the south, and consequently beyond Malvern Hill, for those approaching that position either by way of the Quaker road or New Market road. All the roads leading to this landing pass either along the side or at the foot of the hill which thus commands the approaches. It overlooks the whole surrounding country; wooded at the east, it is entirely bare on all the other sides. A cluster of acacias surrounds the old house of Mr. Crewe, situated on the highest point above the rather abrupt acclivities which stretch down to the James. These slopes are less precipitous to the west on the side facing Richmond, and become still gentler to the north toward the Quaker road. A point equally important to defend was that of Frazier's Farm, at the other extremity of the line, for it commands the passage of White Oak Swamp. The intermediate position was that of Glendale. At this point all the roads through which the enemy, coming from Richmond, might try to throw himself upon the flank of the Federal column, emerge into the Quaker road. Omitting a few irregularities and one or two cross-roads of no importance, the intersection of these different roads at Glendale may be represented by a square, the four angles of which, each facing a cardinal point, would mark the entrance of the four principal roads into the clearing. The Confederates, who had crossed the White Oak Swamp by following the tracks of Heintzelman, or those who had followed the right bank, were to debouch by the Charles City road into the northern angle; those who had come down by the Central or New Market road were to unite,

in order to penetrate together into the clearing by the western angle. The Federals, coming from White Oak Bridge, entered the road by the eastern angle, in order to strike at the southern angle the Quaker road, which led to the margin of the James.

These were the only three points in which the line formed by the Federals to cover their movement was vulnerable. In fact, the line occupied by the Federals between Glendale and Frazier's Farm was covered by the White Oak Swamp on the Richmond side. Between Glendale and Malvern Hill small swamps, forming the source of the Western Run, and rendered impassable by a dense forest, extended to the right of the Quaker road, so that the roads coming from the Central or New Market road, being compelled to avoid them, all converged upon the slopes themselves or in full view of Malvern Hill. This was the line that all the forces of Lee intended to attack on the 30th of June, and that McClellan had to defend for a sufficient length of time to enable his train to reach Haxall's Landing without impediment. On this occasion he could no longer count upon the inaction of the enemy, for Lee had had ample time to concentrate his army. Visiting all the points which were menaced, General McClellan speedily made his dispositions for battle. Keyes left Haxall's and proceeded to occupy the space comprised between the James at Turkey Bend on one side and Malvern Hill on the other. Porter, who had arrived by the Quaker road, took a strong position on this hill. At Frazier's Farm, Franklin was ordered to defend to the last the pass of White Oak Swamp, as the troops against whom Sumner had fought the day previous at Savage station were sure to come and dispute it. Finally, McClellan's attention having been called to the Glendale junction by the prince de Joinville, whose suggestions he always willingly listened to, he saw at once all the importance of this point. It was evidently here that Lee was preparing to strike the decisive blow. In order to cover the march of the army it was necessary to hold and preserve at all hazards the western and southern angles. Accordingly, all the disposable forces yet remaining were sent to defend this position. The moments were precious, the forest thick, the roads intricate, and it was essential to spare the worn-out troops all unnecessary counter-marches; they were consequently drawn up somewhat at random,

but finally succeeded in forming a large arc of a circle, covering the greater part of the Glendale junction, the convexity of which was turned toward Richmond. Slocum was deployed on the right of the Charles City road, his left resting upon this road and facing north; Kearny, who remained where he had bivouacked during the night, joined him, his lines being deployed on the left of this road a little above the New Market road and looking toward the north-west. McCall had come about noon to take position on his left *en potence*; he rested his right on the New Market road, across the cross-road which connected the former with the Quaker road, and awaiting the enemy from the west. In rear, on McCall's left, Hooker had deployed his division, his right extending as far as the cross-road which forms an angle toward the south; he thus found himself facing south-west and resting upon the edge of a wood before a large clearing intersected by the New Market road. A space of several hundred metres separated Hooker's right from McCall's left, but at a short distance in rear of this gap was posted Sumner with a portion of Sedgwick's division, which was half concealed by the other two. The remainder of this division had not yet left Frazier's Farm. There was hardly any connection between the different parts of the line which had thus been formed at Glendale; the generals of division were all ignorant of the positions of their neighbors, and found it difficult to maintain communications between them in the midst of the forest. Nor does it appear that any person had assumed the superior command of the troops assembled in the vicinity of this clearing; but they were in sufficient proximity to each other for mutual support, should the din of battle reveal the presence of the enemy at any given point.

On the part of the Confederates, their whole army was preparing to make a desperate effort before McClellan could have time to reach the James. Jackson with his four divisions had only halted for a moment at Savage, and had entered the road which Sumner had taken during the night for the purpose of forcing the passage of White Oak Swamp, in front of Frazier's Farm. Hill and Longstreet, who had left Richmond, were proceeding along the New Market and the Central roads, having sent a few detachments forward on the Charles City road. They

were therefore to debouch directly upon Glendale. Magruder, having returned to the rear after his reverse at Savage station, had joined Huger, and following them closely with his united forces was to form the Confederate right in the general attack. Wise's legion, with other troops hitherto posted on the right bank of the James, crossed the river at Drury's Bluff; they were ordered to take position on the extreme right, so as to forestall the Federals if possible in the occupation of Malvern Hill.

Jackson had reached the pass of White Oak Swamp at eleven o'clock in the morning, where he found Franklin firmly posted. The latter, having eight or nine batteries at his command, covered the passage with the fire of his guns. His infantry, just reinforced by a portion of Sedgwick's division, thus consisting of nine brigades, was drawn up a little in the rear. Jackson's forces were far superior in number to those of the Federals; he brought with him his four large divisions, and the eighteen or twenty batteries which he had commanded since the 26th. But the approaches to White Oak Bridge, encompassed on both sides by wooded swamps, rendered it impossible for him to avail himself of this superiority and to bring all his troops into line at once, so that, in spite of his great daring, in spite of the interest he had in acting promptly, he was afraid of venturing with his soldiers into this formidable defile. Seven Confederate batteries were placed in position above the pass with a view of silencing the fire of the Federal guns before the infantry should attack in full force. The Federals seemed at first to have the worst of it; the two batteries of Hazzard and Mott, which were in the first line, were silenced, nearly all their guns being shattered by the enemy's projectiles. The combat, however, was soon renewed with rifled ten-pounders, which, being able to keep farther back, and almost beyond range of the Confederate artillery in consequence of their light calibre, inflicted upon the latter considerable losses in their turn. Meanwhile, the battalions of infantry of both parties continued under arms, one side ready to commence the attack, the other to repulse it, and both alike exposed to the enemy's projectiles, which were causing cruel ravages in their ranks. Notwithstanding all their efforts, the Confederates were unable to silence the fire of Franklin's artillery; the cannonading was thus continued during the

whole day ; and when night came, Jackson had not even made an attempt to force the passage. The losses had been severe on both sides.

The battle of Frazier's Farm was an important success for the Federals ; Franklin had succeeded in holding nearly one half of the Confederate army in check the entire day. In contenting himself with extending his line in a manner which might appear excessive, rather than abandon the passage of White Oak Swamp, McClellan had prevented Lee from uniting his two wings, which were separated by this marsh. He had thus paralyzed Jackson's four divisions at a moment when their presence on another battlefield might have been decisive. In fact, a fierce and sanguinary conflict was taking place on that very day around the Glendale junction, a few kilometres from that spot.

Toward two o'clock in the afternoon a few Confederate detachments, coming by way of the Charles City road, had attacked Slocum, but were easily repulsed. They preceded the troops of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, amounting in all to about eighteen or twenty thousand men, then under command of the latter. A little before three o'clock these two corps debouched upon the Glendale clearings by way of the New Market road, the first on the right, the second on the left of that road, and fell directly upon McCall's division, which, placed in the centre, occupied the most salient point of the Federal front. McCall had ranged his troops in two lines, Meade on the right, Seymour on the left, with Reynolds' brigade in reserve, while five batteries covered his front. After having prefaced the attack with a shower of shell, the Confederate columns charged their adversaries with great vigor. McCall's small division was reduced to six thousand men by his losses of the preceding days, and for the last four days it had fought more and marched more than any other division in the army of the Potomac ; nevertheless, it succeeded in thoroughly repulsing the first onset ; Seymour and Meade being each attacked in succession by the enemy, who was endeavoring to find the weak point in the line, defended themselves most energetically, and even took several hundred prisoners.

But at each new attack, the Confederates bring forward fresh troops, and McCall's Pennsylvanians become exhausted. Hill has at

length found the open breach between this division and that of Hooker, and availing himself of this discovery endeavors to turn both of them in succession. On the left of the Federal line, Hooker, fiercely attacked, is obliged to bring all his reserves, and a regiment detached from Sumner's corps, to the assistance of Grover, who commands his first brigade. More to the right another charge is made by the Confederates against Seymour's brigade, forming McCall's left wing, and against two German batteries borrowed from the reserve artillery, which cover it. The gunners are put to flight; a great portion of this brigade is thus placed between two fires; it at once becomes disintegrated, and the fugitives are driven back upon Hooker. The latter allows them to pass through his ranks, and receives the pursuing Confederates with a murderous fire. Longstreet's soldiers have not been able to preserve their ranks during the charge, and thus they arrive in disorder. They are stopped short, and two of Hooker's regiments, the First and Sixty-ninth Massachusetts, resuming the offensive, drive them at the point of the bayonet upon McCall's two other brigades, which, having firmly kept their ground, receive them with a well-sustained fire. Sedgwick, in the mean time, has received reinforcements; the two brigades which had been detached in the morning to support Franklin at Frazier's Farm have been sent back to that general, as soon as he has found himself strong enough to defend the pass without them. These troops, still fresh, arrive at Glendale, and proceed to occupy the space left open in the Federal line by Seymour's brigade, which is entirely disorganized. The battle is re-established, although some little ground has been lost. The enemy, however, constantly renews his attacks, and he turns from the line occupied by Hooker and Sedgwick, to direct his main efforts against McCall's right and Kearny's left, at the other extremity of the Federal positions. Kearny is supported by Taylor's brigade of Slocum's division, which had long been under his own command. The sight of their old chief infuses additional ardor into the four New Jersey regiments comprising it, and this timely reinforcement enables him to hold his position. But McCall's right, consisting of Meade's brigade, is again engaged in an unequal and murderous struggle. Many are the attacks it has already repulsed, when, toward six o'clock, the Fifty-

fifth and Sixtieth Virginia make a desperate charge upon Randall's regular battery, posted alongside of Meade, which, up to this time, has resisted every assault. The Virginians, carrying the musket in one hand, and drawn up in the form of a wedge, rush forward at a run across the open space of six hundred metres which separates them from the Federal guns. Nothing can withstand them; although decimated by grape and musketry, they are not staggered. They reach the goal at last; the gunners are killed, the cannon captured, and Meade's brigade is obliged to fall back. It however continues to fight with uncommon obstinacy; at seven o'clock a new charge results in the capture of Cooper's battery in the centre of McCall's line. But the Ninth Pennsylvania charges back in return, and, after a fierce engagement, recaptures the guns. The enemy at the same time abandons those taken from Randall, which he has not been able to carry off.

It is near sunset, and the contest becomes less animated. The two magnificent divisions of Hill and Longstreet have been lavish of their efforts; there is not a man left in reserve. Magruder, who should long since have been on the field of battle, has not yet made his appearance. Jackson's cannon is still thundering in the direction of White Oak Swamp, but he has made no progress since morning—a bad sign for the Confederates. No intelligence can be obtained of him, because in order to reach him it would be necessary to go round the whole swamp and through the suburbs of Richmond, a distance of from forty to fifty kilometres. The Confederate army, divided into two parts by this obstacle, is rendered powerless. The Federals have had but fifteen or eighteen thousand men engaged at Glendale against the twenty thousand who have attacked them; but the remainder of the divisions of Hooker, Sedgwick and Slocum are within reach, ready to sustain them, and the Confederates have not failed to perceive, toward the close of the battle, that they have been dealing with troops who felt sure of support. They relinquish the attack; and believing these troops to be even more numerous than they really are, they abandon the greater portion of the ground they have just conquered, in order to disengage themselves. General Lee was on the field of battle, and had brought with him President Davis; for it was hoped in Richmond that this day, the 30th, would complete the destruc-

tion of the army of the Potomac. How grieved Lee must have felt at having lost so much time on the 28th, when he saw two of these divisions struggling alone in fruitless efforts against the vital point of the enemy's line; how bitterly he must have regretted having caused Jackson to waste the whole of the 29th, by uselessly detaining him in front of the ruined bridges of the Chickahominy, and by having finally placed him with four divisions, on the 30th, between two swamps, before a defile which a few guns had prevented him from crossing! His mistake as to McClellan's real design had compromised the most brilliant results of his victory at Gaines' Mill. Far from rectifying this error, he had made matters worse when, on being informed of the march of the Federals toward the James, he had directed one half of his army into the blind alley of Frazier's Farm. It is difficult to account for this blunder on the part of so skilful a general, except by attributing it to his ignorance of the country occupied by his adversary. If he had brought back Jackson to Richmond on the 29th, leaving Magruder to follow Sumner alone, he would have been able on the 30th to place three-fourths of his army in line between White Oak Swamp and the James.

An engagement of secondary importance had taken place on the banks of this river, while the battles of Frazier's Farm and Glendale were being fought. Wise's legion had come down the James for the purpose of forestalling if possible the Federals at Turkey Bend. In order to do this it had to go completely round the foot of Malvern Hill. Before reaching this point it ran against Porter's corps, which, as we have said, was posted upon the slopes of the hill extending to the flat wooded lands which separate it from the James. The Confederates attacked it from that side, but with the lack of spirit felt by troops who do not anticipate meeting the enemy; and despite the protection afforded them by the thick underwood, they were easily repulsed by Warren's brigade. At the same time they engaged in an artillery fight with Porter's batteries posted on the summit of the hill, and for a moment threw the march of the Federal train into confusion. A few gun-boats, under Commodore Rodgers, were waiting for the army at Haxall's Landing; one of them, the *Galena*, had just taken General McClellan on board, who desired to make a reconnaissance up the

river, when Wise's attack commenced. Rodgers immediately threw a few of Parrott's hundred-pound shells in the direction in which the enemy's reserves were supposed to be. These missiles, fired at random, could not do much harm to troops scattered about the forest; but the strange noise which announced their approach, and the crashing of trees which they shattered on their passage, and finally the violence of their explosion, produced a deep impression upon the Confederates. The Federals, on the contrary, who heard from a distance the heavy and powerful voice of the naval guns, hailed it as that of an auxiliary impatiently expected.

It was time for them to reach the banks of the James. During the whole of the 30th, notwithstanding the opportune discovery of a new road, as above mentioned, the train had proceeded very slowly and with much difficulty. The booming of cannon, resounding along so many points of the line, had more than once spread senseless alarms among the drivers of this long column. The larger part of reserve and siege artillery, and the batteries detached from the several corps which McClellan had ordered to Malvern Hill to fortify that position, found great difficulty in advancing. All the farmhouses, all the huts, were converted into hospitals, where the victims of the battles of Savage station, Frazier's Farm and Glendale were huddled. There was scarcely a sufficient number of surgeons to attend to their most pressing wants; and most of the wounded felt the painful certainty of being left at night in the hands of the enemy. The stifling heat of a Virginia summer, the want of sleep, the long marches, the combats incessantly renewed, the excitements and the anxieties of every description, triumphed over the most robust constitutions, and prostrated those whom the terrible swamp-fever had yet spared. Night marches had also singularly contributed to diminish the effective force of the several corps, and to increase the number of stragglers. Many soldiers became lost in the obscurity, and, being unable to find their regiments, at daylight rejoined the invalid column, which extended the whole length of the train. Frequently without haversacks, but always armed and well provided with ammunition, they moved along in groups of from three to twenty; and finding themselves freed from all official

authority, they soon resumed the independence natural to their character. The sick, the lame and the crippled increased in a frightful proportion. Finally, what was a still greater cause of the privations of the soldier in the midst of these incessant engagements, the distribution of rations could not be made with any regularity. In proportion as this crowd, composed of so many different elements, perceived from afar across the verdure the waters of the James, the smooth surface of which sparkled under a burning sun, but one idea pervaded it, one common ardor gave strength to these worn-out men. They rushed toward the river to refresh themselves, to make sure that they were not the sport of some delusive mirage, to take a nearer view, and to touch, if they could have done so, those gunboats whose assistance was to put an end to their dangers and sufferings; and finally, to hail the national flag, which, floating gently in the breeze, reflected its constellated azure in the waters. To witness their eagerness one would have said that the James was to them the river of oblivion, to which, the poet tells us, the shades repair in crowds in search of a sovereign remedy against all their sufferings.

The sight of their comrades under arms, however, military honor, the exhortations of the officers who had been detailed to reorganize them, soon restored strength to the most disheartened, and in a short time improvised companies and battalions, inspired with fresh ardor, might be seen falling into line behind the well-trained soldiers of Porter.

To sum up the account, the operations of the 30th had secured to the Federals all the advantages which those of the 29th had led them to expect. Placed as it were back to back and able to support each other mutually, their rear-guard on one side, and their centre on the other, had repulsed all the attacks of the enemy. Franklin, resting his left upon impracticable swamps, had held in check with eighteen thousand men an army of more than thirty-six thousand, commanded by the redoubtable Jackson, whilst Slocum, extending his right as far as these same swamps, occupied the extremity of the other line, which at Glendale covered the roads followed by the entire army. These two lines formed thus an acute angle, the vertex of which, posted on the southern bank of White Oak Swamp, was protected by this insurmountable ob-

stacle, and entirely separated the two wings of the assailants. If Jackson had succeeded in pushing his way beyond Frazier's Farm, he would have taken the Federal combatants at Glendale in rear and crushed them between two fires. If, on the other hand, Hill had been able to penetrate as far as the Quaker road, he would have cut the Federal army in two and secured the destruction of one-half that army.

The battle of Glendale, therefore, was remarkable for its fierceness among all those that have drenched the American forests in blood. Nothing could have been more serious than the game which was played in the clearing only the day before, unknown to the staffs of both armies. If the number of trophies had constituted the only evidence of success, although the Confederates left a few in the hands of their opponents, all the advantage would have been on their side. They had made many more prisoners than they had lost, and in the course of the evening their outposts had picked up General McCall, who had lost his way in the woods. They had captured eight or ten guns from the Federals, while the latter only carried off four flags, to which must be added two pieces of artillery which Wise had left at Malvern in Porter's hands. But the Federals had reason to consider themselves fortunate in not having paid dearer for the results they had obtained by their tenacity in that battle; their retreat was thereby assured, and the delicate operation of a change of base might be considered an accomplished fact. Indeed, by four o'clock in the afternoon on the 30th, the last wagons had reached Malvern Hill. Before sunset the entire train was encamped in the vast clearing at Haxall's, doubled upon itself, and protected against all attacks by the position of Malvern Hill, while the numerous field and siege guns which had accompanied the train were painfully climbing the height which they were about to render impregnable.

All the ambulances were in safety; only about one hundred wagons failed to appear at the muster, to which trifling number must be added one cannon abandoned in a quagmire, four or five guns lost by McCall at Glendale, and as many dismounted pieces which Franklin was obliged to leave at Frazier's Farm. Four thousand wagons, four or five hundred ambulances, three hundred and fifty field-pieces, fifty siege guns and two thousand five hun-

dred head of cattle had thus followed a single road, a mere woodland path, constantly occupied by troops on the march, or obstructed either by infantry or cavalry, amid the din of battle, which was heard simultaneously in front, in the rear and on the flank, and had travelled a distance of more than thirty kilometres in forty-eight hours. General McClellan had good cause to consider such a march as an almost unlooked-for success, and the manner in which it was conducted was highly creditable to the administrative departments of the Federal army.

Nevertheless, although this army had fortunately escaped from a perilous situation, it could not remain in the positions which it occupied from Frazier's Farm to Haxall's Landing. Not only was it necessary that it should be concentrated for purposes of defence, provisions and rest, but it was also compelled by the configuration of the course of the James to leave Haxall's Landing, and look for a more favorable point for revictualling lower down. In fact, the James River becomes so narrow above its confluence with the Appomattox at City Point, that vessels going up to Haxall's would have been constantly exposed to the fire of batteries erected by the enemy on the right bank of the river; consequently, Commodore Rodgers, at his first interview with McClellan, had recommended Harrison's Landing as the most favorable point to establish dépôts for the army. It was here, therefore, that its march was to terminate, for it could not think of remaining on White Oak Swamp, or even at Malvern, receiving its supplies by land from Harrison's Landing; it would have been starved in a very few days.

Malvern Hill first, then Harrison's Landing, were therefore the two stages in the journey naturally appointed for the army of the Potomac. General McClellan had no intention of defending Frazier's Farm and Glendale, and was waiting for the reports of the generals who had just fought in those positions, to send them the order to fall back. An immediate retreat, however, had become so necessary that they took upon themselves to carry it into effect. Franklin, the most distant, began his movement about ten o'clock in the evening, having previously notified the headquarters of his intention. His neighbors were only apprised of this movement by General Seymour, who, while wandering about

in search of his brigade, from which he had become separated at the time of his rout at Glendale, accidentally fell in with Franklin's heads of column. There was no longer time to ask for instructions from headquarters at Malvern Hill. Franklin's retreat opened the way for Jackson. Heintzelman and Sumner prepared at once to carry their troops to the borders of the James. In this they only anticipated the orders which McClellan was about to send them. The general-in-chief had no reason to blame his lieutenants for this great eagerness to fall back, for the ignorance in which he remained till evening in regard to their situation, and which occasioned the delay in forwarding the orders for retreat, could only be attributed to the very imperfect organization of the Federal staffs. The necessity of providing for the ulterior movements of his troops justified his remaining on the gun-boats of Rodgers; but his momentary absence had been noticed by soldiers who needed encouragement in the midst of a bloody strife, and also by lieutenants who were already too much inclined to criticism. By not waiting for his tardy instructions, his corps commanders rendered the retreat which had become inevitable more easy of accomplishment. The night march was performed in the best order, and before daybreak the Federal army was concentrated around the approaches of Malvern Hill.

This hill afforded an admirable position. Its summit, two thousand five hundred metres in length by one thousand two hundred in width, formed a level and open plateau. Rising gradually from north to south to the ridge of the acclivity overlooking the James, it presented great facilities for the manœuvring of troops. From north-east to south, at the foot of the barren slopes which terminated the descent, its base was enveloped by the Western Run and thick underwood. To the west wound one of the tributaries of this stream, also surrounded by swampy forests, and quite difficult for artillery to cross. The approaches to Malvern Hill were only easy between these two water-courses. On this side, below the principal hillock, the slopes extended gradually across an open country. The Quaker road, after joining a cross-road coming from the New Market road, took advantage of these slopes to ascend Malvern Hill, leaving a small wood and the West house on the left, then forked before reaching the summit.

The west branch followed the western ridge, passing by the Crewe house, thence descending upon the steep acclivities which look to the south to cross the Western Run at Turkey Bridge. Finally, not far from this bridge it again connected with the direct road from Richmond to Haxall's, which is a continuation of the New Market road, running close to the banks of the James. The east branch skirted the eastern side of Malvern Hill, and after passing the Binford house descended into the woods which overshadow the Western Run, to merge at last into the other branch at Haxall's.

The last Federal troops reached Malvern on the 1st of July at ten o'clock in the morning. Before going on board the *Galena* to make a reconnaissance, McClellan himself posted these troops upon the ground, which he had examined the day before, giving to their line the form of a vast semicircle, which extended from the Crewe house to the Binford house, through the wood adjoining the West house. Refusing his extreme right, he had deployed it to the east along the Western Run as far as in front of Haxall's, while the extreme left was effectively protected by the impassable mouth of this stream and by the gun-boats presenting their broadside in the James. The army thus guarded all the approaches to Malvern, bringing its two wings close to the banks of the river. It was disposed in the following order, reckoning from left to right: At the extreme left, Sykes guarded the approaches of the direct road from Richmond to Haxall's, having one brigade posted at the foot of Malvern, near Turkey Bridge, and the other two on the slopes of the hill; Morrell was on his right, beyond the Crewe house; together they formed Porter's corps. Couch's division, which had been detached from this corps, was placed by McClellan immediately after it. It was deployed midway between the summit of Malvern Hill and the woods bordering its base, its right resting upon a deep and wooded ravine. This ravine, which extended almost as far as the West house, marked the boundary of what was properly called Malvern Hill, separating the Federal left from the centre. This centre was formed by Heintzelman's corps, extending from the ravine to the wood of West, the skirt of which he occupied; his forces lay across the Quaker road, Kearny on the left and Hooker on the right.

Between Hooker and the Binford house the line was prolonged by Sumner's corps,—first Sedgwick, then Richardson, on his right. Farther on, the course of Western Run was guarded by the divisions of Smith and Slocum, composing Franklin's corps. Finally, the bridge of Carter's Mill spanning this stream, and the approaches to Haxall's, where a large number of roads converged, were entrusted to Keyes, with Peck's division, who thus found himself facing eastward, with his back turned toward that of Sykes. There was every indication that the efforts of the Confederates would be directed against the Federal left. In fact, they could only approach the army of the Potomac by two roads—that from Richmond to Haxall's and the Quaker road, which, fortunately for the Federals, led to that part of their positions easiest to defend. It was this side, therefore, that McClellan took particular care to fortify. The division of Pennsylvania Reserves, which McCall had commanded till the battle of Glendale, where he was taken prisoner, was placed in rear of Porter. Although this small band had been terribly decimated, it was yet ready to make a gallant fight. The general-in-chief gave, moreover, a powerful reinforcement of artillery to his left wing. For the first time since the beginning of the campaign, the ground was admirably adapted to the employment of this arm; and the foresight with which McClellan had organized a reserve of more than one hundred cannon, the constant care he had shown in attending to its requirements, and the energy he had displayed in preserving it intact during the retreat, in spite of its weight and the many dangers to which it had been exposed, were at last to be abundantly rewarded on this evening of July 1st. The reserve batteries were massed on the left and centre of the Federal lines under the direction of Colonel Hunt, an officer of the highest merit. They were placed wherever a favorable position could be found, and more than sixty pieces were so disposed as to cover with their converging fire every point of Porter's line. Finally, the heavy siege guns having reached Haxall's, thanks to the unremitting zeal of Colonel Tyler, who had left but one behind during the retreat, ten of them were hauled up to near the Crewe house, whence they could, by firing over the friendly lines, reach

the assailants if they should venture upon the slopes of Malvern Hill.

It was evident that the Confederates intended to try a last attack upon the army of the Potomac. On the evening of the 30th their situation was much less favorable than it had been three days before. The army which they thought, after the battle of Gaines' Mill, they held shut up within a network of iron, had escaped them with all its *matériel*, leaving in their hands only some wounded men, a few thousand prisoners and broken cannon. All their efforts to crush it had failed, and it had finally found a position on the James whence it could, at the first opportunity, undertake operations much more dangerous to Richmond than those which had been prevented at so great a sacrifice. On the other hand, the Confederate army was at the end of its resources. Forced marches and countermarches, only interrupted by frequent and bloody combats, had greatly attenuated its ranks, and the number of men it was able to bring into line before Malvern Hill on the 1st of July was much inferior to the force with which it had commenced its movement six days before. The woods were filled with its wounded, sick and stragglers. The two corps of Longstreet and A. P. Hill had suffered so severely at Glendale, that a day's rest was absolutely indispensable to them, and they had to be relieved during the night by those of Huger and Magruder.

The retreat of the Federals, however, had at last enabled Lee to bring the two wings of his army together. Although this concentration was effected somewhat tardily, he could not fail to take advantage of it to attack his adversary, who was equally exhausted, before the latter should have time to establish himself in an entrenched position. At break of day Jackson crossed the White Oak Swamp, and soon reached the battle-field of Glendale. He received an order to continue to follow the enemy by the Quaker road, while Magruder and Huger were to file to his right by forest paths, to gain the road to Haxall's and come up to attack McClellan's left wing. Longstreet and Hill, being held in reserve, followed in the rear of Jackson, and came to take position on his left, at a considerable distance from the field of battle, which they did not leave during the whole day. Before crossing

the Western Run at the Quaker road ford, and appearing in front of the first slopes of Malvern, Jackson left his old division, with two of Ewell's brigades, in the woods near Willis' Church, and moved forward with the remainder, Ewell's third brigade in the centre, Whiting's division on the left, and D. H. Hill on the right. The latter, deploying between the road and the tributary of the Western Run, followed the course of this stream by partly extending his line into the adjoining woods. Having reached the point where this stream connects with the ravine which separated McClellan's centre from his left, the Confederate general sent, beyond the ravine, Anderson's brigade, which thus debouched upon the right of Couch's division, formed by Howe's brigade. It was three o'clock. Whilst the artillery of Whiting and Ewell was cannonading the Federal centre, Anderson, supported by the fire of two batteries, vigorously attacked the Federals, but in vain. Howe had been waiting for the Confederates at a short distance. The latter, being received by a terrific fire, halted, when a charge of the One Hundred and Second Pennsylvania completed their repulse on one side, while on the other the Thirty-sixth New York carried off the flags of the Fourteenth Alabama. The Lafayette Guards, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Thonret, fully sustained the reputation they had already acquired at Williamsburg and Fair Oaks, and Couch took advantage of this success to rectify his line by advancing about eight hundred metres. The attack of the Confederates was not renewed. Lee had sent an order to his generals to wait until the whole army had got into line before resuming the offensive. Armistead's brigade of Huger's division was, by rushing forward with loud yells, to give the signal for a general assault upon the enemy's positions.

Meantime, the march of Magruder and Huger was impeded by the woods and swamps they had to cross before reaching the positions which had been assigned them. Their artillery especially could scarcely be dragged along. Through some unaccountable neglect on the part of the Confederate staff, no map of this region existed in the army; as we have already stated, no one had foreseen the possibility that the tide of war would flow in that direction. The column therefore proceeded somewhat at random. At last two of Huger's brigades emerged from the woods on

Anderson's right. The third, Armistead's, which was to have commenced the attack, followed Magruder. The latter, pushing his heads of column forward as fast as the thick underwood which he had to clear right and left from his path permitted, arrived about four o'clock in front of Porter's positions, and immediately placed Purcell's guns in battery, the only field-pieces that had been able to follow him. But the Confederate artillerists have scarcely shown themselves when they are crushed by the fire from Porter's powerful guns. Despite their stubbornness, their pieces are speedily dismounted or reduced to silence. Another battery, called the Letcher Artillery, which has come up to their assistance, has also most of its cannoneers killed or wounded in a short space of time. Magruder, whom no obstacle can dismay, thinks he can rescue this battery by making his soldiers charge some of the Federal guns posted nearest to his point of attack. This task is entrusted to one regiment, which rushes up bravely to the assault within one hundred and fifty metres of the enemy's guns; but the latter reply by such a shower of grape that the Confederates recoil in disorder, leaving the ground strewn with dead and wounded. A second and a third charge, also made by a single regiment at a time, are followed by the same result. The fire of the artillery is supported by the volleys of musketry from Porter's troops. No direct orders, no general command, control the movements of the Confederate army. Stuart, carried away first toward the White House by the greed for plunder, then into the peninsula in the vain hope of overtaking Stoneman, has not yet rejoined Lee, and it may be said that with him the eyes of the Confederate army are absent. Whiting on the left, D. H. Hill in the centre, Magruder and Huger on the right, afford each other no mutual support, there being no communication between them, nor any instructions from Lee to enable them to act in concert. After having given to the different corps, as a signal of attack, an indication entirely insufficient, the commander-in-chief of the Confederate army seems to have ceased to preside over the movements of these corps, which are, as it were, lost in the midst of the forest. The Federals, on the contrary, from the heights of Malvern Hill, can perceive all these movements at a glance, and their central position enables them at all times rapidly to mass men

and cannon upon the point most menaced. Their view extends even so far that McClellan can see the columns of Longstreet and A. P. Hill as they proceed to take position in the rear on the left of Jackson; and being anxious about his right flank, which is not so well protected by nature, he retains a considerable force there for a considerable time. We have seen that Magruder, not having all his troops in line, was unwilling to push the battle to the extreme; but he had sustained useless losses by risking a few batteries first, then three regiments one after the other. This valiant soldier had been exasperated by reproaches which had been cast upon him the day before for not having reached Glendale in time, so that he had sworn, it is said, to lead his soldiers directly up to the enemy the first time he should encounter him, and it is to this motive that his bloody attacks, so imprudently renewed, must be attributed.

Meanwhile, the sound of the battle, which was being fought on the extreme right of the Confederates, did not reach the rest of their line, being intercepted by the density of the forest, and undoubtedly also by the wind, which had suddenly changed,—an unreliable messenger, upon which Lee had reposed too much confidence. As we have said, Armistead's brigade, which was to have given the signal for the attack, having followed Magruder instead of proceeding with the remainder of Huger's division, found itself placed in a portion of the line where it could no longer play the important part which had been assigned to it. But toward six o'clock D. H. Hill, who had been impatiently waiting for the signal agreed upon, thought that he had heard it at last. He distinctly recognized the sound of sharp musketry mingled with hurrahs, and did not wait for anything more to put his division in motion. He was probably deceived by the distant echo of one of the last partial charges attempted by Magruder, the first having been made an hour before. Such was the utter want of communication between the different generals that Hill remained in ignorance of the fact, not only during the whole battle, but even for some days after, when he wrote his report, that Magruder had really attacked the enemy before himself, and sustained a combat much longer than his own. When he put his division in motion, believing the whole army to be engaged, his neighbors on the

right and left, having heard nothing, remained motionless in their turn ; and even after the battle had commenced they do not appear to have received any order to support him. If we make this assertion with some reservation, it is because the Confederate reports, from that of the general-in-chief to those of simple colonels, are so vague, so confused and contradictory in all that concerns the hour, that it is almost impossible to arrive at any positive conclusion as to the share of responsibility for the check resting upon each. However that may be, Hill advanced alone against the Federal positions. After Anderson's first attack he had borne toward his right, Lee having indicated the enemy's left as the point upon which all the efforts of his army were to be concentrated. He had therefore before him Morrell's right, Couch's division, reinforced by Caldwell's brigade, which had been temporarily detached from Richardson, and finally the left of Kearny. The woods skirting the foot of Malvern Hill had hitherto protected the Confederates ; but as soon as they had passed beyond the edge of the forest they were received by a fire from all the batteries at once, some posted on the summit of the hill, others ranged midway, close to the Federal infantry. The latter joined its musketry fire to the cannonade when Hill's first line had come within range, and threw it back in disorder on the reserves. While it was re-forming new battalions marched up to the assault in their turn. The remembrance of Cold Harbor doubles the energy of Hill's soldiers. They try to pierce the line sometimes at one point, sometimes at another, charging Kearny's left first, and Couch's right, formed by Caldwell's and Howe's brigades, and afterward throwing themselves upon the left of Couch's division. But here also, after having nearly reached the Federal positions, they are repulsed. The conflict is carried on with great fierceness on both sides, and for a moment it seems as if the Confederates are at last about to penetrate the very centre of their adversaries, and of the formidable artillery which but now was dealing destruction in their ranks. But Sumner, who commands on the right, seeing no likelihood of any attack on that side, detaches Sickles' and Meagher's brigades successively to Couch's assistance. During this time Whiting on the left, and Huger on the right, suffer Hill's soldiers to become exhausted, without sup-

porting them. Neither Lee nor Jackson has sent the slightest order, and the din of the battle which is going on in their immediate vicinity has not sufficed to make them march against the enemy. Jackson, however, feels at last the necessity of reinforcing Hill and aiding him in the desperate attack he has undertaken. Taking upon himself the management of the battle on this side, and directing in person those bloody but fruitless assaults, he calls up in great haste from Willis' church his reserves, consisting of his old division and that of Ewell. But these troops are far off; and notwithstanding their alacrity, they cannot arrive until after sunset. At seven o'clock Hill reorganized the *débris* of his troops in the woods. He had no longer the means for essaying a new attack; his tenacity and the courage of his soldiers have only had the effect of causing him to sustain heavy losses.

He complained bitterly of having been sacrificed and abandoned by his colleagues; yet he had not been so entirely isolated as he imagined, for more to the right Magruder had been engaged at the same time as himself, and under circumstances equally unfavorable, in a struggle which was to have an issue not less fatal. Recognizing the uselessness of his former attacks, he has ceased fighting in order to wait for the arrival of his artillery, which he left behind during his march a few hours before, and to which he sends orders to sacrifice everything in order to join him in time. He depends upon the fire of his rifled guns, about thirty in number, to silence the batteries which protect Porter's line, and to enable him to charge at the point of the bayonet. But it is near six o'clock. Day declines, and the artillery does not arrive. Perhaps the fiery Magruder has also heard the distant sound of the battle in which Hill was then engaged. Without waiting for his cannon any longer, he orders his fine division to attack the formidable positions occupied by the Federals. He points out to them as the aim of their efforts the Crewe house, around which a large portion of McClellan's reserve artillery is concentrated. This is, in fact, the key to the whole position. Before they can reach the Federal lines which cover it, the assailants have to cross six hundred metres of a rather steep slope, which does not afford the least shelter. Magruder's first brigade has scarcely appeared in sight when it is exposed to a terrible artillery fire. Still the

Confederates continue to advance; but the Federal infantry, which has been waiting for them within a short distance without firing, receives them with a murderous discharge, and taking advantage of the confusion thrown into their ranks to assume the offensive, drives them back upon the slopes which they have ascended with so much difficulty. Magruder, not considering himself beaten, brings all his brigades successively into action, and Huger rouses himself at last from his long inaction to participate in the battle. But the Confederate generals, by dividing their efforts, have lost all chances of success. A charge *en masse* of one or two entire divisions could alone have compensated for their inferior artillery, and while it would have involved the sacrifice of fewer men than they had lost in detail, they might perhaps have thus succeeded in reaching and surrounding the Federal batteries. As soon as Porter understands the tactics of his opponent he husband his resources. His infantry and artillery consume an enormous quantity of ammunition, but their losses are insignificant, for the enemy has never been able to make a stand sufficiently near them to engage in a regular musketry fight. Each time that an attacking column stops to fire it is immediately driven back. Whenever one of his regiments or one of his batteries has exhausted its ammunition, Porter replaces them with others, sending the former to the second line to fill their cartridge-boxes or their caissons. In this manner he keeps up the fight, exposing only a portion of his troops, and keeping the remainder massed in case the enemy should attempt a general assault with all his forces.

It is already near seven o'clock. Magruder, Huger and D. H. Hill—that is to say, the whole Confederate right—have successively taken part in the struggle. But Whiting remains inactive, and limits himself to the exchange of a few cannon-shots with the enemy from a distance; Ewell and Jackson's old division cannot arrive in time; Magruder's artillery has not made its appearance, nor have Longstreet and A. P. Hill been brought forward. Even where the battle is raging with the greatest violence, Lee, as we have seen, has not succeeded in preserving concert of action. The attacks are made by each general individually, without any understanding with his neighbors; consequently, they

have all had the same issue. More than once the Federal lines have seemed on the point of being charged and broken, so great is the impetuosity of the assailants; but at the last moment the latter are always checked and compelled to redescend those fatal slopes, already covered with the dead bodies of their comrades. The last rays of the setting sun, gilding the tree-tops and the smoky heights of Malvern, light up this bloody scene. In the centre D. H. Hill has given up the contest, but Magruder, loth to resign himself to this cruel reverse, persists in continuing the fight. It is only toward nine o'clock that the booming of cannon gradually dies away along the entire line, and the silence of the night succeeds at last, unbroken, to the noise of battle.

This time the Confederates had experienced a defeat unmitigated by any compensation. The great effort they had made to repair the errors committed on the preceding days had signally failed. Their divisions, exhausted and diminished by six days' marching and fighting, had been led to the assault of formidable positions without order or unity of action, and had paid dearly for the confidence of their generals—a confidence which, since the victory of Gaines' Mill, had become positive presumption. Their losses were enormous and out of all proportion to those they had inflicted upon their adversaries. So useless a sacrifice of life troubled and discouraged them. Magruder's corps was partially destroyed; those of D. H. Hill and Huger had suffered cruelly; those of Longstreet and A. P. Hill had not yet recovered from the effects of the battle of Glendale. The troops of Whiting, Ewell and Jackson would no doubt have been in a condition to renew the contest on the following day, but the struggle was virtually at an end. It was one of those facts which impress themselves upon the strongest minds. Up to this time the Confederate army had labored under the conviction that the capitulation of McClellan and all his troops would be the inevitable result of the campaign. The soldier, unable to judge of the combined movements of the Federals, had seen nothing but success in all his encounters with them, and believed that as great advantages had been obtained at Frazier's Farm and Glendale as at Gaines' Mill; consequently, when on the evening of the 1st of July he found himself repulsed at all points by those very men whom he

had supposed to be in full flight, discouragement took the place of the assurance which until then had imparted so much strength. The men still fit for service set themselves to numbering those present and those that were absent—the killed, the wounded, the sick and the stragglers; the latter were in frightful numbers. If Lee had desired at this moment to lead his army once more to the charge, he would not have been followed. He had to remain contented with the results obtained—results, indeed, of sufficient importance to satisfy any rational mind that had not been lulled into illusions. Lee could show, as substantial evidences of his success, fifty pieces of cannon—most of them damaged, it is true—which his soldiers had captured at the point of the bayonet, or picked up on the field of battle, a considerable number of wagons, a large number of muskets, accoutrements of every description, provisions, tents, ammunition, together with six thousand prisoners, one-half of them wounded, and among them several generals. In a strategic point of view, the results were still more considerable. McClellan, who may be said to have been laying siege to Richmond, had been violently interrupted in that siege, conquered in open field, and compelled to undertake a perilous retreat in order to find a new base of operations at a much greater distance from the aim of all his efforts. He had sustained considerable losses, for the *matériel* which the enemy had taken from him was nothing compared with what he had himself been obliged to destroy. The wounded who had followed the army were far more numerous than those who had remained behind. No one had as yet counted the dead, who might be reckoned at many thousands. Finally, the thought that a campaign undertaken with so much perseverance had ended in a disaster, depressed the courage of every one, from the general-in-chief to the simple soldier.

The Federals, however, had achieved on the borders of the James the victory which had been denied them on the Chickahominy. If the first part of this short but sanguinary campaign was illustrated by the battle of Gaines' Mill, the second was by that of Malvern Hill. The enemy, therefore, could not compel them to fall back farther. But the motives which had decided McClellan to select a position below City Point for his army

still existed; the vicinity of the right bank would always have rendered it difficult to provision Malvern Hill. The general-in-chief, therefore, adhered to the order issued before the battle, directing the evacuation of this position during the night of the 1st and 2d of July. The place he had designated as the quarters for the army near his new base was Harrison's Landing, formerly the property of President Harrison, situated twelve kilometres lower down in a direct line. Whilst the convoy, which had resumed its march since the evening of the 30th, was approaching the Harrison plantation by roads which, at times, had to be cleared with the axe, and was fast covering all the spaces surrounding the improvised wharves along the river, the greater part of the army was slowly falling back by way of Haxall's. Porter, who was the last to leave, covering its march with a regiment of cavalry and the brigade of regulars, only reached this point on the morning of the 2d. At Haxall's he passed Peck's division, which, after having prepared the road to Harrison, formed the rear-guard of the whole army, under the chief command of General Keyes, who had several regiments of cavalry to protect this march. The heat of the preceding days had been followed by torrents of rain; and if it proved an obstacle to the pursuit which the Confederates might have wished to attempt, it also impeded the movement of the wagons. Nevertheless, they continued their course over two roads without any difficulty, before the enemy was able to disturb them; and when he finally made his appearance, he no longer found anything to pick up on the track of the Federals. He did not venture to attack them, while Stuart, who had followed Keyes with several batteries of horse artillery, contented himself with sending after him a few harmless cannon-shots.

The army of the Potomac was to find at Harrison's Landing the repose it absolutely needed. The retreat from Malvern Hill was effected without any trouble; but precisely, perhaps, because they were no longer stimulated by the presence of the enemy, the soldiers gave way more rapidly to physical exhaustion than before. This last night march, following so many other fatigues, transcended the powers of endurance of most of them; when the columns, more and more stretched out and reduced, reached the

encampments which had been assigned to them, Nature asserted her rights, and the need of rest overcame every other consideration. Fortunately, but few troops were required to cover the position, which was naturally very strong. The army was massed between the James and a deep marshy water-course called Herring Creek. The approaches to the peninsula, thus formed by the river and the stream, were speedily protected by a considerable abatis and field-works. A fleet of transports soon came to cast anchor in front of the army, and a few hours later the wagons were carrying rations to all the divisions of the army. The functions of the quartermaster's department, under the superintendence of Colonel Ingalls, were admirably performed. The army was soon rested and organized; the sight of a few reinforcements sent from Fortress Monroe had produced the best effect upon the spirits of the soldiers, whose imagination magnified their number. The stragglers had all rejoined their regiments, so that an estimate could be formed of the number present. The army of the Potomac, reunited before Richmond June 20th, had an effective force of one hundred and four thousand seven hundred and twenty-four men fit for service, and eleven thousand two hundred and eighty-nine sick or unable to perform any kind of service. On reaching Harrison's Landing there were scarcely fifty thousand men in the ranks, but on the 4th of July, when the corps commanders made their reports, it was found that the net losses of the army since the 20th of June amounted to fifteen thousand two hundred and forty-nine men, of whom one thousand five hundred and eighty-two had been killed, seven thousand seven hundred wounded, and five thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight missing. This last figure comprised, besides prisoners, all the soldiers who had been left on the field of battle, whose fate, whether killed or wounded, could not be ascertained; to this number may be added, without exaggeration, six thousand sick or lame who had gone to the hospital in consequence of the excessive fatigues of the preceding days. McClellan therefore found himself with about eighty-four thousand men under arms, not counting those who had just joined him.

The losses of Lee's army during the seven days amounted to twenty thousand men, to which number must also be added at

least five thousand rendered unfit for active service by the same causes which had operated with his adversaries; this army, therefore, had undergone a diminution of twenty-five thousand men.* This was more than one-fourth of its effective force on the 26th of June.

An interlude was to follow this great struggle. While McClellan was fortifying himself at Harrison's Landing, Lee, hampered like himself by the difficulty of subsisting his army, was obliged to fall back as far as the environs of Richmond. Both sides were gathering their troops together while waiting for a favorable opportunity to renew the contest. In the estimation of those who did not allow themselves to be troubled by foolish alarms and were not blinded by party prejudices, McClellan's situation was far from bad. The material losses he had sustained could be easily repaired. The great danger the army had incurred had excited an extraordinary sensation in the North, which resulted in numerous enlistments; the government felt at last that it could no longer haggle about reinforcements; the soldiers had been trained by their trials, and their chief had displayed qualities which justified the confidence reposed in him. Planted on the James, McClellan could, either by ascending this river or by seizing upon Petersburg, strike much deadlier blows at Richmond than when his army lay across the Chickahominy, far from any water communication.

Such was the position of the two armies about the 7th of July. On this day the steamer coming from Fortress Monroe landed a passenger at Harrison's Landing, whose dress, as simple as his manners, did not at first attract any attention, but in whom people soon recognized President Lincoln. He had come to consult with the commander of the army of the Potomac about the measures to be adopted under those grave circumstances.

But before we begin the narrative of the new campaign which was preparing in Virginia, we must retrace our steps to relate the events of which the valley of the Mississippi had been the theatre during the spring of 1862.

* See the tabular figures of effective strength in Note B, Appendix to this volume.

BOOK II.—THE NAVAL WAR.

CHAPTER I.

NEW ORLEANS.

NEW ORLEANS was the most important of all the cities of the Confederacy, as well on account of its population, numbering one hundred and seventy thousand souls, as by its position on the lower course of the Mississippi. It had within its walls but an insignificant number of slaves, about thirteen thousand, but it was the principal mart of all the rich cotton and sugar plantations which lined both banks of the Mississippi, and which were exclusively cultivated by negro labor. Its inhabitants, therefore, widely divided by the difference of race and language, had always been unanimous in sustaining the cause of slavery since it had played the first part in the political affairs of the republic, nor had they been among the less zealous in raising the standard of secession in 1861. Many of them had fought bravely on the battle-field of Bull Run. Should the Confederacy ever be recognized and enjoy a tranquil independent existence—should it succeed in realizing the dream of that vast association known by the name of *Knights of the Golden Circle*, and encompass the Gulf of Mexico by annexing Cuba on one side and Mexico on the other—the *queen of the Mississippi* was certain to become the capital of this new power. So long as the war lasted it was a strategic point of the utmost importance. If the Federals should succeed in taking possession of this city, they would obtain a foothold in the centre of one of the richest rebel States; they would take from their adversaries a port which required a large number of vessels to blockade, and would secure a strong base of operations from which to attack in rear the armies charged with the defence of the upper course of the Mississippi. Consequently, since the

outset of the war their aim had been to make themselves masters of the place. We have said that in the month of December, 1861, General Phelps had landed with a few Massachusetts battalions on a small sandy islet called Ship Island, situated at the entrance of Lake Borgne. As this bay extends to within a short distance of New Orleans, the station of Ship Island, although a disagreeable spot, swept by winds dangerous to vessels and unhealthy for men, afforded, nevertheless, an indispensable point for victualling the fleet and the troops which were about to attack the capital of Louisiana. Upon this island Phelps had found a large fortification commenced before the war, which the Confederates had evacuated during the month of September, and which had been completed by the Federal troops.

While the Federal government was organizing the expedition the object of which was the capture of New Orleans, it maintained a strict blockade of the coast of the Mexican Gulf, despite the inclement season, which it rendered more stringent by gradually occupying the coast itself. A few words will suffice to explain the small military operations which preceded in the first four months of 1862 the setting out of this great expedition.

The first was the occupation of Cedar Keys. This group of islands is situated on the western coast of Florida, a short distance from the main land, and fronting the head of a line of railway which, crossing the peninsula in an oblique direction from south-west to north-east, connected with the Atlantic coast at Fernandina. The war-steamer *Hatteras*, which appeared there on the 10th of January, took possession of this post without firing a shot; there the Federals found several guns, four schooners, with four or five smaller vessels; they also captured about fifteen prisoners and destroyed the railway station. Six weeks after, on the 24th of February, a few sailors in a launch tried to take possession of another vessel which they had spied on the coast; they were unable to get her away, but succeeded in destroying her.

The principal river which empties into the Gulf of Mexico, east of Mobile Bay, is the Appalachicola, formed by the junction of the waters of Flint River and the Chattahoochee. At its mouth there are found alluvial deposits, which cause the coast to

describe a convex curve surrounded by islands and sand-banks. This navigable river afforded the best way for conveying the products of the States of Georgia and Alabama to the coast, which the blockade-runners came to receive in the little town of Appalachicola, situated on Appalachee Bay. In order to put an end to this traffic, two launches were detached from the Federal cruiser *Mercedita* on the 23d of March, which blockaded the entrance of the bay, and ordered to proceed to the town. The Confederate authorities, together with a small garrison, had fled at their approach; but the sailors did not consider themselves sufficiently strong to venture on shore. They returned on the 3d of April, ten days afterward, in eight launches or whaling-boats, took temporary possession of the town, and did not return on board the *Mercedita* and *Sagamore* until they had destroyed all the vessels that could be used in the contraband trade.

More to the west the naval division charged with the blockade of the Mississippi also occasionally visited the enemy's coast; this was at the time when Farragut was commencing his operations, and it was essential to keep a watch over the Confederates along the whole line they had to defend. While Butler's troops were impatiently waiting on the sandy shores of Ship Island for the moment when they might penetrate into the passes which lead to the rich city of New Orleans, it so happened that one day during the equinoctial storm, when a furious gale of wind was blowing, and the sea was more violently agitated than usual, some soldiers picked up on the beach a little girl three years old, who had been washed by the waves from a Confederate ship which was going to pieces at the entrance of Lake Borgne. The child, restored to consciousness by the unremitting care of those around her, was able to tell the name of her relatives; and Major Strong, chief of Butler's staff, prompted by a humane instinct, undertook to carry her, under a flag of truce, to Biloxi, a small town formerly frequented by the inhabitants of New Orleans as a sea-bathing resort, situated opposite Ship Island. But on his return he was treacherously attacked by parties lying in ambuscade, and came near being killed or captured, with the sailors who had escorted him. The two tenders, the *Jackson* and the *New London*, accompanied by a transport with the Ninth Connecticut regiment on board, were sent

to chastise the perpetrators of this infamous outrage. These vessels, which a short time before, on the 23d of March, had already exchanged a few cannon-shots with two small Confederate steamers, appeared before Biloxi on the evening of April 2; the troops were landed, the town occupied, and the authorities were glad to get off at the cost of some humble apologies. On the following day the three Federal vessels ran into the Pass Christian channel, a short distance from there, drove off the two Confederate steamers, landed a few troops to destroy the Confederate dépôts, and, after having again taken the men on board, returned to Ship Island. Finally, on the very day when, as we shall see presently, Farragut was taking possession of New Orleans, the 27th of April, a Federal detachment seized a small abandoned work called Fort Livingston, on the western coast of the Mississippi delta, where some Louisiana militia were in the habit of parading for a few hours once a week.

A few Confederate vessels, while attempting to force the blockade, fell, about the same time, into the hands of the Federal navy stationed in the Gulf of Mexico.

We may mention the brig *Wilder*, which was run ashore near Mobile on the 20th of January to escape from the Union cruisers, and was raised and taken off by the latter under a brisk fire from the beach. The most important capture was that of the steamer *Florida*, a splendid vessel engaged in the contraband cotton trade between the coast of Florida and Havana. On the 4th of April a Federal launch which had been sent to reconnoitre the bay of St. Andrews, west of the mouth of the Appalachicola, surprised a small schooner employed as a blockade-runner, which had taken refuge there a month before. It was found that when captured the captain of this vessel made strong professions of loyalty to the Union cause, and even proposed to assist the Federals in seizing the *Florida*, whose whereabouts, at the extremity of the bay, near the mouth of Bear Creek, he divulged to them. The armed sailors concealed themselves on board the schooner, which stood off for the *Florida* without any one suspecting the trick. In the twinkling of an eye the Federals jumped on board and took possession of the enemy's vessel. Here, again, they found men ready to assist them. As was almost

invariably the case, the engineers were at heart in favor of the Union, and readily consented to continue their services. After a dangerous run of several days, after having run aground three times and having lost many men by the fire of the enemy concealed along the shore, the brave boatswain, Lewis, brought the *Florida* into the Bay of St. Joseph. An attempt almost as bold was made on the 5th of April by a Federal launch and a whale-boat, at the other extremity of the Mexican gulf, to seize the schooner *Columbia*, which had taken refuge in the San Luis Pass, in Texas, west of Galveston. But after having been for a moment in possession of the vessel, the Union sailors were obliged to abandon their prize, which they set on fire before leaving.

Meanwhile, the project of an expedition against New Orleans, which had been determined upon at the close of the year 1861, and then relinquished, when a war with England seemed imminent, had been revived as soon as the question of the Trent prisoners was amicably settled. General Butler had been directed to raise the necessary troops for this expedition; and in order to make him independent of the local authorities, whose recruiting operations he might interfere with, a military department was created expressly for him in the New England States. He set himself actively to work, and soon succeeded in raising about ten thousand men. The most important part of this expedition, however, was that pertaining to the navy. This was entrusted to Captain Farragut, an officer of large experience, who had remained faithful to his flag, although a native of Tennessee. He was placed in command of the Gulf squadron, and embarked at Hampton Roads on the 2d of February, on board the fine sloop-of-war *Hartford*, which he was to lead into many battles. The secret concerning the object of the undertaking had been carefully kept. The vessels which the government was collecting from all quarters for this expedition had received sealed orders, designating Key West or the mouths of the Mississippi as the rallying-point.

Butler started three weeks later. On the 23d of February, after receiving his instructions from the President and General McClellan, he left Chesapeake Bay with a fleet of transports, on board of which were the troops he had raised in the North, together with three regiments detached from Baltimore. He was

to take up two other regiments at Key West, and one at Fort Pickens. The voyage was long and tedious, and it was only after being one month at sea that he landed at Ship Island, where he found himself at the head of thirteen thousand seven hundred men.

Farragut had long been waiting for him, and had availed himself of this delay to organize his forces, and prepare them for the difficult enterprise which had been entrusted to them. His squadron consisted of the frigate *Colorado*, forty-eight guns; the sloop-of-war *Brooklyn*, twenty-four guns, which had been blockading the Mississippi for some time; the sloop-of-war *Iroquois*, nine guns, brought back from the West Indies; of the following ships, recently fitted out in the arsenals of the North: the *Hartford*, which we have just mentioned, twenty-four guns; the *Richmond*, twenty-six guns; the *Pensacola*, twenty-four guns; the *Mississippi*, twelve guns; the *Oneida*, nine guns; the sailing sloop-of-war *Portsmouth*, seventeen guns; and ten gun-boats: the *Varuna*, twelve guns; the *Cayuga*, six guns; the *Winona*, the *Katahdin*, the *Itasca*, the *Kineo*, the *Wissahickon*, the *Pinola*, the *Kennebeck*, the *Scioto*, four guns each. These gun-boats were all merchant-vessels of small tonnage, which the Navy Department had purchased and converted into war-ships for the occasion. Farragut had, moreover, several other war-vessels of a new description, which we shall find playing an important part in the various battles of which the Mississippi is to be the theatre. There were twenty sailing-brigs, each carrying a mortar, which had been fitted out at the Brooklyn arsenal. These vessels, of light draught, registered from two to three hundred tons; their entire centre, from keel to deck, was occupied by massive timber-work supporting a solid platform, in the centre of which was a turning-table containing the mortar. This mortar weighed eight tons and a half, and could throw bombshells fifteen inches in diameter. Several tugs were attached to the service of this flotilla, which was commanded by an intelligent and energetic officer, Captain David Porter. Farragut's fleet consisted of forty-six vessels in all, carrying three hundred guns or mortars, but not a single armored vessel.

It was precisely at the moment, when the immense superiority

of the latter kind of vessels had just been demonstrated by the battles in Hampton Roads, that Farragut was about to venture with his wooden ships under the converging fire of the forts of New Orleans. The inhabitants of the latter city, therefore, felt perfectly safe. They predicted for the Federals the fate of the English expedition which Andrew Jackson had so entirely defeated under their walls in 1815. The position of New Orleans seemed to justify these expectations. In the preceding volume we have already described the flat and marshy country extending south of this city, the peculiar formation of the bed of the Mississippi, which, like the Nile and the rivers of Holland, runs over a sand-shallow (*dos d'âne*) incessantly banked up by its own alluvia and the natural levees which enclose it for a great distance into the sea, which, giving to its mouth the aspect of a series of promontories, deceived the first explorers of the Mexican Gulf. The waters of the river all along the delta are of great depth; there are none of those sand-banks which render the navigation of its upper course so dangerous. But below the *Tête-des-Passes*, at the point where each branch empties its waters into the sea, there have been formed, as at the entrance of all large rivers, difficult bars, on which there are but three or four fathoms of water. New Orleans is situated on the west bank, one hundred and sixty kilometres above these mouths, but only separated by a few kilometres from Lake Borgne, where the waters which the levees allow to escape discharge themselves through numerous channels, or *bayous*, to use a local term. It is impossible, however, to attack the city on this side, because Lake Borgne is very shallow, and the space between its shores and the levee upon which New Orleans stands is occupied by large and impassable swamps. A few unimportant works were amply sufficient to cover the city back of these swamps. Forts Jackson and St. Philip, which, as we have said, protected the lower course of the river and commanded the real approaches to the great city of the South, are situated at about sixty kilometres from the passes of the Mississippi. Fort St. Philip, on the left bank of the river, was established by the Spaniards, and had recently been reconstructed under the superintendence of Captain Barnard, a Federal officer of engineers, who had since been placed at the head of that

arm of the service on McClellan's staff. Fort Jackson, so named after the defender of New Orleans, was situated opposite, near the site of the old Fort Bourbon. The department of war at Washington had naturally received detailed plans of all these works, and Barnard had furnished a memoir on the one he had reconstructed, and which his comrades were ordered to capture.

The Confederate authorities considered themselves invulnerable on this side; consequently, they did not trouble themselves about protecting New Orleans, except against an enemy coming down the Mississippi. It was at Columbus, Island Number Ten and Fort Pillow that they had intended to defend the capital of the Gulf of Mexico. When General Lovell succeeded Twiggs in the command of Louisiana in October, 1861, he was absolutely without resources. The regiments raised in that part of the country had gone to fight elsewhere; the arsenals were empty, the forts had scarcely any armament, and the war-vessels in process of construction on the river were yet unfinished; money, men and materials of war were alike wanting. The armies of Virginia and Kentucky had swallowed up everything. During the winter Lovell had, by assiduous activity, remedied this evil to a considerable extent. A double *enceinte*, well fortified, protected the city on the land side. Two powder-manufactories were kept at work day and night. The garrison numbered, besides the militia, eight thousand men, all well-trained troops. But the reverses sustained by their armies in the North-west were a subject of increasing alarm to the Richmond authorities. In the month of March Lovell had been obliged to send five thousand men to Columbus, and little by little all those of his soldiers who had enlisted in the service of the Confederacy were taken from him. There were only left to him three thousand volunteers raised by the governor of Louisiana, engaged for only three months, badly equipped and undrilled. He had also been requested to furnish cannon and ammunition. In short, conflicts of authority and the want of money delayed the completion of the two vessels upon which he had relied for defending the Mississippi against the Federal fleets. These vessels were the *Louisiana* and the *Mississippi*, each registering one thousand five hundred tons, strongly plated, armed with a beak, supplied with a powerful engine, and

each carrying twenty guns. The Richmond government had decided that these vessels, with fourteen river-boats more or less armored, should proceed to the Upper Mississippi as soon as completed to contend with Foote; but the danger which threatened New Orleans was so great that Lovell succeeded, by force of entreaty, in obtaining permission to retain these vessels, as well as six of the gun-boats. The other eight were taken from him. Nevertheless, at the end of March the Confederate flotilla found itself in a condition to afford powerful aid to Forts Jackson and St. Philip if they should be attacked by the Federals. It consisted of the *Louisiana*, which had at last been completed; the ram *Manassas*, which had already caused so much alarm to the Federal ships the preceding year, and which had been sent back to New Orleans by order of Beauregard; six river-boats, the *Warrior*, the *Stonewall Jackson*, the *Resolute*, the *Defiance*, the *Governor Moore* and the *General Quitman*, most of them protected by iron plates and cotton-bales, each armed with a beak; and five other vessels of the same description, equipped under the direction of the governor of Louisiana. But the Richmond authorities, unable to understand the necessity for a single command, had persisted in placing this flotilla under the orders of officers acting independently of the land-forces. Commodore Whipple, residing in New Orleans, with Captain Mitchell as second in authority, had the exclusive command of the vessels charged with the defence of the passes. During the whole siege Mitchell declined all concert of action with the defenders of the forts, refused to listen to Lovell's advice or the requests of Duncan, and by his inaction during the bombardment exposed himself to severe but just criticisms on the part of his comrades.

The Confederates, however, on being informed of the approach of Farragut's fleet, had not deemed these vessels to be a sufficient protection for New Orleans, and wanted to close the entrance of the Mississippi, just as the Russians had closed the port of Sebastopol. But the great depth of the river, which is from fifteen to twenty-five fathoms, did not allow of vessels being sunk in its bed, as even their masts would have disappeared under the waters. Lovell attempted to supply this kind of obstruction by means of a floating barrier or dam. An enormous chain, brought from Pen-

sacola, was stretched from bank to bank, at a point where the Mississippi is only six hundred and sixty metres wide. Large trunks of cypress, ten metres in length and placed in the direction of the current at short distances apart, supported this chain, and the whole was firmly kept in position by seven anchors placed up stream. Unfortunately for the Confederates, this formidable obstacle obstructed the course of the river but too effectually. When its waters began to rise in the spring, overflowing both banks and surrounding all the approaches to the forts with an impassable barrier for infantry, they bore down all the rubbish which the Mississippi washes away from the forests that lie on its upper banks, and which it yearly sweeps down into the sea. Being stopped by this barrier, the accumulated trunks soon formed a floating mass reaching as far as Fort St. Philip, and a day naturally came when the weight of this mass broke the obstacle which had held it back. This occurred at the end of February. By means of contributions from the inhabitants of New Orleans—for the Confederate exchequer was empty—Lovell set himself to work to repair this disaster. Eleven hulks of brigs were anchored in the river and bound together by a slight chain, which, rising and sinking alternately, allowed the floating matter to pass, while the rigging of these vessels, lowered into the space which separated them, would become entangled with the screws of the vessels which should approach them. Only a portion of the old raft was kept on the right bank of the river. A narrow passage was contrived for Confederate vessels which might desire to reach the open sea. This obstacle was still sufficiently effective to stop the Federal fleet for some time, and thus kept it exposed to the converging fire of more than one hundred guns placed upon the two banks.

Indeed, the two large forts and their dependent batteries mounted one hundred and fifty guns. Fort St. Philip, situated on the salient angle of an elbow in the river, enfiladed it in two directions. Fort Jackson, situated a little lower down, was of larger dimensions. It was a regular pentagon, with a curtain one hundred and fifty metres long, and commanded all the surrounding country with the exception of a portion of the levee on the right bank, which, two kilometres lower down, was masked by a dense forest. It mounted seventy-five guns; but some

of his best pieces had been taken from him and sent to Island Number Ten by order of the Richmond authorities. It had many bomb-proof shelters; a portion of its artillery was in casemates; its garrison, which should have been two thousand five hundred men, scarcely numbered more than one thousand five hundred. These two forts possessed, nevertheless, a sufficient number of practical gunners to serve, with two full reliefs, the eighty guns which covered the river. A land-battery erected in front of Fort Jackson protected the point where the chain was fastened to the right bank; but at the last moment two heavy rifled guns, which had been placed there with the utmost difficulty, were taken away to be put on board the *Louisiana*, where they did not fire a single shot.

Since the blockade had interrupted navigation below New Orleans, the mouths of the river had become blocked up with mud, thus adding a natural defence to those we have already described. Consequently, when Farragut tried to enter the Mississippi River in the month of March, he had the greatest difficulty in getting his sloops-of-war over the bar. The frigate *Colorado*, drawing twenty-two feet of water, was obliged to remain outside, and the greater part of her crew were distributed among the other vessels. It was only on the 8th of April that, the sloops-of-war *Mississippi* and *Pensacola* having surmounted the obstacle, Farragut saw the whole of his fleet assembled in the waters of the great river. By the 28th of March the enemy's position had been reconnoitred, and the edge of the wood which covers the right bank below Fort Jackson was selected as the best position for the mortar-boats. Having been delayed by want of coal, the fleet was unable to start until the 17th of April, while Butler, who had arrived from Ship Island with nine thousand men, was waiting for the issue of the conflict at the entrance of the river, to land his troops upon some tenable ground. At this period the whole of the Mississippi delta was but a vast impracticable swamp, and his troops had nothing to do but to gather the fruits of the advantages secured by the navy. The rise in the river, however, which paralyzed the action of the Federal soldiers, also rendered them considerable service. The small army of Lovell, flooded in its encampments, was exposed to every kind of suffering and privations,

and the forts themselves were menaced by the water, which was undermining the friable soil upon which they were erected. Finally, on the 11th of April the floating bar was again considerably injured, although enough remained to form an obstacle difficult to surmount.

On the 18th of April the mortar-boats, which were to open fire, cast anchor two thousand metres from Fort Jackson, along the woods above mentioned, without being discovered by the enemy. In order to disguise them more effectually, their masts and rigging were enveloped with green boughs, while their hulls were plastered over with the reddish clay of the Mississippi. Six of them occupied a more exposed position close to the left shore, but their fire was more certain. A few gun-boats accompanied them. The distances had been calculated with great precision, so that on the morning of the 18th these twenty mortar-boats were able to concentrate their fire upon Fort Jackson. The effects of this terrible bombardment were soon felt, without, however, preventing the fort from replying with vigor. It even soon compelled the six mortar-boats which were not masked by the wood to change position to avoid being sunk, but the exact spot occupied by the rest was not discovered. Finally, toward five o'clock in the evening all the wooden buildings occupying the parade-ground caught fire. This accident suspended the service of the Confederate guns, and the garrison had the greatest trouble in extinguishing the flames. At sunset, after having discharged one thousand five hundred shells, Porter ceased firing. During the night the Federal gun-boats which kept guard succeeded in scattering several fire-ships launched by the enemy.

From the 19th the mortar-boats continued firing without intermission day and night, each of the three divisions composing the flotilla performing this service for four hours. Not having been able to regulate the fuses of the shells properly, Porter determined not to cut them ; so that, instead of bursting in the air, these projectiles buried themselves five or six metres deep into the soft earth of the fort, and their explosion, although not very dangerous to its defenders, greatly injured the construction. On the evening of the 20th, Farragut confided to his flag-officer, the brave Bell, one of the best officers in the American navy, the

dangerous mission of proceeding with two gun-boats, the *Pinola* and the *Itasca*, to open a breach in the floating bar constructed by the enemy. During this expedition the mortars redoubled their fire in order to compel the latter to seek refuge within their casemates. Taking advantage of their confusion, Lieutenant Caldwell boarded one of the dismantled hulks that lay in the river, unloosed the chains attached to it, and placed a bag of gun-powder with a fuse furnished with an electric attachment. The defenders of the forts had soon perceived the two gun-boats, and the latter, while retiring, were covered with a shower of shells. The wire which was to have caused the explosion of the powder-bag broke; but one of the chains being detached, there were left two practicable passages for the Federal fleet. Hoping, however, to silence Fort Jackson completely, Porter continued the bombardment until the evening of the 23d. His ammunition was almost exhausted, and the fire of the enemy had not sensibly slackened; one single gun in Fort St. Philip, which was undoubtedly the best, and four in Fort Jackson, had been dismounted. On the other hand, one of the mortar-boats had been sunk by a cannon ball which had gone entirely through it; the Federals, however, had lost but very few men, and their boats had perfectly withstood the concussion produced by the firing of the enormous guns they carried.

They, however, despaired of their ability to reduce the forts by a simple bombardment. There was no question as to the havoc caused by their projectiles in Fort Jackson. According to the Confederates themselves, more than eight thousand bombshells had fallen within the *enceinte*, so that the casemates, notwithstanding the sand-bags with which they had been covered, were half in ruins and on the point of falling to pieces; the powder magazine was no longer safe, and all the masonry was damaged. And, what was still more serious, the bombshells, by bursting in the dyke which kept the river out, had caved it in in many places, and the waters, which were very high at the time, had flooded a great portion of the work, rendering the bomb-proof shelters almost uninhabitable and communications between the different batteries extremely difficult. If the ground had not been so soft and the bombshells had not penetrated so deeply into the earth,

the fort would have been destroyed in two or three days. General Duncan and his two lieutenants, Colonels Higgins and McIntosh, encouraged, however, their soldiers by their own example. The five or six heavy guns which alone would reach the station occupied by the Federal ships were constantly at work; fire-ships came down the river every night. There was nothing, therefore, to indicate the termination of the struggle; to put an end to it, Farragut determined to attempt a bold stroke, and to force the passes under the fire of the enemy's guns.

Nor was this an alternative resorted to in a moment of embarrassment, but rather a plan long cherished by that mind at once so calculating and so bold. Combining the two greatest qualities of a warrior, forming his plans with calm deliberation, foreseeing every danger which they could present, and executing them without hesitation, Farragut had promised the government at Washington to capture New Orleans. He had announced before embarking that he should, if necessary, place himself with his wooden vessels before the enemy's forts, that, instead of fighting them at a distance, he should approach them within short range, to fill the embrasures of their casemates with grape, and that by sacrificing one or two of his ships he would secure a passage for the rest of his fleet. This was the manœuvre he was about to attempt, which, often repeated by him with the same intrepidity and success during the war, was to place him in the highest rank among the naval commanders of our epoch. He may probably have been engaged on other occasions in more desperate conflicts than the one for which he was preparing on the 23d of April, 1862, but on this day he was going to make the first trial of a new system; and as the admiral himself said to us in his own graphic language a few years later, "It was like the egg broken by Christopher Columbus; it was necessary to imagine what no one had ever accomplished before under similar circumstances." It was necessary, above all, to be able to execute so rash a manœuvre at a time when the vast superiority of forts over wooden vessels was everywhere asserted. Farragut was fortunately assisted by resolute officers, to whom he was not afraid of saying by way of encouragement that "they would have to meet their foe in a kind of warfare most unfavorable to the navy."

It having been ascertained by a reconnaissance that the passage between two of the connected hulks was still free, Farragut gave the signal for weighing anchor at two o'clock in the morning, April 24th. He had verbally given the minutest instructions to all his officers, while allowing them ample freedom of action in their preparations for battle. The inventive mind of the Americans had taken advantage of this privilege. Some of the commanders had painted their decks white, the better to recognize each other in the dark, and this seems to have succeeded remarkably well; others had plastered their hulls with clay; all had improvised shelters for the vital parts of their ships, some by hanging coils of rope on their sides, others by lining the interior with sacks of coal or hammocks.

At half-past three o'clock in the morning the fleet began to move in two columns. The right column was under the orders of Captain Bailey, second in command, whose flag was hoisted on the gun-boat *Cayuga*. He was followed by the two sloops-of-war *Pensacola* and *Mississippi*, and the five gun-boats *Oneida*, *Varuna*, *Katahdin*, *Kineo* and *Wissahickon*. The left column consisted of the three sloops-of-war *Hartford*, *Brooklyn* and *Richmond*, under the immediate command of Farragut, and the six gun-boats *Scioto*, *Iroquois*, *Kennebeck*, *Pinola*, *Itasca* and *Winona*, which he placed under the command of Captain Bell. The two columns were to proceed in such a manner as to afford each other mutual support; the vessels composing the right column had shifted all their heavy guns to starboard to fire upon Fort Philip; those of the left column to larboard to engage Fort Jackson. The sloops were to slacken their speed during this combat to draw the fire of the adversary, while the vessels of weaker model, proceeding more rapidly through the dangerous space, were to attack the enemy's flotilla.

It was a dark night; the Confederate ships, still careless in spite of Duncan's warnings, had neither boats posted to watch the river, nor fires upon the water to direct the aim of the land-batteries. The defenders of Fort Jackson, however, soon discovered the Federal vessels, which, owing to the difficulty they experienced in navigating a channel unknown to them, and against a violent current, advanced but slowly, making scarcely four knots an hour.

The fire of Fort Jackson was soon joined by that of St. Philip, which enfiladed the river and the Federal fleet without eliciting a single shot in return. The mortars had been directed to respond for them, and continued firing without intermission, while the gun-boats attached to their service, and the sailing-ship *Portsmouth*, had gone up within easy range of Fort Jackson and covered it with shells.

Both Farragut and Bailey found the passage between the dismantled vessels which were to arrest their course; the fires tardily kindled by the Confederates to light up the scene of the battle served them as guides; the two columns followed them and immediately discharged their guns against the two forts. The river was soon enveloped in smoke, which augmented still further the obscurity of the night and the difficulty of manœuvring. The last gun-boats of the two columns lost sight of those that preceded them. The *Kennebeck* on the right, the *Winona* on the left, became entangled among the chains stretched between the brig-hulks; the former sunk one of the hulks, but wasted much precious time in getting free. At the same time, the *Itasca*, which preceded the *Winona*, was struck by a cannon-ball, which penetrated her boiler and disabled her; the two vessels ran foul of each other. The *Itasca* was carried away by the current, and the *Winona*, left alone after having tried in vain to find her way, was obliged to descend the river once more with the *Kennebeck*, under the concentrated fire of all the enemy's guns. While these events were taking place, the remainder of the fleet had passed Fort Jackson, responding as best it could to the salvos of the Confederate batteries. Higgins' soldiers, crippled by Porter's projectiles, exhausted by six days' bombardment, serving guns nearly all of which were in a damaged condition, in ruined casemates, had no means for stopping the Federal vessels, which escaped them with but trifling damage. In the midst of the darkness nothing but a fortunate chance could have enabled them to sink one of those vessels in their passage.

But Fort St. Philip, which had scarcely sustained any damage from the bombardment, was more formidable. Bailey had already passed it with the *Cayuga*, after having fired grape into the embrasures, in conformity with the instructions of the commodore;

but he had paid dear for his audacity, for no less than forty-two cannon-balls had struck his ship. The *Pensacola* and the *Mississippi* had in their turn been brought into action. Farragut came to their assistance, but he was attacked at the same time by the *Manassas* and the fire-ship; in trying to avoid them the *Hartford* ran aground, and was set on fire by the fire-ship. Fortunately, the flames were soon extinguished; the flag-ship got once more afloat, and while the *Manassas* was disappearing in the darkness it opened so well sustained a fire within short range, upon the batteries of Fort St. Philip, that nearly all the Confederate cannoneers abandoned their guns. The *Brooklyn* had followed in her wake, but her progress was delayed by the bar, and she had only succeeded in effecting a passage by sinking one of the hulls moored in the river, at the risk of becoming herself a wreck. This sloop encountered the *Manassas* in her turn. The Confederate ram fired her solitary gun at her at a distance of three metres; fortunately for the *Brooklyn*, the ball lodged in the sand-bags placed around her engine, and did it no damage. The *Manassas* then tried to run into her adversary; but not having sufficient space to back, in order to acquire the necessary impetus, the force of her thrust was broken against the chains that hung over the sides of the Federal vessel. The latter had taken the place of the *Hartford* in front of Fort Jackson, when another foe, one of the Confederate gun-boats, came to attack her. A single broad-side, fired at fifty metres, sufficed to disable this new adversary, which caught fire, and the burning of which lighted up for an instant the scene of this desperate combat.

While each vessel was directing its fire by the flash of the enemy's guns, the Union gun-boats had passed the forts; and the Confederate cannon having been almost silenced, the sloops also succeeded in ascending the river, so that, when daylight rendered the combatants visible, fourteen of the Federal ships found themselves above the forts. The others were disabled, but none of them had been lost. The most difficult part of Farragut's undertaking had been accomplished in less than an hour; the battle, however, was not yet won. Through a fortunate chance for the Federals, the *Louisiana*, which had reached Fort Jackson on the 20th, had sustained some injury to her machinery, and Mitchell

was unwilling to take that vessel into action, or even to allow her to be placed in a position where she could support the batteries of the forts. He thus rendered useless the artillerists, the cannon of heavy calibres and the ammunition he had received for the armament of his vessel. In passing the forts, Farragut had left behind him the powerful instrument upon which his foes had built so many hopes; but the latter had yet the *Manassas* and about ten wooden vessels with which to oppose him. These vessels, evidently surprised by his attack, had lost the best opportunity to fight him while he was cannonading the land batteries; but they were about to make a strenuous effort to repair their error. Most of them were at anchor a little above Fort St. Philip; so that Bailey, who led the fleet with the *Cayuga*, saw them coming down to crush him. Even before the steamers that followed in his wake had all passed this fort, the *Cayuga* was attacked by three of the enemy's vessels; she made a successful stand against them. One was struck at thirty paces by an eleven-inch shell, which obliged her to make speed for the shore, where she was abandoned and set on fire; another was disabled, and just as a third was approaching, two Federal gun-boats came to the succor of Bailey. These were the *Oncida*, which had just run into and sunk one of the enemy's vessels, and the *Varuna*, which immediately passed to the head of the assaulting column. But the latter vessel ventured too far, and a few kilometres above St. Philip was in turn attacked on every side. The *Morgan*, commanded by an old Federal officer who had joined the Confederates, raked her deck by an enfilading shot. While the *Varuna* replied to and disabled this first adversary, another Confederate ram, the *Stonewall Jackson*, took her in flank, and struck her twice with the beak, causing an enormous leak. The *Varuna* had barely time to head for the shore, to bring up in the mud, and avoid sinking in deep water with all her crew. In the mean time, the *Oncida* came to her assistance; she compelled the two Confederate ships to make also for the shore, and took the crew of the wrecked gun-boat on board.

The remainder of the fleet, which had arrived at this juncture, was finishing the work of dispersing or destroying the light vessels bearing the Confederate flag, when the *Manassas* was seen in the

distance coming up the river to assist the latter. Farragut immediately ordered the sloop-of-war *Mississippi* to go and attack her. Before these two vessels were able to come in contact the *Manassas* had already received the fire of two or three gun-boats. The *Mississippi*, with a full head of steam, came down upon her; but as she was about being boarded the nimble Confederate eluded the blow and struck the side of the *Mississippi*, when, recognizing the impossibility of continuing the contest, she steered rapidly for the shore. The Federals tried in vain to capture her and set her afloat, but the fire of Fort St. Philip prevented them; so they riddled her with shell, which set her on fire. The current soon raised her and carried her off. Thus abandoned and enveloped in smoke, the *Manassas* drifted slowly down the river, and passing the forts she had not been able to defend arrived at last in front of Porter's flotilla, to which her appearance caused at first considerable alarm. The Federals, however, soon perceived that this enemy, hitherto so much dreaded, was only an inanimate body, and while they were preparing to board her she was seen to go down with a hissing sound like that of burning coal falling in the water, and sinking never to rise again.

The contest was ended for the moment. The inhabitants of New Orleans, whose fate had just been decided, had reposed that night in quiet and confidence. They had soon become accustomed to the bombardment, the distant echo of which sometimes reached them, and they had easily persuaded themselves that the enemy would never be able to pass the two forts. It was therefore with feelings impossible to describe that they learned, on the morning of the 24th, that the Federal fleet had forced the passage, and that nothing could prevent it from bringing its broadsides to bear upon the very wharves of the capital. Although the more distinct sound of cannon, indicating the approach of Farragut, confirmed this news, they could not yet credit so great and so unforeseen a disaster; but the most incredulous became convinced when they saw the authorities themselves set fire to the dockyards of the navy. The scene of confusion and desolation of which this conflagration was the signal is nowhere better described than in the work of the Confederate historian Pollard, who cannot be suspected of exaggeration. Those who only the day before were

earnestly at work to finish the *Mississippi* and other vessels intended for the defence of the city, were now hastening to destroy them; they set them on fire and pushed them violently into the river, which swallowed them, together with munitions of all kinds. The spirit of destruction is contagious; the blockade-runners, which had not been able to get out since the occupation of the passes by Farragut, but which nothing prevented from ascending the river, were in their turn ruthlessly destroyed. Enormous bales of cotton that these vessels were to take to Europe were still piled up along the wharves; part of them were thrown into the water, the rest were soon consumed by fire. The people went about in search of all the cotton that was in the warehouses of the city to destroy it likewise. In doing this they followed the prescriptions of the Confederate government, which, relying upon a dearth of cotton as a means for compelling Europe to intervene in its behalf, had particularly recommended to allow none of it to fall into the hands of the enemy.

The river was covered with burning fragments, which it carried down to meet Farragut, as if to reveal to him sooner the extent of his success. In proportion as the day advanced the excitement in the city increased; the atmosphere was filled with a thick smoke, and the sound of the tocsin rung by every church-bell mingled with the crackling of flames and the sound of explosions. Presently the inhabitants of New Orleans perceived groups of horsemen advancing along the Mississippi levee; they recognized General Lovell and a few officers, who, after having been present at the nocturnal combat, had succeeded, not without difficulty, in passing the enemy's fleet. They were immediately surrounded and plied with questions. They related the circumstances of the battle, the courage displayed by the gunners and seamen, and the complete destruction of the fleet. But where was Farragut, and what was to be done? Farragut was approaching, and any attempt to defend the city against him would be only to subject it to all the horrors of a bombardment. Lovell had left a few troops below to impede the progress of the Federals, and to serve the twelve guns of the Chalmette batteries, erected on both sides of the river to protect the enclosure he had constructed. For a moment he thought of attempting a desperate stroke by boarding

the Federal ships as soon as they should present themselves before the city ; but when he asked for a thousand men willing to join in this undertaking, scarcely one hundred responded to the appeal ; he had only three thousand men in all under his command. Consequently, giving up the idea of continuing a useless struggle, he concluded to evacuate the city and to retire with his little garrison to Camp Moore, situated one hundred kilometres in the interior, on the Jackson Railroad. This determination, for which he was unjustly blamed, was wise as well as necessary ; for if he had attempted to defend New Orleans, he would not only have exposed that city to frightful ravages, but would have given Farragut an opportunity to achieve a much more decisive success ; and the Federal fleet would probably have taken advantage of such success to seize the whole course of the Mississippi. New Orleans, from its position, was a perfect trap for troops who had to defend it against an enemy having control of the river. North of the city stretches the great Lake Pontchartrain, bordered by gardens and villas, which, at a place called Kenner, above the city, draws so near the Mississippi as to be only separated by a strip of land one kilometre in width. This strip alone connects with the main land the irregular peninsula which forms the left side of the delta, and on which stands the city of New Orleans. Lake Pontchartrain, in fact, empties itself into Lake Borgne by means of two deep channels, the Rigolets and the bayou of Chef Menteur ; the rise in the waters had carried away all the obstacles that had been placed in these channels, the latter being only defended by two insignificant works. It thus opened Lake Pontchartrain to the small Federal gun-boats, enabling them to navigate there ; all retreat on this side, therefore, was impossible for the Confederates. Elsewhere this same freshet, by raising the surface of the Mississippi to a level with its levees, enabled the Federal vessels to place their broadsides in front of the isthmus of Kenner, and entirely to command its passage. If Lovell had remained in New Orleans, he would have been obliged to capitulate with all his troops at the end of a few days. His sagacity and prudence saved him from this inevitable disaster, and his speedy retreat secured the possession of Vicksburg to the Confederates. As soon as he had formed his decision he at once ordered all the *matériel* that

could yet be saved to be conveyed out of the city; the railroad was the only means of transportation left him, for, amid the panic, the steamers, which might have been of assistance to him, had either been burnt or taken away. His artillerists formed a corps of expert gunners. As soon as the evacuation was completed he sent them to Vicksburg with a brigade composed of his best troops. These were the men whom Farragut found in that important position three weeks after, and who, by defending it during a whole month, gave Van Dorn time to come up and protect it against his attacks.

Meanwhile, the news of the departure of the troops had been spread abroad even before Lovell had made his first dispositions for retreat. This greatly increased the confusion. The entire population wandered about the streets greatly excited; some proposed to burn the city to prevent its falling into the hands of the Federals. This proposition, however, was not adopted; but under the pretext of depriving the enemy of the resources which the rich warehouses of the city offered, thousands of vagabonds set to plundering them. Night soon came to favor their depredations—a fearful night for that unfortunate city, exposed alike to the excesses of her own inhabitants and to the attacks of a victorious enemy.

The latter were, in fact, drawing every moment nearer. After the last fight with the Confederate gun-boats, Bailey had ascended the river with the *Cayuga* as far as the quarantine, and, meeting with the Chalmette regiment under Colonel Trymanský, he had thrown a few shells into his camp; the Confederate soldiers, who had lost all their courage, capitulated without making the least resistance. The possession of the quarantine secured to Farragut a direct communication with the sea through a bayou of the Mississippi accessible to small boats. He immediately advised Butler to avail himself of the opportunity, and to ascend this bayou to land his troops above the forts, so as to invest them completely. Then, leaving a few gun-boats to watch the enemy's ships which he had not been able to destroy, especially the *Louisiana*, he had resumed his victorious march. On the 25th, toward eleven o'clock in the morning, he cleared an elbow in the river from which is obtained the first glance of the great commer-

cial city, which is spread out in the shape of a crescent on the left bank. Shortly afterward he engaged the Chalmette batteries.

A few broadsides sufficed to silence them; and soon after, the whole Federal fleet, sailing in a single column, cast anchor in front of the city, each vessel taking position to enfilade one of the long and straight streets which run down to the river, traversing the entire city. There was not a soldier in the town. Lovell, however, had not yet left, having remained in person to hasten the removal of the *matériel*. When Captain Bailey demanded the surrender of New Orleans, the Confederate general transferred all his powers to the mayor. The latter, knowing that Farragut could land no troops, only thought of protracting negotiations in order to give Lovell time to complete the evacuation; and to this effect he opened a correspondence with the Federal commodore, the inflated style of which was in contrast with the simplicity and moderation of Farragut's answers. This singular state of things continued for five days;—on one side a large defenceless city, on the other side, and in front of it, a formidable fleet, possessing all the appliances for destroying it, but not the means to occupy it. Farragut's humanity did not permit him to use his cannon to enforce his authority, and the mayor, sheltering himself behind an unarmed population, took advantage of the conqueror's forbearance to defy him and keep the flag of the State of Louisiana floating on the public buildings. He thus succeeded in engrossing Farragut's attention so completely that this officer, ordinarily so vigilant, neglected to cut, at the isthmus of Kenner, the communications between New Orleans and the army; and Lovell, established at Camp Moore, continued to hold intercourse with the city, and even proposed to return if the inhabitants were willing to expose themselves to a bombardment, in order to resist the invader. If, however, he had succeeded in saving his *matériel*, his small army was greatly reduced in numbers, for the volunteers raised in New Orleans refused to serve any longer under his orders; and finding the road still open to them, they returned *en masse* to their homes. The same spirit of insubordination broke out not only in Forts Jackson and St. Philip, as we shall presently show, but also in all the small garrisons of Western Louisiana, which had been ordered to the city by Lovell, and which,

instead of obeying him, disbanded as soon as the order was received. Such were the inevitable consequences of the doctrine of secession; when carried to extremes, it reacted against the cause which had at first profited by it.

At last the news of the capitulation of the forts, which extinguished the last hope of the Confederates and rendered Butler's troops available, put an end to this strange state of affairs. On the morning of the 24th, as soon as Porter saw Farragut's fleet above the forts, he summoned the latter to surrender, and on their refusal to do so renewed the bombardment, directing his fire especially against the ship *Louisiana*, which, as we have stated, had not participated in the battle, and had thus escaped Farragut's guns. During this time all the channels through which the defenders of the forts might have tried to communicate with New Orleans were occupied by light vessels, while Butler, landing his troops near the quarantine, invested them completely. General Duncan was, nevertheless, in hopes of being able to resist a little while longer. If Fort Jackson was in ruins, St. Philip was still in a tolerably good condition. Only four men had been wounded in the second fort and forty-two in the first; among the latter, notwithstanding the eight thousand bombshells which fell within the enclosure of the fort, only nine wounds had proved mortal. This was at the rate of about one thousand projectiles for each man killed. But the defenders of the two forts were exhausted, isolated, exposed to a bombardment which threatened to become murderous in the extreme, and discouraged, in short, by the prospect of an inevitable surrender. The majority of them, being either Europeans or Americans from the North, were strangers in the city they had been called upon to defend, and to the cause in the service of which they had been enlisted almost by force. During the contest they had bravely performed their duty; but from the moment that Farragut had passed the forts, they were unwilling to sacrifice themselves uselessly. Accordingly, on the 27th of April they assembled *en masse*, proceeded to spike their guns, to throw the ammunition into the water, and they even fired upon the officers who endeavored to bring them back to their duty. A single company, composed of planters, remained faithful to the Confederate flag. The

revolt which had broken out in Fort Jackson threatened to extend to St. Philip. The soldiers were already exchanging signals; and in spite of Duncan's efforts, the garrison of the first fort prepared to abandon it. All resistance had become impossible. The day following, the 28th, Duncan and Porter signed a capitulation, in which the latter was pleased to render homage to the bravery and loyalty of his adversary. But the parleys came near being interrupted by an act which was as brutal as it was unexpected. The Confederate captain Mitchell, who had been blamed by his comrades in the forts for his want of vigor in their defence, was independent of the military authorities, and did not consider himself as included in the capitulation. When Porter's flotilla drew near for the purpose of securing its consummation, Mitchell took care to leave no flag floating on the *Louisiana*, which was moored above St. Philip; but immediately after, taking advantage of the moment when all the Federal vessels were assembled at a short distance, he set fire to his own, and launched it upon them as a fire-ship. Fortunately, the *Louisiana* exploded too soon, just off Fort St. Philip, nearly killing its commander. The explosion was terrific; and if it had taken place a few minutes later, it would certainly have destroyed the *Harriet Lane*, on board of which Porter and Duncan had met to arrange the details of the convention.

While General Phelps occupied the forts, Butler, with the remainder of his troops, was proceeding toward New Orleans. The way was henceforth clear, and there was nothing left to prevent the victualling of the fleet. Forts Pike and Macomb, situated at the entrance of Lake Pontchartrain, had been abandoned, and the Confederate steamers which were on the lake were destroyed by their crews even before they had seen a single enemy. The last defences of New Orleans were therefore overthrown.

Accordingly, on the 29th, Farragut, who had hitherto prudently avoided everything which might bring on a collision with the population, sent at last a detachment of marines to hoist the Federal flag upon one of the public buildings. But these marines had scarcely retired when the flag, hauled down by a man named Munford, was dragged through the streets and trampled under foot. On the 1st of May the Federal transports reached the

wharves. Farragut devolved upon Butler the task of occupying and governing New Orleans, and a few hours after, the Federal troops took possession of that city.

Farragut had recovered his freedom of action. He at once availed himself of it to ascend the river. Near Carrollton, ten kilometres above New Orleans, there were, besides some works of considerable importance, a floating bar, ready to be stretched, in anticipation that Foote's flotilla would come down the Mississippi as far as that point. It was, in fact, as we have remarked, the attack from the north which the Confederates feared most, and in view of which they had made especial preparations.

On the 9th of May the *Iroquois* made her appearance before Baton Rouge. The political capital of Louisiana offered no resistance, and a detachment of marines took possession of the arsenal. On the 12th the same vessel appeared before Natchez, where she met with no resistance. The fleet followed, securing these easy conquests. Whilst Porter was taking back to Ship Island his mortars, which were supposed to be no longer needed on the Mississippi, General Williams, with a few troops embarked on transports, followed Farragut, and placed garrisons at all the places which it was important to defend. The conquest of the lower Mississippi was proceeding rapidly, and the Federals already flattered themselves with the hope of reopening the navigation of the entire river from St. Louis to New Orleans, not only to men-of-war, but to the thousand merchant-vessels which had ploughed its waters before the war. They also believed that, once masters of one of the regions which formerly produced the greatest quantity of cotton, they would speedily cause the cultivation of this plant to revive, and by throwing open the mart where the entire world had been accustomed to provide themselves, they would silence those who, in Europe, made the ruin of the cotton trade a pretext for their intervention in favor of the Confederate cause.

These illusions were soon dispelled. On the 18th of May the batteries of Vicksburg stopped the *Oneida*; soon after, Farragut, reaching the place with his whole fleet, and perceiving the several tiers of guns which commanded the entire course of the river, was obliged to acknowledge that it would be impossible for him to overcome this new obstacle without a great effort. Even the

possession of New Orleans, therefore, and a large portion of Louisiana, of great importance in a strategic point of view, was not followed by the political and commercial results which the victors had anticipated.

The Federals, who did not as yet dare to attack slavery, and confined themselves to fighting the Confederate government, respected all the institutions which existed before the rebellion, believing that such a course would facilitate the return of their enemies under the common flag ; but they never succeeded in reviving the cultivation of the large plantations which had constituted the wealth of Louisiana, nor in restoring real activity to the cotton trade of New Orleans. On the one hand, the bitter hostility of the population was constantly arming guerillas, who soon became common plunderers, embarrassing, by their depredations, every kind of trade and industry ; on the other hand, although still legally protected by the Federal government, slavery could no longer exist by the side of the Union flag. The leaders of the rebellion had taken good care to proclaim this fact, the planters felt it, and the slaves themselves were beginning to perceive it. That un pitying employment of the blacks, which alone had formerly contributed to the large harvests of cotton, had become impossible. May we not see the decree of a higher justice in the concurrence of circumstances which prevented the Federals from reviving this odious system of labor, the real cause of the war, and led the men of the South to become themselves the most active instruments of its suppression ?

We left Butler making his entry into New Orleans, and we wish we could leave him at once to resume the narrative of the campaigns of the Western armies, interrupted since the battle of Shiloh ; but it is impossible for us to pass by altogether in silence the proconsulate of the Massachusetts lawyer in the great city of the South. His administration has never been impartially judged, nor could it be. Political prejudice prepared in advance both accusers and defenders, equally intolerant toward the delegate of the Federal government. But the selection of the man to whom this mission was confided greatly aggravated the difficulties of the task. Amid the stern necessities of war, such a choice is either an honor or an insult to the vanquished, according to the

character and reputation of the individual. It is true that the Washington government had not at that time any illustrious general whom it could send to govern the inhabitants of New Orleans, but it would have been a thousand times better to have entrusted the supreme authority in that great city to a true soldier, some military man unconnected with politics, and incapable of lending himself to intrigues and speculations, than to the former political ally of Jefferson Davis, the lawyer in uniform, who made his appearance on the levee of the Mississippi just as Farragut's fleet was moving off in search of the enemy.

For a conquered, rebellious or hostile city, whichever it may be called, New Orleans was at first treated with lenity; no war contribution was imposed upon it. The Federal troops, received on their landing with hisses and shouts by an immense crowd, displayed the greatest moderation; private property was everywhere respected; moreover, the municipal government which the city possessed before being captured was recognized and accepted by the victors. The mayor, Mr. Monroe, who had made no secret of his profound devotion to the Confederate cause, continued to be the official representative of the city, as he was when he organized its defence in concert with Lovell. Mr. Lincoln had recommended to his generals to simply restore the supreme authority of the Union and the Federal laws, without meddling with the internal affairs of cities and counties otherwise than to enforce respect for those laws. It was hoped at first that this programme, at once so wise and so difficult of application, would succeed in New Orleans. After a few days of great excitement this city had seen all the Federal troops encamped in its squares take their departure; there only remained a sufficient guard to preserve public order, which, however, was never disturbed. The municipal council had resumed the regular direction of city affairs. A newspaper having refused to publish Butler's first proclamation, the latter merely sent a few printers by profession that happened to be in the ranks of his army, who set up this official document, and the journal, notwithstanding this refractory act, was only suspended for one day.

But it would have required a different man from General Butler, and a population less passionate in its demonstrations than

that of New Orleans, to have permanently mollified those relations, so painful on both sides, which the war had established between the conqueror and the conquered. On being imprudently provoked, the military authorities could not fail to abuse the absolute power they possessed, which offered them the most dangerous temptations. To the silly insults heaped upon his officers in the streets of New Orleans, Butler replied by a special order which was at once odious, absurd and indiscreet. The Federal officers would have looked upon Order No. 28 as a personal insult if they had attributed to it the signification which created a just indignation among their adversaries; the interpretation put upon it by the latter was treated by the people of the Northern States as pure calumny. But the Washington government, instead of weakening, would have increased its moral authority even among its enemies, if it had forestalled all controversy upon a subject which admits of no misinterpretation, by revoking the powers it had entrusted to a man so utterly incapable of appreciating the value of his own words.

This the government did not do; and the difficulties it encountered in New Orleans increased from day to day. How could this population, radically hostile, have been prevented from forwarding encouragements of every kind to the Confederate armies, with valuable information regarding the military preparations which were carried on under its own eyes? The utmost vigilance was required, but violence was a useless weakness. The mayor was deposed; this was unavoidable. He was imprisoned, as well as one of the most prominent citizens, Mr. Pierre Soulé. It is possible that, after having accepted the re-establishment of the Federal authority as a fact, these zealous servants of the Confederacy may have culpably played a double game; the laws of war authorized their banishment, but their imprisonment has never been justified.

But Butler went still farther; he had the gloomy courage to erect for one particular occasion the political scaffold, that fatal aliment of civil discords. The death of Munford is the only stain on the brightest page, perhaps, in the history of the United States—the one on which it is written that neither after victory, nor even during the course of this terrible war, while the citizens

were giving their lives by thousands in defence of the Union, has any other political crime, to use the technical expression, been expiated by the blood of the guilty. Munford was the same man who, on the 27th of April, hauled down the Federal flag hoisted by some sailors of the *Pensacola* over the Mint, before New Orleans had been regularly occupied. It was a senseless act, for it might have drawn the whole fire of the Federal squadron upon an innocent city; and if one of Farragut's sailors had seen Munford drag the national flag through the mud, he would have done right to shoot him on the spot. It was, however, an act of hostility, and not of treason. He had not, therefore, been at first arrested for this deed; but as he had become the leader of the most turbulent portion of the rabble, and the instigator of all the outrages committed against the Federals, he was prosecuted at the end of six weeks for this offence. Having been tried and found guilty by a military tribunal, he was hanged on the 7th of June, and thus became a martyr in the eyes of all partisans of the South.

To the persistent hostility of the inhabitants of New Orleans, the Federals replied by treating that town more and more as a conquered city; the despotic authority of the provost-marshal weighed most heavily upon the people. A large number of property-owners being in the Confederate service, their houses were seized; those who, without leaving the city, made themselves conspicuous by their sympathies for the cause of the South, were subjected to all sorts of vexations. Speculation was soon brought into play to render these unfortunate measures still more odious; the laws of confiscation, to which we shall refer again, were applied in a manner unexampled in the history of this war. The property seized was sold at a nominal price to adventurers who were protected by the general-in-chief. It is even asserted that his own brother was the principal agent of all the shameful transactions which, at that time, usurped the place of legitimate commerce. This commerce, in fact, from the time that the supply of cotton collected in the city previous to its occupation was exhausted, was narrowed down to supplying food to the inhabitants, who could find nothing within the contracted space which the war had left them to enjoy, not even the provisions necessary for their

daily consumption, and the result was that there were absolutely no exports. Hence a vast deal of distress, which the financial crisis still further increased; the loans contracted by the governments of Richmond and Louisiana since the secession could not be recognized by the Federals, and the bonds which represented them soon became almost valueless. Necessity, however, did not allow Butler to include in his proscription the Confederate paper money, which was the only circulating medium at that time; and by an anomaly as strange as it was unavoidable, this symbol of the rebellion was for a long time tolerated and received in the Federal coffers.

Butler was not wholly responsible for these misfortunes, and we must add, in justice to him, after having enumerated his arbitrary acts, that during his administration he exhibited, in some respects, not only energy, but considerable intelligence. The quiet of the city was never disturbed, while the sanitary regulations were carried into effect with a degree of method before unknown in that great city. Unemployed negroes were set to work, at the expense of the Federal government, in cleaning sinks and in draining the swamps nearest to the city, so that, to the great astonishment of the inhabitants, who expected their old enemy, the yellow fever, to pay them a visit in summer and ravage the Federal garrison, this terrible scourge did not appear, and, as a sort of compensation for other evils, spared New Orleans during the whole period of the war.

CHAPTER II.

MEMPHIS.

WE have seen how the valor of Farragut and his sailors had secured to the Federals the possession of the mouth of the Mississippi, with a new base of operations in the valley of the great river. The Unionists had thus taken an important step toward the conquest of this large artery, which cut in two the slave territories. The next stage in their career lay along the upper course of the river. In fact, until the freedom of the Mississippi was definitively secured to the Union, its opening was to be the principal object of all the land and naval campaigns which followed successively in the West, with varied results, during the next fifteen months.

We left both Federals and Confederates the day after the battle of Shiloh. Beauregard had taken his troops back to Corinth, leaving Grant on the field of battle near Pittsburg Landing. On both sides it was necessary to repair their losses, and both were hastening to concentrate all the available forces upon these two points, around which were to be decided the possession of the Mississippi, and perhaps the entire fate of the war.

Immediately on his return to Corinth, from the 10th to the 12th of April, Beauregard had received the considerable reinforcements for which Johnston would not wait when he fought the battle in which he lost his life. Sterling Price and Van Dorn, leaving the Arkansas and crossing the Mississippi at Helena, brought him the army that had fought at Pea Ridge. Then, his opponents having given him a long respite, all the administrative resources of the Confederate government were brought into action to strengthen his army with new recruits. The States of Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana having been invaded, their militia were ordered to take the field, and were despatched to Corinth: it is

true that these soldiers added rather to the numbers than to the strength of Beauregard's army. Finally, toward the 2d or 3d of May, the latter was joined by Lovell, with the greater portion of the garrison of New Orleans; this general atoned for the humiliation of his recent defeat by the promptness with which he joined the Confederate army of the West.

The paramount duty of this army, since it had lost Kentucky and the larger portion of Tennessee, was to retain possession of the two great arteries which meet at right angles at Memphis, and which were of the greatest importance to the Southern States: viz., the course of the Mississippi as far as Vicksburg, and that section of the Charleston Railroad which extends to Chattanooga. Fortunately for them, of the two lines the river way was at once the principal and the easier to defend.

If the railway alone was lost, there was nothing to prevent the substitution of the Vicksburg, Mobile and Montgomery branches for the direct line. It was necessary to be prepared for this; for from Corinth to Chattanooga this direct line, nearly parallel to the course of the Tennessee, and running alternately on one or the other side of the river, described a large arc, the flank of which was constantly exposed to the enemy. This line might possibly have been protected by occupying the flank of the Tennessee in force, at Eastport for instance, where it begins to follow the course of the river; the navigation of the Tennessee, the only way by which the Federals could reach the railroad, would thus have been closed against the enemy's gun-boats. But, on the one hand, the remembrance of Donelson inspired the Confederates with an exaggerated fear of these gun-boats, and caused them to neglect almost entirely the defence of their rivers; on the other hand, in order thus to cover their right, they would have been obliged to expose their left, rendering it practicable for their adversaries, who occupied impregnable positions at Pittsburg Landing, to come out and seize the grand junction, invest Memphis, and thus cut the railroad in a still more vital part. Corinth was the only point from which all the movements of the Federal army could be equally observed, whether it ascended the Tennessee or attempted to strike a blow at Memphis.

Besides, the occupation of the railroad by the enemy did not con-

stitute a serious danger for the Confederates, because, east of Corinth, no railway line runs southward. There is at that place, as we have shown in a previous chapter, a zone, alike destitute of railroads and navigable rivers, which, extending from Corinth to Chattanooga, effectually covered the Confederacy between these two extreme points. It was upon one or other of these points that the Federals, masters of the Tennessee, were to direct their efforts, and the necessity of first conquering the valley of the Mississippi rendered it necessary for them to begin by a campaign against Corinth. The defence of this position was easy. The zone, which was impassable to the armies, protected it sufficiently to the east, and it communicated directly with the south by the Mobile Railway, without depending upon that of Chattanooga. Westward, below Memphis, the Mississippi presented much greater difficulties to an attack by the Federals. In fact, it will be remembered that their successes in Kentucky and Tennessee had been due to the facilities which three parallel rivers offered to invasion. By ascending the Tennessee, Grant had succeeded in taking Fort Donelson in the rear, and the fall of the defences of the Cumberland and Tennessee had led to that of all the works erected on the Mississippi. But below Memphis the Federals could no longer turn the works erected on the great river, and place them between two fires. It was therefore necessary to approach them in front, and boldly brave the batteries erected on both banks, without being able to occupy both with a sufficient force.

One month had elapsed since the battle of Shiloh, and Beauregard had employed this time in forming around Corinth a vast entrenched camp capable of sustaining a regular siege. The few houses composing this modest village near the intersection of the two great lines from Memphis to Charleston, and from Mobile to the Ohio, are situated on a piece of low, clayey and humid ground. But at a distance of a few hundred metres east and north the ground rises, forming a marked undulation. Beyond this undulation there are two streams running parallel, which finally form a junction under the name of Philips Creek. Surrounded by almost impassable swamps, they cover Corinth to the east and south, and empty at the south-west into the Tuscumbia River, one of the tributaries of the Tombigbee. Northward, an

immense clearing separates the strip of land we have mentioned from College Hill, which commands the whole surrounding country. Some heights similar to those which separate Philips Creek from Corinth line the opposite bank; on the highest of these, due east of the junction, stands the hamlet of Farmington. It was upon the hill nearest to Corinth that Beauregard had constructed his principal line of defence. An almost continuous breastwork of earth and wood, following all the depressions in the ground through the forest, and fortified by abatis, formed a connection between several large redoubts commanding the prominent points, and the different roads which terminate at Corinth. The northern clearing had been considerably enlarged. The approaches to the entrenched camp were covered by the positions of College Hill and Farmington, where Beauregard had placed advanced works. The whole country around Corinth, which lies almost on the water-shed between the waters of the Tennessee and those of the Gulf of Mexico, was intersected by marshes covered with woods, and only traversed by narrow roads easily broken up; the task imposed upon the Federals, therefore, was a difficult one. Consequently, the Confederates were full of confidence, and the pompous proclamations addressed to them by Beauregard entirely harmonized with their sentiments. The various troops placed under his command had preserved their former organization. The army of the Mississippi, consisting of the corps of Bragg, Polk, Hardee, and Breckenridge's reserve, was commanded by the first-mentioned of these generals; Van Dorn had command of the trans-Mississippi army. Thanks to the recruits and the militia incorporated into these corps, their total effective force amounted to sixty-five thousand men.

The battle of Shiloh had impressed Halleck with the necessity of concentrating all his forces for the purpose of attacking the army of Beauregard. His presence on the theatre of operations, already rendered necessary by the independent positions of Grant and Buell, was henceforth indispensable. He left St. Louis for Pittsburg Landing on the 9th of April. Before his arrival, Grant had taken the first step in the direction which his superior was about to follow, and had sent Sherman, whose military talents were revealed in the smallest details, as well as on the most

important occasions, to cut the Chattanooga Railroad east of Corinth. Ascending the Tennessee with the gun-boats as far as Eastport, Sherman proceeded thence in the direction of the railroad and destroyed the Big Bear Creek bridge east of Iuka. The Confederates thus lost, never to recover it, this important line of communication. The junction of Van Dorn and Beauregard, however, caused a similar movement on the part of the Federal troops, which until then had been operating on the right bank of the Mississippi. While Curtis was advancing in Arkansas, which was stripped of all resources, Pope was ordered to bring to Corinth the troops which had been operating against Island No. 10.

It will be remembered that this fortified island had capitulated with its garrison on the 8th of April, just as Beauregard was bringing back his army from Shiloh to Corinth. Immediately after, Pope made haste to descend the Mississippi, in order to take advantage of his success to occupy the course of the river as far as practicable. On the 14th of April, his army embarked on transports, and, escorted by the gun-boats, arrived before Fort Pillow; he had thus gained one hundred and fifty kilometres in a direct line, and nearly two hundred and fifty, following the windings of the Mississippi. Fort Pillow, which acquired such a fatal notoriety by the massacre of its negro garrison in 1864, was situated on the left bank, only a few kilometres above Memphis, covering both that important city and the left wing of the Confederates. Built on a high bluff, it presented a favorable position for stopping the Federal gun-boats. The latter tried in vain to bombard it. Pope landed his troops to invest the place; but as the operation threatened to be long protracted, Halleck ordered him to rejoin him. Leaving two regiments to assist the fleet, in protecting that portion of the river which was already conquered, against any possible offensive reaction on the part of the enemy, he embarked his army on the transports, ascended in turn the Mississippi, the Ohio and the Tennessee, and finally disembarked at Pittsburg Landing on the 21st of April.

There was but one division of the army of the Ohio, commanded by Mitchell, which had not taken part in this concentration. The task assigned to it was to cover Halleck's extreme left, and to take advantage of the assembling of the enemy's forces at

Corinth to penetrate as far as possible into the vast region watered by the Tennessee, from its source to the vicinity of Eastport, which the Confederates, at that time, had left entirely unprotected. Mitchell was to continue the destruction of the track of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad wherever he found it impossible to hold it, and to occupy that portion of the line which follows the right bank of the Tennessee, at a certain distance from the river, between the bridges of Stevenson and Decatur. Leaving the capital of Tennessee at the same time as the remainder of the army of the Ohio, but bearing to the south-east, he reached Murfreesborough, where he remained until the 4th of April, to reopen the first section of the railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga, which the Confederates had entirely destroyed. The next stage was at Shelbyville, and the trains leaving Nashville were soon enabled to bring his supplies as far as that place. Then, leaving his dépôts at this point, he set out on the 7th of April by forced marches, crossed over to Fayetteville on the 8th, and notwithstanding the entire absence of good roads, he arrived on the 11th at Huntsville, a station of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, east of Decatur. The surprise of the Confederates was complete. Mitchell captured their dépôts, several trains of cars, with one hundred and fifty soldiers, and seventeen locomotives; and, what was of still greater importance, he did not allow them time to destroy the track.

Without losing a single instant—for to gather the fruits of this surprise every moment was precious—he despatched trains of cars loaded with soldiers east and west, which deposited detachments near the bridges, stations and all the points which it was essential to defend. A considerable quantity of *matériel* was gathered on the road, and before the close of the day this small division had conquered, without firing a shot, one hundred and sixty kilometres of railway between Stevenson and Tusculum. This section of the road was henceforth protected against all attacks from guerillas; even the great bridge across the Tennessee had been saved. By thus extending to the west, Mitchell had nearly reached that portion of the same line which Sherman had destroyed a few days before. On the east, his advanced posts, after having taken possession of the junction of the Memphis and

Nashville Railroad at Stevenson, and having seized five engines, had pushed as far as the borders of the Tennessee and the environs of Chattanooga. But he was indebted for these easy conquests to the extreme confusion into which the Confederate army had been thrown by the battle of Shiloh, and they were too extended to admit of his defending them for any length of time. In fact, Beauregard had scarcely re-entered Corinth when he hastened to send detachments of cavalry to dispute the possession of the railroad, and Halleck, finding himself unable to reinforce him, was obliged to abandon the whole railway line situated on the left bank of the Tennessee. On the 24th of April, he evacuated Tusculumbia and Decatur, and on the 26th burnt the bridge situated near the latter town. Protected on this side by the waters of the river, he placed a strong garrison in Huntsville, and proceeded to the north-east with his forces to seize Chattanooga, which was already considered a position of great importance; he intended at the same time to protect his communications, which were maintained by the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and which parties of the enemy were menacing between Shelbyville and Stevenson, a point where this line connects with that of the Memphis and Charleston. On the 30th of April, he took possession at Bridgeport, near Stevenson, of the bridge, through which the two tracks, now consolidated into one, cross over to the left side of the Tennessee. It was an excellent position for beginning an offensive campaign, and a few reinforcements, detached from the grand army which was then at Pittsburg Landing, might probably have enabled him to strike some decisive blows. At the head of the cavalry, which Halleck kept inactive before Corinth, he could have crossed the Tennessee at Gunter's Landing, the southernmost point of its course, and reached Gadsden, a magazine of considerable importance, situated on the banks of the Coosa, a large river which flows into the Gulf of Mexico, only sixty-five kilometres from that place. He might even have pushed one hundred and thirty kilometres beyond that point, so as to reach Rome, where was one of the principal cannon-foundries of the Confederacy; a few kilometres farther on, he would have reached the great artery of the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad, which he could have rendered unserviceable for a long time. But Mitchell, deprived of all reinforce-

ments, was obliged to confine himself to the task of defending a portion of the country he had conquered with so much daring and good fortune ; this task occupied him during the entire siege of Corinth, and subjected his troops to great fatigue, being obliged as they were to range themselves along a line too much extended for their numbers. On the 13th of May, General Negley occupied Rodgersville on the right, on the Huntsville and Florence road ; in the early part of June, he was sent to the extreme left, to menace Chattanooga and give chase to parties of Confederate cavalry, whose incursions were multiplying on that side.

Among the expeditions undertaken by Mitchell's soldiers at this period, we must mention one which, despite its tragic termination, shows what a small band of daring men could attempt in America ; it will give the reader an idea of the peculiar kind of warfare which served as an interlude to the regular campaigns of large armies. An individual named Andrews, employed in the secret service of Buell, and twenty-two soldiers selected by him, went to Chattanooga, under different disguises, and thence to Marietta in Georgia, which had been assigned them as a place of rendezvous, and which was situated in the very centre of the enemy's country. Once assembled, they got on board a train of cars loaded with Confederate troops and ammunition. During the trip this train stopped, as usual, near a lonely tavern, close to the track ; everybody got out, and both engineer and fireman went quietly to breakfast. Andrews took advantage of their absence to jump upon the locomotive, which was detached by his men, with three cars, from the rest of the train ; they started off at full speed, leaving their fellow-travellers in a state of stupefaction. At the stations where they stopped they quietly answered that they were carrying powder to Beauregard's army. Presently they began the work of destruction which they had projected ; they cut the telegraphic wires, tore up the rails behind them, and proceeded to fire the bridges which they reached on their way to Chattanooga. They hoped to arrive at that city before the news of their expedition had been spread abroad, to pass rapidly through it and join Mitchell at Huntsville. But it was necessary to avoid the trains running in the opposite direction. One of these trains, which they had just passed on the way, after exchanging the

most satisfactory explanations, reached an embankment where Andrews had torn up the rails, and made every preparation to throw the cars off the track. The conductor discovered the trap in time, and backed his engine instantly, in order to overtake those who laid it. At his approach the Federals made off in great haste, throwing out of the cars everything that could embarrass their flight. They at first got a little ahead, and the few occupants of log huts lying contiguous to the railway track looked on without understanding this strange pursuit. But being short of fuel, they soon began to lose ground; they could not stop long enough to tear up the rails; they tried in vain to keep up the fire of their engine; they were about to be overtaken; their oil had given out; the axle-boxes were melted by the friction. The game was lost; they stopped the engines and rushed into the woods, where they hoped to conceal themselves. Meanwhile, the telegraph had everywhere announced their presence, and the entire population started in pursuit. A regular hunt was organized in these vast forests, and Andrews was captured with all his men. The majority of them were shut up in narrow iron cages and publicly exhibited at Knoxville, to intimidate the Union men, after which fifteen of them were hung; the remaining eight were spared, and had the good fortune to survive and relate their strange adventures.

The arrival of Pope had increased the forces assembled at that place under Halleck to ninety thousand effective men.* They were divided into three large corps. Grant's old army, called the army of the Tennessee, composed of the divisions of Hurlbut, Sherman, Smith and Davis, was under the orders of General Thomas, who at the beginning of the war had distinguished himself at Mill Springs. Buell commanded the army of the Ohio, which he had so opportunely led to the battle-field of Shiloh, comprising the divisions of McCook, Wood, Nelson and Crittenden. The army of the Mississippi, which Pope had brought from Missouri, and to which Curtis had contributed some reinforcements from Arkansas, consisted of the five small divisions of Stanley, Hamilton, Palmer, Paine and Plummer; a distinguished officer, General Granger, commanded its cavalry. The reserve was composed of the divis-

* Badeau gives him one hundred and twenty thousand men, but it is probable that this figure includes non-combatants.

ions of Wallace and McClelland, and was under command of the latter. Grant had been deprived of all effective directions by having been appointed second in command of the whole army. Whether Halleck doubted his capacity, or was desirous in the event of a reverse to shift a portion of the responsibility upon this modest and hard-working man, he had placed Grant in a position which was equally odd and false; retaining nominally a certain authority over his old lieutenants, invested with the title of commander of the military district of Tennessee, he was, in reality, reduced by the jealousy of his chief to the position of bureau clerk, making summaries of reports and signing leaves of absence for sick soldiers.

On the 1st of May, three weeks after the battle of Shiloh, Halleck started at last with this large army to go in quest of Beauregard at Corinth. The day before, Wallace's division, which had been despatched in a north-westerly direction, had cut the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railway at Purdy. It had thus isolated Corinth from the peninsula comprised between the Tennessee and the Mississippi, in which the Confederates, although no regular troops were stationed there, kept up numerous relations, and whence they could derive considerable resources.

On the 1st of May the town of Monterey was occupied by the Federals, and Beauregard, having been apprised of the fact, was preparing to receive them. This time he waited for them inside his works, and did not even make any serious effort to defend the approaches. If the Confederate army was then more numerous than it had been at Shiloh, everybody felt that the fiery spirit of Sidney Johnston was no longer there to inspire them. The methodical mind of the officer of engineers had succeeded the commander of the Utah expedition and chief of Texan partisans.

Indeed, from the first, Beauregard allowed Halleck to seize the important position of Farmington almost without a shot. It was occupied by Marmaduke, with a force of about four thousand five hundred men. Whether it was that he had not expected the enemy so soon, or that he did not attach great importance to this position, the Confederate general had failed to reinforce his lieutenant, and the latter had retired on the 3d of May, after an insignificant defence. Master of Farmington, where he stationed a

brigade, Pope, who formed the advance of the Union forces, was enabled to cut the railroad track east of Corinth. He had planted himself in the rear of this place, while the rest of the army, deploying on his right, took position in front of Beauregard, along Philips Creek. In the centre, Buell had arrived by two roads, while Grant, on the right wing, had led the three columns composed of his old troops, then commanded by Thomas and McClelland. If this movement had been executed with promptness, if at least a portion of this numerous army had taken advantage of the weak defence of Farmington to enclose the Confederates within their lines, and turn the ravine of Philips Creek on the right, much precious time would have been gained, and Beauregard would have had only the choice between an unequal combat and an immediate retreat. He was left at liberty to resume the offensive, and on the 9th of May he availed himself of this advantage to attempt a dash against Farmington. A portion of Van Dorn's army had the day before drawn near the Federal advanced posts in crossing Philips Creek; it was to attack them in front, whilst Price, extending more to the right, should endeavor to surround the small garrison of Farmington. The latter, placed under the orders of General Palmer, was composed of Payne's brigade, a regiment of cavalry and a battery of artillery. Van Dorn commenced the attack at nine o'clock in the morning, with ten or twelve regiments and five batteries.* Palmer made the best resistance he could; but Halleck having given positive orders not to bring on a general engagement, Pope did not dare to assist him, but remained a mere spectator of his efforts. After a fight of five hours, the Federals were obliged to fall back upon the positions where their comrades were awaiting them, indignant at the inaction imposed upon them. They had sustained considerable losses in this fruitless encounter, which the cavalry had vainly endeavored to repair by an unfortunate charge. But Price, on his side, had failed to appear at the rendezvous; and

* The Federals assert that he had twenty thousand men; the Confederates say two thousand; but the record of losses proves that there were men killed belonging to ten regiments and five batteries, which makes a total of from five to six thousand men engaged: the forces put in motion both by Van Dorn and Price may well have reached the figure of twenty thousand men.

when he did arrive to take the Federals in flank, and thus to surround them, they had disappeared, and he found Van Dorn already in possession of Farmington.

The next day this position was abandoned by the Confederates, as they did not think it possible to hold it. This was proof positive either that its defenders should have been reinforced, so as to hold it at all hazards, or that it should have been abandoned without a struggle; but the remembrance of the terrible surprise of Shiloh prevented the Federal general from profiting by the lesson given by the recent campaign of McClellan in Virginia; so that, for fear of running some risk, he was preparing for himself a disappointment similar to that which followed the evacuation of Yorktown. He had determined only to advance his divisions step by step, behind fortifications and breastworks, the zigzag of which was slowly developed through the density of the forest. In this way he expected to manœuvre against his opponent without exposing himself in the least, and to compel Beauregard, while besieging him, to come out and attack him in his own entrenchments. This was to give his adversary odds in the game, and to allow him great freedom of action. Grant urged Halleck in vain to cross Philips Creek at the extreme right of his line, where there was no enemy in his front, in order to carry the works situated between the Ohio Railroad and that stream; an opening made at that point would have permitted him to turn all the rest of the Confederate line. But the advice of the conqueror of Donelson was not listened to. Fortunately for the Federals, the advanced positions of Thomas' army on the right were entrusted to Sherman. Although the combats, the marches and sickness had reduced his division to two thousand men present for duty, this enterprising general was only waiting for an opportunity to shut up the enemy in his entrenchments, and to break by any kind of success the monotony of the labors imposed upon his soldiers.

This opportunity presented itself, or rather was created by him, on the 17th of May. Hitherto the Federals had remained on the left bank of Bridge Creek, a stream flowing eastward, parallel to Philips Creek, into which it empties below Corinth. These streams are separated by a strong undulation in the ground,

which is itself divided into several hillocks (*mamelons*.) Upon one of these the forest was cleared, and at a distance of two thousand metres above the works of Corinth, and three thousand from the Federal parallels, stood a farm containing several buildings known as Russell's House. A road coming from the positions occupied by Thomas' centre crossed Bridge Creek; seven hundred and fifty metres farther it reached the hillock, and two hundred and eighty metres beyond Russell's House it finally merged into another road coming from the north. A Confederate brigade occupied Russell's House, its pickets being posted along the right bank of Bridge Creek. Sherman determined to seize this position. M. L. Smith's brigade and a battery were ordered to attack it in front by the central road, while General Denver, with two regiments and a battery, was to turn the enemy's left by the other road. Two other regiments were detailed from Hurlbut's division to support this movement on Sherman's left.

These several detachments were put in motion on the 17th at three o'clock in the afternoon. Driving the enemy's pickets before him, Smith reached the hillock on which stood Russell's House, where he met with a vigorous resistance. His four guns were at last dragged over the slopes of the hill, and the farm was riddled by their shot; thus attacked and menaced on their left, the Confederates retired, leaving twelve dead on the ground. Denver and Smith met at the cross-roads, where they stationed their pickets. This engagement was the counterpart of that at Farmington; but the Federals did not entirely abandon the important position they had conquered, as the Confederates had done. As Halleck's instructions did not allow the whole line to be advanced to draw near this position, Sherman only left an advanced post at the farm, and placed two regiments in the improvised entrenchments at the eastern extremity of the clearing.

Beauregard, however, had no idea of offering the battle for which the Federals were still preparing; his object was to protract the campaign, and to delay as long as possible the moment when the loss of Corinth, now of little importance in itself, would involve the fall of Memphis, which might prove fatal to his cause. An unforeseen chance, or the news of the defeat of McClellan in the east, could alone have enabled him to resume the offensive.

His soldiers were suffering greatly for want of water and its bad quality, notwithstanding the artesian wells he had bored; and, according to his own reports, their number was reduced to forty-seven thousand present for duty. Consequently, while actively and ostensibly busy in multiplying his works, he was preparing beforehand to evacuate them. On the 9th of May, his generals received instructions to this effect. The slow movements of the Federals enabled him to postpone this operation for some days; finally, on the 26th of May, he gave the necessary orders for the evacuation.*

Two lines of railway were in the hands of Beauregard, that of Memphis at the west, and the Meridian line at the south. By falling back upon the first, he covered the important town which was the terminus of this line; but it would have been impossible for him to defend it for any length of time, for Halleck, being master of the Mississippi, had the means of speedily concentrating around this place larger forces than he had before Corinth. By this westward movement, Beauregard, moreover, exposed himself to the loss of his communications with the armies which defended the rest of the Confederacy, from Chattanooga to Richmond. He determined, therefore, to penetrate into the interior, far from all water communication, by following the Meridian and Mobile Railway due south. The town of Baldwin, situated on this line, and that of Greentown, which is near it, were designated as points of concentration to the several corps commanders.

On the 26th, the Confederates began to remove the *matériel*, the heavy guns, the dépôts of provisions and ammunition, the baggage, and even the implements for boring artesian wells. Minute instructions were given to deceive the vigilance of the Federals. The outposts increased their activity; every time that a train arrived to carry away the *matériel*, the troops replied to the whistle of the locomotive with vociferous shouts, to induce the belief that the train had brought large reinforcements.

The Federals had some suspicion of these preparations; but

* In his official report, after enumerating the very legitimate causes which decided him to adopt this step, Beauregard adds another reason which is somewhat singular; it is that the enemy had twice refused the battle he had offered him outside of his entrenchments.

instead of pressing Beauregard, so as to compel him to confine himself to the defence of his entrenchments, or to turn his evacuation into a rout, Halleck limited himself to insignificant demonstrations. Like McClellan in Virginia, he would undertake nothing without the support of his siege artillery, and, as before Yorktown, the latter was ready to open fire on the very day when no one remained to reply to them.

On the evening of the 27th, he ordered Sherman to seize a house occupied by the enemy on the road from Russell's House and Corinth, and situated on the summit of a gentle acclivity, at the southern extremity of a large clearing. This clearing was bounded on the south by the crest of a hill covered with brushwood. on the east by woods of less density; on the west it stretched down to the marshy and impenetrable thickets of Philips Creek. For the last ten days the Federals had occupied the northern edge of this clearing. The attack was to be made in front by one of Sherman's brigades, that of Denver, while another, under M. L. Smith, was to turn the enemy's position through the woods on the east side—that is to say, on the left; the third remained to guard the camps. Two other brigades were placed under Sherman's command; Hurlbut despatched that of Veatch to support Smith's movement on the left, while McClelland, who was encamped in rear to the north, detached Logan's brigade from Judah's division. The latter followed the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad; then, turning to the left and crossing Philips Creek near its source, it proceeded to take position on the right of Denver. On the morning of the 28th, after a brief cannonade, Denver and Veatch dislodged the Confederate brigade posted around the house, without much damage to either of the combatants. Sherman advanced the whole of his line, extending his extreme right as far as the Ohio Railroad, which easily overcame the resistance of the enemy. Shortly after, the Confederates attempted to resume the offensive along the whole line; but they were easily repulsed, and Sherman immediately entrenched himself in his new positions. Meanwhile, Pope, who occupied the extreme left, was advancing on his side, driving the Confederate sharpshooters before him to within a kilometre of their works. At the same time, he tried to cut the principal artery

through which Beauregard's army received its supplies, the southern branch of the Mobile and Ohio Railway ; on the evening of the 27th, Colonel Elliot, who was entrusted with this duty, started with nine hundred horse,* and making a large circuit reached the village of Iuka on the 28th, where he bivouacked. Bearing to the right, he struck the Mobile and Ohio Railway near Booneville on the night of the 29th, and waited in the woods for daylight. On the 30th, at two o'clock in the morning, learning that the town of Baldwin was fortified and well defended, he fell back upon Booneville, of which he took possession. At that very moment Beauregard was quietly evacuating the works around Corinth: the destruction of the railway track through which he was retreating might have seriously embarrassed him if it had been accomplished a little sooner. But when Elliot arrived at Booneville, which is situated about thirty-two kilometres from Corinth, all the trains had already passed beyond that point, with the exception of a single one, which the Federals captured and burnt. They, however, found in this place a considerable number of sick and wounded, whom it had been found impossible to transport farther. Beauregard, who had gotten wind of these movements, had the railway track well watched by a train of cars loaded with infantry. But Elliot avoided it, keeping some detachments of cavalry in check, and succeeded in destroying the track ; then he resumed his march to join Pope, whom he overtook on the following day.

In the mean while, Corinth was abandoned. A portion of the *matériel* belonging to the Confederate army was forwarded to Memphis by the Charleston Railroad, and the premature destruction of the bridge over the Hatchie River on that line caused the loss of five trains loaded with provisions and ammunition. Beauregard's soldiers proceeded in a southerly direction in several columns, following the roads running parallel to the Meridian Railway. At break of day on the 30th, the camp-fires were still burning, but the Confederate cavalry alone occupied the works around Corinth. The advanced sentinels, whether through

* These were two regiments, the Second Iowa and the Second Michigan, commanded by two officers, both destined to rapid advancement—Lieutenant-colonel Hatch and Colonel Philip Sheridan, who is now lieutenant-general of the army.

forgetfulness or design, had not been relieved ; and when the successive explosions of the mines constructed by Beauregard for the destruction of the works, bridges and artesian wells finally attracted the attention of the Federals, there was not a single man before them. A simple statement will show to what extent Halleck had deceived himself as to the situation of his adversaries : at the very moment they were slipping away from him, he issued instructions to his corps commanders, warning them to be prepared for a general attack on the part of the enemy, "everything seeming to indicate," he said, "that the latter was massing his troops against the Federal left." Sherman, on his part, was preparing to test the range of some heavy guns placed in battery the day before, when his chief, having at last been apprised of what was going on, allowed him to feel the enemy.

A few hours subsequently, Pope's and Sherman's soldiers effected a junction amid the deserted camps of Beauregard. But the possession of Corinth was not sufficient to compensate for their fatiguing labors and protracted suspense ; they had justly hoped that Halleck would have taken advantage of his vast numerical superiority to terminate this campaign by a decisive victory, which would open to them at once the course of the Mississippi and that of the Tennessee. This disappointment, following so close upon that which had caused the evacuation of Yorktown, produced a great sensation in the North. Beauregard had the double merit of having postponed this retreat as long as possible, and of having ably conducted it when it became necessary. The loss of so important a position was not the less a serious check for the Confederates ; it led to that of Memphis, and of all that section of railroad which connects these two points, securing to the Federals a new and solid base of operations. Besides, Halleck might follow the example of the army of the Potomac, which, on the very day following the evacuation of Yorktown, had been able to overtake its adversaries at Williamsburg. But he only sent in pursuit of the Confederates a few detachments of cavalry, which gave up the chase on reaching the borders of the Tuscumbia River, a few kilometres from Corinth. Beauregard left his advanced posts on this water-course until the 2d of June, for the purpose of rallying the stragglers, while he assembled his several

corps in the neighborhood of Baldwin, only fifty kilometres from Corinth; here he remained until the 7th.

Pope, reinforced by one of Buell's divisions, started at last in search of the Confederate general in this new position. After encountering some difficulties, he crossed the Tuscumbia and the marshes which border that river; but he was taken ill, and was obliged to transfer the command to Rosecrans and retire to his own camp. While he was lying there, a report was suddenly circulated that he had achieved an important success; in fact, on the 4th of June, General Halleck, in a despatch addressed to the Secretary of War, which was soon communicated to all the newspapers, announced that Pope, at the head of forty thousand men, was within fifty kilometres of Corinth, vigorously driving the enemy before him, and that he had already taken ten thousand prisoners or deserters, with fifteen thousand muskets. The public rejoicings in the Northern States were of short duration; for this news was soon formally contradicted, both through letters received from the Federal army and by the declarations of Confederate generals. Halleck was silent, and Pope imitated his silence, despite the attacks of which he was the object. Yet incredible as it may appear, although it is a positive fact, this strange despatch was entirely fabricated by Halleck. Compelled, as we shall presently be, to expose the errors committed by Pope in the command of the army of Virginia, we are glad to have it in our power to clear him of an unmerited accusation, and to relate a fact which reflects honor upon his character. Being ill in his tent, six kilometres only from Halleck's headquarters, he had forwarded to the latter by telegraph a detailed account of the movements of his subordinates, ending with the remark that the woods were full of stragglers, probably ten thousand, and that they would eventually be picked up. Turning this hope into a fact, Halleck had hastened to draw up the despatch we have mentioned, declaring at its close that the results obtained were all he could have wished. During the entire period of the war, Pope never suffered a bitter word to escape him, nor a single complaint against his superior, who had taken such a liberty with his name. He waited for the pacification of the South to ask him for an explanation, which the latter refused under the most frivolous

pretexts. Their correspondence, placed by Pope in the hands of the committee on the conduct of war, and published by the latter in 1866,* can leave no doubt in the mind of the impartial reader as to the manner in which Halleck compromised his subordinate, to abandon him afterward, while it is highly creditable to the patriotism and disinterestedness of the latter general.

It was only on the 7th of June that Pope resumed command of his troops, which, during his absence on the 3d and 4th, had encountered the enemy's skirmishers between Booneville and Baldwin. Making a feint through the causeway on which the latter village is situated, in order to menace the Confederate right, he prepared to make a serious attack upon their left wing, south of Blackland, on the 8th; but Halleck interfered and again ordered him to remain on the defensive. Beauregard naturally took advantage of this to retire. The Federal cavalry did not pursue him beyond Guntown; and while his several columns were assembling on the 9th in the neighborhood of Tupelo, Pope was ordered to take his troops into comfortable encampments until he should receive further instructions. Finding no drinkable water where they had been brought to a halt, the Federals were soon compelled to fall back upon Corinth; and on the 12th, Pope went into camp on the banks of Clear Creek, only six kilometres from that place.

Thus ended the campaign of Corinth, which, properly speaking, was only a continuation of that of Shiloh. Halleck, although with an enormous force at his disposal, did nothing but leisurely reap the advantages which the sanguinary encounters of the 7th and 8th of April had secured to the Federals through Grant's tenacity and the opportune arrival of Buell. This was the only time that he commanded in person; a month later he was called to Washington to assume the chief direction of the war. His opponent, Beauregard, also left the army he had commanded; but it was in disgrace. His army being once established at Tupelo, he had gone to rest himself at Bladen Springs, leaving Bragg temporarily in command, when Jefferson Davis availed himself of his absence to depose him. The actions of this general did not certainly correspond with the arrogant assumptions contained

* *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of War*, Supplement, vol. ii., p. 76.

in his proclamations. The premature reputation which, in a moment of enthusiasm, had been attributed to the conqueror of Fort Sumter, had ruined him, as is generally the case with men whose genius has been vaunted before being tried; he had, however, exhibited some sterling and solid qualities which inspired the confidence of his soldiers. But even the intervention of the Confederate Congress only tended to confirm the inflexible President Davis in his determination; and General Braxton Bragg, for whom he had felt a strong friendship since the battle of Buena Vista, was definitely placed at the head of the army of the Mississippi.

As we have intimated before, the loss of Corinth by the Confederates was certain to be followed by that of Memphis; for these two points were like two bastions reciprocally flanking each other, neither being able to defend itself without the other.

We have seen that on the 21st of April, Pope, on being summoned to Pittsburg Landing, had left before Fort Pillow two regiments with the Federal flotilla which Foote had brought over as a force of observation. Foote, debilitated by his wounds, had abandoned the command in which he had displayed so much courage and ability. He was replaced by Captain Davis, who, while waiting for the issue of the siege of Corinth, contented himself with throwing from time to time a few bombshells into the fort. His mortar-boats were protected by seven gun-boats, which were river-boats more or less iron-clad, and most of which had already been tried before Forts Henry and Donelson. On the 10th of May, the flotilla was moored close to both banks of the river, eight kilometres above Fort Pillow, when, toward six o'clock in the morning, eight steamers flying the Confederate flag were seen rapidly approaching. These were also river-boats, clumsily armored and provided with that kind of beak which the success of the *Merrimac* had brought into fashion. Captain Montgomery, who was in command, had come to offer battle to the Federal flotilla, in the hope of being able to disperse it and relieve the fort. His vessels were of greater draught, much less protected, and supplied with guns of far inferior calibre to those of his adversary; but, on the other hand, he had the current in his favor, which could not fail to carry any of the enemy's ships

which should be disabled under the guns of Fort Pillow. He first attacked a mortar-boat, but the Federal steamer *Cincinnati* soon came up to relieve it, and to draw upon herself the entire efforts of the Confederate vessels. Many of them tried, but in vain, to sink her. A pistol combat ensued from deck to deck; the Federals discharged upon their adversaries jets of steam and boiling water, drawn from the boiler by means of pipes (*tuyaux*), called steam-batteries. The *Mound City* came in turn to assist the *Cincinnati*. On the Confederate side, the *General Bragg* and the *Van Dorn* kept up the fight. The remainder of the two hostile fleets was coming up to take part in the conflict, when the Confederate commander, alleging that his adversaries had run into the shallows, where he could not follow them, gave the signal for retreat. His purpose had not been accomplished, and two of his vessels had sustained much injury; but on the side of the Federals, the *Cincinnati* and the *Mound City* were also severely damaged.

Beauregard had successively summoned to him all the small garrisons placed *en echelon* along the line of the Mississippi, so that at the end of May the garrison of Fort Pillow was reduced to a few hundred men. On leaving Corinth he ordered the post to be evacuated. On the morning of the 5th of June, the Federals found Fort Pillow abandoned; it was a work of considerable strength, containing large bomb-proofs; about twenty dismounted guns were found in it.

The gates of Memphis were open. The Federal vessels came down the river in great haste to take possession of the city. Fort Randolph, situated twenty kilometres below Pillow, was also deserted, and on the evening of the 5th the flotilla came to anchor for the night at islands Nos. 43 and 44, only two or three kilometres above Memphis.

This flotilla consisted, besides the mortar-boats and transports, which were of no service in battle, of five gun-boats, the *Benton*, the *Louisville*, the *Carondelet*, the *Cairo* and the *St. Louis*; and four rams, the *Queen of the West*, the *Monarch*, the *Switzerland* and the *Lancaster No. 3*. The latter vessels were not under the orders of Commodore Davis; having been built by the war department under the superintendence of Colonel Ellet, an officer

of great energy and intelligence, they had been placed under his exclusive command. This independent position gave rise to many controversies with the navy, which the impracticable disposition of Ellet only tended to aggravate. But when the hour of trial came, he was always sure to be found in the front rank, ready to take upon himself the most dangerous task. These rams were far superior to the gun-boats; having but a single wheel at the stern, strongly built and covered with iron plates, they moved with great speed, and were easily steered.

On the 6th of June, at break of day, Montgomery weighed anchor with his eight steamers, the *Van Dorn*, the *General Bragg*, the *Little Rebel*, the *General Lorell*, the *General Beauregard*, the *General Price*, the *Sumter* and the *Jeff Thompson*, each carrying two guns. He had resolved to risk everything rather than abandon Memphis without a fight. It was, indeed, the only important city on the borders of the Mississippi between Cairo and New Orleans. Its population, which in 1860 numbered twenty-three thousand souls, had espoused the cause of slavery with great zeal. Consequently, at the news of the approach of the Federals, and the sight of the Confederate flotilla getting under way, they rushed in crowds upon the bluffs overlooking the lists formed by the waters of the great river, where was to be fought the battle upon which their fate depended. A bright sun lighted up this exciting scene. The two flotillas were advancing toward each other. Finding soon that the gun-boats were moving too slowly, Ellet shot ahead of them with his rams; but one of them, the *Switzerland*, ran aground, broke her rudder, and remained disabled for the rest of the day; another, the *Lancaster*, being badly commanded, kept aloof from the action. Ellet therefore had only two ships left with which to engage in a close fight, while the gun-boats were discharging their guns as they steamed up. He led the *Queen of the West* against the *General Lovell*; and taking advantage of a mistaken manœuvre on the part of the latter, he struck her and sunk her in the middle of the river. But just as the Federal ram was trying to get free from the wreck of her sinking adversary, she was herself struck and greatly damaged by a Confederate ship. Ellet was wounded, but succeeded, nevertheless, in getting his vessel clear. The arrival of the *Monarch* had drawn

the fire of the Confederates upon that vessel, which was attacked by two of their gun-boats, the *Beauregard* and the *Price*; the *Monarch* evaded them by a well-timed movement, and the *Beauregard* struck with full force the wheel-house of the *Price*, which, to avoid being sunk, was obliged to head for the shore. This first encounter decided the issue of the battle, but Montgomery's flotilla fell back in vain; it could not escape from its adversaries. Carried along by the current, the combatants passed pell mell under the eyes of the inhabitants of Memphis, and continued the struggle below the city. The Confederates defended themselves with energy. Only one vessel withdrew from the contest, the *Van Dorn*, which had a cargo of nearly fifty thousand pounds of powder, a real treasure that must be saved. The fire of the Federal gun-boats had greatly damaged the other, the boilers of which were not sufficiently protected, and Ellet's rams arrived in time to complete the work of destruction. The *Beauregard*, entirely disabled, soon sunk near the shore; the *Little Rebel*, carrying Montgomery's flag, and the *Sumter* reached the bank of the Arkansas, where their crews landed in great haste. The *Jeff Thompson*, likewise abandoned, caught fire and blew up; finally, the *Bragg* sunk before she had time to get out of deep water. The Confederate flotilla was annihilated. It had lost seven vessels out of eight. The Federals were chiefly indebted for their success to Ellet and his two rams, the *Monarch* and the *Queen of the West*, which had alone fought at close quarters and made terrible use of their beaks. Not a single man had been wounded on board the gun-boats.

The battle had ended at half-past seven in the morning, sixteen kilometres below Memphis. The inhabitants had returned to their homes silent and dejected. The city was occupied during the day, and the Federal military authorities entered into an arrangement with the mayor, for the maintenance of public order and the protection of private property. Whatever party spirit may have had to say then, their rule was extremely mild. When the Federal soldiers took down the Confederate flag, which floated over the city hall, as it was their right and duty to do, a considerable crowd gathered around to insult them, hurraing for Jefferson Davis; no one was molested on that account.

The capture of Corinth and Memphis marked a new phase in the conquest of the course of the Mississippi. The Confederates, assailed at the same time from the south and the north, were only in possession of that section of the river comprised between Memphis and Baton Rouge; and we shall see in the next chapter that there was a time when it seemed as if even this last portion was about to be wrested from them. They succeeded, however, through their energetic efforts, in preserving it for a long time; and their adversaries were obliged to purchase its conquest at the cost of fourteen months of labor and fighting.

CHAPTER III.

PULASKI.

WE left the Federals in possession of Corinth and Memphis, the army of Beauregard disappearing in the depths of semi-tropical forests where the Tombigbee takes its source, and Montgomery's ships lying at the bottom of the Mississippi.

The part to be played by the Federal fleets was fully laid out; Farragut, by ascending the river, and Davis, by descending it, were to endeavor to join hands and destroy all the obstacles which still obstructed its course.

What, in the mean time, was the large army encamped at Corinth going to do? It had allowed Beauregard to escape at the very moment when it felt sure of crushing him; but it could yet strike some decisive blows either to eastward or westward, the Confederates being nowhere sufficiently numerous to make any strong opposition.

Eastward, Mitchell had forced open the way to Chattanooga and approached the gap which opens south-east of that town, before which, at a subsequent period, so much blood was shed at the battles of Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge. He was master of the passes of the Tennessee, and the Federals, stationed at Corinth, could reach Chattanooga much more speedily than their adversary encamped at Tupelo. They might probably conquer by the same stroke the whole upper course of the river which waters this town.

Westward, the Federals could sweep both sides of the Mississippi, cause all the Confederate works which defended them to fall, and perhaps prevent the enemy from erecting the formidable citadels of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the capture of which, at a later period, cost so dear.

The Tennessee was rapidly falling, and would soon cease to be

navigable for vessels engaged in conveying supplies to the army ; but the drought would put the roads in excellent condition for vehicles. Everything, therefore, was in favor of prompt and vigorous action. But Halleck divided his army, and, notwithstanding the resources he had at his disposal, allowed his adversaries to forestall him everywhere.

The Columbus Railroad was again with much trouble put in order, so as to connect Corinth directly with that dépôt, situated on the Mississippi. Sherman was directed to open communications with Memphis by restoring the western section of the Charleston line. The army of the Ohio left Corinth on the 10th of June, and Buell was ordered to proceed with it in the direction of Chattanooga, where Mitchell was beginning to be sorely pressed ; but this movement was slowly executed.

Sherman, at the head of his own division and that of Hurlbut, proceeded toward Memphis, dropping detachments of troops as far as Holly Springs to cover his left flank. The rebuilding of the Mobile Railway, which had been completely destroyed by the enemy, was a considerable undertaking. Begun on the 9th of June, it was only finished on the 26th.

The Confederates had profited by this delay. The new general-in-chief, Braxton Bragg, had boldly divided his army and abandoned the position of Tupelo, which Halleck still believed him to occupy. He had determined to cover at once the two points we have already indicated as being of the greatest importance for the future of the war, Chattanooga and Vicksburg.

He proceeded toward the first with all the old army of Johnston, consisting of the corps of Hardee and Polk, as rapidly as the difficulties of communication in that portion of the Southern States allowed. He had the merit and good fortune to reach Chattanooga before Buell. It was not too soon, for a few days previous, the 7th of June, the Federal general Negley, with his single brigade and some cannon, had nearly taken possession of this city by surprise. Bragg found it of great advantage to transfer the war to the vicinity of Chattanooga. Master of this position, indeed, he could menace either Tennessee or Kentucky, Nashville or Louisville, and wrest from the Federals all the conquests they had achieved during the last few months by taking

them in rear. He was also drawing near Virginia, and could, in case of necessity, join Lee and Jackson, obviating, at all events, the necessity of their detailing troops to cover their lines on that side. The forces which had been dispersed in East Tennessee had been again assembled at Knoxville, under command of Kirby Smith; the garrison of Cumberland Gap had also evacuated this important post to join him. The army corps thus formed was ordered by Bragg to Chattanooga. Thanks to this reinforcement, and to the numerous recruits which the new conscription law supplied him, Bragg saw his forces increased to forty-five thousand men; but the recruits had to be drilled before they could take the field. Satisfied, therefore, with having forestalled his adversaries and occupied the position he was so anxious to hold, the Confederate general awaited the issue of the great struggle that was going on around Richmond between Lee and McClellan.

Buell, on his part, did not seem to think of attacking him. After having reorganized his army, and put an end to the acts of pillage committed by the soldiers of Mitchell, who were scattered over too much ground to be closely watched, he extended his army in one long line from south-west to north-east, from Huntsville by way of Battle Creek to McMinnville, along which the railroad could easily bring his supplies. Keeping stationary in these positions, he made no efforts either to dispute the possession of Chattanooga with Bragg, or to intercept his communications with Knoxville. This was a serious negligence on his part, for by making a vigorous demonstration against the first-named city he could have prevented the turning movement by which, shortly after, his adversary compelled him to retire to the borders of the Ohio, and by menacing Kirby Smith in East Tennessee he would have made a diversion equally advantageous in a political and military point of view. The population of this district, strongly in favor of the Union, was, in fact, anxiously longing for the arrival of the blue coats, and chafing under the oppression of the Confederates. The railroad, passing through Knoxville, connected the armies of the east with those of the west; its loss would have increased the distance which separated them.

At last Buell's inaction emboldened his opponents, and Bragg resumed the offensive by sending some daring partisans upon his

flanks and upon his base of operations. But we shall have occasion a little later to speak of the expeditions of Forrest and Morgan, as also of the campaign to which they were the fortunate prelude; we must, for the present, leave Bragg and Buell fronting each other, and return to the banks of the Mississippi.

Farragut, as we have stated, had rapidly ascended this river, and witnessed the unresisting submission of all the towns lying along its course as far as Vicksburg, the fortifications of which had stopped the progress of his vessels on the 18th of May, 1862. Situated at an almost equal distance from Memphis and New Orleans, this little town stands upon a point where the left bank of the river commands its course, and forms one of those high banks called *bluffs*. It is connected with the great Memphis and New Orleans railway, the *Mississippi Central*, by a branch which strikes this line at Jackson, the capital of the State. But its peculiar importance was derived from the fact that on the opposite bank lies the head of a railway running into the State of Arkansas. Vicksburg, therefore, was the bond between the western part of the Confederacy and the other slave States. Although the latter branch, pompously called the Vicksburg and Texas Railroad, did not run beyond the little town of Monroe, it greatly facilitated the importation of the agricultural products of the Western States, which from that time was a question of capital importance to the rest of the Confederacy.

Before the capture of Memphis and Baton Rouge, two great fluvial lines conveyed these products into the waters of the Mississippi, which they ascended or descended afterward to the central dépôt at Vicksburg. These were the Arkansas, which, after its junction with White River, empties into the great river between Memphis and Vicksburg, and the Red River, which runs into it between the latter city and New Orleans. But in June, 1862, the Federal gun-boats had reduced the navigation of these rivers to a mere contraband traffic. After the battle of Memphis, Davis, having assembled all the vessels he had left in the upper part of the river, despatched four steamers, the *Mound City*, the *St. Louis*, the *Lexington* and the *Conestoga*, with several transports, to reconnoitre the waters of the Arkansas and White River. The Federal fleet ascended the latter river for a distance of one hun-

dred and thirty kilometres from its mouth, and on the 16th of June it made an attack upon two Confederate batteries erected on a spot called St. Charles. This engagement, which took place at a distance of six hundred metres, was most vigorous; at last the weak armor of the *Mound City* was pierced by a cannon-ball, which burst her boiler, causing a frightful havoc on board that vessel. In an instant the water and scalding steam spread in every direction, burning and suffocating all who were between-decks; a large portion of the terrified crew jumped into the river only to meet with another kind of death, for those who could swim were nearly all struck by the balls of the enemy. Fifty-nine corpses were lying in that unfortunate vessel; forty-nine men had disappeared, and forty-one were wounded; out of one hundred and seventy-five, only twenty-six escaped from this disaster. The other gun-boats in the mean while took the place of the *Mound City*, which had drifted to leeward with the current, and soon after, a landing-party, turning the Confederate batteries, captured these works with most of their defenders.

About the same period, the naval division of Colonel Ellet appeared above Vicksburg. This place was now the only obstacle which separated the Federal fleets that had come from Cairo and from New Orleans, and was thus blockaded by them both above and below. But its position enabled it to defy all attacks, from whatever side they might come. Six hundred and thirty-two kilometres above New Orleans, the Mississippi, in numerous windings, after running from south-east to north-east, turns abruptly in an exactly opposite direction; it thus forms a flat and marshy strip of land on the right scarcely one thousand two hundred metres in width, and on the left it enfolds the extremity of a long chain of hills, which extend into the interior of the State of Mississippi. Vicksburg is situated on the bluffs which form the extremity of these hills. The Confederate batteries rose, some at the foot, others on the summit of these bluffs; the first swept the surface of the waters contiguous to the place; the others commanded not only the entire peninsula, but also that portion of the river lying beyond. A current running three miles an hour, and an ever-shifting channel, increased still further the difficulties which the Federal fleets had to surmount. Farragut had soon

found that it would be impossible for him to capture this position with the means which were at his disposal at the end of May. We have said that when Bragg took up his march for Chattanooga, Van Dorn, who had been invested with a new independent command, was charged with defending both banks of the Mississippi with his troops and those of Price. He immediately repaired to Vicksburg in person with Breckenridge's division, completed and multiplied the defences of the place, and collected there a powerful artillery.

The Federals, on the other side, were extremely slow in preparing to assume the offensive. Halleck had so thoroughly partitioned his army that he had not even a few thousand men to spare as landing-parties with Davis' fleet. Although Farragut's resources were infinitely more restricted, it was upon him alone that the entire task of the attack upon Vicksburg was to fall. After the capture of New Orleans, Porter's division of mortar-boats had returned to Pensacola; he recalled it. All the vessels he could dispose of went up the river, while the transports landed below Vicksburg a small body of troops detached by Butler from the garrison of New Orleans, and placed under the command of General Williams. The difficulty in managing the mortar-boats and the transports, and in obtaining supplies for the fleet, delayed the time when Farragut saw all his forces united below Vicksburg, on the 27th of June.

His fleet consisted of five sloops-of-war, the *Hartford*, bearing the commodore's pennant, the *Troquois*, the *Oneida*, the *Richmond* and the *Brooklyn*; six gun-boats, the *Kennebec*, the *Katahdin*, the *Wissahickon*, the *Scioto*, the *Wipona* and the *Pinola*, forming the first division; six other gun-boats, the *Octorara*, the *Westfield*, the *Clifton*, the *Jackson*, the *Harriet Lane* and the *Owasco*, which, with sixteen mortar-boats, constituted the second division, under David Porter; Williams' division of infantry, about three thousand strong, was on board. The latter was evidently too weak to attempt any demonstration against the works of Vicksburg, whose garrison numbered eight or ten thousand men; it could only protect the dépôts of the fleet against a surprise.

On the evening of the 27th, everything was ready for an attack. While the second division was to cover the Confederate

works with projectiles, the task of the first was to force the passes. Renewing the bold manœuvre which had proved so successful at New Orleans, Farragut calculated that his fire would drive for a moment the enemy's gunners from their pieces, and that he could avail himself of this to pass their batteries with his best ships. In this effort his success was complete. The first cannon-shots were heard on the 28th of June before three o'clock in the morning. Porter's mortars, the range of which had been studied for the last two days, were placed on a broadside line within two thousand five hundred metres of the Confederate works, and kept up the fire with the greatest precision; the gun-boats of the second division engaged in the battle at shorter range. The first division was already in motion, and the *Iroquois*, which led the van, had drawn near the enemy's batteries before being discovered by them.

The smoke of battle soon darkened the first glimmer of daylight. While the *Iroquois* was passing safe and sound under the fire of the batteries, which rose in tiers from the margin of the water to the summit of the bluffs, Farragut, on board the *Hartford*, had slackened his speed to rally the rest of his division and silence the enemy's artillery. In passing, the Federal ships threw shrapnel shot into the batteries at the water's edge, which drove the enemy's cannoneers from their posts. But they soon reappeared, and resumed the service of their guns; they followed with their shot the Union fleet, as far as that portion of the river which runs beyond the tongue of land, the abrupt turning of which compelled them to pass a second time within range of their guns. At six o'clock in the morning, the *Iroquois*, the *Oneida*, the *Richmond*, the *Scioto*, the *Winona*, the *Wissahickon* and the *Hartford* came to anchor above Vicksburg. The *Brooklyn*, which was to have followed the flag-ship, detained at first by some impediments in the river, was further delayed, and dropped to the rear after a useless cannonade; it had been followed by the *Katahdin* and the *Kennebec*. The Federal losses did not amount to more than thirty or forty killed and wounded; none of the vessels had been seriously damaged.

Above Vicksburg, Farragut found Ellet with his naval divisions. As he wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, he had again

demonstrated that batteries erected by the river-side could be passed, and that he was ready to renew the operation as often as was desired. But if he had isolated the forts of New Orleans by passing them, he could not this time count upon the same results. In order to make a serious attack upon Vicksburg, an army was required; and when Farragut requested Halleck's co-operation, that general replied, on the 3d of July, that he could not detach any portion of his troops for that operation. The navy, therefore, had to continue the struggle on the Mississippi almost alone. The Confederates were preparing to maintain the contest, not only by obstructing navigation by means of batteries erected on both sides of the river, but by attacking the Federal vessels with the same weapons. In order to repair the disaster sustained at Memphis, which had caused their flag to disappear from the waters of the great river, they were actively at work upon a new ram called the *Arkansas*. The Yazoo River is an important tributary lying off the left bank, which empties into the Mississippi a short distance above Vicksburg, after skirting the foot of the hills we have before mentioned. When Davis had appeared before Vicksburg, the *Arkansas* was in process of construction near that city; she was at once towed into the Yazoo River as far as Yazoo City, nearly fifty miles above the mouth of that river; a stockade was built to protect her against the Union gun-boats, and the Confederates continued the process of equipping her as secretly as possible. The Federal officers, however, were not ignorant of her existence. On the 15th of July, having learnt from some deserters the day before that she was at last completed, and had left Yazoo City, Davis despatched three gun-boats, the *Tyler*, the *Queen of the West* and the *Carondelet*, which were of lighter draught than Farragut's ships, to make a reconnaissance of the Yazoo. They had not to proceed very far to encounter the adversary they were in search of. The *Arkansas*, constructed nearly on the same model as the *Merrimac*, but much smaller, had her sides covered with iron plates in the shape of a roof, and carried nine guns; she had come down the river, and passed the night on a kind of lake called Old River, formed by an old arm of the Mississippi, which connects with the Yazoo near its mouth. She no sooner perceived the Federal vessels than she

rushed toward them ; they did not wait an instant for her approach, but fled under a full head of steam, exchanging a few cannon-shots from a distance with the foe. The *Carondelet* was soon compelled to seek refuge on some sand-banks, where her light draught sheltered her from the attacks of her adversary. The latter continued the chase ; and suddenly the Federal fleet, which was at anchor between the mouth of the Yazoo and Vicksburg, saw the two gun-boats enter the river, followed close by the *Arkansas*. This appearance was a complete surprise to the fleet. Obligated to be sparing of its coal, which had become extremely scarce, the fires had long since been extinguished ; and not being under steam, it could not manœuvre for battle. Meanwhile, the *Arkansas*, whose sides rose but little above the surface of the water, being only surmounted by a chimney and a large Confederate flag, leisurely proceeded down the river ; the fire of the whole fleet was soon concentrated upon her ; she replied, and was immediately enveloped in a cloud of smoke. When this veil was torn asunder, the Confederate was seen continuing her progress despite a shower of missiles ; and before the Federal ships had time to set their engines in motion in order to bar her passage, she was already moored at the pier of Vicksburg under the protection of friendly batteries. This bold stroke cost her crew ten killed and fifteen wounded. The Federals suffered much more, the *Carondelet* alone having had thirty and the *Tyler* twenty-four men disabled. The situation of the Federal fleet below Vicksburg had become critical. There was, in fact, but one sloop-of-war, the *Brooklyn*, and a few gun-boats to protect the mortar-boats, unable to move of themselves, the numerous transports and all the dépôts of the Federals. The *Arkansas* had so well resisted the enemy's projectiles that this rich prey seemed to be at her mercy ; and nothing could prevent her from afterward pursuing her course as far as New Orleans. But while these vessels were being put in a condition for defence, and David Porter was burning one of his mortar-boats, which it had been found impossible to remove, Farragut adopted without hesitation a bold resolution. He ordered the fleet to descend the river again, passing under the fire of Vicksburg, so as to close the lower Mississippi against the dangerous visitors who had just braved his power. Night came

on before his vessels could be put in motion. It was impossible, however, to delay any longer. The Federal ships filed before the enemy's works, steering their course by the light of the Confederate guns. They were struck by a few cannon-balls, but none of them were stopped, and before daybreak Farragut's entire fleet was again assembled below Vicksburg, ready to bar the passage against the *Arkansas*. The latter, not being provided with a sufficiently strong engine to manœuvre in the midst of the current, which is very strong in that part of the river, did not dare to attack him.

On the 22d of July, the Federals made another attempt to get rid of this inconvenient neighbor. The *Essex*, one of Ellet's ships, commanded by W. D. Porter,* was charged with this duty. At four o'clock in the morning she descended the river, and, without returning the fire of the Confederate batteries, steered under full steam toward the *Arkansas*, which lay at anchor close to the shore, and struck her violently with her beak; but the blow glanced off, and the *Essex* ran aground upon a shoal. While endeavoring to extricate herself, she discharged her guns at close range against her stationary foe, causing her much damage. But the Confederates in their turn concentrated all their guns upon the *Essex*, while their infantry opened a still more destructive fire with their rifles, compelling her to retire. After waiting in vain for the two fleets to come to his assistance, Porter slowly descended the river and joined Farragut's ships, having had his armor pierced by only two balls.

The injuries received by the *Arkansas* were repaired, and the Federals were obliged to acknowledge that it would be impossible, with the means at their disposal, to reduce Vicksburg, the fortifications of which were growing every day. They had vainly tried to avoid them, by cutting a channel through the narrow tongue of land enfolded by the waters of the Mississippi in passing before the city; under the influence of the summer heats, the level of the river fell faster than they could dig the channel. The heat decimated Williams' soldiers, who were employed in this rough and thankless work. The crews of the fleet were also terribly re-

* W. D. Porter must not be confounded with David D. Porter of the mortar-boats, now admiral.

duced by fever. The Confederates, moreover, were more and more threatening the communications of the two squadrons with their bases of operations, Memphis and New Orleans. Price was assembling his troops above Vicksburg, as if he intended to return to Arkansas. The disasters of the Federals in Virginia called for the exercise of the utmost prudence. Davis and Farragut determined to abandon all offensive operations for the moment. The former reascended the Mississippi as far as Helena, a little town situated on the right bank three hundred miles higher up. As throughout that section of the river there was not a single bluff to be met, upon which could be erected one of those batteries whose slanting fire was alone dreaded by the gun-boats, Davis felt sure of being able to descend the river as far as the vicinity of Vicksburg whenever he should think proper to do so.

The draught of Farragut's sloop-of-war would have sufficed to oblige him to bring them nearer to the mouth of the Mississippi when its waters were at the lowest point. On the 28th of July, he cast anchor before the levees of New Orleans, having left W. D. Porter with the *Essex* and *Sumter* below Vicksburg, and the two gun-boats *Katahdin* and *Kinco* at Baton Rouge. Williams' troops had been landed near that city, which thus became the last stage of the Federals above New Orleans.

Encouraged by this double retreat, Van Dorn sent Breckenridge, with about six thousand men and eleven cannon, to attempt the recapture of Baton Rouge. By seizing the official capital of Louisiana, the Confederates would have obtained a twofold advantage. The moral effect would have been considerable, while the capture of this place would have secured to them the possession of that portion of the river which receives the waters of Red River—a necessary line of communication, as we have said, for their supplies. The *Arkansas*, which had received a new sheathing of iron and cotton, was to unite with two gun-boats, the *Webb* and the *Musie*, lying in Red River, and co-operate with Breckenridge's division in an attack upon Baton Rouge. The Federals had two gun-boats and the ram *Essex* with which to oppose them on the water, and on land four thousand men debilitated by sickness, with eighteen cannon. They had not been able to entrench themselves effectively, when on the 5th of August, at one

o'clock in the morning, Breckenridge's vanguard opened the fight. Williams' troops formed a semicircle outside of the city, which is situated on the left bank, resting on the river both above and below. His right wing, which was consequently posted below, was flanked by the two gun-boats, the left wing by the *Essex*.

Breckenridge's entire effort was directed upon the latter point, and the Federals were soon compelled to give way. The brave Williams was shot through the heart while endeavoring to rally his men. But the success of the Confederates was of very short duration; the fire of the *Essex*, which enfiladed their lines, threw them into confusion. The *Arkansas*, which was to destroy the Federal flotilla, to take Williams' troops in the rear, to cut off their retreat and oblige them to lay down their arms—the invulnerable *Arkansas*—did not make her appearance. The Federals recovered from their disorder, and the assailants were crushed by their artillery. Breckenridge paused to wait for the *Arkansas*, unaware of the accident that had happened to this vessel; and finally, about ten o'clock in the morning, he retired, having lost nearly five hundred men in this fruitless encounter.

Meanwhile, the *Arkansas*, rudely constructed, had had two of her engines successively disabled only a few miles above Baton Rouge, and it had been found necessary to run her ashore to prevent her being carried off by the current and falling into the power of the Federal ships. As soon as the battle on land had ceased, the latter went in search of her; the *Essex* soon perceived her old antagonist, which was waiting in vain for the two gun-boats, her acolytes, to come and take her in tow. The contest could no longer be continued. At the first shot thrown by the *Essex* the commander of the *Arkansas* landed his crew, and setting fire to his vessel sent her adrift in the current. It was a strange sight to see that vessel, steered by no human hand, slowly following the course of the great river, enveloped by the smoke of the interior fires that were consuming her, and still bearing the flag which was about to disappear in an instant, with herself, in the waters. The heat soon caused the guns to go off, the balls losing themselves in the two banks; a moment after, the vessel blew up, and its fragments were engulfed in the river.

This was a serious loss to the Confederates; but they were not

long in indemnifying themselves for this double reverse, by taking possession of the village of Port Hudson, a formidable position, which the Federals had neglected to occupy. Van Dorn saw that, instead of sacrificing his men by trying to capture Baton Rouge, he could secure the same result by fortifying any given point below the mouth of Red River, which, like Vicksburg, could check the progress of the Federal gun-boats. Port Hudson was admirably adapted for this purpose, and soon became an important stronghold. From that moment the Confederates were again sole masters of all that portion of the river comprised between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, for these two places flanked each other mutually; the great Red River line of communication for obtaining supplies was again open to them, and the two sections of the Confederacy, which had been temporarily separated, were again firmly united. The Mississippi, of which, in June, 1862, the Federals might probably have taken possession, was lost to them, owing to the absence of troops which Halleck had not had the foresight to detail in time for this important operation. From that day Vicksburg and Port Hudson became the two bastions before which, for a whole year, all the efforts of the Federal fleets and armies, seeking in vain to act in conjunction, were destined to fail.

But before returning to Virginia, where events were taking place, the influence of which was to be felt even in the Far West, we must retrace our steps to narrate operations, at once military and naval, of which a portion of the coast of the Confederate States had been the theatre during the early part of 1862.

We followed these operations upon the coast of North Carolina and in the Gulf of Mexico up to the spring, a period when they ceased entirely, partly in consequence of the new destination given to Burnside's army, which left Albemarle Sound for the borders of the James, and partly owing to the retreat into the interior of all the Confederate forces stationed on the coast of Louisiana. It remains for us to speak of the combined operations of the fleet called the South Atlantic squadron and of the army of T. W. Sherman, on the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida during the first six months of 1862.

In the preceding volume we gave an account of the battle

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fought on the banks of the Coosaw on the 1st of January, which secured to the Federals the possession of the entire group of the St. Helena islands. During this month, their gun-boats were employed in running into and observing the large bays of which they had taken possession—North Edisto, St. Helena Sound and its branch, South Edisto, the Coosaw, the Broad River, Warsaw and Ossabaw Sounds. The localities of North Edisto, in consequence of its contiguity to Charleston, required particular attention. Reconnaissances were likewise made in the inland channels which connect the Savannah River with the adjoining arms of the sea, in order to complete those we have mentioned above, which had revealed the existence of a navigable communication between the river and Warsaw Sound, by means of which the guns of Fort Pulaski could be avoided. During the early part of January, a bold explorer had discovered another pass on the left bank of the Savannah, which, after a thousand windings between marshy islands, debouched northward into Dawfuskie Bay, near the island of Hilton Head. Commodore Dupont resolved to throw a sufficient force into these labyrinths, so as to take possession of them if those passes should prove to be practicable for his vessels. The expedition on the left bank, although prepared with great care and secrecy, was detected by the enemy a short time before the day fixed for its departure. The channel through which it was to emerge into the Savannah River is so narrow and difficult, that the idea of forcing a passage through could not be entertained; a few sharpshooters lying in ambush along the shore would have been sufficient to defend it. Nevertheless, Rodgers ventured very far into the channel called Wright's River, and reached a point whence he could throw his projectiles as far as the waters of the Savannah River.

But Dupont, convinced that he should not be able to attain the object he had in view on that side, directed all his attention to the right bank. There the Federals already occupied Tybee Island, which they contemplated making the base of their operations against Fort Pulaski as soon as the season should permit. The December expedition had found the channel which connects the river with Warsaw Sound strongly barricaded and defended by several works. Captain Davis, with six gun-boats and three

transports having Benham's brigade on board, was directed to explore another channel which opened higher up. He penetrated very far, passed in sight of Fort Pulaski, the defenders of which, being taken by surprise, had not time to turn their guns against him, and arrived before the stockades, which stopped him within short cannon-range of the point where the channel he was following empties into the river. A regiment which had been in charge of these stockades had abandoned them, but five Confederate gun-boats soon appeared and opened fire upon the Union vessels from a long distance. This was the flotilla of Tatnall, who, seeing that the Federals were trying to invest Fort Pulaski, was hastening to provision it; the flotilla towed a large number of lighters laden with rations. While it was engaged with Davis' ships on the right side of the river, Rodgers, who found himself precisely opposite on Wright's River near the left side, took part in the combat, throwing his shells into the midst of the enemy's flotilla. Two vessels belonging to the latter beat a retreat. The other three continued their course without sustaining any injury, left the lighters at Pulaski, and returned to exchange a few more shots with the Federals. But the ebbing tide had given the shore such elevation as to intercept all the missiles, and this useless cannonade was brought to an end without bloodshed. Davis, having ascertained that it would require a much larger force than he had at his command to get through the pass and occupy it permanently, retired. It was decided to attack the defences of Savannah in front, and to force the entrance of the river by reducing Fort Pulaski as speedily as possible.

Pending the preparations for this attack, the necessity of guarding the islands already occupied, the reconnaissances and conquests of new positions by the navy, gave occasion to affairs, generally bloodless, which we shall merely enumerate here in their chronological order.

The islands of Edisto had become the refuge of all the negroes of the neighborhood, who ran away from the main-land plantations, which had been abandoned by the whites. The latter returned from time to time to hunt them out, and on the 7th of February they exchanged a few musket-shots with the Federal gun-boat *Crusader*.

Owing to their possession of all the islands of South Carolina, the Federals maintained a strict blockade of the coast of that State. Although it became every day more difficult to run this blockade, still a considerable traffic was carried on in provisions—destined not only for the Confederate armies, but also for the inhabitants of Savannah and Charleston—through the numerous inland canals which separate these islands from the main land. The Federals made great efforts to break up this traffic, and on the 13th of February they seized three vessels laden with rice in Bull's Bay.

Meanwhile, the operations of investment which were to precede the siege of Pulaski progressed slowly. Tybee Island, already designated for the erection of breach-batteries, had been occupied since the month of December. Troops were landed on the islands situated to the left of the channel of the Savannah, and one battery was erected on a promontory called Venus Point, the soil of which was firmer than that of the surrounding localities. This battery was speedily armed; and as it was above Fort Pulaski, it rendered the communications between the defenders of the fort and the city of Savannah extremely difficult. The necessity for covering this position compelled Captain Rodgers to establish himself permanently on Wright's River. It was impossible for him to take his ships into the Savannah, because, its waters being only navigable during a few hours in the day, at high tide, they would have found themselves blockaded in a river belonging to the enemy, the banks of which could conceal hidden dangers; but he took them through the adjoining passes of Venus Point and placed them across these channels. In this manner their guns had complete command of the river; at low water the gun-boats gradually settled in the mud, and thus formed immovable citadels. Commodore Tatnall came to attack them in this difficult position on the 14th of February; but the Federals, supported by four batteries of field-artillery that had recently been landed on the island, compelled him to retire.

Other dangers menaced the Union forces. They had constructed some slight stockades at a point where Wright's River becomes separated from the Savannah, in order to stop the fire-ships which the enemy might launch against them; but they could not prevent

him from planting torpedoes along the course of the river itself. This is the first time that we meet these powerful engines of defence, borrowed from the Russians, and which were soon destined to play so important a part in the war. Furnished with an explosive apparatus and fastened to an anchor, they floated on the surface; consequently, they were quickly discovered by the Federal launches employed in exploring the Savannah River, and fished up by them without receiving any injury; but the fear of encountering some of these torpedoes between two waters was no doubt the reason which prevented Dupont from going up the river with his gun-boats.

While he was fortifying himself at Venus Point, the month of February passed away without any other incident, except a trifling attempt on the part of some sailors upon a Confederate battery situated at Bear's Bluff, near North Edisto channel.

But Dupont was preparing an expedition which was to secure him the possession of some of the most important points on the coast of Florida, and which we shall find at work early in March.

The Atlantic coast, south of the mouths of the Savannah as far as the point where the peninsula of Florida commences, has the same configuration as at the north as far as Charleston. Between the continent and the open sea stretches a chain of islands of considerable size, and separated by numerous canals; the enormous volume of water which the rivers of Georgia discharge into the Atlantic has hollowed several bays, of great extent and depth, in this chain, dividing these islands into many groups. These groups and estuaries, beginning from the Savannah River, are the following: Tybee Island, a bay; then Warsaw Islands, a bay; then the Ossabaw Islands, a bay; then St. Catharine Islands, a bay; then Sapelo Islands, the mouths of the Altamaha; the islands and then the Bay of St. Simon; Jekyll Island, the Bay of St. Andrews; Cumberland Island, the Bay of St. Mary; Amelia Island, upon which stands the little town of Fernandina, terminus of the Cedar Keys Railway; and finally the Bay of Nassau. On the coast of Florida we find only small rivers, for their flow is limited by the breadth of the peninsula, and the soil is, moreover, so flat that the waters find no outlet to the sea. The fertile islands

of the coast of Georgia, formed by alluvia, are then succeeded by extensive sand-banks, caused by the deposits of the Atlantic, sometimes separated from the main land, sometimes joined to the continent and intersected by numerous inlets. The most important of these openings, from north to south, are: St. John's River, situated a little south of the Bay of Nassau, at the extremity of which stands the village of Jacksonville; the port of St. Augustine, on which is situated the city of the same name; then Mosquito Inlet, near which stands the little town of New Smyrna; and finally, the two neighboring passes, called Indian River and Gilbert's Bar, by which Hutchinson Island is bounded. Still farther south, the influence of a tropical climate is gradually manifested along this inhospitable coast, by coral reefs which rise among the sand-banks; then these disappear by degrees; the alluvial deposits formed in rear of the coral chain sink lower and lower, and this chain finally terminates in a succession of islets and rocks, which extend far into the sea in the direction of Havana.

Dupont weighed anchor on the 28th of February to take possession of the principal points along this coast. The *Wabash*, bearing his pennant, was followed by eighteen gun-boats, a cutter, a transport fitted out as a man-of-war, and six transports with General Wright's brigade on board. General Sherman accompanied the expedition. On the 2d of March, the fleet came to anchor in the Bay of St. Andrews, whence it was to attack the inlets of St. Mary's Bay, which were defended by Fort Clinch, a work of considerable strength, built near Fernandina, at the same period and on the same model as Fort Pulaski. But at the news of the approach of the Federals, the Confederate troops had abandoned this part of the coast, Cumberland Island, Fernandina, and even Fort Clinch, whose solid masonry could, however, have enabled its garrison of fifteen hundred men to sustain a long siege. Dupont had only to send a few vessels of light draught to St. Mary's through the inland canals, which took possession of the town and fort without opposition. This operation was marked by an incident unexampled of its kind up to the present moment. The railroad from Fernandina to Cedar Keys, after skirting for some distance, on Amelia Island, the sheet of water which separates it from the continent, crosses this sheet of

water over a large bridge built on piles. Just as the gun-boat *Ottawa* was entering this lake she saw a train of cars passing along its border with the garrison of Fernandina and its supplies on board. She started in pursuit, and chased the train while it was crossing the pile-bridge. She threw several shells after this train, but was unable to overtake it and cut off its retreat. A steamer loaded with war materials and thirteen guns was all that fell into the hands of the Federals.

This easy success led to others. The signal for evacuating Fort Clinch was imitated along the whole coast of Georgia between the bays of Ossabaw and St. Mary. All the white population, seized with panic terror, which the Confederate leaders took good care to foster, followed the retreat of the troops, and abandoned the plantations and villages along the coast to retire into the interior, or to seek shelter in the woods. As soon as he found himself master of Fernandina, Dupont divided his fleet, in order to display the Federal flag simultaneously at all the important points he could reach. One gun-boat took possession of the little town of St. Mary's, and proceeded about fifty miles up the river of the same name, the estuary of which forms the bay already mentioned. Some of his crew were wounded by the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, ambushed along the beach. Captain Godon was ordered to explore the arms of the sea which separate the main land from the chain of islands adjoining the coast to northward, with three gun-boats. On the 9th of March, he had reached St. Simon's Bay. Two large earthworks situated at the contiguous extremities of the islands of Jekyll and St. Simon commanded the entrance of this bay on the side toward the sea. Godon found them abandoned; the little town of Brunswick, itself situated at the extremity of the bay, was almost deserted, but two days after, a Federal launch, which had gone in search of provisions, was attacked by parties of the enemy concealed in the neighboring woods, and thus lost several men. From Brunswick the Federal flotilla continued its course, and, passing between the island of St. Simon and the main land, entered the vast estuary of the Altamaha. Godon ascended this beautiful river as far as the small town of Darien, where he found but few inhabitants; but one of his ships having broken her engine, and the others being of too

heavy draught, he did not dare to venture farther into the interior, and returned to the Bay of St. Simon, a central position, whence he could easily command the whole coast of Georgia.

In the mean time, Dupont had extended his conquests south of Florida; two light divisions were directed, one under the orders of Lieutenant Stevens, toward the great channel called Saint John's River; the other, commanded by Dupont in person, to the Bay of St. Augustine. The former, consisting of six light steamers, after having shown itself in the Bay of Nassau, entered St. John's River on the 9th of March. Dupont left it at the entrance of this difficult bay, taking with him the second division, which comprised, besides the sloop *Wabash*, his largest gun-boats, and on the 11th made his appearance in the Bay of St. Augustine. The Confederate garrison had fled in great haste, but the inhabitants of this small town had not abandoned it. They themselves delivered into Dupont's hands Fort Marion, a permanent work of masonry formerly built like Fort Clinch by the Federal government, which the raw militia of Florida had never dreamed for an instant of defending. Dupont took possession of it on the 12th of March, and found five pieces of cannon there.

On the same day Stevens occupied the large village of Jacksonville with as little trouble. He had been detained till the 11th before the bar, which three of his gun-boats found it very difficult to cross. On the morning of the 12th, he ascended St. John's River, through which the waters of the sea penetrate to the centre of the Florida peninsula. The Confederate authorities had fled, after setting fire to the large workshops and fine saw-mills, the owners of which were for the most part Northern men, but the inhabitants did not exhibit the same hostile feeling toward the Federal sailors as those of Georgia; the doctrine of States' rights had not penetrated into this old Spanish colony; slavery had not been developed, and the troops which landed took possession of Jacksonville in the midst of a perfectly indifferent population. Finally, by the occupation of the Mosquito Inlet passes, Dupont completed the work of closing the Confederate coast to the contraband trade which had been carried on with the English colony of the Bahamas. He proceeded in person to those passes with several ships; but a detachment of Federal sailors, having pene-

trated too far into the interior with some launches, fell into an ambuscade on its return, on the 22d of March, in which the commanders of the two vessels who had organized this imprudent expedition perished.

Shortly after this a fatal occurrence took place which, without diminishing in the least the efficacy of the blockade, tended to cool the sympathies which the sight of the old national flag was still able to rouse along this coast. After four weeks of occupation, Jacksonville was evacuated on the 8th of April. The seizure of this town was a mistake. The mission of General Sherman's troops and Dupont's gun-boats should simply have been to close every avenue against smugglers, who might attempt to run the maritime blockade. It was sought to employ these forces to bring back whole districts into the Union, whose inhabitants were ready to rally under the flag of the strongest, whoever he might be. This action was calculated to compromise all who had shown any interest in the Federals; this was particularly the case at Jacksonville, where many of its influential inhabitants had manifested a decided devotion to the Union cause. They were compelled to embark with the Federal troops, leaving all their interests behind, to go and vegetate at Port Royal or New York in useless exile; and the news was quickly spread along the whole coast that the same fate awaited all those who should display any partiality for the Star-spangled Banner.

Meanwhile, the preparations for an attack upon Fort Pulaski were soon to be completed; the batteries at Venus Point had been reinforced; the works on Tybee Island were rapidly progressing, and the garrisons at these two points had been increased. The Confederates felt the necessity of concentrating all their forces for the defence of Savannah. Fort Jackson, which had been built during the early stages of the war between the city and Pulaski, on the right bank of the river, had been enlarged and another work erected higher up. Both were mounted with powerful guns, while the Confederates had abandoned, as too far distant, the batteries they had raised a few weeks previously on Skidaway Island to command one of the canals which connect Savannah River with Warsaw Sound. Some Federal launches visited and destroyed these works on the 24th of March. All the ap-

proaches to Savannah by water had been closed by means of stockades and the hulls of ships sunk in the river. Tatnall's gunboats were stationed above these obstacles, and since the 22d of February there had been no communication with the garrison of Pulaski, except by means of light boats, which came down in the night with provisions, at the risk of being sunk while passing before the Federal batteries situated above the fort. That of Venus Point, of which we have already spoken, erected with the greatest trouble in the centre of a perfect swamp, had received its armament on the 11th of February. In order to command the pass still more thoroughly, General Viele, who with his brigade had charge of the works on the left bank of the river, succeeded in building a small work upon a spot called Bird's Island, and placed a few guns in it.

It was, however, on Tybee Island, south-east of Pulaski, that the great works required for the bombardment of the fort were being prosecuted. In order to present a correct idea of this siege, and its importance in a point of view illustrative of the improvements in artillery, we must describe in a few words the position of the work it was intended to attack.

The estuary of the Savannah River is bounded on the south by Tybee Island, and on the north by Long Island, Venus Island and Dawfuskie Island; to the southward the coast projects farther than to the northward, and forms the low and sandy promontory of Tybee, against which the sea breaks almost incessantly, and upon which stands the lighthouse which before the war lighted the entrance of the river. On a line with the northern extremity of the coast, in the middle of the current of the Savannah, there are several sand-banks, formed no doubt by the meeting and collision of the fresh waters with the waves of the Atlantic, upon which time has deposited a thick layer of oozy mud. The largest of these islets, and the nearest to the right bank, called Cockspur Island, had been selected by the American engineers as the site of Fort Pulaski. The foundations of this fort had been laid upon piles sunk, through the mud, to a great depth into the sand. Its form was a rectilinear pentagon, its vertex turned to the east in the direction of the open sea; it was surrounded on four sides by a ditch more than twenty yards in width, full of

water and mud ; the entrance on the west side was protected by a small demi-lune. The fort was constructed of solid brick, rising to a height of eight yards above the level of the surrounding soil. The four exposed sides contained a row of casemated batteries, and were mounted with guns placed *en barbette*; at the base were built the barracks, and in the north-east angle of the yard was the powder magazine. Around the fort a wall had been built around a space of a few acres to protect it against spring-tides ; the other part of the little island was frequently under water, and no landing could be effected except at two points, situated, one at the north and the other at the south.

Captain Gillmore, of the Federal engineers, who had been sent to make a survey of the place in the month of December, had proposed to erect batteries on Tybee Island to bombard the fort. It was the only point from which it could be attacked with any chance of success ; but this success was very uncertain, for the river and the swamps which surround it rendered it impossible to approach it nearer than sixteen hundred yards of the wall, and this solid piece of masonry seemed to defy all the artillery of the besiegers at such a distance. If Fort Sumter had fallen nine months before under the fire of Beauregard's guns, it was because it was not prepared to sustain a siege ; the Confederates had not damaged it seriously, and its small garrison was only obliged to capitulate in consequence of a want of provisions, and the burning of the wooden barracks within the fort. The defenders of Fort Pulaski had no reason to apprehend such casualties, and the project of effecting a breach from a distance of sixteen hundred yards was an entirely new thing at that period, when rifled guns of heavy calibre had not yet been tried against permanent fortifications. Consequently, the Confederates, full of confidence in their massive walls, suffered Colonel Rosa, with a Federal regiment, the Forty-sixth New York, to establish himself quietly on Tybee Island.

The newly-arrived troops set themselves bravely to work. The island is bounded north and east—that is to say, along the beach of the open sea—by a kind of low sand-bank ; this miniature bank presents a dry and firm soil, but is only a few score metres wide, beyond which are encountered swamps, in which the

mud is from a foot to eighteen inches deep. It was upon that portion of the bank which faces north that Gillmore intended to place his batteries, from thirty-four hundred to sixteen hundred yards from the fort; but after having landed the materials for their construction and armament near the light-house, the whole had to be dragged across the swamp in order to protect them against the fire of the enemy. The site chosen for the batteries most distant from the landing was separated by two miles and a half from the latter place. It became necessary not only to drag over this entire distance the gabions, the fascines, the timber for platforms, the gun-carriages, the cannon, and the mortars which were to constitute the armament of the batteries, but to construct beforehand a causeway for the conveyance of all this heavy material across the swamp, the ground of which had about the consistency and elasticity of gelatine. This preparatory labor consumed a vast quantity of stumps of trees and brushwood. After it was completed, the Federal soldiers had another task to perform which was equally difficult. Every night, after having assisted in landing the material on a dangerous shore up to their waists in water, they harnessed themselves to heavy carts loaded with a portion of the armament, dragged them through the deep sand and along a narrow causeway, more than sixteen hundred yards long. At times one might see two hundred and fifty men striving with great difficulty to move one of these heavy vehicles, sometimes lighted by the uncertain rays of the moon, which gave a false appearance of firmness to the smooth surface of the mud, sometimes bending under the gusts of wind which caused the sea to roar along the beach, lashing their faces with the salt foam.

This work was prosecuted while the fleet, as we have remarked, was visiting all the principal points on the coast. The necessity of effecting all the landings at high tide, and during calm weather, and of erecting batteries and bringing up the materials only under cover of night, caused great delay in their completion. The Forty-sixth New York, however, which was the first to land, was soon reinforced; Colonel Terry, who acquired so much distinction at a later period by the capture of Fort Fisher, had joined it with the Seventh Connecticut, a few other companies of volun-

teers and a detachment of sappers and miners. Gillmore, who had been appointed brigadier-general, stimulated by his example and confidence the ardor of all around him.

About this time the importance of the operations of which this coast was the theatre determined the President to make it an independent department. He placed it in charge of General Hunter, a meritorious officer, cool and resolute, who had the reputation of possessing great good sense and experience, and whom we have already seen at work in Missouri. General Benham proceeded to Tybee to assume command of the troops assembled there, and all those stationed south of the Savannah River; General Viele, who was placed under him, continued to direct the special operations on the left bank of the river.

Hunter arrived at Tybee soon after his appointment. It was now the beginning of April, and by the 8th of that month the works were entirely completed. Eleven batteries, constructed of sand, gabions and dry mud, were erected on the beach, those nearest to the fort facing north-east and the others nearly due east. A canal, called Lazaretto Creek, which empties into the river near the point where the first batteries stood, covered them against any attack that might be made by the Confederates, coming down the right bank. But the latter might have tried to overthrow them by directing against them the fire of the heavy guns of Fort Pulaski; although they were as well masked as was practicable, it is difficult to believe that the small garrison and its brave commander, Colonel Olmstead, had not perceived them. It is to be supposed, therefore, that he was anxious to spare his ammunition, and that he looked upon the sixteen hundred yards which separated him from the assailants as an ample guarantee of his safety.

Many persons among the Federals participated in this opinion; and although Gillmore relied chiefly upon his rifled guns, which he had posted as near the fort as possible, to produce really destructive effects, he had deemed it necessary to support their fire by that of numerous mortars, and a few of those large smooth-bore shell-guns constructed for the navy, and called columbiads. The following was the armament of his batteries, beginning at the east with the one most remote from the fort: the first, at three

thousand four hundred yards, three thirteen-inch mortars; the second, at three thousand two hundred yards, three thirteen-inch mortars; the third, at three thousand one hundred yards, three ten-inch columbiads; the fourth, at three thousand and forty-five yards, three eight-inch columbiads; the fifth, at two thousand seven hundred and fifty yards, one thirteen-inch mortar; the sixth, at two thousand five hundred and fifty yards, three thirteen-inch mortars; the seventh, at two thousand four hundred yards, two thirteen-inch mortars; the eighth, at one thousand seven hundred and fifty yards, three ten-inch columbiads, and one eight-inch; the ninth, at one thousand six hundred and seventy yards, five thirty-pounder Parrotts and one forty-eight pounder James (old twenty-four); the tenth, called the McClellan battery, at one thousand six hundred and fifty yards, two James eighty-four pounders (old forty-two) and two sixty-four pounders (old thirty-two); the eleventh, at one thousand six hundred and fifty yards, four ten-inch siege mortars. The siege artillery, therefore, comprised nine thirteen-inch mortars, seven ten-inch ditto, six ten-inch columbiads, four eight-inch ditto, two of James' forty-two pounders, two thirty-two and one twenty-four ditto, and five Parrott's thirty pounders, making in all twenty-six smooth-bore and ten rifled guns; among these ten, only the first four named were really of a powerful calibre. The last three batteries, placed side by side, were connected by a trench, each having magazines and splinter-proof shelters.

At daybreak, on the 10th of April, a small boat bearing a flag of truce was seen to leave the coast near the lighthouse, to proceed toward the fort, and to go back immediately. It had scarcely returned when Hunter gave the signal for the bombardment to commence; the garrison had refused the summons to surrender. All was ready in the Federal batteries, and every man was at his post. The large mortars, which were most distant, fired, with a charge of fourteen pounds, shells containing seven pounds of powder, the trajectory of which was described in twenty-two seconds. The columbiads of the distant batteries were inclined at an angle of twenty degrees, so as to give a curved fire; they used a charge of seventeen pounds of powder, and the length of fuse was twenty seconds. The shells of these guns were to

pass over the parapet and reach the interior of the fort. The other pieces, placed in Batteries 8, 9 and 10, were to effect a breach and dismount the enemy's artillery. The ten-inch columbiads, enormous cast-iron guns, elsewhere described, were to throw solid shot with a charge of twenty pounds; the powerful effect of such a charge of powder applied to so heavy a projectile was to make its trajectory almost a right line, which enabled it to strike the walls with full force, the elevation of the gun being only five degrees. The James guns of the McClellan battery also fired solid shot at an angle of four degrees, but with charges of only eight and six pounds; the other rifled pieces, of a smaller calibre, were to throw shells into the barbette-battery of the fort at an angle of forty degrees. The point designated to be breached was that portion of the south-eastern face nearest to the south angle, for an opening effected at this point would have enabled the Federal projectiles to reach the powder magazine inside of the fort.

The bombardment lasted the whole of the 10th. The fire of the Federal guns, served with great zeal by the same troops that had placed them in battery, was well sustained, and was quite exact; when it ceased at night, after having continued for nine hours and a half, more than three thousand projectiles had fallen upon the fort. The mortars, brought up with so much trouble, did not produce very satisfactory results; their fire was uncertain, and the shells which struck the fort had but little effect. Four of the columbiads had their trunnions broken under the shock of the heavy charges of powder they had been compelled to bear. But the others, and the guns of the McClellan battery, had behaved extremely well; the beginning of a breach appeared at the angle which had been designated as their point of fire; two barbette guns and three in the casemates had been silenced.

The Confederates had responded with great vigor during the entire day; and if nobody had been hurt by their fire, they had not up to that time had a single man wounded on their side. They were therefore full of confidence, and employed the night in removing their artillery, to concentrate its fire on the Tybee batteries, which they hoped to demolish on the morrow. General Viele had indeed endeavored to divert their attention by causing the cannon at Venus Point to fire upon the fort; but the distance was

too great, and the batteries he had constructed nearer, on Long Island and Turtle Island, could not be armed, as they were only to be approached by water, at the risk of being sunk in the passage by the enemy's guns. It was on the 10th that the Federals were able to convey some cannon to the place under cover of the bombardment.

On the morning of the 11th, the wind was blowing so hard as to affect the course of the projectiles; and when the Federal officers reopened fire about seven o'clock, they anxiously asked each other what the result would be. But the James guns soon gave proof of their power and precision; the breach began to widen around one of the embrasures; at ten o'clock the arches of the casemate were uncovered, and the two adjoining embrasures were in a crumbling condition. The large columbiads co-operated in shattering the masonry, which had been riddled by the conical projectiles; the entire wall which masked the casemates in front of the three embrasures tumbled down at noon, thus forming an almost practicable ramp from the ditch. While these projectiles were completing the work of destruction, the conical shells penetrated through the open casemates, striking in the vicinity of the powder magazine, the locality of which was perfectly known to the Federals. The timber blindage which had been placed over it was not sufficient to protect the fifty thousand pounds of powder which it still contained, and it might blow up at any moment. By prolonging the defence the garrison was therefore uselessly exposing itself to inevitable destruction, for the Federals were already examining the breach to ascertain if it was practicable; their launches were being got in readiness; the ditch would soon be filled up; and nothing could then prevent the assailants from landing on the island and entering *en masse* through a breach too large for the small number of its defenders. Consequently, Colonel Olmstead, who had gallantly done his duty, hoisted the white flag at two o'clock. It was precisely a year, to the very day and hour, since Beauregard had fired the first cannon-shot against Fort Sumter.

The Confederate garrison, which surrendered as prisoners, consisted of twenty-three officers and three hundred and sixty men of the First Georgia; it had had three men wounded. Only one

man had been killed on the side of the Federals. On that very evening Gillmore hoisted the Federal flag over the walls which his guns had just battered. The capture of the fort, with the forty-seven guns constituting its armament, was not the most important result obtained by this distinguished officer. In proving that rifled guns of medium calibre could easily effect a breach in the thickest masonry, at a distance of sixteen hundred yards, he had caused the art of sieges to take a great stride in advance. The Parrott guns had as usual been uncertain in their aim ; that of the James cannon had, on the contrary, been excellent.

When the news of the capture of the fort reached Savannah, where for the last two days the inhabitants had been anxiously listening to the booming of cannon, the greatest uneasiness prevailed ; but the stockades supported by the flotilla, and by two forts which they had had time thoroughly to arm, constituted an obstacle which the Federal fleet could not well surmount. It did not make the attempt to force it, but contented itself with the possession of the lower waters of the river. The chief advantage it derived from the capture of Pulaski was the not having to blockade the entrance of the Savannah River in future, as the fort, which was promptly repaired, closed it effectually henceforth against the foreign contraband steamers.

Notwithstanding the reverse they had just sustained, the Confederates were fully determined not to permit their adversaries to approach Savannah and penetrate into the interior. They kept a careful guard over all the points through which the Federal troops stationed on Tybee Island might try to obtain a foothold on the continent. Thus it happened that on the 17th of April the Eighth Michigan, having been sent on a reconnaissance in the Wilmington canal, soon found itself in the presence of an enemy ready for battle. These troops had hardly landed from the steamers which had brought them when they were assailed by the Thirteenth Georgia, which drove them back at the first encounter. Fortunately for them, the Federals, being but slightly pressed, were able to rally, and even to repulse the assailants, and they hastened to re-embark, after having had ten men killed and thirty-five wounded.

The task of the fleet, however, and of the small detachments

scattered along the coast, was henceforth confined to the exercise of a kind of police duty, designed to prevent the enemy from gradually recapturing the belt of islands and canals which had been so easily delivered up to the Federals, and which now separated him entirely from the sea. Hence the vast number of small expeditions and disconnected reconnaissances, having no other object in view than to explore some new channel, to prevent the erection of some battery, to wreak vengeance for an ambuscade, or to capture any trading craft still sailing in those inland waters. We shall confine ourselves to a brief enumeration of some of these minor operations.

The gun-boat *Crusader* was specially detailed to watch the Bay of North Edisto. On the 19th of April, Commander Rhind landed with a few soldiers near the Seabrook plantation for the purpose of hunting out some of the enemy's sharpshooters who had frequently troubled him; he met them and dispersed them after a slight skirmish, in which he had three men wounded. On the 29th of April, he went up Dawhoo River to destroy a battery of two guns which the enemy had placed on that stream. After receiving the fire of these two guns, which did him no injury, he landed, and finding them abandoned rendered them unfit for service. A field-battery, with a few sharpshooters concealed in the woods, was waiting for him at a turn in the river a little lower down; the Federal commander had foreseen this ambuscade, and passed the dangerous point without losing a single man.

In the mean while, two gun-boats at the other extremity of the line of the coast, occupied by Dupont, were trying to remedy the bad effect produced by the evacuation of Jacksonville, by making their appearance every three or four days before that town; they even sailed up St. John's River several times, and proceeded as far as Picolata, on a line with St. Augustine.

Each of the naval stations established in the principal bays along the coast organized expeditions similar to those of which North Edisto Sound and the entrance of St. John's River had been the point of departure. A foreign brig having run the blockade to reach Sapelo Sound, two of the gun-boats stationed at that point, the *Wamsutta* and the *Potomska*, followed her into Riceboro' River; they proceeded thirty miles up this river; but

after steaming that distance, they were at last informed, near the village of Dorchester, that this vessel had been burned. In coming down the river two Federal sailors were killed on the deck of the *Wamsutta* by the enemy's sharpshooters.

No demonstration had been attempted on the side of Charleston, the approaches to which were known to be too well defended to be seized and occupied by small detachments. Consequently, the naval division charged to observe the waters of South Carolina confined itself to the task of blockading as strictly as possible the entrance of this great port, which the famous stone fleet had in no way obstructed, as we have before observed. The monotony of this duty was broken on the 13th of May by a remarkable incident, showing what assistance the Federals might expect from that portion of the colored population—unfortunately, not very numerous—which had not been entirely brutalized by field-slavery. The *Planter* was a small steamer carrying two guns which happened to be in the port of Charleston, and which General Ripley, who was in charge of the defences of the bay, made use of, both in his tours of inspection, and for transporting soldiers and *matériel* of war. She was commanded by a white officer, but the pilot, named Robert Small, the engineer and fireman were mulatto slaves. On the morning of the 13th, the vessel had just shipped four guns of heavy calibre, destined for the armament of exterior works. She was lying at the wharf under steam; the whites, for some reason or other, had all gone ashore. The pilot Small perceived this, and a bold idea immediately passed through the mind of this slave, whose master thought he had a right to control and to employ for his profit not only his body, but also his intelligence. He suddenly gave the signal for departure; he was obeyed as usual. There were with him seven men, five women and three children on board, all colored. Naturally enough, there was no one among them to offer any opposition to a design which the absence of the whites rendered it easy to fathom; and as the inhabitants were accustomed to see the *Planter* going and coming in the harbor, the authorities of the port entertained no suspicion. Guided by Small, she thus passed before all the forts, displaying the Confederate flag and that of South Carolina, and exchanged the usual salute and signals with the lookout.

When the latter discovered that she was outside of the port and had substituted a white flag for the war ensign, it was too late; and before his late masters had realized the bold stroke he had just accomplished, Small was in the midst of the Federal fleet, which was greatly astonished to receive the unexpected gift of a steamer fully equipped from the hands of this daring and intelligent negro.

The services of this new pilot were soon made available on the coast of South Carolina, with which he was perfectly acquainted. These services were the more important because Hunter and Dupont intended to take advantage of the propitious season of the year to undertake the siege of Charleston; the capture of Pulaski encouraged them to do this; and as they had met with no serious resistance anywhere else on the coast, it was easy for them to collect a sufficient number of men for that purpose. But it was necessary first of all, on the one hand, to get possession of some of the islands in the vicinity of Charleston as stations for troops, and on the other hand to make the blockade more stringent along that portion of the coast situated between this city and North Carolina, which had hitherto been less strictly guarded by the Federal fleet.

On the 20th of May, three gun-boats, detached from the division which blockaded Charleston, entered the Bay of Stono River, south of the city, under the pilotage of Robert Small, destroyed an old fort which the Confederates had built, and subsequently abandoned, at Legareville, and took a few prisoners. The chief result of the expedition was to secure a safe anchorage for the Federal fleet in that bay, and an easy point of debarkation for the troops who were to operate against Charleston. General Hunter resolved to avail himself of these advantages to attempt against the forts which commanded the entrances to Charleston the manœuvre which had proved so successful in the attack upon Pulaski. The Bay of Charleston is separated from Stono River at the south by a group of islands, which strongly resemble those of Tybec, being, like the latter, encircled by canals, which are the means of communication between the two bays. The most important are Morris and Folly, bordered by the sea, which will play a prominent part in the history of the siege of Charleston,

and back of these, surrounded by a large belt of marshes, James Island, covered with villages and cultivated fields. The Federals hoped that, by taking possession of this island and the canals which enclose it, they would be able to penetrate into the bay, which serves as a harbor to the cradle of secession, without having to pass under the fire of Sumter, Moultrie and the forts that General Ripley had built a year before in front of the principal entrance of this bay.

On the 29th of May, the large gun-boat *Paucnee* entered Stono River, notwithstanding the difficulties of the bar, against which she struck more than twenty times, and everything was ready at the southern extremity of James Island for the reception of the troops with which General Hunter expected to commence the siege of those forts. They soon began to arrive in small detachments, some from the group of the St. Helena Islands, where the main body of Hunter's forces was still cantoned, others from Tybee, the garrison of which, since the capture of Pulaski, had become useless, and others still from many small Southern stations. This concentration was not without inconvenience, for it stripped many of the points which it would have been judicious to hold; the Confederates recovered possession of many plantations they had abandoned, and practiced the most cruel reprisals against the fugitives negroes who had sought refuge under the ægis of the Federal flag. But everything was made subservient to the necessities of the expedition, from which so great a result was anticipated as the capture of Charleston. The Confederates, who had evacuated the neighborhood of the deep waters of Stono River for fear of the large gun-boats of the enemy, had removed their lines of defences a little farther back, so as to shut the Federals within the flat and damp lands forming the southern extremity of James Island. The right of this line rested on the upper part of Stono River, and its left upon the Secession Creek canal, near the village of Secessionville; it consisted of several batteries strongly armed. General Evans established himself there with three or four thousand men, pushing his pickets to within a few paces of the encampments of the Federal army. The latter, which had landed few men at a time, found its numbers complete about the 10th of June; it was from seven to eight thousand

strong, and comprised the two divisions of Generals Wright and Stevens, with the independent brigade of Colonel Williams, the whole being under the command of General Benham. Hunter came to spend a few days among his troops, but he soon arrived at the conclusion that to isolate the forts situated on Morris Island, by reaching the Bay of Charleston, would not be such an easy matter as the investment of Pulaski. Prudence required that the Federals should remain in their positions until, with the aid of the fleet, they could extend their lines upon the islands which bordered the sea, and commence regular siege operations against the forts.

But no sooner had Hunter returned to Port Royal than Benham, deceived by false reports, and carried away by unreflecting ardor, determined to carry the entrenchments in front of him by a *coup de main* in order to gain possession of the dry and cultivated land extending beyond. He selected the works of Secessionville as the point of attack, in consequence, no doubt, of the support he expected to receive from the gun-boats. This was taking the bull by the horns.

The country residences constituting the hamlet of Secessionville are situated near the Secession Creek canal, which connects the Bay of Charleston with that of Stono, and stand upon the extremity of a strip of land which extends into the midst of vast swamps. Enveloped at the east by Secession Creek, this peninsula is bounded on the west by a stream called St. John's Creek, which, running in a north-westerly direction, loses itself in these same swamps. It connects with the firm land of James Island, in a ridge which rises to an elevation of several yards above the surrounding low lands, extending in a straight line for a distance of about a mile and a quarter in the direction of Stono River. The Confederates had stationed themselves on this isthmus a little in front of Secessionville, at a point where it does not exceed two hundred yards in breadth. A large redoubt, called Battery Lamar, with a profile of nine feet and a ditch two yards wide, rose above the ridge, which it commanded for a long distance; it was armed with a gun of heavy calibre, and had besides platforms for several field-pieces; two breastworks, forming a curtain, descended to the right and left, resting upon thickets, by which the swamps

were bounded on both sides. Back of this line there were other breastworks and rifle-pits, which overlooked the interior of the redoubt. The latter was covered in front by large abatis; but a little beyond, the peninsula was intersected by two transversal hedges, with *banquette* and double ditch, capable of affording shelter to the assailants. The ground, formerly devoted to cotton-raising, was deeply ravined by transversal furrows. Colonel Lamar occupied this position with one or two regiments. The remainder of Evans' troops had been posted by General Pemberton, who was in charge of the defence of Charleston, upon the summit of a slight prominence in the ground, which, originating back of St. John's Creek, extended across the whole island, commanding the entire country as far as the Federal camps, situated between four and a half and five miles from Secessionville.

Benham, thinking that he would be able to surprise the enemy in these positions, put his troops in motion on the 16th of June, at two o'clock in the morning. Stevens' division, numbering three thousand four hundred men, was to make an assault upon Battery Lamar, while a few gun-boats, ascending Secession Creek, were to attack them in the rear. Wright's division and Williams' brigade were charged to cover the left flank of the assailants against any offensive movement from the rest of the enemy's line.

The troops were on the march at the appointed hour, the Eighth Michigan forming the advance of Stevens' division. Although the Confederates had got wind of this movement, and although, anticipating the attack, Evans had sent reinforcements to the defenders of Secessionville, which raised their number to three thousand, the latter allowed themselves to be taken completely by surprise, and their grand guards were captured without resistance. The Union troops, young and inexperienced, behaved like veterans in this first attack, owing probably to their very ignorance of the danger they had to encounter. They advanced with the bayonet without firing a shot, and had already passed the last hedge, situated some five hundred yards from the work, before its defenders had become aware of their approach. Colonel Lamar had scarcely collected a few men, and fired his siege-gun once, when the assailants were already in the ditch. One of the most sanguinary close combats was engaged on the parapet itself; it was five o'clock in

the morning, the day was hot, foggy and damp; the combatants were soon enveloped in dense smoke. The boldest among the Federals had penetrated into the entrenchments, and planted on them the flag of the Eighth Michigan, but they could not capture the redoubt, the guns of which, loaded with grape, swept the summit of the ridge, and opened several gaps in the ranks of the regiments which Stevens had sent to their assistance; these reinforcements became separated, and could only reach the enemy's works by following the edge of the swamps. The gun-boats had not advanced far enough to enfilade the Confederate works, but bombarded them from a distance without effect. The troops posted in the second line opened a murderous fire upon the Federals; the latter were driven back into the ditch, and after a struggle of half an hour they were compelled to retire and seek shelter behind the first hedge.

The attack had failed. Stevens, however, did not give up the contest; he sent for succor to Benham, who had remained with Wright's column, and had not met the enemy. This general despatched Williams' brigade, which, crossing St. John's Creek, came to take position on the western prolongation of the Confederate entrenchments, and opened an enfilading fire upon their defenders, while the only serviceable gun in Stevens' possession continued to cannonade the redoubt. The brave Lamar had been seriously wounded, and a large number of men had fallen by his side; his position was becoming critical, when two regiments, sent by Evans to cover his right, encountered Williams, arrested his flank movement, and at the same time the Confederate field-pieces, posted *en potence*, riddled them with shell. Benham, deeming it impossible to carry by main force a position so well defended, gave at last the signal for retreat.

This was the first time that the small army which had been operating on the coast for the last seven months had a serious engagement with its adversaries. It was a costly trial. The losses amounted to nearly six hundred men, comprising more than sixty officers; they fell chiefly upon two or three regiments, which had been decimated in less than half an hour, during the first attack; the Eighth Michigan had lost two-fifths of its whole force. This encounter reflected more credit upon the courage of the soldiers

on both sides than upon the dispositions made by their chiefs. One had thrown forward his troops within a space which was constantly becoming narrower, against works before which they could not even deploy, and which he ought to have endeavored to turn by the left; the other had suffered himself to be taken completely by surprise. The Confederates lost two hundred and seven men in this affair.

The Federals, having returned in sadness to their camp, were soon ordered to re-embark, and were again scattered in different directions. All idea of an attack upon Charleston was abandoned, and the navy remained alone to watch Stono River, in view of certain operations which were postponed until the following year.

No feat of arms of any interest occurred along that coast after the battle of Secessionville until the beginning of July, a period at which we must interrupt this portion of our narrative.

On the 7th of April, the gun-boat *Onward* entered the waters of Bull's Bay, and stationed herself there for the purpose of closing this anchorage against the contraband trade; she found an abandoned work on Bull's Island, situated at the extremity of the bay.

On the 21st of June, the gun-boat *Crusader*, piloted by Robert Small, destroyed, at the inner extremity of North Edisto Bay, a battery situated on the heights of Simon's Bluff, which the Confederates abandoned after firing a few musket-shots.

The naval operations north of Charleston were equally unimportant.

On the 21st of May, the gun-boat *Albatross* had entered the deep estuary called Winyaw Bay, between Charleston and Cape Fear, at the inner extremity of which stands the little town of Georgetown. This place had become one of the resorts of blockade-runners; but the Federals encountered no opposition. They made their appearance in front of the pier, without landing, sailed up and down the bay and rivers which empty into it, picked up eighty fugitive negroes, and destroyed a few works which the Confederates had mounted with wooden guns in order to intimidate them; the *Albatross* remained in the bay, so as to render its blockade more effective.

During the six months which we have considered in this chap-

ter, the fleet captured several vessels, nearly all English, which it would take too much space to enumerate here; and the increasing high price paid for every article imported from Europe into the Southern States proved that the blockade was at last strictly maintained.

In the midst of these operations there occurred a political incident which caused more commotion in the North than most of the insignificant engagements we have just been relating. We allude to Hunter's proclamation abolishing slavery in the three States nominally under his jurisdiction—a proclamation which was condemned by the House of Representatives and repudiated by President Lincoln. We shall, however, confine ourselves in this place to a simple specification of its date, with the intention to speak of it in another chapter, when we shall take occasion to review all the political events which marked the year 1862, and to point out the progress made by the cause of abolition during that period.

BOOK III.—MARYLAND.

CHAPTER I.

CEDAR MOUNTAIN.

WE must return to the theatre of war in Virginia. It will be remembered that we left the army of the Potomac at Harrison's Landing, resting after the seven days' battle, and Lee leading back his own forces to the neighborhood of Richmond. A month had elapsed since Mr. Lincoln, landing on the banks of the James, had come to consult with General McClellan relative to the plans of the forthcoming campaigns; it was now the 8th of August. During this period only a few skirmishes had disturbed the silence and inaction that succeeded the great marches and desperate struggles which the month of June had witnessed. Everything, however, seemed to indicate that a new crisis was at hand. A Federal army about fifty thousand strong, called the army of Virginia, was concentrated on the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, between the two branches of the Rappahannock. Jackson was preparing to attack it at the head of three divisions. Farther to the south, Lee still occupied Richmond with the remainder of his army. At Harrison's Landing the constant coming in and going out of transports, shipping war materials, cavalry and the wounded, together with the preparations for departure ostensibly going on in the camps, denoted an early movement on the part of the army of the Potomac. It was indeed about to make a start, but only to turn its back upon the enemy. Acting in obedience to superior orders, its chief would be compelled, in spite of his protest, to take it back to Fortress Monroe; he was about to abandon the position he had conquered on the James after so many sacrifices, which the victorious enemy could not

wrest from him. A few words will suffice to explain this strange result.

We have seen how the personal ambition, the jealousy and the unwarranted alarms, which at the time of the embarkation of the army of the Potomac had conspired to exercise a fatal influence over Mr. Lincoln's mind, had since continued to embarrass McClellan. After having kept McDowell back for the defence of Washington, the President and his Secretary of War, who was as great a novice as himself in such matters, had undertaken to direct the campaign from the recesses of their cabinet. We know the result. The three small independent armies of McDowell, Banks and Fremont, formed at the expense of the reinforcements intended for the army of the Potomac, had been beaten in detail. While Jackson was stealing away to repair to Gaines' Mill, the Union generals were only occupied in the reorganization of their troops, exhausted by forced marches and useless countermarches. McDowell returned, but too late, to his positions at Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock; Banks concentrated his forces near Luray. Fremont remained in West Virginia, whither he had returned immediately after the unfortunate expedition of Cross Keys. Meanwhile, the President, a man of modesty and good sense, had very soon discovered the error he had committed in attempting to direct the complicated movements of several armies from Washington; but instead of securing unity of direction by restoring General McClellan to supreme authority over all the troops destined to operate against Richmond, he summoned General Pope from the West, and placed the corps of McDowell, Banks and Fremont under his command. The latter, refusing to serve under an officer who was his inferior in rank, transferred the command of his troops to Sigel. It was now the 26th of June, the day of the battle of Mechanicsville. Shortly after, Mr. Lincoln revived the rank of commander-in-chief of all the Federal armies, of which he had stripped McClellan just as he was taking the field; but not wishing to reinstate that general, he conferred the office upon Halleck. The brilliant successes of the armies of the West had won the admiration of all men; these successes were supposed to be due to the superiority of those armies over Eastern troops, and in taking their generals it was thought that they

would bring victory with them. But the President was extremely ill advised ; from those armies, which numbered among their generals a Grant, a Sherman, a MacPherson, a Sheridan, he selected Halleck and Pope for the supreme command.

General Pope inaugurated his assumption of the command by a general order, in which he expressed his personal views regarding strategy in language which was offensive not only to his predecessors, but to the soldiers whom he addressed. "I desire," he said, "that you will dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue among you. I constantly hear of strong positions to be captured and occupied, of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas." Pope himself proclaimed that it was no longer his task to cover Washington while the army of the Potomac was making an offensive campaign against Richmond. He would adopt the plan of campaign favored by Mr. Lincoln in opposition to that of landing on the peninsula of Virginia, and by following the land route he expected to enter Richmond before General McClellan, to show the latter how much he had been mistaken in advancing by way of Yorktown and Williamsburg. The Federal troops destined to operate against the Confederate capital were, therefore, divided into two armies, one numbering ninety, the other fifty thousand men, unable to form a junction, and separated from each other by all the enemy's forces. Such a dangerous situation could not be allowed to continue. Halleck was well convinced of this ; but instead of falling back upon McClellan's plan of assuming a strictly defensive attitude, and of bringing back the troops charged with the defence of Washington to the banks of the Potomac, in order to render the reinforced army of the Potomac perfectly free in its movements, he added his own persuasions to the representations of those who were already asking the President to sacrifice the conquered positions near Richmond to the plan of campaign which the new general contemplated carrying into effect. The committee appointed by Congress to report on the conduct of the war, not satisfied with exercising exclusive judgment over accomplished facts, was always interfering with the management of military affairs. Pope contrived to humor their prejudices by attacking McClellan, and to flatter their vanity by submitting for

their approval plans of campaign, which he took good care not to execute when the occasion presented itself.*

In this way he gained the support of the committee. Mr. Lincoln was beset by those who, in the name of public interest, were urging him to consolidate the two armies of Virginia and the Potomac by bringing the latter back to the line of the Rappahannock. The President resisted a long time. Indeed, on the occasion of his interview with McClellan at Harrison's Landing, the latter had so thoroughly demonstrated the importance of that position, that he went back fully determined to allow the chief of the army of the Potomac full freedom of action. But General Halleck had claimed for himself, as commander-in-chief, the exclusive direction of all the armies in the field, and Mr. Lincoln, conscious of his own incompetency, submitted to this new authority. All the measures taken for placing the army of the Potomac in a condition to resume the offensive were immediately altered. Burnside had brought seven thousand men to Fort Monroe from Newberne; four thousand more, taken away from Hunter, had joined him at Hampton Roads from Beaufort; this important reinforcement was temporarily detained, and landed on the sand-beach of Newport News; no assistance was even sent to the waters of the James to repair the ordinary losses which sickness entails upon all large armies; and McClellan, reduced to a subordinate command, remained as totally ignorant of the part

*This is the language he used (*Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War*, vol. i., p. 276 and following): "I propose to defend Washington, not by keeping on the defensive, nor by fortifying in front of the enemy, but by placing myself on his flanks, and attacking him day and night as soon as he has crossed the Rappahannock, until either his forces or mine are destroyed. With my troops thus disposed, although I have but forty-three thousand men, I should have no fear of seeing the enemy reach Washington, even though he had eighty thousand men. By placing myself upon the enemy's flanks, if he has only forty or fifty thousand men, I can beat him. If he has seventy or eighty thousand men, I shall attack his flanks and compel him to follow me into the mountains to get rid of me, which, I suppose, is precisely what you would like. . . . I doubt if the enemy can come even so far as Fredericksburg." *Question by Mr. Chandler*.—"If you had had the army which was here on the 1st of March, more than two hundred thousand strong, do you suppose that anything could have prevented you from marching from here to New Orleans?" *Answer*.—"I think not."

reserved for his troops as the humblest of his soldiers. It even appeared as if General Halleck had made it a duty to cause him to feel the inferiority of his new position, by addressing to him the most severe reproaches whenever the letter of his orders, frequently impossible to execute, was not carried out. An instance of this kind will show how far this hostile feeling was prejudicial to the welfare of the service. This occurred at the time when the army of the Potomac was about to begin its retreat. It was of the utmost importance that it should reach Aquia Creek in time to support Pope against Lee's demonstrations. Halleck was urging haste, but there was a want of ships for its transportation. The telegraph did not extend as far as Harrison's Landing, and the public service consequently suffered on account of this interruption. McClellan, wishing to regulate and expedite the embarkation of his troops, came down the river James one day, and went into the telegraph office at the extremity of the line for the purpose of putting himself in direct communication with Halleck. On receiving this summons, the latter merely stepped into the Washington office to write a despatch of four lines, and went out immediately, without waiting for an answer, leaving the clerk to communicate his abrupt departure to McClellan, who returned to his headquarters without having been able to procure the telegraphic audience to obtain which he had travelled one hundred and fifty miles.

The soldiers were beginning to feel even more impatient than their commander. The army of the Potomac, recovered from its fatigues, numbered about ninety thousand men in marching condition. Its presence alone on the borders of the James doomed Lee's troops to inactivity, for with such a neighbor the latter could not think of uncovering his capital to go and crush Pope on the Rapidan. This army, however, could not be allowed to remain any longer stationary on the unhealthy banks of the great Virginia river. It was indispensable either to withdraw it or to give it the means to move forward. On the 25th of July, Halleck went at last to discuss this question with McClellan. The latter, with a sagacity which was to receive a striking vindication at a later period, pointed out to Halleck on the map the position

of Petersburg,* and proposed to him to seize it by crossing over to the south bank of the James. Once master of this point, he could cut the communications of Richmond with the south, and secure the fall of the capital without having to attack it in front. He was thus foreshadowing the plan followed precisely by Grant in the last campaign of the war; and when Halleck, according to his own statement, rejected it as dangerous and impracticable, he little foresaw the events which, two years later, so completely belied his predictions. The commander-in-chief, however, informed McClellan that the President authorized him to make a direct attack upon Richmond if a reinforcement of twenty thousand men would suffice him for that operation; otherwise, the army was to leave the peninsula and join Pope. After some hesitation McClellan declared himself ready to undertake the attack on those conditions; and while Burnside was returning to his troops for the purpose of bringing them over to him, he made active preparations for resuming the offensive.† Nevertheless, while prosecuting this work, he could not help regretting the niggardly manner in which the forces placed at his disposal for this great enterprise had been measured, and he was too frank to conceal his regrets from his superiors. Writing to Halleck on the 26th to give him an account of the means of defence possessed by the enemy, he closed his communication in these terms: "Might not fifteen or twenty thousand men be withdrawn from the West to reinforce me temporarily? They should be returned on the day of the capture of Richmond. Please to take this suggestion into consideration; I am sure it is worthy of it." There is not a word in this despatch calculated to create the impression that McClellan had reconsidered his determination to attack Richmond with the only forces that had been promised him; but General Halleck made it a pretext to alter once more all the plans of campaign, and to obtain an order from the President that the army of the Potomac should be recalled to Aquia Creek. This decision was concealed from McClellan. On the 30th of July, he was ordered to

* *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War*, vol. i., *Halleck's Memorandum*, p. 454.

† *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War*, vol. i., *Halleck's Memorandum*, p. 455, and *Burnside's Deposition*, p. 638.

leave all his sick and wounded at Fortress Monroe in order that he might be more free in his movements; but at the same time these instructions seemed to imply that the plan of attack against Richmond was still approved, for he was ordered to push his reconnaissances in that direction, and to ascertain the strength of the enemy; the authorities at Washington even seemed to think that the latter had evacuated his capital. At the same time Burnside was notified not to stir from Hampton Roads, and a few days later he was ordered to Aquia Creek.

In order to conform himself to Halleck's instructions, McClellan, believing that he was on the threshold of a new campaign, directed Hooker to resume possession of Malvern Hill; some engineer troops were simultaneously to seize a promontory, called Coggin's Point, on the south side of the James, whence, the day before, D. H. Hill, with about forty pieces of cannon, had kept up a most vigorous although not very damaging fire upon the transports and even the camps of the Federals. Coggin's Point was occupied and strongly entrenched; a position was thus secured which freed the navigation of the James from all impediments, affording, moreover, an excellent *tête de pont* for any enterprises or diversions that might be attempted south of the river. Hooker, on his side, had set out with his division and Pleasanton's brigade of cavalry during the night of the 2d-3d of August; but having got lost in the woods, he was obliged to return to camp. The next day, the 4th, reinforced by Sedgwick's division, he again took up his line of march, and at daybreak drove a battery and two regiments of the enemy from Malvern Hill, making about one hundred prisoners. The Federal cavalry pushed on as far as White Oak Swamp Bridge, where some thirty Confederate mounted men were captured. But at the very time that McClellan was thus knocking at the gates of Richmond, where everything seemed to indicate a fortunate beginning to his new campaign, he received the fatal order which had been resolved upon several days before in cabinet council at Washington. He had at last compelled Halleck to tell him whether all the sick and convalescents were to be left behind, or whether the latter should remain at Harrison's to join their regiments from that place. Closely pressed by this question, the new commander-in-chief had spoken

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the decisive word, informing McClellan that his army must return to Aquia Creek. The latter protested in vain, in behalf of the national welfare, against such a disastrous measure; in vain did he represent that his army, strongly posted on a river, was only about fifteen miles from Richmond, and that the proposed movement would involve a march of seventy miles, followed by a difficult embarkation, then a water transit ending in a debarkation equally laborious, and that it would find itself at the last at a distance of seventy-five miles from the enemy's capital, in the midst of a region destitute of water communications. These wise counsels had no effect; Halleck insisted upon the prompt execution of his order, more injurious to the Federal cause, it may be said, than the greatest of the defeats we shall have to recount. From that moment McClellan thought of nothing but to organize the transportation of his immense *matériel* with the insufficient means at his disposal. Hooker was recalled from Malvern Hill as soon as he was convinced that the enemy could not harass his march. It was decided that the army should retire from Harrison's to Fort Monroe by land. A portion of the artillery and cavalry, which had been embarked in haste, was forwarded directly to Aquia Creek, where Burnside had preceded it. Such were the preparations which occupied the Federal troops up to the 8th of August. For the last four days McClellan had been at work in hastening their completion with as much zeal as if he had approved of the order he was obeying; but no human power could prevent delays in such a delicate operation, and it was calculated that it would require at least three weeks to enable the whole army of the Potomac to land and be again in condition to take the field.

While the destination of this army gave rise to so much anxiety, Pope was reorganizing and concentrating his own. He knew that Jackson, on leaving the valley of Virginia in the middle of June, had announced his intention of reappearing in those regions at the end of one month, and the inhabitants awaited his return with implicit confidence. Everything indicated that the Confederate general would not fail to be there at the time specified. Pope made his dispositions to close the entrance of the valley against him.

We have already had occasion to describe this portion of Virginia, as well as the country extending more to eastward, from the crests of the Blue Ridge to the Chesapeake. The principal water-course of the latter region is the Rappahannock, which flows at nearly an equal distance between Richmond and Washington, intersecting at right angles the road which connects these two cities. It is formed of two branches, both originating at the foot of the Blue Ridge, and called, that from the north the Rappahannock, that from the south the Rapidan, which form a junction at a distance of about ten miles above Fredericksburg, a point where the river becomes navigable. To the Confederates the gate of the valley was Charlottesville, as Front Royal was to the Federals. It was from this point that by following a line of railway, of which they were masters, they could strike the roads which descend parallel to the Shenandoah by way of Port Republic and Harrisonburg. The Richmond and Charlottesville Railway runs up northward as far as Gordonsville, where it joins that which comes directly from Alexandria and Manassas Junction; it successively crosses the two branches of the Rappahannock, and passes through the village of Culpepper Court-house between the two. If Charlottesville is the gate of the valley, Gordonsville is the key. It was this point that Pope resolved to menace in order to prevent Jackson from again following the course of the Shenandoah. He found the troops placed under his command singularly scattered by the unskilful manœuvres of the preceding campaign. Banks and Sigel were in the valley, the latter at Middletown, the former lower down. In the early part of July both were ordered to cross the Shenandoah at Front Royal, then the Blue Ridge at Luray Gap, and, while Sigel, remaining at Sperryville, should guard the pass of Thornton's Gap, Banks proceeded to take position about seven miles farther on the Culpepper Road. Ricketts left Manassas Junction to occupy the point where the Warrenton and Culpepper turnpike crosses the Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge.

Pope had about forty-five thousand effective men in the field under his command, distributed as follows: First corps: Sigel, eleven thousand five hundred; Second corps: Banks, eight thousand; Third corps: McDowell, eighteen thousand five hundred;

Sturgis' brigade, two thousand; cavalry, five thousand.* He had no enemy in front, and therefore desired to take advantage of this situation to gain ground, and endeavor to cut off the means of communication of the Confederates at Gordonsville. Banks carried Crawford's brigade to occupy the village of Culpepper, and his cavalry appeared along the banks of the Rapidan. On the 14th, Pope sent him instructions from Washington to make a demonstration as far as Gordonsville, and not to return until he had destroyed the railway track. But General Hatch, who was entrusted with this mission, encumbered his column of infantry with so heavy a train of artillery and wagons that his march was considerably delayed. When he reached Madison Court-house, on the 17th, he learned that Jackson had reached Gordonsville the day before, and he withdrew without accomplishing anything.

These preliminary operations had been directed by Pope from his office at Washington. On the 29th of July, he came at last to assume command of his army, after having availed himself of his sojourn in the Federal capital to induce the President to accept his plan of campaign. He was one of those who had most severely denounced McClellan's march toward the James after the battle of Gaines' Mill, and subsequently insisted with the greatest importunity upon the recall of the army of the Potomac to the banks of the Rappahannock. On leaving the city he was promised that this measure should be carried out, although, as we have already observed, the decision of the President was to be kept from General McClellan for several days, and he was to facilitate the embarkation of the Federal troops at Harrison's Landing by drawing the attention of the enemy to the borders of the Rapidan by vigorous demonstrations.

In the presence of an enemy like Jackson he might be sure of not having long to wait for the coveted opportunity to measure strength with his new adversaries.

Ricketts, who commanded a division of McDowell's corps, was at Culpepper, where Crawford's brigade of Banks' corps had already preceded him some time before. On the 7th of August, Banks, with the remainder of his forces, drew near to Culpepper,

* See Note C, Appendix to this volume.

and occupied the point where the road crosses Hazel River. All the forces at Pope's disposal—that is to say, about twenty-eight thousand men—were thus placed *en echelon* on the road from Culpepper to Sperryville on the morning of the 8th of August. It was rather a venturesome position for this small army; it was away from its dépôts, established at Manassas, and could only obtain the supplies it needed by the single track of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. This line, often destroyed and imperfectly repaired, was altogether insufficient, and General Pope had increased the difficulties in the way of forwarding provisions, by brutally discharging a special agent, Mr. H. Haupt, an upright and intelligent man, who was the first to introduce order and regularity into this service. Consequently, there frequently occurred embarrassments and *blocks*, to use the technical American term, which came near causing an actual famine in the camps.

The task of organizing railroad transportation, of which we shall speak in detail hereafter, had, in fact, become one of the most serious questions of the war, and one of the most important branches of the military administration. Consequently, at the end of eight or ten days, Pope was obliged to give back the direction to Mr. Haupt, who was the only man at the time capable of exercising it. But he persisted in his determination to free himself from the embarrassments to which the necessity of procuring his supplies from such a distance subjected him. He desired to subsist his soldiers, as much as possible, upon the country they occupied, forgetting that this system, universally practiced in our wars, could not be applied to large armies in a country so thinly peopled as Virginia, except by passing rapidly through without stopping. Moreover, the commissary department was not yet accustomed to procure and collect at a given point the few resources which even the poorest region possesses. The orders, therefore, issued to this effect were of little avail; they caused a great deal of trouble in the commissariat, and were made the occasion or pretext for much pillage and many disorders, which had the double effect of ruining the country through which the army was passing, and of striking a serious blow at discipline in its ranks. Having once adopted this course, Pope further aggravated the sufferings of the country he occupied by resorting to

new measures which were alike odious and fruitless. The railway, with which, in spite of everything, he could not dispense, was frequently obstructed by bands of partisans he had not been able to disperse. Exasperated by their audacity, he held all the families, residing within the circumference of five miles radius from the place where any excesses had been committed, personally responsible for their attacks. Finally, by a general order to which we shall again refer, and which mingled in a deplorable manner political questions with military matters, he required all the inhabitants of the country he occupied to take the oath of allegiance, threatening with expulsion such as refused to comply.

What should have been done in the first instance, his measures being utterly powerless in this respect, would have been to repair the disorder introduced into his several army corps, by the errors of which his predecessors had been guilty during the month of June. A large number of stragglers had ended by deserting into the interior. No distinction appears to have then been made between those present and the absentees in the reports; and Pope found out more than once, at the very moment he was placing his troops in line, that one-third of the men he had believed at his disposal were missing. In short, to tell the entire truth, he did not inspire his subordinates with entire confidence. In spite of his faults, Pope was a brave soldier, loyal, disinterested and indefatigable; but it was impossible for the old generals of the army of the Potomac, nearly all of whom had exercised independent commands, to feel well disposed toward this new chief, who had been brought over from the West without having performed any brilliant military exploits to justify the selection. Some of his general orders had contained instructions as to the manner of waging war which had wounded them, and his protracted stay in Washington, before he had shown himself to his army, had prevented him from counteracting these prejudices through his personal influence. He consequently found obedient subordinates, but disposed only to execute his orders literally until they should know him better; this was a great misfortune for the army he was about to command.

The month during which the Federal armies had remained inactive had not been wasted by Lee, who found himself placed

between Pope and McClellan. The former was at too great a distance for him to go in pursuit of him by uncovering Richmond; the latter, entrenched in his fortifications, could defy all attack. But while waiting for a favorable opportunity to resume the offensive, the Confederate general was occupied in filling up the attenuated *cadres* of his army; the convalescents, recruited from the trials of the campaign, were returning to the ranks; the arrival of numerous recruits and regiments, withdrawn from all the small garrisons of the coast and the interior, swelled his army to ninety or ninety-five thousand men. Emboldened by this increase of strength, he kept a strict watch over McClellan, the latter being the more formidable of his two adversaries. He placed Hill's corps on the right bank of the James, Longstreet's in New Kent county, himself remaining in the neighborhood of Richmond with the rest of his troops. Fearful, however, lest Pope might attempt to intercept, at Gordonsville, one of the principal arteries which connect Richmond with the rest of the Confederacy, he resolved on the 13th of July to send Jackson with his old division, under Winder, and that of Ewell, to protect this important junction. Jackson arrived at Gordonsville on the 19th, but did not feel strong enough to attack Pope, and asked for reinforcements. Meanwhile, he remained on the defensive. His cavalry, while scouting on the Culpepper road, met that of the Federals at Orange Court-house and attacked it; but after a vigorous engagement the former was repulsed, losing fifty-two prisoners. Lee did not dare to reinforce his lieutenant, as he still feared an attack from McClellan; and his paramount object was to compel the latter to evacuate Harrison's Landing, or, at least, to prevent his resuming the offensive on the James; he was not aware what a powerful and unlooked-for auxiliary his designs had found in General Halleck. Finally, toward the latter end of July, seeing that McClellan still continued stationary, and knowing that Burnside had not left Fortress Monroe, he began to think that the main effort of the Federals would be directed against Gordonsville. On the 27th of July, he despatched A. P. Hill's corps in that direction, which joined Jackson on the 2d of August. In order to conceal this weakening of his forces, he ordered D. H. Hill to make the artillery demonstration which,

as we have stated above, decided McClellan to occupy Coggin's Point.

So long, however, as Burnside and the fleet of transports, which lay in readiness to ship his troops, remained at the mouth of the James, whence they could proceed either to Harrison's Landing or to Aquia Creek, it was evident to Lee that the movement of the Federals had not yet been determined upon. Accordingly, he sought with particular care for every item of intelligence calculated to enlighten him as to the design of his adversaries. Finally, one evening, either on the 4th or 5th of August, a small steamer bearing a flag of truce was seen coming up the James, passing the Confederate outposts and approaching Aiken's Landing, a place designated for the exchange of prisoners. In the midst of the soldiers, whose gray coats were worn out by long confinement, the sick and wounded, to whom the thought of freedom restored both strength and health, an officer was making himself conspicuous by his extreme anxiety to land. His face was well known to every Virginian, and his name to all his companions in arms; it was the celebrated partisan Colonel John Mosby. His eagerness, which everybody attributed to his ardent temperament, was very natural, for he had news of the greatest importance to communicate to Lee. A few hours later he was at the headquarters of his chief, to whom he made known the fact that at the very moment he was leaving Hampton Roads, that same morning, the whole of Burnside's corps was being embarked, and that its destination, as he knew positively, was Aquia Creek.

Lee lost no time in availing himself of this information, which chance had so opportunely thrown into his hands. He had nothing more to fear on the side of the James, and he was extremely anxious to strike Pope before Burnside could join him. Jackson, having been promptly apprised of this fact, started on the 7th of August to attack Pope at Culpepper with his three divisions, Ewell first, followed by Winder and A. P. Hill, forming altogether an army from twenty-five to thirty thousand strong. On the morning of the 8th, his cavalry encountered the enemy on the borders of the Rapidan, and the same evening he crossed this river at Burnett's Ford, on the Orange and Culpepper road. General Bayard, who led the Federal cavalry with great ability,

succeeded, not in interrupting but in embarrassing his march so effectually that Lawton's brigade was obliged to clear the road to protect the baggage of the Confederates.

At the first news of the crossing of the Rapidan, Pope had put his troops in motion, so as to concentrate them in front of Culpepper. They occupied the line formed by the Culpepper and Sperryville road; Sigel on the right, posted on the latter village, Banks in the centre, at the Hazel River Bridge, and on the left, at Culpepper, Ricketts' division with Crawford's brigade of Banks' corps. On the evening of the 8th, this brigade, which had been sent to support Bayard's cavalry, joined the latter at Cedar Mountain, seven miles and a half from Culpepper, on the Burnett's Ford road; Banks had reached Culpepper; Sigel bivouacked at Hazel River Bridge.

On the morning of the 9th, the two armies advanced toward each other. Sigel, after having delayed his movement for several hours, posted himself at Culpepper, while Banks proceeded in the direction of Cedar Mountain, followed by Ricketts at a distance of three miles. Jackson, on his side, presented himself with his first division, Ewell's, before the heights upon which Banks' corps had just joined Crawford's brigade. This corps, although composed of two divisions, Williams' and Augur's, only numbered about seven thousand combatants, so greatly had it been reduced by marching and fighting. Such, however, was the confusion which prevailed in the administrative department, that Banks was under the impression that he had from twelve to thirteen thousand men under his command. The orders he had received from his chief were not explicit; he was to take a good position, so as to hold Jackson in check, and attack him if he found himself strong enough to do so. But the remarks he had heard made by officers of Pope's staff had stung the old commander of the Fifth corps of the army of the Potomac to the quick. As brave as he was imprudent, he was longing to show to the officers of the army of the West that his soldiers were not afraid to measure themselves with the victors of Cross Keys.

Cedar Mountain, also called Slaughter Mountain, is a hill of considerable height, dotted with woods, and, running north and south, it dominates the whole surrounding country between Cul-

pepper and the Rapidan. Before reaching the foot of this hill the road followed by Banks, along which he was to encounter Jackson, descends into the deep ravine of Cedar Creek; it then ascends a bare hillock stretching from south-east to north-west, and connecting again by a semicircular ridge of wooded hills with the spurs of Slaughter Mountain. The road forks on the hillock; to the right it passes among the wooded hills leading to Madison Court-house, beyond the Rapidan; the other branch, which leads to the railway bridge on this same river, descends into a second valley, of less depth than the first, then makes a *détour* to the left around the east side of the mountain. On the west slope there is a cross road, which diverges from the main route at a point where it inclines to the left. Three roads, therefore, coming from the south, through which the Confederate forces could pass, converge upon the hillock.

Crawford's Federal brigade had occupied the plateau situated at the north and in the rear of Cedar Creek since the day previous. But when Banks came to join him on the 9th, he learned that several of the enemy's batteries had appeared on Cedar Mountain, above the angle of the road. Anxious to engage the battle, he sent a few troops to support the skirmishers stationed on the hill, and followed soon after with the main body of his small army. He extended his line to the left as far as the second valley, resting it upon the woods which reach down from the mountain on that side. His centre, drawn up across the road, followed the rounded summit of the hill through fields of wheat and corn. The right occupied woods, beyond which extended a large clearing bounded by other woods. The heat was intense, the sun scorching, the dust suffocating, and water scarce all along the road. As soon as Banks and Jackson found themselves, however, in presence of each other, both made preparations for an attack, each believing that he had merely a vanguard to contend with. Banks placed Augur's division on the left, Green's brigade at the extremity of the line on Cedar Mountain, Prince across the road, with Geary on his right. Williams' division took position still farther to the right, Crawford's brigade near Geary, and Gordon's, with the cavalry, on the extreme right. It was half-past four o'clock when these dispositions were completed. Precisely at this moment

Jackson began the attack. Early's brigade was ordered to open the battle by following the Culpepper turnpike, while Ewell, with his two other brigades, Trimble's and Hay's, was to gain the summit of Cedar Mountain, by making a circuit to the right, and from this commanding position to attack Banks' left in rear.

Early, deployed to the right of the road, was advancing across the wheat-field, and driving the Federal cavalry before him; but just as he reached a hillock whence he could view the whole of the enemy's line, he was received by such a lively fire from the artillery of Prince and Geary, that he was obliged to fall back and seek shelter behind the ridge of the hill. His artillery, soon coming into line, replied to the Federal guns; and although the losses were considerable on both sides, Early did not dare to resume the offensive. Winder, with Jackson's second division, was following close upon the first. It arrived in time to deploy to the left of the Culpepper turnpike, and somewhat *en potence* on Early's line. Campbell's brigade was on the extreme left, in the woods opposite to that occupied by Crawford's Federal troops. Taliaferro's brigade, with three batteries on his right, was nearly parallel to the angle of the road, that of Ronald being held in reserve. Just as he was placing his guns in position, Winder was killed by the bursting of a shell. Ewell, on his side, having completed his movement, opened a brisk artillery fire upon Geary, but did not venture to advance. The excellent deportment of the Union troops, who scarcely numbered seven thousand combatants, against fourteen or sixteen thousand Confederates, deceived Jackson as to their real numbers, and he continued cannonading for two hours without being willing to risk an attack, while waiting for the arrival of Hill.

Encouraged by such hesitation, Banks resolved to assume the offensive, and to charge the batteries, that were beginning to inflict severe losses upon him. While Green, being without instructions, remained stationary in the woods on the extreme left, under a murderous fire of artillery, Prince and Geary fearlessly advanced across the stubble-fields which separated them from Early's batteries. They would probably have succeeded in capturing or dislodging them if the first brigade of Hill's corps, under Thomas, had not come up at this very instant to the relief of Early. This

timely reinforcement checked the rush of the Federals. Taken between the cross-fires of the Confederate infantry and artillery, they saw their two generals, who had encouraged them by their example, stricken down. Augur and Geary were severely wounded, the two brigades half destroyed, and their *débris* fell back upon the position they had so imprudently left. In this desperate struggle one of the Federal regiments, the Fifth Ohio, out of an effective force of two hundred and seventy-five men, lost no less than one hundred and fifteen in killed and wounded.

The battle, however, was not confined to these two brigades. At the moment they attacked Early, the right wing, under Williams, had made a similar movement against Winder's division, and in an instant the fire of musketry burst forth along the whole line. Williams at once launched Crawford's brigade across the clearing which separated it from the Confederate brigade of Taliaferro. It was half-past five o'clock. Crawford, charging the left of Taliaferro with great vigor, threw it into complete disorder. The centre of Winder's division was thus pierced, and Taliaferro's soldiers, flying along the Culpepper road, uncovered Early's flank in their turn. Confusion spread among a portion of this brigade, and its left, being attacked in the rear, fell back rapidly. Augur's brigade, which, despite its losses, had not abandoned the contest, was soon without an enemy in its front. But Jackson hastened to the rescue; and passing through fugitives who no longer listened to the voice of their officers, he led in person into the fire the Stonewall brigade, then commanded by General Ronald. Jackson was one of those strong-minded men who conceal a fiery soul under a passive exterior. Transformed by the danger which menaced his army, his eye flashed, his orders were issued in a voice which rose above the din of battle, his gestures inspired the most disheartened, and his enthusiasm was soon communicated to those around him. At the cry of "Stonewall Jackson!" his soldiers attacked Crawford, whose troops were exhausted by the very effort which had given them victory; receiving no assistance, and being at once attacked in front by Ronald, and in flank by Campbell, who had remained on their right, they succumbed to superior numbers, and were repulsed. Gordon arrived too late to be of any assistance. In fact, the whole of Hill's corps had

just appeared on the field of battle, and that general, after sending Thomas to Early's assistance, led the three brigades of Branch, Pender and Archer in person to the left to replace Winder's division in the line of battle. Jordan's three small regiments were broken and exhausted by fruitless efforts against these new adversaries. Banks, who had been constantly exposed during the battle, was obliged to take his line a little to the rear in order to concentrate his forces. Jackson then put the whole of his army in motion. On the right, Ewell, who had hitherto confined himself to a cannonade, participated in the movement. But once established on the ground which their opponents had just abandoned, the Confederates found the latter drawn up in excellent order along the edge of the wood. Jackson paused, and night coming on put an end to this sanguinary struggle. Pope had arrived in person at seven o'clock in the evening, toward the close of the battle; but Rickett's division, which followed him, did not reach the scene of action until several hours later. Banks having at first written to his chief that he did not expect to be attacked by the enemy, that division had been detained for a considerable time at Culpepper; its march was subsequently retarded by the narrowness of the road. It relieved the troops which had been engaged in the position they occupied, and prepared to repulse Jackson's attack on the morrow. But the latter had no idea of renewing the fight. The battle of Cedar Mountain had cost him too dear, and the check he had sustained was the more keenly felt, because he had engaged all his troops against an enemy far inferior in number. He, therefore, waited two days before sending an account of the battle to Richmond; and when he wrote at last to the Confederate authorities, stating that he had won the victory, he was on the south bank of the Rapidan, which he had recrossed with his whole army. His campaign was ended for the time; he found himself compelled to remain on the defensive until Lee should send him fresh reinforcements. The Federals, who had fought with great stubbornness, could therefore, notwithstanding the ground lost at the close of the day, consider the result of the battle of Cedar Mountain as an advantage on their side. Their losses amounted to fifteen or eighteen hundred men—that is to say, one-third of their entire force. Two of their generals

were wounded, and a third, Prince, had been taken prisoner. But these sacrifices had not been useless. Although their forces did not amount to more than half the number of their adversary's, they had held the latter in check, and compelled him to retire, leaving behind him two hundred and twenty-three killed, and bearing away one thousand and sixty wounded—a success which was the more creditable in view of the fact that this adversary was the redoubtable Jackson, whose troops had already passed through the ordeal of so many battles.

The vigorous demonstration which the latter had just made had nevertheless caused Halleck to feel seriously alarmed concerning the army of Virginia.

It was evident, in fact, that from the day when Lee should be unembarrassed by the vicinity of McClellan, he would be able to throw himself with all his forces upon Pope, who, in his advanced position on the Rapidan, ran the risk of being crushed before he could receive the slightest reinforcements. These considerations, which should have impressed him with a sense of the danger attending the evacuation of Harrison's Landing, determined him, on the contrary, to urge the speedy embarkation of the army of the Potomac. But as we have said, it took a long time to organize the means of transportation, and McClellan received a much larger number of despatches from Halleck urging his departure than of vessels to convey his *matériel*. Such an operation is at all times extremely complicated and subject to many delays; this had been experienced a few months before, when this same army was conveyed to Fortress Monroe by sea. At that period, however, McClellan possessed facilities which were wanting at Harrison's Landing. At the latter place the wharves were much smaller and less numerous than at Alexandria; the depth of water in the James did not allow vessels of large tonnage to come up so high; the general was no longer within reach of Washington, and had no telegraphic line to communicate with the capital; in short, instead of being able to superintend the transportation of his troops in person, he was at the mercy of two or three officers, who, having no concert of action, shifted the responsibility of their respective neglects upon each other, and of a general-in-chief who seemed too much

wrapped up in his strategic combinations to attend to these details, however important.

McClellan decided to send off by water all the *matériel* which his wagons could not carry, together with a portion of his artillery, his twelve thousand sick, and a reinforcement intended for Burnside, composed of a few batteries and some cavalry. To this he subsequently added Reynolds' division of Pennsylvanians. He purposed to cover the march of his convoy with the remainder of his army, and to fall back by land on Fortress Monroe, where he expected to find much greater facilities for embarkation. Despite his efforts and those of his intelligent quartermaster, Colonel Ingalls, it was not till the evening of the 16th that the last vessels received their cargoes on board, and left the wharves at Harrison's Landing. The movement of the army had commenced on the 14th. On the morning of the 15th, while Reynolds' division was descending the James to join Burnside at Aquia Creek, the large convoy was started in the wake of the corps of Heintzelman and Porter, which led the march. The road to be followed by the army lay parallel to the James, and connected near Williamsburg with that by which the Federals had advanced a few months before. The enemy was only able to send a few detachments of cavalry in pursuit of McClellan; very few troops, however, would have sufficed to embarrass him considerably in crossing the Chickahominy, which he was obliged to do at Barnett's Ferry, near its mouth. At this place the river is nearly seven hundred metres in width, but the very magnitude of this obstacle rendered it more easy to surmount it, as the depth of water enabled the Federal gun-boats to range themselves before the point designated for the passage, and to defend its approaches. They had already entered the Chickahominy when Porter reached Barnett's Ferry, and under their protection the engineers were able to throw a bridge over the immense sheet of water, which was to be crossed in a few hours. In the mean time, Heintzelman's corps, which occupied Jones' Bridge and the passes of the Chickahominy above the point of navigation, covered the left flank of the army on the march. On the evening of the 16th, McClellan was among the last to leave the abandoned encampments at Harrison's Landing, and turning his back on

Richmond, on the enemy's army and the battle-fields upon which he had so manfully struggled, was sadly retracing his steps over the road which was to lead him to Williamsburg, Yorktown, Newport News, the theatre of the first incidents of this campaign, which had begun under such favorable auspices, and all the fruits of which were lost through the fatal blindness of his superiors.

On the same day, August 16th, Porter reached Williamsburg, where he was to wait for the remainder of the army; but having been informed, through an intercepted letter, of Lee's movement against Pope, he immediately started again for Newport News in order to be able the more speedily to come to his assistance. We shall see how badly his zeal was rewarded. On the 18th, after a march of about one hundred kilometres, performed in three days and one night, he encamped on the beach of Hampton Roads. At the same moment the last Federal soldier was crossing the Chickahominy, and on the 20th the whole army, distributed between Yorktown, Fortress Monroe and Newport News, was ready to embark at these three points as rapidly as the limited number of transports placed at its disposal would permit. The cavalry of Averill and Pleasanton covered the rear. The campaign of the peninsula was ended. General McClellan requested Halleck to issue a special order thanking the army of the Potomac for its services during this campaign. The latter did not even reply to the despatch containing this request, and not a word came from Washington to encourage these soldiers, who were thus made to feel the malevolence entertained toward their chief. McClellan had been ordered to forward his troops as fast as they could embark, to Aquia Creek, where Burnside had landed on the 8th of August, and whence he had already despatched eight thousand men of his corps, forming Reno's and Stevens' divisions, to reinforce Pope's army. On arriving at Aquia Creek, the army of the Potomac was to enter into the system of combined armies of which Halleck intended to assume the command in person. But instead of simplifying the transmission of orders by bringing all his forces together, he only complicated the whole matter by the manner in which he regulated the functions of the different generals whom he undertook to control. In fact, he remained

himself in his office at Washington ; Burnside was made commander of Aquia Creek ; McClellan retained the direction of the army of the Potomac ; and Pope, as chief of the military department on the soil of which they were fighting, was to have temporary command of all the troops which these two generals were able to send him. Such an arrangement threw every branch of the service into confusion, made a division of responsibilities, and could not fail to result in disaster.

Reynolds, with three thousand men, arrived at Aquia Creek on the 21st, and immediately proceeded to join Pope. On the morning of the 22d, Porter's corps, which had been detained on the Chesapeake by stormy weather, disembarked at the same point, while that of Heintzelman was landed at Alexandria. On the 23d, Franklin embarked at Fortress Monroe, and according to instructions from Halleck also repaired to Alexandria. On the 24th, General McClellan reached Aquia Creek in person ; and on the same day, Sumner, who had been delayed until then for want of transports, commenced at last to ship his troops at Newport News, and landed them in the afternoon of the 26th at the wharf where those of Reynolds and Porter had already disembarked. Keyes' corps was left to guard the extremity of the peninsula, between Yorktown and Fortress Monroe. Such was the distribution of the corps composing the army of one hundred thousand men, which had left the encampments at Harrison's Landing on the 16th. In the course of ten days the whole of it had been transported to the several points of disembarkation which had been designated ; the dates we have given above show that, in spite of delays which could not have been prevented, this operation was performed with the greatest promptitude. Consequently, on the morning of the 24th, one-third of the infantry of the army were on the march to join their comrades of the army of Virginia, who were fighting on the Rappahannock. But it is the *matériel* and all the accessories of an army which require so much time for embarkation and debarkation. The infantry, which had taken up its line of march as soon as it landed, was deprived of this *matériel*, and of those indispensable accessories to all armies in the field ; it left behind it horses and cannon, the landing of which had not yet been completed. It had, therefore, but a small con-

tingent of artillery, no cavalry, and no wagons for the transportation of rations and ammunition. Porter's soldiers had with them but forty rounds of cartridges for each soldier, and Heintzelman's only four. The marches and sea-voyages had increased the sick-list, and it had been found necessary to leave detachments of troops to guard the dépôts at Aquia Creek, so that these five divisions, which on the 20th of July numbered thirty-seven thousand men, had not more than twenty or twenty-two thousand when they joined Pope.

Let us now return to this general, and to the theatre of war on the Rapidan. After the battle of Cedar Mountain, Jackson, on his return to Gordonsville, had asked his chief for new reinforcements. Lee was not yet willing to believe that the Federals had entirely abandoned the menacing position of Harrison's Landing; but knowing that Burnside was at Fredericksburg, and that numerous vessels were ploughing the James, he very soon understood that the enemy was about to transfer the theatre of active operations to the Rapidan, and determined to forestall him, so as to render it impossible for him to resume the offensive on the James. In fighting Pope with all his forces he was fully certain of drawing all the Federal troops also in that direction, and of thus freeing Richmond from the danger which had threatened that capital since the day when McClellan first made his appearance on the Chickahominy. Accordingly, on the 13th of August, he responded to Jackson's appeal by putting Longstreet in motion with his whole corps and Hood's division; Anderson's strong division was to follow immediately. Stuart was brought back to Gordonsville from the neighborhood of Fredericksburg, where he was watching the lower Rappahannock; D. H. Hill was left to guard Richmond with his corps, the recruits and dépôts. We have said that Lee's army was then from ninety to ninety-five thousand strong. Out of this number he took with him about seventy-five thousand; these forces were divided into two army corps. Jackson retained under his command the three divisions with which he had fought at Cedar Mountain, comprising fourteen brigades and fourteen batteries, from thirty to thirty-five thousand men in all. Longstreet's corps was formed of the four divisions under Hood, Anderson, Walker and McLaws, numbering

about thirty-five thousand men. Stuart's cavalry and the reserve artillery, with the various special corps, completed the figures we have just mentioned. On the 15th, even before the Federals had entirely evacuated Harrison's Landing, Longstreet's heads of column arrived at Gordonsville, and the day following, precisely at the same hour that McClellan was proceeding toward Williamsburg, Jackson was proceeding once more in the direction of Cedar Mountain. Before crossing the Rapidan he waited for the remainder of Lee's army to join him. Finally, on the 20th of August, he crossed the river at Somerville Ford, while Longstreet was performing the same operation lower down, at Raccoon Ford. They expected to surprise Pope in the positions which he had occupied since the battle of Cedar Mountain.

But the Federal general, most fortunately for him, had been informed by a letter of Lee, intercepted on the 16th, of the movements and strength of the Confederate army. Notwithstanding the arrival of Reno, who had joined him on the 14th with his two small divisions of four thousand men each, he found himself with only fifty thousand combatants under his command. Convinced of the numerical superiority of his opponents, Pope had retired from the borders of the Rapidan to those of the Rappahannock; he there opened the new campaign by a retreat, which, although a necessary manœuvre in his situation, nevertheless promptly belied the promises contained in his general orders. The movement of the Federals, commenced on the morning of the 18th, was completed on the evening of the 19th; on the left, Reno occupied Kelly's Ford; Banks, Rappahannock Station; McDowell, Rappahannock Ford; and Sigel formed the extreme right of the army, higher up the river. The cavalry was not to fall back until closely pressed by the enemy. It was before this line of the Rappahannock that Lee presented himself on the 21st with his whole army.

It is necessary for us to point out, in this place, the configuration of the ground upon which the two belligerents were about to contend. The chain of the Bull Run Mountains, the most eastern of the Alleghany ridges, bounded on the north-east near Leesburg by the Potomac, extends to the south-west in a straight line to the borders of the upper Rappahannock, where it termi-

nates in a succession of steep hills, thickly wooded, and without roads. The country comprised between the Potomac at the north-east, the Bull Run Mountains at the north-west, and the Rappahannock at the south, may be compared to a kind of triangle, the vertices of which are—one at Leesburg, at the junction of the mountains and the Potomac, another between Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg, at a point where the Potomac and the Rappahannock are only separated by a narrow peninsula, and the third at Waterloo Bridge, thrown over the Rappahannock, on the Warrenton and Luray road, near which the prolongation of the Bull Run Mountains reached down to the river. It was this triangle that Pope had to defend. Its interior topography is simple. Numerous small water-courses, all parallel, run south-westward of the Bull Run Mountains; but before discharging themselves into the Potomac, they nearly all unite to form the Occoquan. The most prominent of these water-courses, from south to north, are: Licking Run, Cedar Run, Broad Run and Bull Run. The chain of the Bull Run Mountains, around which winds the Warrenton and Luray road at Waterloo Bridge, is crossed by only three roads, one at Leesburg, another at Aldie, north-west of Fairfax Court-House, the third at Thoroughfare Gap, a long narrow breach between two rocky walls. Above Fredericksburg the Rappahannock, like all the torrents of this country, is nearly everywhere fordable during the dry season, but it only requires a rain-storm to render it impassable. The third side of the triangle was formed by the Potomac, and served as a base of operations to Pope's army. The estuary of this river, which is navigable between Alexandria and Aquia Creek, connected these two railroad termini, where the Federals had established important dépôts. The Aquia Creek line ran to Fredericksburg, whence it penetrated into the enemy's country. That of Alexandria supplied Pope's army with provisions. After passing all the runs enumerated above, it reached the Rappahannock station. The principal stations, enumerating from Alexandria, were,—Manassas Junction, whence an important branch, as we have already known, proceeded eastward, passing through Thoroughfare Gap, to reach Front Royal on the Shenandoah; Bristow, near Broad Run; Catlett's, near Cedar Run; Warrenton Junction, whence a small

branch ran to the village of Warrenton, at the foot of the mountains; then Bealeton, and finally Rappahannock station. Omitting the route leading from the chain bridge to Leesburg, which was parallel to the Potomac, and therefore useless, there is but one turnpike to be met in this country,—that which had already played so prominent a part in the battle of Bull Run in 1861, and which is known as the Warrenton turnpike; leaving Alexandria, it passes through Fairfax Court-house, whence a branch called the Little River Turnpike is detached from the main line to Aldie, reaches Centreville, runs down to the stone bridge, where it crosses Bull Run, passes through the battle-field of July 21st by ascending the little valley of Young's Branch, leaving the wooded undulations of Sudeley Spring to the right, and the open plateau of Manassas to the left, and, after passing the Groveton farm, reaches the hamlet of Gainesville, where it intersects the small railway leading to Manassas Gap.

Gainesville is an important junction, for it is there that a road branches off parallel to this railway, which leads through Thoroughfare Gap and the villages of White Plains and Salem to the west of the Bull Run Mountains, into the valley of Virginia. From Gainesville the principal road continues the direction from east to west, which it follows from Alexandria to New Baltimore, where it turns southward to run along the side of the mountains, crossing them at Warrenton, and thence reaches Waterloo Bridge to the west. This road on one side, and the Orange Railway as far as Rappahannock station on the other, were the lines through which Pope could receive supplies and reinforcements from Washington. It was essential, above everything, to cover them in order to protect the capital. But as the greater portion of the army of the Potomac was to land at Aquia Creek, Halleck had directed him to keep up his communications with this point at any cost, having selected it as being at that time nearest to the positions occupied by the army of Virginia. This army thus found itself placed at the intersection of two diverging lines, those of Alexandria and Aquia Creek, and obliged to defend both of them. We shall see the fatal consequences of this position. The first was to retain Pope on the upper Rappahannock, when his principal care should have been to effect a junction with

the army of the Potomac. He knew very well that Lee with his powerful army could turn either of his flanks by way of Waterloo Bridge or the lower Rappahannock, and thus cut him off either from Washington or Aquia Creek. But if he had fallen back upon either of these points, he would have uncovered the other; and Halleck, who from the recesses of his office did not weigh the practical difficulties of the movements he ordered, believing that a few hours would suffice to disembark the army of the Potomac, advised Pope not to leave the Rappahannock, promising him speedy and powerful reinforcements.*

On the 21st, the whole of Lee's army—Jackson on the left, Longstreet on the right—presented itself before the Rappahannock. A brisk cannonade was engaged on both sides of the river, which was continued the whole day, but the Federals were everywhere on their guard, and the Confederates did not try to force a passage at any point. Unable to surprise his adversary or to attack him in front, Lee resolved to strike his right flank by crossing the barrier which held him back as near its source as possible. On the morning of the 22d, while Longstreet was extending his lines to cover the positions occupied the day before by the whole army, Jackson marched rapidly up the right bank with his three divisions, preceded by Stuart's cavalry. On the other side of Hazel River, a large stream which lay on his route, he was perceived by the Federals; the brigades of Bohlen and Milroy crossed the river in succession and attacked his rear, not in the hope of arresting him, but of delaying his march. They were easily repulsed, and Jackson reached Freeman's Ford before night. Finding this pass strongly guarded by Siegel, he proceeded higher up, and took possession of Sulphur Bridge or Warrenton Springs, which was only guarded by a small outpost. On the same evening, Early occupied the left bank of the Rappahannock at this point. This movement had not taken Pope unawares. On the 20th he had indicated it to Halleck as very probable, and had explained to his chief how he proposed to parry it. On the morn-

* "Do your best to keep possession of the Rappahannock," he wrote him on the 21st. "To-morrow large reinforcements. . . . Defend every inch of ground, *fight like the devil*, until we can reinforce you. In forty-eight hours you shall have all the troops you want."

ing of the 22d, all doubts on the subject disappeared, and he made all his arrangements accordingly. He determined not to defend the crossing of the Rappahannock; but carrying out the tactical principles he had developed before the committee of Congress, he was willing to allow the enemy to proceed as far as Warrenton, in order to fall upon his flank before his whole army could cross the river. During the day he brought back the greatest portion of his troops to the rear of his right wing on the side of Fayetteville, abandoning Kelly's Ford and leaving only a few troops to guard the other crossings. At the same time he designated Fayetteville as the rallying-point for all the reinforcements he expected from Aquia Creek; for he was ignorant that these reinforcements, long since promised, had not yet landed; General Halleck was as careful to conceal from him the movements of the army of the Potomac as he was to prevent McClellan from knowing those of the army of Virginia. Meanwhile, on the evening of the 22d, Pope changed his mind, and adopted a new plan entirely different from that which was in process of execution. Bringing back all his forces to the left on the lower Rappahannock, he determined to cross this river above and below Kelly's Ford, in hope of being able to take advantage of the isolated position of Longstreet to attack him, while Jackson was still occupied in crossing the upper Rappahannock. New orders were issued to all the corps commanders, and the expected reinforcements were directed to meet at Stevensburg, a point situated between the Rapidan and Rappahannock, in the very midst of the Confederate armies.

But during the night of the 22d a terrible storm burst forth; the rain fell in torrents, and from daybreak the waters of the Rappahannock began to swell. They first struck Waterloo Bridge, and carried it away. Early, who had crossed it the day before, found himself alone on the enemy's bank in a dangerous position. The flood, which increased in its descent, soon reached the lower fords, in the vicinity of which the Federal troops were beginning to arrive, and which a few detachments had already crossed. Pope recalled them in hot haste to the left bank. It was high time, for at seven o'clock in the morning the river had risen two metres, and presented a formidable obstacle. It was necessary to give new counter-orders, and the already exhausted soldiers were

obliged to retrace their steps across roads entirely broken up. This accident, however, was not without some compensation; by separating Early from the rest of the Confederate army, the freshet exposed him to the Federal attacks. Pope saw this, and tried to avail himself of the opportunity thus offered him. But he committed the error, common among the Federals, of attributing a larger numerical strength to the enemy he designed to attack than the latter really possessed. In order to hem in and crush him irretrievably, he concentrated nearly the whole of his army, which the flood had relieved from the care of defending the fords along the river. This combination necessitated another very fatiguing march for his men. Siegel was directed upon Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge; Banks and Reno, who were lower down, were to follow him; McDowell, with his corps reinforced by Reynolds' division, was brought back to the rear and right as far as Warrenton.

During these contrary movements, which were beginning to infuse doubt and uneasiness into the minds of chiefs and soldiers, he learned that the enemy's cavalry had appeared in the rear of the army, cut the railway and plundered the baggage of most of the general officers. In fact, Stuart, faithful to his traditions, had crossed Waterloo Bridge with three hundred horse on the 22d, and by a rapid march had reached Catlett's station that same evening, where he fired into a passing train of cars; then he captured a park of wagons containing all the staff papers of General Pope, a valuable prize for Lee, which was perhaps of great assistance to him in the movements he was about to undertake. He then quickly resumed his retreat, eluding the twelve or fifteen hundred men encamped in the vicinity, whom his daring exploits threw into the utmost confusion. But the darkness which had protected him also made him miss a rich prey; for he passed without perceiving an immense convoy parked in the neighborhood of the station, which was then almost entirely without defenders. Although he had not had time to do much damage, he succeeded in disorganizing the wagon and railway service through which his opponent obtained his supplies.

During the whole of the 23d, Pope's soldiers were painfully marching toward the positions which had been assigned to them.

McDowell arrived at Warrenton in the evening ; but Siegel, following a direction parallel to the Rappahannock, was greatly impeded in his progress by the swollen streams he encountered at every step. He was therefore obliged to stop in the evening on the borders of Great Run, a tributary of the Rappahannock, all the bridges over which had been destroyed by Early, who now occupied its right bank. The Confederate general had passed the whole day in the precarious position in which he had been placed by the sudden rise of the waters. But Jackson had been so actively at work in the construction of a rude trestle-bridge that communications between the two banks had been re-established during the night. At daybreak, Early had again joined his chief ; and when Buford's cavalry reached Waterloo Bridge a few hours later, the prey they expected to seize had escaped. The only result of all these manœuvres, therefore, was the having caused the Federal soldiers to march for three days without intermission, sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another, leaving behind them their provisions and baggage and used-up men, and strewing the road with a long line of stragglers. Lee's soldiers, on the contrary, had all been able to rest for at least thirty-six hours ; consequently, they were soon able to make good use of the strength which their leaders had so well managed to spare.

During the 24th there was the same difference in the position of the two armies, the artillery of which kept up a useless cannonade across the flooded river. The Federal troops were still continuing their forced marches ; Siegel was massed at Waterloo Bridge ; Reno and Banks, who followed him with difficulty, were, the former at Sulphur Springs, the latter between this and the preceding point. The two divisions constituting McDowell's corps came by a forward movement to place themselves in second line, that of Ricketts halting seven kilometres east of Waterloo Bridge, and that of King between Sulphur Springs and Warrenton. Farther back in the rear was Porter's corps, which had just landed at Aquia Creek, and having received no counter-order was marching up the Rappahannock to join Pope, whom he believed to be at Kelly's Ford. In an opposite direction, Heintzelman's corps, which had landed at Alexandria on the 22d, was also

on the march to overtake the army of Virginia. On the very day he landed, Heintzelman sent a portion of Kearny's division by rail to the neighborhood of Manassas. The next day the remainder of his corps, with a division recently formed at Washington, under General Sturgis, took the cars to follow Kearny. But Stuart's raid of the night previous had thrown confusion and alarm into the whole line. The trains dared no longer make their trips without an escort, and did not run beyond Catlett's station, the enemy's cavalry being looked for in every direction. To increase the disorder, one of the generals picked a quarrel with Colonel Haupt, the able superintendent of railroads, put him under arrest, and took upon himself the whole management of the service. Unutterable confusion was the result, and it was soon followed by an entire stoppage of the trains. It was only on the 24th that Haupt, who had been relieved from arrest by express orders from Halleck, succeeded at last in restoring order; but the necessity of forwarding supplies to the army, and the want of cars, which Pope had detained for the removal of his *matériel*, rendered it impossible to transport more than twelve thousand men a day by this line, and the night of the 24th-25th was far advanced before Heintzelman's corps and Sturgis' first brigade were able to reach Warrenton Junction. While Pope, providentially protected by the rise of the Rappahannock against the attacks of his foe and his own imprudence, remained at a distance of eighty kilometres from Alexandria and fifty from Aquia Creek, which the detachments of the army of the Potomac, scattered between these two points, and marching at random, had not yet been able to reach, so as to join their new chief,—the supreme direction which was to make these various movements tend toward the accomplishment of a single object was completely at fault. Adhering to his purpose of ordering all the movements of his troops by telegraph, Halleck himself had finally lost sight of the positions they occupied. To McClellan, who asked in vain for positive instructions, he replied: "You ask me for information which I cannot give. I do not know either where General Pope is, nor where the enemy is in force. These are matters which I have all day been most anxious to ascertain."

Meanwhile, the Confederate army, massed on the right bank of

the Rappahannock, under the hand of its chief, and well rested, was preparing to resume the offensive by a bold march.

Jackson had, in fact, put his three divisions in motion at day-break on the 25th. Abandoning the positions he had occupied since the 22d in front of Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge, he proceeded up the principal branch of the Rappahannock, which, under the name of Hedgeman's River, flows from east to west before reaching the extremity of the Bull Run Mountains. The Federals had not been able to extend their lines sufficiently to observe the upper part of its course. Leaving the village of Amissville behind him, Jackson crossed the river at Hinson's Ford without molestation, and reached the hamlet of Orleans. He was now separated from the Federal army by the Bull Run Mountains. The first opening he found was Thoroughfare Gap, thirty-two kilometres from Orleans. It was upon this point that he directed his course. Speed was an essential condition of success for his daring enterprise; it would have been sufficient for a division detached from Pope's army, or for some of McClellan's troops, who were then being transported by rail, to reach this place in advance of him to bar the passage of this defile. Accordingly, Jackson, protected by the mountain barrier, was hastening his march as much as possible. Leading his soldiers through paths scarcely visible, cutting across fields unmindful of obstacles, forcing his way through woods, barriers and streams, he constantly pushed them forward, encouraging them by his presence and his words. The artillery followed as best it could; the wagons struggled in vain to keep up with the column; no halt was allowed for meals; the soldiers ate, while they marched, a piece of biscuit or a few ears of corn gathered in the fields. The population, astonished at this apparition, followed with wondering eyes, and demonstrations of sympathy, the Confederate soldiers, and especially the illustrious and popular chief, who they felt confident was about to secure a new triumph for their cause. At last Jackson reached Salem about midnight, a village situated at the intersection of the Manassas Railway and the Gainesville and Front Royal road. He found himself at the foot and only within a few kilometres of Thoroughfare Gap. His three divisions were full, having left but a few stragglers behind, notwith-

standing the forty-five kilometres they had marched in a single day. He only gave them a few hours' rest, started again at sunrise, and finding Thoroughfare Gap unoccupied took possession of it early in the morning. During this time, Stuart and his cavalry, who had all along covered his right flank, crossed the mountains south of the defile through paths which any one else would have deemed impassable, and continued thus to mask his movements.

Longstreet, who was charged to detain Pope on the Rappahannock, had employed the day in making demonstrations along that part of the river where, the day before, he had relieved Jackson's divisions. Pope, seeing the waters falling, imagined that Lee was preparing to take advantage of the fact to attack him in front, and on the evening of the 24th he ordered his army to make a new movement. His intention this time was to range his forces along the railway line from the Rappahannock to Warrenton Junction, so as to face the north-west, believing that by this movement he would be able to menace Lee's flank and cover his own communications with Aquia Creek. But orders too frequently modified are almost invariably transmitted wrong and badly executed. The movement of the army on the 25th was made without concert; and Sigel, without suspecting the truth, remained alone at Waterloo Bridge during the whole day. He only retired in the evening because he discovered his isolated position just in time, and joined McDowell at Warrenton by a night march. Reno had encamped five kilometres east of this village, and Banks had retired to Fayetteville. In short, while the remainder of Heintzelman's corps was reaching Warrenton Junction by rail, that of Porter, coming from Aquia Creek, struck this line at Bealeton station, farther south.

Nevertheless, in spite of the precautions taken by Jackson, he was unable to escape the vigilant eye of the signal corps of the Federal army. One of the officers of this corps, which rendered such essential service during the war, Colonel Clark, had passed the whole morning of the 25th hidden in the woods, where, at the peril of his life, he had watched the march of Jackson's principal column, and counted thirty-six regiments of infantry, with cavalry and artillery, ascending the right bank of Hedgeman's River. Pope had been informed of this movement about noon; but think-

ing that the enemy's entire army was thus stealing away from him for the purpose of going to operate in the Shenandoah Valley, he does not seem to have thought of Thoroughfare Gap, which lay open on his flank so close to Manassas Junction and his principal dépôts. Deceived by the very tidings which should have put him on his guard, he thought of nothing else at this critical moment but to cross the Rappahannock to separate Longstreet from Jackson. But when the orders issued in view of this new manœuvre reached his troops, they, as we have seen, had just accomplished a long march to the rear, and were singularly scattered. It was at Warrenton that Sigel received the order to force the passage of Waterloo Bridge at all hazards, and this fortunate circumstance alone prevented him from taking part in an affair which would have cost him very dear. Pope, however, thanks to the arrival of Porter and Heintzelman, had from fifty-five to sixty thousand men under his command on the morning of the 26th, and Halleck had promised him twenty thousand more. But instead of drawing near to these reinforcements, and concentrating his entire army upon a point whence he would have been able to cover Thoroughfare Gap, he relied for this important service upon the reinforcements promised him, which, in fact, had not yet even landed at Alexandria; and during the whole of the 26th he persisted in the project he had formed of pursuing the enemy upon the right bank of the Rappahannock. To this effect he had despatched Porter toward Warrenton with orders to leave that town on the morning of the 27th, and to proceed south in the direction of Sulphur Springs.

In the mean time, while the Federals were thus wasting precious time in useless counter-marches, Jackson was still advancing directly toward his object. Preceded by Stuart's cavalry, his three divisions came down from the Bull Run Mountains upon the great railway artery through which Pope's army was receiving all its supplies. Only a few of the enemy's cavalry had noticed their presence; evidently no one expected them from that quarter, everything indicated that the Federals were resting in a fatal security. Heintzelman had already crossed, Franklin had not yet arrived. Immense stores of provisions had been collected at Manassas, the only important station between Washington and

the Rappahannock, the vast fortifications of which, erected by the Confederates during the preceding winter, and completed since by order of McClellan, seemed to offer a perfectly safe shelter. It was, therefore, upon this dépôt that Pope relied to subsist his army. But he was under the impression that Halleck would provide for its defence, and yet, on the 26th, there was only an insignificant detachment there. Jackson, in haste above all to destroy the Orange Railroad, had marched directly upon that point of the line nearest to Gainesville. At eight o'clock in the evening the telegraph connecting Washington with General Pope's headquarters became suddenly silent; it was thus that he learned the presence of the enemy in his rear. Stuart had just reached Bristow station, where he cut the wires and seized two empty trains, which he threw off the track. In the course of the evening, Jackson arrived with his infantry, and established himself in force along the line of the railroad. He had fulfilled in the most brilliant manner the instructions of his chief, thanks to his daring and the tireless legs of his soldiers, who had marched a distance of eighty kilometres in thirty-six hours. Penetrated, however, with the importance of the Manassas dépôts, he resolved to take advantage of the surprise he had created, to destroy them before the Federals could occupy in force that position, so easy to defend. Despite their fatigue, two regiments, the Twenty-first North Carolina and the Twenty-first Georgia, five hundred men in all, resumed their march with Stuart's cavalry, and before the morning of the 27th, they had captured Manassas with its small garrison. A few hours later Jackson joined them, leaving only Ewell's division at Bristow to cover his rear. At Manassas he found an immense booty. Besides three hundred white prisoners and two hundred negroes, whom the Confederate writers classify among the *matériel*, and a few hundred horses, Jackson had in his possession forty-eight guns, ten locomotives with two trains, and, above all, fifty thousand pounds of bacon, a thousand barrels of salt beef, several thousand barrels of flour, a vast quantity of forage, together with the assorted stores of all the sutlers of the army. The Confederate soldiers, who for some time past had been living entirely upon fruit, biscuit and grain, seized upon these luxuries, so opportunely thrown in their way, to compensate

for their privations. It was a perfect feast for all; each man filled his haversack with whatever suited him, and they then proceeded to destroy all that was left. Jackson's wagons had not been able to follow; and knowing that he should not long remain in quiet possession of his conquest, he arranged to leave nothing for the Federals but smoking ashes.

While the Confederate soldier was lighting this immense bonfire in the rear of his foe, the greatest confusion prevailed in Washington. Like Pope, the Federal authorities had only been apprised of this raid by the interruption of the telegraph and railway. There were no tidings of the army of Virginia. Stuart's cavalry screened all Jackson's movements as with an impenetrable veil, and had even appeared in the neighborhood of Fairfax Court-house. Had the railway track been destroyed by a mere detachment of this cavalry, or was the whole of Lee's army between Pope and the Federal capital? This state of uncertainty paralyzed everything. It was no longer safe to send provisions and ammunition by rail. The authorities were at a loss whether to send a regiment to the front, or an entire army. The garrison of Washington consisted only of recruits and a very small number of trained troops, for the forty thousand men refused to McClellan had been given to Pope. Fortunately, Franklin's corps had landed on the afternoon of the 26th. It was positively destitute of everything that an army needs for its march, having neither horses, wagons, cannon, rations nor ammunition. Nevertheless, on the morning of the 27th, one of his brigades, composed of New Jersey troops under General Taylor, proceeded by rail as far as Bull Run Bridge, got off the cars, crossed the stream, and boldly advanced to see what they could discover in the direction of Manassas. The Confederates, seeing this handful of men—for they only numbered one thousand or twelve hundred—concealed themselves in the woods and the works; and when the Federals were within a very short distance, they opened a terrific fire upon them, which laid one-third of the party low; the remainder hastily fled to the other side of Bull Run and to Centreville, carrying with them their wounded general. At Centreville a few troops rallied around the *débris* of this unfortunate brigade.

CHAPTER II.

MANASSAS.

POPE'S position, as we have seen, had become extremely critical; he divined at last the danger that threatened him, and set to work to make up for lost time. When, on the evening of the 26th, he massed his army between Warrenton, Fayetteville and Warrenton Junction, he believed that he had nothing to fear on the side of Thoroughfare Gap and Manassas, relying upon Halleck to protect his right and rear; he thought of nothing then but to maintain himself in the positions he occupied along the line of railway, to preserve his communications with Aquia, and at the same time strike a blow at the enemy on the other side of the Rappahannock, if the opportunity should offer. But during the night he received information of the capture of Bristow station by the enemy's cavalry, and of Jackson's presence at Salem the evening before. Such a coincidence could leave him no longer in doubt. Jackson had penetrated between him and Washington with a considerable force, and he knew that the remainder of the enemy's army was still on the Rappahannock in front of Sulphur Springs on that very night. It was evident that the reinforcements so oftened promised had not even reached Manassas. The question with him, therefore, was no longer to defend this or that line, but to save his army, thus taken between two fires. He could retire to Aquia Creek, but this would uncover Washington. He justly preferred to regain his communications with the capital by a rapid movement which offered him a chance of meeting, with all his forces, the isolated corps of Jackson, and of making him pay dearly for his audacity. On the 27th of August, at day-break, he put his whole army in march in that direction just as Jackson was completing his work of destruction at Manassas. Longstreet, on his side, seeing the line of the Rappahannock

abandoned by his opponent, concluded that Jackson had struck home, and he set out in great haste by way of Orleans and Salem, to join him, if possible, between Thoroughfare Gap and Manassas. It was between these two points that Pope intended to post himself to prevent this junction, which could be easily done, as the space which separated him from it was not half the distance that Longstreet had to march. Gainesville, where the turnpike and the railroad passing through Thoroughfare Gap intersect the main road from Alexandria to Warrenton, was the strategic point, the possession of which would secure this important result to the Federals. Pope entrusted McDowell with the task of occupying this position with his own corps and that of Siegel, and Reynolds' division, in all about twenty-five thousand men. Kearny and Reno were directed to follow him as far as Greenwich, a village situated south of Gainesville, while he in person, following the railway track with Hooker's division, proceeded toward Manassas. Finally, Porter, who had been on his way to Warrenton Junction since the day previous, was to concentrate his two divisions at that point, and then to resume his march along the Greenwich and Gainesville route as soon as Banks should join him. The latter was to cover the retreat of the army by following, like Hooker, the railroad line as far as Cedar Run.

That evening this movement was successfully accomplished; the rear-guard, however, had not yet come up. Morrell had only joined Porter during the day, and the latter had remained at Warrenton Junction, waiting for Banks, who was to relieve him there; the railway track had been destroyed by Stuart, and it required a whole day's work to render it practicable for the trains which followed the army. But Hooker had obtained a great advantage over Ewell's division, which had been left near Catlett by Jackson. He had met this division seven kilometres above Bristow station, and driven it before him beyond the point last mentioned on the borders of a difficult stream, called Broad Run. Ewell, finding himself too far from Jackson, was not willing to resist to the last extremity; but Hooker's vigorous attack had compelled him to abandon his wounded on the field of battle. There were about three hundred men disabled on each side. At last, quite late at night, McDowell, Siegel and Reynolds had

reached Gainesville, while Kearny and Reno were at Greenwich within supporting distance. The greatest portion of the Federal army was thus posted on the only road through which the two sections of Lee's forces could effect a junction, and it seems clear that Pope's troops had only to remain there to compel them to fight separately. In fact, during the very day that Ewell was struggling at Bristow, Jackson was allowing to his two other divisions the repose they so much needed around Manassas, and Longstreet's corps, directed by Lee in person, had made their bivouacs at a considerable distance from Salem. This corps, charged with escorting the baggage of the army and picking up all the stragglers, had not been able to march as fast as that of Jackson two days before.

The situation of the latter was, therefore, perilous. But Pope lost all the fruits of his movements the day before, by being in too great a hurry to gather them. The combat at Bristow on the evening of the 27th had made him aware of Jackson's presence at Manassas with a considerable force. It was evident that the latter would seek to maintain his communications with Lee through Thoroughfare Gap if possible; if not, more to the north, through Aldie. It was therefore the left wing of the Federal army which should have been brought forward, so as to dispute with him at least the first of these two lines, and separate him from his chief. Pope, on the contrary, thought that Jackson would throw himself upon his right, at the risk of being driven into the deep waters of the Potomac; he made all his dispositions to receive his attack on that side, and, even in his report, he blames the victorious Jackson for not having executed so strange a manœuvre. This blunder made him abandon the important positions of which he had a chance to possess himself without a fight. In fact, not satisfied with recalling Porter, whom he ordered to proceed from Warrenton Junction to Bristow by a night-march, he brought back his entire left wing to the right. McDowell, with the three corps which had reached the intersection at Gainesville the evening before, was directed to start at daybreak for Manassas, availing himself of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Kearny was to join Hooker and Porter at Bristow for the purpose of proceeding toward the same point with them by another railway line.

Reno also received instructions to leave Greenwich and follow McDowell's movement upon Manassas. The whole Federal army, therefore, was converging upon this point, uncovering Thoroughfare Gap and abandoning the main road, the possession of which was only of importance to the Confederates. But even if this movement had been well timed, its execution was attended by great inconvenience. After a long march, McDowell, Sigel and Reno only reached their encampments in the middle of the night; they were ordered to start at early dawn, although their soldiers were exhausted. Porter was to undertake a night-march through a wooded country and over a road encumbered by the wagons of the whole army. In short, the generals, finding their troops much more reduced in number by such useless fatigues than they would have been by a pitched battle, were no longer in haste to execute orders which they expected every moment to have countermanded. Porter alleged the difficulties of the road as a reason for waiting until daylight, and only reached Bristow at ten o'clock in the morning; it was half-past seven when Sigel left Gainesville. McDowell on his part, with better judgment than his chief, had detached, on the 27th, one of his divisions, under Ricketts, toward Thoroughfare Gap, to bar its passage. When the order to march in an entirely opposite direction reached him, this division had to be left behind, and to its own resources.

Whilst Pope, to quote his own words, thought that he was going "to bag the whole crowd" of his enemies, Jackson, far from falling into the trap, was only endeavoring to join the rest of Lee's army with all speed. At nightfall on the 27th, at the very time when the Federals were preparing to attack him at Manassas, he was evacuating that position. His work of destruction was finished, the railway track cut and the supplies burned. Jackson was well aware that the Federal army, thus deprived of resources, would be obliged at the end of two or three days to draw near Washington to avoid dying of hunger. Consequently, while retiring, he was desirous of leaving to his chief the means of profiting by the disorder he had just thrown into the Federal army, to give them battle before they could receive any reinforcement from Washington. Longstreet would probably pass through Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 28th, and the Confed-

erate forces, at last united, could then strike a decisive blow. It was necessary to keep within reach of the Federal army and hold it in check, without, however, bringing on a general battle. Jackson therefore decided not to fall back on the Aldie passes, as he was authorized to do; for it would have been to relinquish the hope of joining Longstreet on the eastern slope of the mountains. He determined to take position near the old battle-field of Bull Run, on the ground where McDowell had made his flank movement in 1861. He rested his left upon Bull Run near Sudeley Springs, as if he intended to menace Centreville, and extended his right to Groveton in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap; he was thus facing the junction where he had left nothing but charred *débris*, and could command the Warrenton turnpike, which lay perpendicular to his line of battle; still presenting his front to Pope, he retained him at Manassas, and in case of necessity he could fall back upon the mountains. He had also found, as a cover to his line, an old railroad embankment, unfinished and abandoned, which formed a sort of breastwork, behind which his men could make a protracted resistance against a superior force. In order, however, to deceive his foe, he caused a portion of his troops to make a *détour*. While Ewell and Taliaferro's division went directly to place themselves in these positions, Hill, with a view of drawing the Federals in pursuit, marched northward, crossed Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford and arrived at Centreville. But once there, he brought his heads of column back to the left, almost retracing his steps, took Warrenton turnpike, and, crossing Bull Run at the stone bridge, came, on the afternoon of the 28th, to take position to the left of the rest of Jackson's corps. This stratagem was completely successful.

The several Federal corps were all on the march on the morning of the 28th; but being worn out and debilitated, their movements were somewhat haphazard. Pope, still thinking that his last order had been executed as promptly as he had conceived it, was looking for his troops where they had not yet arrived, and sending them orders which they could not receive in time to be of use. Kearny and Reno had joined Hooker at Bristow toward eight o'clock in the morning of the 28th. Taking these troops along with him, Pope had proceeded in the direction of Manassas,

on the track of Ewell, who had retired toward this point during the night. He arrived there at noon. The position was abandoned; nothing was left of the dépôts upon which he had relied to feed his army. Jackson's rear was at this moment crossing Blackburn's Ford, and Hill's column was seen in the distance proceeding toward Centreville. The Union general, believing that the Confederates were falling back to the northward upon Aldie, resolved at once to pursue them in that direction, and ordered a new movement accordingly. McDowell, who had left Gainesville and the main road to march upon Manassas, was obliged to change this direction for that of Centreville. Messengers were sent to call back Ricketts, who, as we have said, had been detached to Thoroughfare Gap by McDowell. Porter was ordered to Manassas. Finally, Pope, fearing lest Jackson should escape him, continued his march upon Centreville with Heintzelman's and Reno's corps, and suffered himself to be led more and more astray by Hill's manœuvre.

While these movements were in process of accomplishment, Jackson took the position we have indicated, from Sudeley Springs to Groveton, while Lee, with the rest of his army, proceeded by forced marches upon Thoroughfare Gap. Toward evening, after a long, sultry day, the battle opened at several points at the same time. On the extreme right of the Federals, Kearny had reached Centreville, and attacked Hill's rear, which had just abandoned that position to join the remainder of Jackson's corps. Skirmishing was kept up in the woods until dark. On the extreme left, Ricketts' division still occupied Thoroughfare Gap all alone, when Longstreets' heads of column reached the entrance of the defile. The Federal batteries commanded all the passes, and for a time arrested the progress of the Confederates. The latter, promptly taking advantage of their numbers, sent a portion of their infantry round through a path which crosses the mountain north of the road through Hopewell Gap; they thus attacked the positions of the Federals in the rear, and compelled them to retire. Ricketts, called back by Pope at the same time, marched the whole night to join McDowell between Manassas and Centreville. The other division of this corps, King's, was engaged at the same hour in a fierce contest with the largest portion of Jackson's army.

We have seen that at noon, when Pope found Manassas evacuated, he sent word to McDowell, who was proceeding toward this point from Gainesville, requesting him to bear toward the left, so as to strike the main road, and march upon Centreville. But the order of the commander-in-chief only reached that general when he had already advanced very far in the former direction, and the difficulty of finding practicable roads, in order to follow the new direction indicated, retarded its execution. Nevertheless, toward six o'clock in the evening, McDowell with King's division, followed at a long distance by Sigel and Reynolds, struck the Warrenton and Centreville road at a point where it begins to descend into the little valley of Young's Branch. He was coming from the south; Jackson had already taken position on the wooded heights which command that road to the northward. On his right, Stuart had deployed his cavalry, so as to protect his flank against any attack; he occupied the Warrenton road as far as the vicinity of Gainesville, his line extending as far as possible in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, for he was impatient to join Longstreet, the booming of whose cannon already resounded through the gorges of the defile. An artillery battle had just commenced between King and Jackson, when the latter was informed by Stuart that his right flank was not menaced by the enemy from the Gainesville Road. Finding himself thus free in his movements, he ordered Ewell to bring his division and Taliaferro's to the attack, and to fall upon the flank of the Federals, who were seen marching in column from the other side of the road. Starke's brigade of Taliaferro's division, supported by the fire of three batteries, advanced first as skirmishers; but the Federal guns soon silenced those of the Confederates. The rest of the division, supported on the left by two of Ewell's brigades, came up to restore the fortunes of the fight. Gallantly led by their chiefs, these six brigades rushed furiously upon the two Federal brigades of Gibbon and Doubleday, posted in a large orchard. Both sides defended their positions with great stubbornness; the two Confederate division commanders were severely wounded; Ewell lost a leg while charging at the head of his soldiers. The latter, however, despite their efforts and numerical superiority, could not succeed in dislodging their adversaries. Night alone

put an end to the battle. When it had become completely dark, the whole of McDowell's column having crossed over toward Centreville, King brought his troops to the rear, and abandoned the ground where he had made so successful a defence, but which he could no longer hold without seriously compromising himself.

The action of the 28th left the Confederates in a much less perilous position than they occupied the day before. Jackson, strongly posted along the unfinished line of railway, saw not only his retreat assured, but his right flank entirely disengaged. Master of the main road, and knowing Longstreet to be at Thoroughfare Gap, he could join him the next morning. The Federals, on the contrary, had lost all the advantages they had possessed twenty-four hours previously, and their movements had been performed with so much confusion that on the morning of the 29th, when Pope had been able to ascertain the precise situation of his army, he was obliged to change all the plans he had formed during the night. The two corps of Heintzelman and Reno had actually pushed as far as Centreville, whither Hill had adroitly drawn them; and there was only Siegel's small corps with Reynolds' weak division in front of Jackson on the main road. That of King was in the rear, in the vicinity of Manassas. Porter, who, according to Pope's calculations, should have been at that place, had not yet passed Bristow station; Banks was behind him on Cedar Run; and Ricketts' division was endeavoring to effect a junction with McDowell on the side of Manassas. The capital point of Gainesville was still unoccupied, and it was now too late for the Federals to prevent a junction of the two wings of the Confederate army.* While renouncing the idea of opposing this junction, Pope might yet reap another advantage. He held Centreville, Manassas and the Bull Run crossings; it was easy, therefore, for him to mass all his army on the north bank of this stream, while waiting for the important reinforcements which would no doubt be forwarded to him from Washington, to place himself once more in communication with the capital, and thus to oblige the enemy to come and attack him in a formidable position. In fact,

* A glance at the map will suffice to prove this, notwithstanding the assertions of Pope, who, in his report, pretends that the position of Siegel and Reynolds separated Jackson from Thoroughfare Gap.

McClellan, after his arrival at Alexandria on the 27th, had set himself immediately to work to reorganize the few troops left under his orders, and to put them in a condition to take the field again. He had sent for Sumner, whom Halleck had so unadvisedly ordered to land at Aquia Creek, and who, coming up on his transports, joined him on the morning of the 28th. Almost at the same time, Franklin was approaching the wharves of Alexandria. These two army corps, being entirely without means of transportation, could not effect a junction with Pope, of whom there were no tidings, who was believed to be cut off from Washington by the whole of the enemy's army. But if he had taken position at Centreville, and if Sumner and Franklin had been able to push their heads of column forward without taking the precautions necessary in passing through an enemy's country, they would have promptly taken a reinforcement of twenty or twenty-five thousand men to the army of Virginia. In point of fact, notwithstanding the time consumed in the preparations required by the circumstances, Franklin had begun his march on the morning of the 29th. The necessity of concentrating all his forces in the vicinity of Centreville was the more imperative for Pope, because his provisions were beginning to fail; the fatal effects of the burning of the dépôts at Manassas were already being felt, and he could not but know that, whether victorious or vanquished, hunger would oblige him to take his army back to the left bank of Bull Run the next day. But still believing he should find Jackson isolated, and that the latter would try to escape him by a speedy retreat through Thoroughfare Gap, he determined, the morning of the 29th, to bar his passage by again occupying the position of Gainesville, so imprudently abandoned the day before. Being convinced that he should not meet the enemy before reaching Gainesville, he thought to gain time by not uniting his several army corps to march upon that village, but simply designated the latter as a point of concentration for his columns, which came by different roads, some from Manassas and others from Centreville. He was thus dividing his forces, and turning his back upon Franklin, at the very moment when the latter was endeavoring to join him. Heintzelman and Reno were ordered to leave Centreville by the Warrenton turnpike, and cross

the stone bridge, so as to form the right wing of the army. Siegel and Reynolds were to form the centre and take position at Groveton to attack Jackson in front. McDowell and Porter were once more to retrace their steps, and from Manassas to throw themselves on the right flank of the enemy near the Gainesville road.

But Jackson had no idea of beating a retreat, for he was now certain of Longstreet's support. The latter was approaching with three of his four divisions, that of Anderson having been left behind; at the time when McDowell was leaving Manassas in the vain hope of forestalling him at Gainesville, he had already passed that point. Jackson, on his side, was drawing his line close, and taking up strong positions from Sudeley Springs to Groveton behind the unfinished embankments he had occupied the day before; he thus rested his left on Bull Run and extended his right so as to cover the Gainesville road, by which Longstreet was expected to debouch. It was in this position that Siegel came to attack him while Pope was trying to collect the different portions of his army.

The left of the Confederate line was formed by Hill's division; the centre by Ewell's, commanded by Lawton; the third by Taliaferro's division, under Starke, which lay across the Gainesville road and commanded all its approaches. Heintzelman and Reno on the right, McDowell and Porter on the left, had a long road to travel. Siegel therefore, who was almost touching the enemy, opened the fight single-handed at half-past six in the morning. Schurz' division, which had deployed to the right of the turnpike, attacked Lawton vigorously, while Milroy, with his brigade and a battery in the centre near the Stone House, and Schenck on the left of the road, cannonaded Starke's troops. The battle soon raged along the whole line. The Federals were gaining ground, especially on their left; for, Longstreet not having arrived, Jackson's right was still exposed. But that general, finding that his left was not menaced, soon concentrated his forces against Siegel, who had been contending alone for the last four hours, and whose soldiers were beginning to give way. Lawton had resumed the offensive, and the Federals could scarcely hold him in check. Just as Schenck was preparing to go to Schurz' assistance, he was

himself vigorously attacked, and it was evident that Siegel would not be able to resist much longer, when friendly heads of column appeared at last, and restored strength and confidence to his soldiers. Kearny on his arrival formed on the right of Siegel, leaving more than half his troops in reserve. Hooker, who followed him close, extended his line in the direction of Sudeley Springs, facing Hill. About this time Reno emerged through the turnpike, and, placing himself on Schenck's left, enabled him to contract his front. The extreme left was formed by Reynolds, who had arrived from Manassas.

In the presence of these reinforcements, Jackson merely kept up a brisk cannonade, with intermittent volleys of musketry; the moment for resuming the offensive had not yet come. In fact, the whole Confederate army was just then taking its positions. Lee had arrived at ten o'clock in the morning with Longstreet's heads of column, about the same time that Kearny was getting into line on the other side.* At noon Longstreet's rear-guard reached the field of battle, and the whole Confederate army was united. It was at this hour also that Pope, who had until then remained at Centreville, made his appearance on the scene of action. The hamlet of Groveton is situated a little east of the turnpike and Young's Branch, which has already been mentioned in the narrative of the battle of Bull Run. Jackson's right rested on a hill in the rear of this hamlet. The arrival of Longstreet, who deployed his three divisions to the right of the road, made Groveton the Confederate centre, and the hill was occupied by several batteries commanded by Colonel S. D. Lee. Advancing his right wing under General Jones as far as the Manassas Railway, Longstreet drew up his line of battle at right angles with the road, by placing Hood's division, which formed his left, on the right of Jackson, near Colonel Lee's batteries. This line formed with that of Jackson an obtuse angle, which gave to the front of the Confederate army the shape of a very open V, with the vertex turned southward toward the enemy. The two branches of the letter, inclined to the rear, would represent the position of the two

* The hour of Longstreet's arrival was the subject of violent controversies; but we are of opinion that this question has been set at rest without appeal by Mr. Swinton's critical investigation of it. (*Army of the Potomac*, p. 186).

army corps, that of Jackson deployed to the left from Groveton to Sudeley Springs, and that of Longstreet to the right, between Groveton and the Manassas Railway.

The latter, therefore, completely barred against McDowell and Porter the road which Pope had indicated, when he ordered them to march upon Gainesville from Manassas, and even the possession of Groveton was no longer of any importance to them, since the enemy's army, which they had hoped to divide, was already reunited. Consequently, it was not long before Porter met Longstreet's line of battle drawn up across the railway track; he was forming his troops, whose long columns this discovery had taken by surprise, when he was joined by McDowell, his superior in rank, who was closely following him with King's division. McDowell asserts that he commanded Porter to attack; the latter has affirmed, on the contrary, that his chief ordered him not to move. However that may be, Porter deployed Morrell's troops in face of the enemy, massed those of Sykes in reserve, and finding it impossible to execute the movement which he had been ordered to make by Pope in the morning, waited for further instructions in the position where McDowell left him. The latter having rejoined Ricketts, who was returning from Thoroughfare Gap, found himself at last, about three o'clock, at the head of all his army corps; and renouncing the idea of following the direction which had been indicated to him, he proceeded toward Groveton, where the booming of cannon announced that the combat had been renewed with increased violence. Pope, in fact, who was not aware of Longstreet's presence, and still believed that he had only Jackson before him, imagined that it would be sufficient for McDowell and Porter to push forward to strike the right wing of the Confederates, and to fall upon their flank and rear. Consequently, between two and three o'clock, thinking that this manœuvre must have been nearly accomplished, he ordered Hooker to attack the enemy in front. This gallant officer remarked to him that such an attack would stand very little chance of success. Hill had actually found in the railroad embankments a real parapet, behind which he could resist many assaults. Pope insisted; Grover's brigade charged with the bayonet, and penetrating between the Confederate brigades of Gregg and Thomas set foot on

the embankment. All Hill's troops were concentrated to dislodge them; the rest of Hooker's division hastened to their assistance; and notwithstanding their numerical inferiority, the Federals maintained their position, when Early, throwing himself into the *mêlée*, put an end to the struggle and carried off the victory. Kearny, who had been notified too late, only attacked the enemy after Grover's repulse. Movements so badly combined could not succeed. Kearny experienced the same fate as Hooker.

While the right of the Federals was sustaining considerable but fruitless losses in these partial engagements, Pope was wondering that he did not hear Porter's cannon thunder upon what he believed to be Jackson's flank. Having at last been informed of the position in which McDowell had left his subordinate, he sent him, at half-past four o'clock, an order to attack the enemy's lines, and to carry out the prescribed movement. He expected to renew the assault upon the railroad at the moment when, according to his own calculations, Porter must have flanked the enemy's line. Allowing him an hour and a half to accomplish this, he gave the signal for a new attack in front between five and six o'clock. On the left the division of Reno, and on the right that of Kearny, who had taken Hooker's place, both advanced under a most terrific fire. Kearny, making a change of front, charged the extreme left of the enemy's line, broke it, threw it upon its centre, and once more took possession of the embankment. Reno supported him. But the Confederates made an offensive return, and the Union troops, having no reserves left, finally lost all the ground they had so persistently contested. It was now a quarter-past six o'clock. At this moment McDowell appeared on the battle-field with the heads of column of the remainder of his corps, which, having diverged from the Gainesville road, had just arrived from Manassas. He debouched on the left of Sigel, and instantly deploying the first division, under King, led it to the attack upon the enemy's positions near Groveton. But instead of having to fight the exhausted troops of Jackson, he found in these positions Hood's division, which Longstreet, henceforth at perfect ease regarding his right, had sent to the relief of the latter. It resisted without losing an inch of ground. King returned to the charge several times, but

in vain; he could not make these fresh and numerous troops falter. The contest was prolonged after sunset, and amid the darkness of the night could still be heard the shouts of the combatants and could be seen the flashes of musketry. Meanwhile, Porter had remained the whole of this long day in front of Longstreet's right without firing a musket; by some unaccountable delay, the order forwarded by Pope at half-past four o'clock only reached him at nightfall, when a serious attack had become impossible. Pope was not satisfied with blaming him, as he had a right to do, for having failed to move without formal instructions when the booming of cannon summoned him to Groveton, but sought to make him alone responsible for his disaster, maintaining that if Porter had obeyed his orders the day of the 29th would have achieved Jackson's defeat. Notwithstanding these accusations, Porter retained his command, and continued to serve his country usefully; but a few months later, when his friend and protector McClellan had been deposed, these accusations were taken up with renewed asperity, and Porter was brought before a court-martial, which deprived him of his rank. Since the war the truth has come to light; the official reports of both parties have been published, and it is now proved that the tribunal before which he was tried had no knowledge of the existence of certain documents which would have exonerated the accused before passing sentence upon him; it is therefore proposed to revise this sentence in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. However this may be, it is now known that the whole Confederate army was united before Porter could have executed the flank movement from which Pope anticipated such wonderful results, and that he had before him Longstreet's entire right wing, part of which only had been engaged against the Federal centre at the close of the battle. His attack, therefore, could not have produced the results upon which the general-in-chief had counted. But neither the impossibility of executing to the letter the order of the latter, nor even the instructions which McDowell may have given him during the day, afford any excuse for his having remained so long inactive in the presence of the enemy, with two fine divisions, while a great battle was being fought in his vicinity. In short, if the road he had to follow was barred against him—

if, therefore, he could not cut the enemy's army in two and secure its defeat—it is equally certain that a vigorous attack made by him upon Longstreet's right would have drawn out all the forces of this general, and by freeing the rest of the Union line would probably have prevented the reverse which the latter sustained at the close of the day. We cannot avoid, therefore, blaming his inaction at such a time and under such circumstances.* This indifference on the part of Porter to the cannon's appeal, the manner in which he interpreted the orders of superiors, and the tardiness with which these orders reached him, were the inevitable consequences of the confusion we have already referred to in the general management of the army.

In summary, the operations of the 29th, in which Pope had gained nothing, had cost him very dear. He had been unable to prevent the junction of his adversaries on the ground they had chosen; he had allowed the opportunity for crushing them separately to escape; and his army, destitute of provisions, would be compelled to beat a retreat the next day. Consequently, in so far as results were concerned, it was a defeat, although in the contest itself the troops had rather gained than lost ground.

Whilst the Federals were wasting their strength against an enemy well posted, and always ready to concentrate his troops upon the point menaced, trouble and anxiety were on the increase in Washington. Franklin was on the march, but no one had taken the responsibility of deciding how far he should go. Sumner had landed at Alexandria, but had been sent thence in an opposite direction to cover the passes of the Potomac above Washington. McClellan was asking in vain for a frank decision whether he should go to Pope's relief with all the forces that were available, or concentrate these forces around the capital and let the army of Virginia get out of the trouble as best it could; the President referred him to Halleck, who adopted neither of these propositions. Franklin, having no means of transportation nor a single mounted man, stopped at Annandale on the 29th, between Alexandria and Fairfax. Detachments of the enemy's cavalry prevented the railroad from being used for the purpose of revictualling Pope's army, which from that day found itself

* See Appendix to this volume, Note D.

short of rations. Never had the difficulties of the American war been more strictly manifested.

His want of success, the failure of provisions, which would have paralyzed him in case of a victory, the concentration of the whole Confederate army, which had been made manifest by the battle between King and Hood—everything indicated to Pope the necessity of proceeding to Centreville, and waiting there in a strong position for the reinforcements which he could not rely upon at Manassas. He resolved, however, to renew the struggle on the morning of the 30th, upon the battle-field of the preceding day. Deceived by the statements of prisoners and the reports of his pickets, he was once more led to believe that the enemy was falling back upon Thoroughfare Gap; and being no longer able to turn his right, he desired to take advantage of this supposed retreat to attack his left. Both parties, however, were too much fatigued to renew the struggle at an early hour. When daylight came, they had to concentrate, to reorganize, to pick up and care for the wounded. The Federals had from six to eight thousand men *hors de combat*. A still larger number had disappeared within a few days, some having been lost in the night-marches or used up in those of the day, others having run away in the midst of the battle. Consequently, the number of combatants was greatly reduced, and did not exceed forty-five thousand men; the cavalry was unfit for service. It took Pope the whole morning to reconnoitre his positions; the task of re-forming his line and preparing for his new attack occupied him till noon.

The battle-field on which the two belligerents stood fronting each other was divided by the valley of Young's Branch, the general direction of which is from west to east. The main road from Centreville, as straight as a Roman causeway, followed this stream, sometimes on one bank, sometimes on the other; it was intersected at right angles by the road from Sudeley Springs to Manassas Junction. Another road, bearing more to the west, left Sudeley to connect with the main road at Groveton. On the morning of the 30th, this road formed nearly the line of demarkation between the two armies. That of Lee, whose left under Hill was drawn up in rear of Sudeley, still occupied the salient point of the embankment which was so fiercely disputed the day

before, and now defended by Lawton. On his right the line of the railroad inclined toward the north, encircling a hillock which extended back of Groveton to a point above the main road. Jackson's third division, commanded by Starke, occupied the summit of this hill in front of the embankment. On this side the Confederate front had an extension of from twenty-five hundred to three thousand metres. Beyond the road from Sudeley to Manassas the Federals, posted across the eastern prolongation of the embankment, occupied a range of hills opposite to this front. The crest of the plateau by which the valley of Young's Branch is bounded on the south is intersected by three ravines, thus forming three ridges lying perpendicularly to the main road. The first, to the west, which is met at a distance of fifteen hundred metres from Groveton, was the one in which Colonel S. D. Lee had planted his batteries to connect Jackson's right with Longstreet's left. The second, lying less than a kilometre beyond Groveton, long, narrow, and destitute of trees, projected between the main road and the New Market road, and completely commanded the adjoining valleys; it was called Bald Hill. The third, a thousand or twelve hundred metres more to the east, on the other side of the New Market road, derived its name from the Henry House, which was on its summit.

Pope concentrated all his forces upon his right wing; Kearny and Hooker were massed at the extremity of the line; Reno took position between them and Sigel, who, also bearing toward the right, deployed north of the road, a little to the rear of Groveton. On his left Reynolds remained alone south of this road near Groveton, and consequently far in advance of Bald Hill. McDowell's two divisions were separated; Ricketts' went to the right to support Kearny; King took position on Reynolds' right, in advance of Sigel's line. Finally, Porter, brought back from the eccentric position in which he had remained inactive the day before, came to strengthen the centre, where his soldiers, fresher than their comrades, were destined on that day to play the prominent part. Thus, at the moment when all the enemy's forces, as they reached the field of battle, enabled Lee to extend his line, and when by his own left he menaced that of Pope the more, the latter, obliged by the reduction of his troops to contract their

front, was stripping this very wing. Under these circumstances such a concentration could not be effected without confusion. It was in this way that Porter came, without Siegel's knowledge, to place himself in his front, and he found himself at too great a distance to support him effectively, and too near to be sheltered from the enemy's fire.

About one o'clock the fire of musketry on the Federal left broke the mournful silence which had reigned over this sanguinary field since the previous evening. Notwithstanding the union of all his army, Lee had not deemed the moment favorable for resuming the offensive; in fact, satisfied as to the safety of his communications, and knowing his opponent to be short of provisions, he had every interest in compelling the latter to attack him in defensive positions. But he had no idea of retiring, and this the Federals were soon to find out.

After feeling the enemy for some time, Pope decided at last to make a vigorous charge on the centre. McDowell, who had the chief command on that side, launched Porter's corps against Jackson's right. This corps, weakened, it was said, by the absence of the brigade of Griffin, whom Pope accuses of having left the battle-field at daybreak to retire to Centreville, numbered, nevertheless, still seven or eight thousand men, all veterans of the preceding campaign, led by two experienced officers, Generals Sykes and Morrell. They charged with impetuosity; but the open space they had to cross was enfiladed by the hill on which Colonel Lee had planted his eight batteries, and, from the height of this natural bastion, they flanked the entire portion of Jackson's line which was attacked by Porter. Consequently, as soon as Longstreet saw the attack which threatened his colleague, instead of sending him the tardy succor of a few regiments, he concentrated, at less than four hundred metres, the whole fire of his artillery upon the deployed battalions of the Federals which exposed their flank to him. The carnage in the ranks of those gallant soldiers was terrible; the third line alone succeeded in reaching Jackson's positions; but being already decimated, it was easily repulsed. Toward half-past four o'clock Porter's entire corps, exhausted by the unequal contest, fell back in disorder upon Siegel, who had massed his troops behind him. As on the preceding

days, the attack of the Federals had been made by a single corps and on a single point, so that the enemy was able to oppose them with superior forces.

This was the moment the Confederate chief had been waiting for to assume the offensive along the whole line; and he did so with that *ensemble* which had always been wanting on the part of his adversaries. Siegel had scarcely deployed to cover Porter's retreat when Jackson's soldiers were already upon him in a furious attack.

Longstreet in his turn put his columns in motion, and a general engagement took place on the right and left of the main road. Siegel's small corps, reduced to six or seven thousand men, and King's division, weakened by the battle of the previous day, sustained the first shock of the battle. Ricketts, summoned in great haste from the right, came to their relief. Reynolds, on the left of the road, maintained himself with difficulty. It was no longer a question of pursuing the enemy, as Pope had ordered, but of resisting his assaults. Longstreet's entire corps, which had scarcely been in action the day previous, advanced to the attack of the Federal left on the other side of the road. Hood's two brigades, followed by that of Evans, gave the signal of attack along this road. Wilcox, with three Confederate brigades, deployed on his left, Kemper and then Jones, with their divisions, on his right. Anderson, who had arrived from Gainesville, supported this grand attack. While the battle was raging near Groveton, the extreme right of Longstreet, finding no enemy before it, proceeded toward the main road in order to cut the communications of the Federal army. The latter had extended and weakened its line in vain attempts to cover itself on that side; Reynolds, who was posted on Porter's left, had been detached a few hours before and ordered to occupy Bald Hill, which commanded the road; he had been reinforced by Ricketts and one of Siegel's brigades, so that there remained only about one thousand men, Warren's brigade of Porter's corps, to form the left centre of the Federals near Groveton. The young chief of this brigade, with that war instinct for which he was always distinguished, had not waited for orders to place himself at the most important point of the line, which Reynolds had stripped by moving toward Bald Hill. In

this position, when Porter made his great attack, Warren had stubbornly covered the left flank of his chief. But the reverse sustained by the latter obliged him to fall back with the remainder of the corps. Jackson's soldiers, however, did not follow up their success to any great extent. They had cruelly suffered in the recent battles; and Lee, relying upon their vigor, had not reinforced them. By this means he had been able to mass all his forces upon his right wing, which was to strike the decisive blow against the enemy. Consequently, while King and a portion of Sigel's corps found no great difficulty in maintaining themselves in the centre in the midst of an intermittent fire of musketry, the battle raged with increased violence south of the road, where the Federals were severely pressed. It was five o'clock in the evening. Sigel detached Milroy's brigade in that direction; but not having taken a good position, it could not check the assailants, while Reynolds, who, as we have said, formed the extreme left, finally lost a portion of the ridge of Bald Hill. McLean's brigade, posted near him, thus became uncovered and exposed to an enfilading fire; the Confederates took advantage of this, and by a vigorous charge made themselves masters of all this height. It was in vain that Sigel sent Kolter's brigade to recapture it, which bravely rushed to the assault. It was repulsed after seeing its commander struck down. From the point they occupied, the Confederates, having entire command of the road, took the left wing and the centre of their adversary in the rear, menacing his communications with the stone bridge. The Federals were compelled to retire in great haste, so as not to lose this indispensable line of retreat. Indeed, Longstreet was following up his success. His artillery, posted on the heights, swept the main road; his troops were advancing and already preparing to carry the hill crowned by the Henry House. But at this juncture they were checked by Buchanan's brigade of regular infantry, whose unfaltering stand under a terrific fire vindicated the reputation of the troops *d'élite* of which it was composed. This brigade was soon reinforced by that of Tower of Ricketts' division, which vied with them in ardor. Reynolds having again come into line, his two brigades under Meade and Seymour joined these troops, forming a nucleus around which grouped regiments and batteries that had

preserved their organization amid the disorder. Meanwhile, the right wing of the Federals had sustained with some advantage a brisk contest, but was finally obliged to follow the movement in retreat of the left, at the risk of remaining isolated. It fell back upon the ford of Bull Run, situated between Sudeley Springs and the stone bridge, which had been discovered the preceding year by Sherman. It was now six o'clock in the evening.

In checking the offensive movement of Longstreet, the gallant defenders of the Henry House had saved the Federal army from a terrible disaster. They held their ground until night came to spread her dark mantle over Pope's retreat. While Banks was bringing back the greatest portion of the baggage of the army from Bristow to Union Mills, the troops took advantage of the darkness to cross Bull Run; at daybreak they were entirely massed in the vicinity of Centreville, where they at last met Franklin with about eight thousand soldiers.

It was a night full of trials for this army. Its losses in killed, wounded, prisoners and war materials, either captured or destroyed, were very large; eighteen pieces of artillery and six thousand muskets were in the hands of the enemy. But worse than all, the army was discouraged, and it may be said disorganized. Nearly one-half of its effective force was missing at roll-call, while those who remained in the ranks, exhausted by marches and combats, had not even that stimulant which sustains the courage of soldiers to the very last breath—confidence in their leaders. The fatal effects of the strategic combinations devised in Washington were not long in making themselves felt. The scattered Federal forces had succumbed before an adversary who knew how to concentrate his troops in time and never hesitated. The campaign opened by the army of Virginia, halfway between Richmond and Washington, had only lasted a fortnight. Transferred by Jackson's daring to the neighborhood of the Federal capital, it was brought to an end upon the fatal battle-field of Manassas, and the two Federal armies, consolidated either too soon or too late, always deprived of the advantage of numbers through the contradictory orders they were receiving, were about to be brought back in disorder to the very spot which most of their soldiers had left five months before to follow McClellan.

The Confederate army had paid dear for its success ; it was too much fatigued to undertake a pursuit which the darkness of the night, the dangerous fords of Bull Run and the excellent conduct of the Federal rear would have rendered difficult. But the next day Lee set about gathering the fruits of his victory by menacing Washington. Such was, by a fatal concatenation of circumstances, the result of the alarms which at the decisive moment had prompted the refusal of McDowell's corps to McClellan. In consequence of his declining to take some risk at the opportune moment when the city of Washington had nothing to fear, Mr. Lincoln two months after beheld Lee marching upon his capital at the head of a victorious army.

Indeed, on the morning of the 31st, the indefatigable Jackson was again in motion. The Federal forces were united at Centreville. Lee ordered his lieutenant to throw himself once more upon Pope's lines of communication, being fully convinced that the latter would thereby be compelled to retire under the guns of the forts which surrounded Washington. Crossing Bull Run at Sudeley Springs, and describing a large circuit to the left, Jackson reached the main road, called the Little River road, which, on leaving Fairfax Court-house, branches off from the Gainesville and Warrenton turnpike in the direction of Aldie, west-north-west. He marched upon Fairfax, and in spite of a violent storm reached the hamlet of Chantilly the same evening, where he bivouacked ; he already found himself again upon the flank, and nearly on the rear, of the Federals, established at Centreville. Meanwhile, Stuart with his cavalry crossed Bull Run at the stone bridge, where he had an engagement with Pope's rear-guard, and was closely watching all the movements of the enemy. Longstreet crossed the river behind him.

The Federals, on the contrary, remained inactive at Centreville. They had at last obtained the provisions and ammunition they so much needed, which had been sent from Washington under the escort of Franklin's corps. The vehicles which brought them had been obliged to follow in the wake of the infantry for want of cavalry to protect them. It was necessary to distribute these provisions, to reorganize the corps, to rally the stragglers and those who had gone astray, who filled the woods and encumbered the

roads; it was necessary, above all, to give the exhausted men the rest which was indispensable to them. It seemed besides that Pope, having found Franklin at Centreville, and expecting Sumner to arrive on the 31st, could have maintained himself there for an indefinite period. He would soon have, in fact, nearly sixty-three thousand men under his command. The old Confederate works had been turned and completed under McClellan's instructions a few months before. They were occupied by Porter at the north, by Franklin around the village itself, and by Sigel at the south. Heintzelman and Reno were placed in second line, while Banks was ordered to proceed much farther to the south, so as to watch the lower crossings of Bull Run. On his arrival Sumner was to cover the right by extending his line as far as Chantilly, while McDowell formed the reserve on the road to Fairfax Courthouse.

The Federal cavalry had no longer a single horse in good condition, and therefore could not scout for the army. Sumner only reached the position at Centreville very late on the 31st, and was consequently unable to push as far as Chantilly. The result was that Jackson quietly posted himself in that village unknown to Pope, who only discovered the movement which seriously menaced his right on the morning of September 1st. Master of Chantilly and a fine road along which his columns could deploy, the Confederate general was nearer to Fairfax than the Federals established at Centreville, and was about to place himself once more between them and Washington. Pope perceived that he had not a moment to lose to ward off this danger; he evacuated Centreville in all haste to cover the point menaced by throwing himself across the two roads of Little River and Warrenton. Hooker fell back from Centreville to Fairfax, rallied all the troops he could find there, and again followed the Little River road in the direction of Chantilly, passing through Germantown. McDowell and Franklin took position in the rear, on the left, at the angle of the two roads. Reno, leaving the Warrenton road before Fairfax, proceeded to draw up his corps on the left of Hooker's division. That of Kearny, which, with the latter, composed Heintzelman's corps, followed close upon Reno, and was so placed as to prolong his left. Still farther to the left the corps of

Sumner, Sigel and Porter covered the Warrenton road. Last of all, Banks escorted the convoy, which was directed upon Alexandria.

Jackson, on his side, had resumed his march toward Fairfax; but his soldiers, fatigued and hungry, were no longer able to make long marches. Consequently, he did not meet the Federal right, posted on the Little River road, halfway between Chantilly and Germantown, till evening. This road crosses a ravine at a right angle, bounded on the east by Ox Hill, which extends to a considerable distance north and south from the point where the road passes. This hill, covered by the ravine, afforded an excellent position, which had been occupied by Hooker's, Stevens' and Reno's divisions; the two latter were under Reno, who had succeeded Burnside in command of the ninth army corps. It was here that Jackson found them about five o'clock in the evening. After a useless cannonade against Hooker, who lay across the road, he deployed his three divisions to the right of this road, Starke, then Lawton, and finally D. H. Hill, at the extremity of his line. Hill at once went into the fight amid torrents of rain, throwing the brigades of Branch and Field upon the Federal left; but Reno received them without flinching, and drove them back in disorder. The other brigades of the same division, under Gregg, Pender and Thomas, with a portion of Lawton's troops, came to their assistance. Under this new effort Stevens' small division finally gave way, its commander having been killed and its officers decimated. It retired in disorder, and that of Reno was obliged to follow the movement. Hooker was at too great a distance to afford them any support. Kearny, who, as we have stated, was following Reno, fortunately arrived at this moment with his division. Perceiving the danger, he quickened the pace of his soldiers, and placed Birney's brigade in the breach which Stevens' defeat had opened between Reno and Hooker. He advanced more to the right, alone, in search of a position whence his troops could effect a junction with the latter; but carried away by his zeal and deceived by the twilight, he found himself surrounded by the enemy's troops, and fell mortally wounded. Thus ended that noble and brilliant career, which had commenced fifteen years before with the intrepid charge of

the captain of dragoons against the gates of Mexico. Kearny did not, perhaps, possess all the qualities of a general-in-chief—at least, he never had the opportunity of displaying them; but he was an admirable lieutenant. Vigilant, untiring, always ready to take the lead, he could not bear inaction. Battle was his element. When balls began to whistle, his eagle countenance (*figure d'oiseau de proie*) and clear eye assumed a resolute expression which inspired confidence in those around him. He was naturally fault-finding and caustic; but his high-toned mind and generosity of heart made compensation for the defects of his character. Frequently quarrelling with his chiefs, he knew how to make himself beloved by his inferiors, and was always true to his personal friends, among whom the author is proud in being able to count himself. Philip Kearny stands in the first rank among the most illustrious victims of this fratricidal war by the side of McPherson, Sedgwick, Bayard, Reno, Richardson and their gallant adversaries A. S. Johnston, Jackson, Stuart and A. P. Hill. His death created some confusion in the Federal lines; but darkness soon put an end to hostilities, reducing Jackson's success to insignificant proportions.

Pope, in the mean while, did not think he could maintain himself in the defensive position he had taken. The discouragement of his soldiers had at last invaded his own mind. The two armies of the Potomac and Virginia were finally consolidated under his command. But their numbers could no longer avail; for the bravest men in them had come to consider a new battle fought under his direction in the light of a useless butchery—a painful position for a commander-in-chief who had certainly committed many errors, but whose gallantry and activity could not be called into question by any one. Both soldiers and officers instantly clamored for their old general—the man who had organized them into an army, and who, notwithstanding his reverses, had never brought such a disaster upon them.

McClellan, in the mean time, was shelved (*interné*) at Alexandria, kept far away from the scene of action by order of Halleck; and although still nominally commander-in-chief of the army of the Potomac, he had scarcely two or three aides-de-camp about him. He had sent off his last orderly even to escort the ammu-

nition intended for Pope. But when the disaster of the Federal army appeared at last in its true light, stripped of the covering which Pope's despatches had at first thrown around it, a new appeal was made to his patriotism and military talents. Pope, in fact, after having announced to Halleck that he had "completely used up the enemy without losing a gun or a wagon,"* wrote to him a few hours later that his army ran the risk of being entirely destroyed,† and asked him to call it back to Washington to reorganize it, and on the morning of September 2d, without giving time to Jackson to renew the attack, he fell back at the head of several columns toward the Federal capital. On the same day Mr. Lincoln decided at last to entrust McClellan with the command of the defences of Washington, the difficult task of repairing the disasters caused by the faults of another. The old commander of the army of the Potomac, going immediately to meet his companions in arms, found them marching sadly and slowly in the midst of long columns of wounded, lame, and stragglers of every kind. It was difficult for him to recognize in his routed army the fine divisions he had brought back from the borders of the James fifteen days before. He received the command on the 2d of September from the hands of Pope, who, through Halleck's favor and a just appreciation of his personal courage, was appointed to military functions in the North-west less exacting than those he had just resigned.

Nevertheless, while yielding to the necessity which had constrained it to have recourse to the only man capable of saving it, the government of the White House had not done so with a good grace. It limited itself to placing under his command the forts of Washington and the troops assembled within the range of their guns. We may suppose that, this appointment having been exacted from the authorities of the War Department by Mr. Lincoln's good sense and spirit of equity, the former sought to restrict it as much as possible. It is impossible to explain otherwise the strange fact that General McClellan, upon the verbal request of the President, resumed the command of his old army without having been regularly invested with it.

* Pope's despatch to Halleck, Centreville, August 30, 9.45 P. M.

† Ibid., September 1, 8.50 A. M.

In fact, the order of September 2d, limiting his authority to the defences of the capital, was neither modified nor replaced by new official instructions when he led the army to encounter Lee. The duties imposed upon him at this critical hour did not allow him time to remonstrate against an omission, which was too serious, however, to be attributed to the confusion which prevailed in Washington. But if, instead of achieving a victory, he had experienced a reverse in this dangerous enterprise, would not his enemies in the War Department have taken advantage of the irregularity of his appointment to bring charges against him? The idle allegations which, at a later period, were made the pretext for deposing him give the impartial historian the right to entertain such a supposition.

However this may be, McClellan's only thought, on once more meeting his soldiers, was to secure them as quickly as possible the means of regaining their strength and their courage. He brought back each corps into the old position it had occupied during the long winter of 1861-1862. Porter and Sigel took up their quarters at Hall's Hill, McDowell at Upton's Hill, Franklin and Heintzelman near Alexandria, Couch in the vicinity of the Chain Bridge and Sumner at Fort Albany. If so many brave men had not failed to appear at roll call, one might have believed that the painful campaign which had taken the army under the very walls of Richmond was but a dream. In fact, everything had to be commenced anew; and, what was still more deplorable, this bitter experience would teach the Washington authorities nothing.*

* The Confederate reports place the losses sustained by Lee's army, from the 23d of August to September 2d, at the following figures: Longstreet's corps, four thousand seven hundred and twenty-five men; Jackson's corps, four thousand three hundred and eighty-seven; total, nine thousand one hundred and twelve.

It has been impossible for us to find complete information regarding the losses of the Federal army during the same time. It is probable that the confusion which followed the defeat, and the promptness with which the army again took the field under McClellan, did not allow time to all the corps commanders to ascertain these losses with any precision. We have only those of Sigel, which amounted to one thousand and eighty-three men. As his corps was composed of only three small divisions out of the sixteen which were engaged during those few days, Pope's losses may be rated, without exaggeration, in the neighborhood of fifteen thousand men.

The battle of the 29th and 30th of August is sometimes designated by the name of Groveton. Although this appellation is more proper, we have retained the name of Manassas, which has generally been adopted by the victors. Some Federal authors call it the second battle of Bull Run; but we have thought it better to apply this designation exclusively to the battle of July 21, 1861, which was the only one really fought on the borders of that stream.

CHAPTER III.

HARPER'S FERRY.

THE excitement in Washington was intense. One may imagine what must, then, have been the consternation of those who, three months before, had already trembled for the safety of the capital at the mere announcement of Banks' defeat. They must certainly have thought that this time the Confederates would not fall into the same error they were supposed to have committed the previous year, and that they would pursue the vanquished army into the very gardens of the White House. These alarms were in reality without cause. The fortifications which had been erected by the army of the Potomac protected Washington from a sudden attack. Lee had not been able to follow Pope's retreat with the main body of his troops. The Federal general had, in fact, fallen back upon his dépôts, while the Confederate army absolutely needed revictualling before it could resume the offensive. As soon as Lee was made aware that the enemy was encamped under the cannon of the forts of Washington, he directed his attention elsewhere, and withdrew the feeble advanced posts which alone had followed the retreat of the Federals.

His victory had opened to him the gates of Maryland. On the 3d of September, he put his army in motion toward Leesburg, and prepared to cross the Potomac.

This crossing was a great event for the cause of the Confederates. They had abandoned the defensive to assume at last an offensive part. In a strictly military point of view, this was perhaps a rash determination, as it was calculated to jeopardize the results of the brilliant campaign which had just transferred the army of Northern Virginia from the borders of the Rapidan to those of the Potomac. This campaign had left it in a state of destitution which seemed to render a season of rest absolutely

necessary. It was also in want of provisions, equipments, shoes and ammunition ; the roads were crowded with lame soldiers, and the gaps made by sanguinary fights they had not been able to fill up. In short, by carrying the war into the territory of the enemy, Lee would be deprived of the great advantages which the defensive had hitherto secured his cause. It is true that he did not look upon Maryland as a hostile country. Being a slave State, Southern politicians considered her as belonging by right to their Confederacy, and military men relied upon meeting with the same sympathy which had so powerfully aided them in Virginia. Emigrants from Maryland who had taken refuge in the ranks of Lee's army had induced this general to believe, notwithstanding his perspicacity, that thousands of volunteers would rally around him as soon as he should appear on the soil of their State, and that this region, yet untouched by the horrors of war, would revictual his army much more effectually than the distant dépôts of Richmond. Besides, in view of the great army which was being reorganized in Washington, an invasion of Maryland was probably the only means of protecting Virginia. By menacing the Northern States, Lee could prevent the Federal government from reinforcing the army of the Potomac, and the qualities of which his generals and soldiers had just given proofs were an inducement for him to tempt fortune. If he had met with no other adversaries than those he had just conquered, if he had only had General Halleck's or Mr. Stanton's strategy to baffle, a great victory, the siege, and perhaps even the capture, of Washington, might have crowned his daring enterprise. On the other hand, in order to sustain the courage of the Southern people, who were beginning to suffer cruelly, it was necessary to throw the charges of the war upon the enemy's territory, so that the North should behold in her turn her crops destroyed, her cattle carried off and her farms burnt to ashes. It was even thought that her warlike ardor would not be able to stand such an ordeal. The unanimous sentiment of the army was in favor of this invasion as the reward of its labors. In short, the position of the Confederates toward Europe rendered it advisable for them to seize an opportunity to strike a blow which should resound on the other side of the Atlantic. The reader has not forgotten that

at this period the French government, discarding all the traditions of national policy, had openly extended its sympathies to the enemies of the American Union, and that under the name, sometimes of recognition, sometimes of mediation, it had already been several times anxious to intervene in their favor. The wisdom of the English government, which refused to participate in these measures, had prevented France from pursuing so fatal a policy. But the numerous friends of the Confederates did not despair of dragging England into this course, and thus securing them the support of these two great European powers. In order to accomplish this, they only asked of their clients some success which could be adroitly turned to advantage; a victory achieved beyond the Potomac would have enabled them to maintain that the North, beaten on her own soil, would never be able to conquer those vast States which had rebelled against her laws.

On the 3d of September, therefore, Lee turned his heads of column toward the Potomac. The country into which he was about to carry the war, consisting of nearly the whole of Maryland and a portion of Pennsylvania, is comprised between the Potomac at the south and the Susquehanna at the north; it is bounded on the east by Chesapeake Bay, into which the waters of these two rivers empty. It is composed of two very distinct regions. The eastern section, slightly undulating, fertile and under good cultivation, comprises the southern counties of Pennsylvania, which constitute one-third of it; the remainder forms lower Maryland, a region rich in slaves, and consequently in sympathy with the Confederates. The western section is mountainous; the Alleghanies, after sloping down to let the Potomac pass, resume their direction from south-west to north-eastward in long parallel ridges. The valleys they enclose on this side are a counterpart to that of the Shenandoah, the ridges and gorges to be met with being precisely similar to those of the Blue Ridge. Western Maryland is a triangle, which occupies the lower section of this region; it is closely connected with Pennsylvania through its interests and customs, and the mountain population, mostly settlers from the free States, had remained loyal to the Union, like those of West Virginia.

A march upon Baltimore must have been very tempting to the

Confederate leader. Baltimore, the great slave city, was only kept under Federal jurisdiction by force. It had furnished almost alone all the volunteers who assumed to represent Maryland in the Confederate army. Its possession, in short, even though temporary, by intercepting all the railroads leading to Washington, would isolate this city, and perhaps even cause its capitulation. What an immense effect would have been produced on both sides of the Atlantic if Mr. Lincoln, his cabinet and Congress had found themselves besieged in their own capital and separated from the country they governed! But Lee resisted this temptation. As McClellan in Washington held the chord of the arc which the Confederates had to describe, he could forestall them at any point whatever between the lower Potomac and Baltimore. In marching upon this city, therefore, Lee would have given him an opportunity to take an advanced position and deliver a defensive battle.

He preferred to enter the mountainous region of the country. By following this direction and ascending the Potomac, he moved away from the Federal army, without ceasing, however, to menace the Northern States; if he abandoned the idea of attempting an attack upon Baltimore, he drew near to Pennsylvania and Harrisburg, the capital of that State, to the great mining districts it possesses and its principal network of railways; he preserved easy communications by the valley of the Shenandoah, and was protected by the parallel ridges of the Alleghanies; he compelled his adversary to follow him, in short, and assume the offensive. If, attacked by the Federals, he should succeed in defeating them, he could drive them back under the walls of Washington; and the army of the Potomac once isolated from the Northern States, these States were open to invasion without adequate means of defence.

Jackson, after giving his troops one day's rest, had left Ox Hill on the 3d of September. On the 5th he crossed the Potomac at White's Ford, not far from Leesburg. The Confederate soldiers, reduced to positive suffering by the campaign they had just passed through, hailed the soil of Maryland as a kind of promised land. On reaching the shore their bands struck up the national air of the country they thought they were going to deliver--*Mary-*

land! my Maryland!—and all responded in chorus. The silent Jackson himself was carried away by the general enthusiasm. He saw at last the project he had cherished since the beginning of the war about to be realized. Casting their eyes farther on, his soldiers and himself pictured to themselves the rich fields of Pennsylvania, of which they already believed themselves masters. Short-lived illusions! The next day, instead of an ovation, he met with the coldest reception in the small town of Frederick. Situated on the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, Frederick is on the boundary of lower Maryland. Not far from it the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad crosses the Monocacy, a tributary of the Potomac. Jackson occupied the right bank of this river with his three divisions, so as to cover the march of the army against any attack which might come from Washington or Baltimore. On the 8th the whole army was drawn up on the left bank of the Potomac; Lee had come up in turn, and established his headquarters at Frederick. He issued a proclamation explaining to the people of Maryland his object in invading a State which he desired to treat as friendly, although not yet legally a part of the Confederacy, in the hope of obtaining through this appeal to their sympathies the assistance, both in men and *matériel*, of which he stood so greatly in need. In this manly and simple style of address, peculiar to himself, which was in strong contrast with the violent language of Mr. Davis, he presented himself as a liberator, but declared himself unwilling to coerce in any way the will of the sovereign State whose soil he trod. The people of Maryland took him literally at his word, and did not stir. The families of the emigrants alone manifested a noisy sympathy. If the majority were indifferent, the Union party was numerous and did not conceal its sentiments, while the few secessionists, not particularly delighted with the visit of the starving liberators, and anticipating their speedy departure, did not wish to compromise themselves by demonstrations in their favor. The Confederates, astonished at this reception, naturally accused their Maryland brethren of cowardice and treason.

Lee, however, did not waste time. In order to menace Pennsylvania while moving away from Washington, he had to rest his line upon the valley of the Shenandoah, that route flanked by

two gigantic parallel walls which penetrates into the heart of Virginia. At the time of the battle of Manassas its northern extremity was occupied by twelve or thirteen thousand Federals, four thousand of whom, under General White, were at Winchester, and the remainder at Harper's Ferry under Colonel Miles. On the 3d of September, at the news of Lee's march toward the Potomac, White evacuated Winchester and retired to Martinsburg. Miles and himself had been cut off from Washington by Jackson's troops, who had crossed the river in the vicinity of Leesburg. But they had only to cross the water in their turn and enter Maryland to avoid being surrounded by the enemy, and join the forces which were being organized on the borders of Pennsylvania at their approach. The Confederate army once on the other side of the Potomac, Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry lost all their importance, and protected nothing, the railway itself which passes through those villages being no longer of any value to the Confederates, inasmuch as it did not follow the direction of their invading march. All the troops who remained on the Virginia shore, therefore, were sure to be cut off, besieged and speedily made prisoners, without any other advantage than that of having disturbed Lee's communications during a few days. Consequently, the Confederates did not pay any attention to them, fully convinced that they would not be so imprudent as to tarry on the right side of the Potomac. But they had counted without General Halleck. The latter had retained his direct authority over the troops of White and Miles, whom he had ordered to defend Harper's Ferry at any cost, happen what might. He attached an importance to the possession of this point which it is difficult to explain. He pretended to hold the keys of Maryland after the gates had been burst open. When, as Lee was informed at Frederick that the Federals persisted in occupying Harper's Ferry, he determined to take advantage of this strange imprudence, it was the 9th of September. Up to this time the army of the Potomac had watched his movements without seriously interfering with them. It was natural for him to suppose that it had not yet sufficiently recovered from the effects of the last campaign to be able vigorously to assume the offensive. Placed between it and the garrison of Harper's Ferry, the latter was com-

pletely at his mercy. Instead of leaving a detachment to watch it, which would have weakened his army, he could, by deploying a considerable force, try to crush it before McClellan could come to its relief. In order to compass this great result, he resolved to suspend his northward movement for a few days.

The whole army was ordered to take up the line of march the next day toward the upper Potomac. It thus turned its back upon Washington, and abandoned Frederick and the line of the Monocacy. Lee entered the mountainous section of Maryland. The chain of the Blue Ridge, which terminates the point of confluence of the Shenandoah and the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, is prolonged north of the latter river by that of South Mountain. West of this chain is a large valley which is the counterpart of that of the Shenandoah, and the waters of which, flowing in an opposite direction, also run into the Potomac and form two small parallel rivers, the Conecocheague, which empties into the Potomac at Williamsport, and the Antietam, the mouth of which lies a little below Sharpsburg. The river is easily fordable near these two villages in fine weather. In the centre of the valley lies the little town of Hagerstown, at the head of a line of railway belonging to the Pennsylvania railway system. This line runs in a northerly direction through Chambersburg, enters another valley, the waters of which, still enclosed by the Alleghanies, flow in the direction of the Susquehanna, and at last reach this river opposite Harrisburg. At Chambersburg an unfinished branch of this line is detached toward the west in the direction of Gettysburg; but at that time it did not run beyond the foot of the hills over which passes the important road from Wheeling to Philadelphia. In entering the valley of the Antietam, Lee placed the defiles of South Mountain between McClellan and himself. The two principal passes, the most northerly of which is called Turner's Gap, and the other, ten kilometres more to southward, Crampton's Gap, are traversed by two roads, both of which start from the village of Middletown, on the eastern slope of the mountain. The first leads to Boonsboro', and thence to Williamsport and Hagerstown; the second to Rohrerstown, where it forks, ascending toward Sharpsburg on one side, and stretching down in the

direction of Harper's Ferry through Pleasant Valley on the other. A third road leaves Middletown in a southern direction, skirting the eastern side of the mountains, which it goes round by encircling the course of the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. Between the river and the high rocks which line its borders, there is a space of only a few metres in width, which gives passage to a canal, a railway and a wagon-road running alongside of each other. A handful of men is sufficient to block this alpine gorge, and from the opposite bank a few guns, firing over the boiling waters of the river, can sweep the road with grape.

At the entrance of the pass, while the Potomac precipitates itself, intersecting at a right angle the mountains which seem drawn up to bar its passage, the Shenandoah, skirting the foot of these mountains, comes to mingle its waters with the former, to take advantage of the same opening, and to leap with it over the barrier which it has been coasting all the way from its source. Above their confluence, in a very picturesque situation, is seated the little town of Harper's Ferry, in the form of an amphitheatre, on the east slopes of a hill, the summit of which is two or three kilometres from these, and which, under the name of Bolivar Heights, extends from one river to the other. These slopes are entirely commanded by the two spurs of the principal chain of mountains, which, south and north of the Potomac Gap, rise to a height of more than six hundred metres above the waters of the river. The northern heights, which form the extremity of South Mountain, are known by the name of Maryland Heights, while those at the south, which terminate the Blue Ridge, are called Loudon Heights. They are placed like two sentries, having at their feet Harper's Ferry, the Bolivar Hills, all the roads leading to the city, and the two rivers which encircle it. Their possession, therefore, is indispensable to the defence of Harper's Ferry, which in itself is nothing but a kind of blind alley fatal to any one who permits himself to be driven upon it. It was in this blind alley that Lee had determined to capture Miles and his small army.

He ordered Jackson to march upon Boonesboro', then to wheel round to the left, recross the Potomac at Sharpsburg and capture Martinsburg with its garrison, so as to cut off the retreat of the

Federals on that side. Longstreet, who followed him, was directed to stop near Boonesboro' and wait, with all the baggage of the army, until the surrender of Harper's Ferry should enable him to resume the movement toward Pennsylvania. The divisions of Anderson and McLaws, under command of the latter, were ordered to leave Middletown, and to march rapidly by the road leading to Harper's Ferry around Maryland Heights, so as to arrive in time to seize those heights. Walker's division, crossing the Potomac lower down, was to occupy Loudon Heights, thus completely investing Harper's Ferry. Finally, Hill's division was to close the march of the army by falling back upon Boonesboro' through Turner's Gap. Lee thus divided his army into two parts: the first, composed of six divisions, invested Harper's Ferry; while the second, comprising four other divisions, marched in an opposite direction, upon Boonesboro' and Hagerstown. He argued that a prompt success would enable him not to prolong this dangerous separation. Harper's Ferry was to be surrounded on the evening of the 12th by such a large force, that he hoped Jackson would take possession of it the next day, and, starting immediately after, be enabled to join the rest of the army either at Hagerstown or at Boonesboro' on the 14th.

The condition in which the battle of Manassas had left the Federal army justified the bold manœuvre of the Southern general. In resuming command of this army on the 3d of September, McClellan had, indeed, undertaken a colossal task. It was necessary to restore confidence to a discouraged body of troops, re-establish their organization, restore a vigorous discipline, reward some and deprive others of their commands, and all this transformation was to be accomplished in the midst of an active campaign, and in the presence of an adversary like Lee. The name of McClellan alone was almost sufficient to restore courage to his old soldiers. At the very outset he obtained that ready co-operation which Pope had sought in vain from his subordinates. The rest was accomplished whilst marching and fighting. In fact, on the 3d, to follow the movements of the enemy at a distance, the army of the Potomac began by crossing over to the left bank of the river in the vicinity of Washington. As we have stated before, the march of the Confederates toward the North no longer

allowed McClellan to confine himself to a mere defence of the capital, but compelled him to undertake an offensive campaign, so as to protect Baltimore and to free Maryland. The plan of the invaders, however, was not sufficiently developed for him to feel at liberty to move far from Washington in pursuit of them, for they might yet by a rapid move recross the river and suddenly come down the right bank to make an unexpected return to the Federal capital. Such a manœuvre was not very probable; but both Mr. Lincoln and General Halleck firmly believed that the invasion of Maryland was a mere feint of the enemy. They charged McClellan to protect the seat of government, and already reproached him with dangerous imprudence in having advanced his army a few kilometres to watch the enemy. This army, however, drawn up *en echelon* on the left bank of the Potomac, only followed the Confederates in the direction of the Monocacy at a long distance and by short marches; the latter, on their part, seemed less and less disposed to menace the capital of the Union. Finally, on the 7th of September, McClellan, convinced of the futility of the alarms which had hitherto held him back, no longer listened to these timid counsels; and definitely taking the field, he established his headquarters at Rockville, on the Frederick turnpike. The reorganization of the army was nearly completed. The army corps, reduced by the previous campaign to the proportions of divisions, or even simple brigades, had been strengthened by new regiments, which swelled the effective force of each to the figure of from twelve to twenty thousand men. Leaving in Washington all the regiments not yet brigaded with the corps of Sigel and Heintzelman, as well as a portion of those of Keyes and Porter, which had most need of re-formation, McClellan took with him five army corps. His forces were thus divided into two portions. Nearly seventy-two thousand men were left in the capital, half of whom at least were old soldiers. This number, which must appear enormous when we take into consideration the fact that the enemy was no longer menacing Washington, was a necessary concession to the anxieties of the government. The other part, the active army, was composed of the first corps, taken from McDowell and placed under Hooker; the second and sixth corps, still commanded by Sumner and Franklin respectively;

the ninth, under Reno; the twelfth, which had been transferred from Banks to old General Mansfield; and finally, the two divisions of Sykes and Couch, detached from the corps of Porter and Keyes. This army numbered eighty-seven thousand one hundred and sixty-four men of all arms. McClellan divided it into three parts. The right wing, comprising the first and ninth corps, was placed under Burnside; Sumner commanded the centre, composed of the second and twelfth; the sixth, with the divisions of Couch and Sykes—the latter belonging to Porter's corps—constituted provisionally the left under Franklin.

That portion of Maryland through which the Federals were going to pass is very rough and wooded, but the roads are numerous and practicable. Thus each corps could follow a different road, the left along the Potomac, the centre in the direction of Frederick, and the right more to northward, in such manner as to approach Baltimore. On the 9th of September, just as Lee was preparing to invest Harper's Ferry, the left and centre of the army of the Potomac occupied the line of the Seneca from the mouth of that river as far as Middlebrook, while it refused its right toward Brookville. Lee put his army in motion for Harper's Ferry on the 10th. On the morning of the 11th, McClellan hastened the march of his own troops, and having no fear for the safety of Baltimore pushed his right wing forward; the latter entered the town of Frederick on the 12th, after a slight engagement with the enemy's rear-guard. On the 13th the whole army had crossed the Monocacy, and the greater portion of it was concentrated around Frederick. By this time Lee, following the roads from Harper's Ferry and from Hagerstown, had placed the passes of South Mountain between his army and that of McClellan. The latter, however, was not yet able to fathom the designs of his adversary. Did he intend to make a screen of these defiles for a rapid invasion of Pennsylvania, or, according to the plan ascribed to him by General Halleck, was he going to descend again the right bank of the Potomac, to appear unexpectedly under the walls of Washington? However improbable this last supposition might be, the despatches he was receiving from his superior in command warned him, in such formal terms, to prepare for this eventuality, that he could not neglect it altogether in his

calculations. Those who had no knowledge of the indiscretion committed by Miles in shutting himself up at Harper's Ferry found it difficult to understand the object of Lee's sudden movement from east to west. But at this moment a fortunate chance revealed to McClellan all the designs of his adversary, clearly indicating the course he ought to pursue. On his arrival at Frederick on the morning of the 13th, a scrap of paper picked up from the corner of a table in the house which had served as headquarters to the Confederate D. H. Hill was placed in his hands. The printed heading: "Headquarters of the army of Northern Virginia," had accidentally attracted the attention of an officer, who, on unfolding this crumpled piece of paper, soon discovered its immense importance to the Federal cause. It was nothing less, in fact, than a detailed order of march of the great movement which was to cause the fall of Harper's Ferry—an order which Lee had sent to all his corps commanders on the evening of the 9th, and which, by a fatal negligence, Hill had lost on leaving Frederick. McClellan was now in possession of all the plans of his opponent, had seen his hand and surprised him at the very moment when, counting upon the mystery by which he thought himself surrounded, he was dividing his army, and risking a dangerous manœuvre to obtain an important result. It was a splendid opportunity, but the danger at the same time was imminent; for it was evident that Miles, of whom the Federals had heard nothing more, was allowing himself to be hemmed in on the right bank of the Potomac. It was necessary, therefore, on the one hand to prevent the capture of Harper's Ferry, and on the other to attack the Confederate army before it should be able to reunite. It was undoubtedly late, for Harper's Ferry was to be attacked on that very day. But its large garrison was in a condition to resist for a considerable length of time; and for however short a period the execution of Lee's plan might thus be retarded, he was surprised in the midst of this operation with a divided army. The Federal troops immediately took up their line of march toward Middletown. Thence, Franklin, bearing to south-westward with the left, was to carry the pass of Turner's Gap, proceed rapidly down Pleasant Valley on the track of McLaws, attack the latter vigorously with all his forces, rescue

the garrison of Harper's Ferry, and finally, without losing a moment, taking this garrison with him, overtake the rest of the army through Rohrer'sville. In the mean while, Burnside, leading the march, and following a north-westerly course by the road from Middletown to Boonesboro', was to force the pass of Crampton's Gap, followed by Sumner's corps and Sykes' divisions. After crossing the mountain these forces were to attack Longstreet and D. H. Hill, whom McClellan expected thus to surprise far from Jackson and the thirty thousand men massed around Harper's Ferry. The Federal general had not deemed it proper to direct Franklin to follow the shorter route from Middletown to Harper's Ferry, along the line of the Potomac, because, as we have stated, it was easily defended; but a glance at the map will show what important results he had a right to anticipate if the garrison of Harper's Ferry should only make an honorable resistance. In fact, McLaws, finding himself alone on the left bank of the river, and separated from Jackson and Walker by its waters, could not have resisted Franklin, while the latter, after raising the siege of Harper's Ferry, would have been in a position to bar the passage of the Potomac against Jackson, and reach the field of battle before him, where the whole Federal army was going to attack Lee while thus deprived of more than one-third of his forces. A critic, who should fail to take into consideration the condition in which McClellan had found the troops whose command Pope had handed over to him, might perhaps blame him for having lost a few hours in the execution of this plan, to which the incapacity of the defenders of Harper's Ferry was to give a decided importance. But instead of condemning so trifling a delay, we feel convinced that impartial history will render justice to the really extraordinary results he obtained through his activity, the precision of his orders and the prestige of his name in leading to the pursuit of a victorious enemy the routed bands he had rallied ten days before in sight of the capital. He could not make them march with the regularity of tried veterans, nor could his lieutenants, notwithstanding their zeal, always conform strictly to the orders he gave them. It followed that Sumner, on the evening of the 13th, had not left Frederick, that only a single corps of the right wing, Reno's, had reached Middletown, while the greater

portion of the left wing was still on the banks of the Monocacy. The execution of the great movement, in fact, was only commenced on the morning of the 14th. The march of the heads of column of the enemy's army had not been unobserved by Lee, and their arrival at Middletown on the evening of the 13th had made him conscious of the danger that menaced him. Relying upon the slowness of the Federals, and the secrecy in which he believed he had shrouded his operations, he had been unwilling to detach any portion of his troops for the defence of the South Mountain passes, and simple rear-guards had been left in these passes by the corps which had passed through them, on their diverging march upon Harper's Ferry and Hagerstown, to guard them. But at the break of day on the 14th the Confederate general hastened to occupy them again in force, and had the good fortune to forestall the main body of the Federal army, which thus missed the opportunity of occupying them without striking a blow. Whilst McLaws, who had already reached the banks of the Potomac, was sending the largest portion of his division to the rear, with orders to defend Crampton's Gap at all hazards until Harper's Ferry should capitulate, Hill's division, followed by the whole of Longstreet's corps, returned in haste to Turner's Gap.

Reno, having left Middletown at daybreak on the 14th, arrived early at the foot of this defile, which Hill occupied alone with less than six thousand men. Situated between the two villages of Middletown and Boonsboro', at a distance of five kilometres from the former and three from the latter, Turner's Gap, or Frog's Gap, is a deep gorge opening in the South Mountain ridge. After rising to a height of nearly two hundred metres over slopes of considerable steepness, the road enters the gorge, where it winds among abrupt acclivities from one hundred to one hundred and fifty metres in height. This narrow gap can be defended by a handful of men; but the ridge it crosses not being inaccessible, it is upon that, and not upon the defile itself, that the real defence of the pass depends. Sixteen hundred metres north of the road the crest of the South Mountain rises, forming a scarped hill which commands the whole surrounding country; then it divides and encloses a valley which, as it deepens, forms a gradually in-

creasing obstacle between the two lines of heights. Two roads, one to the north of the defile, called the Hagerstown road, the other south of it, known as the Sharpsburg road, ascend the eastern ridge in successive *echelons*, winding among rocky acclivities, wooded eminences, large pasture clearings, and thus allow the first section of the gorge to be avoided. But the key to the whole position is the hill situated at the north, for it commands equally both ridges, while any attack from the south renders it necessary to carry each in succession.

It was, however, from this side that the Federals, not being well informed, approached the enemy. General Cox's division, composed of Ohio troops, and called the Kanawha division, as coming from West Virginia, reached the ground between nine and ten o'clock. It was the head of Reno's corps. Hill's right, which defended the ridge south of the pass, only consisted of Garland's brigade; its numerical inferiority, however, was fully compensated by the defensive advantages of the ground it occupied. After a long and fruitless cannonade, Cox made a vigorous attack, trying his utmost to flank its right. The Federals climbed the bare acclivities under a sharp fire, and sustained severe losses. They reached the summit of the ridge on the Sharpsburg road, first on the left, then at the centre. Garland returned to the charge, disputing its possession with them. But he was killed, and his soldiers were driven in disorder into the valley which separates the two ridges. The second was then at the mercy of the Federals, for Hill had but very few troops to defend it; and if they had been able to follow up their success, the pass would then have fallen into their hands. But Cox was still alone upon the ground; his troops had suffered cruelly, and he paused to wait for reinforcements. He thus enabled Garland's soldiers to reform on the opposite ridge, allowing a portion of Longstreet's corps, which was coming up at a quick pace, time to reinforce Hill's division. The Confederates soon resumed the offensive; but their efforts against Cox proved unavailing.

About two o'clock, Reno, with his second division, under Wilcox, reached the field of battle. Hooker's corps followed closely; McClellan and Burnside directed the movements of their troops in person. Reno placed Wilcox on Cox's right, at the extremity

of the ridge, whence he commanded the depths of the defile, whilst, at the same time, McClellan ordered Hooker to proceed north of the road and attack with one of his divisions the enemy's left, which occupied the Hagerstown road, and the hill commanding the whole field of battle. But before the troops had time to take their positions the enemy renewed the conflict and violently attacked Wilcox's division, which was in the act of deploying. He opened fire at one hundred and fifty metres in so unexpected a manner that the Federal line was for a moment thrown into great disorder, and several of their guns were even abandoned by the gunners. But when the Confederates advanced to seize these guns, the Seventy-ninth New York and Seventeenth Michigan returned to the charge and overwhelmed them. This return movement was the more creditable to these two regiments, because the second was composed of soldiers who had only seen one month's service. Under favor of this success, Wilcox re-formed his division, and occupied the disputed ground, not without paying dear for its possession. In the mean time, Hooker had led Meade's division (formerly Reynolds') to meet the enemy; Hatch's division (formerly King's) formed on his left; that of Ricketts, which followed at a distance, would extend, if necessary, to the extreme right. It was four o'clock. McClellan gave the signal for a general attack. The whole line was put in motion, but it met with a vigorous resistance, for Longstreet had arrived with a portion of his army corps, and was determined at all hazards to prevent the assailants from debouching to the west of South Mountain before Harper's Ferry should surrender, and before Lee should have time to unite his divided army. The Federals, however, being more numerous, full of ardor and skilfully handled, were soon successful at every point. On the left the main effort was made by Wilcox's division, which carried the slopes above the turnpike; it was supported by the division of Sturgis, and later by that of Rodman, both belonging to Reno's corps. The success of the Unionists on this side, however, was not decisive, for they were not yet masters of the second ridge, at the foot of which they were still fighting at the approach of night. But the ground they had gained north of the battle-field had given them control of the pass. In fact, Meade on the right and Hatch on

the left of the Hagerstown road had carried everything before them. The combat had been spirited, the belligerents had engaged at short musket-range, and steep acclivities had been scaled; a long time detained inside of a clearing full of rocks, behind which the enemy's sharpshooters were sheltered, Hatch's division had at last surmounted all these obstacles. In the centre Gibbon had ascended by the main road up to the entrance of the defile, where he had an engagement in which he obtained the advantage. At last the first ridge was taken, as well as the hill which commands it. The second ridge, thus commanded, was turned, and with it the whole of Longstreet's position. If there had yet remained a few hours of daylight, McClellan, who saw Sumner's corps already arriving, might have crossed the mountain and inflicted an irreparable disaster upon his adversary. But it was seven o'clock in the evening, and it was now the 14th of September; darkness soon shrouded the valleys and ridges of South Mountain. The battle was still going on at the left, and the Federals at this moment sustained a serious loss—Reno, a brave and intelligent officer, was killed by one of the enemy's skirmishers; neither side, however, could any longer gain ground, and the fire gradually died away in the shadows of the night. Sumner, passing to the front line soon after, took the place of Burnside's troops upon the ground which they had conquered.

The battle of Turner's Gap had cost the Federals three hundred and twelve men killed, one thousand two hundred and thirty-four wounded, and twenty-two prisoners; the Confederates lost about as many in killed and wounded, and besides, fifteen or sixteen hundred prisoners. This was an important success for McClellan, which restored confidence to his soldiers and opened to him at the same time the entrance to the valley of the Antietam, where he hoped to strike his adversary before Jackson should have returned from Harper's Ferry. If he had been able to begin the battle sooner, he would have inflicted upon Hill, who was isolated, a much more serious reverse, and by obtaining control of the South Mountain passes before night, he would have definitely prevented the junction of his adversaries. But the Federal general could not foresee the failures which were to result in the premature surrender of Harper's Ferry, and he had reason

to felicitate himself upon the result achieved and the unquestionable victory he had just obtained.

Franklin, in the mean while, with the left wing of his army, had also been obliged to force his way through the mountain passes, and at the same hour that the contest was raging around Turner's Gap, he had fought a similar battle at Crampton's Gap. He reached the village of Burkettsville at noon, at the foot of this defile, which he found occupied by three brigades of McLaws' division, under the orders of Howell Cobb, formerly a member of Congress, well known in the political struggles which had preceded the civil war. Here also it was through the accessible ridge of South Mountain, which could not be approached directly by the road, that a passage had to be effected. The Confederates were established on this ridge, fully determined to defend it to the last extremity. Franklin deployed the two small divisions, the only troops he had with him, Slocum on the right of the road and Smith on the left. A stone wall which extended along the base of the mountains served at first as a *point d'appui* to the Confederate line. Dislodged from this shelter, Cobb re-formed his troops on the ridge, where he was supported by his artillery; the latter, however, could not prevent the Federals from reaching the summit. Bartlett's brigade of Slocum's division was foremost in the attack, and suffered the heaviest losses. The Federals ended by seizing all the positions of the enemy. Masters of the Crampton's Gap pass, which Cobb had naturally abandoned, together with the heights that commanded it, they emerged into Pleasant Valley. Proceeding rapidly down this valley, their heads of column bivouacked for the night at five kilometres only from Maryland Heights—that commanding position on the left bank of the Potomac which the defenders of Harper's Ferry should have preserved at all hazards, and where Franklin fully expected to join them. This hope was to be cruelly disappointed. The brilliant combat of Crampton's Gap had cost the two small divisions of Slocum and Smith one hundred and fifteen killed, four hundred and sixteen wounded, and only two prisoners. The losses of the Confederates, who had made a gallant defence, were also considerable, and they left, besides four hundred prisoners, one field-piece and three flags in the hands of their adversaries. As

at Turner's Gap, the success of the Federals would undoubtedly have been more complete if it had been achieved a little sooner. If Smith and Slocum had arrived early before Crampton's Gap by marching a few kilometres farther the previous evening—if Couch, by following them closer, had shortened the battle through his intervention—Franklin would probably have come within sight of Harper's Ferry on the very evening of the 14th, and his presence at this juncture would have indeed changed the issue of the sad drama which was being enacted there. But as we have already remarked, the expression of this regret, in view of the success of the Federal army, cannot, without injustice, be brought as a reproach against its commanders, who had on their hands the double task of marching and reorganizing their battalions. The two battles of Turner's Gap and Crampton's Gap, having been fought on the same day and not far from each other, took the common name of the battle of South Mountain. The total losses sustained in this first encounter on the soil of Maryland was two thousand one hundred and one on the side of the Federals, and about four thousand on that of the Confederates.

In order to convey an idea of the evolutions in the game of which Harper's Ferry was the stake, we must relate in detail the movements of the Confederates, and to this effect go back a few days. We have seen Lee on the 9th of September forming his plans for investing this place, and putting his whole army in motion on the morning of the 10th. Whilst Longstreet, followed by the baggage, the parks of the army and Hill's division, was proceeding toward Boonesboro', McLaws was marching toward Maryland Heights. Walker crossed the Potomac, so as to seize Loudon Heights, while Jackson, describing a large circuit, crossed the river at Williamsport, and descended it again on the right bank, thus to close the circle which was to surround Harper's Ferry. But these complicated movements, despite the energy of the officers who had them in charge, experienced a delay of one day; and that day was sufficient to ensure the safety of the Union troops. Indeed, Jackson had been obliged to deploy his army on the right bank of the Potomac in order to cut off the retreat of the garrison of Martinsburg, which would otherwise have escaped to the west. He had thus organized a kind of grand hunt-

ing-match through the lower valley of Virginia, driving all the Federal detachments before him, and forcing them to crowd into the blind alley of Harper's Ferry. But it was not until eleven o'clock on the morning of the 13th that he made his appearance before the declivity of Bolivar Heights. Walker had established himself the day before on Loudon Heights, which he had found unoccupied, while McLaws had only reached the foot of Maryland Heights at a late hour on the 12th. He had only been able on that evening to engage in a harmless musketry fire with the Federals who were posted there, and had been compelled to postpone the attack till the next day.

On the 13th, the day on which McClellan found Lee's order of march, the Federal troops cooped up at Harper's Ferry numbered fourteen thousand men, two thousand of whom were cavalry, with seventy-three field-pieces. On the approach of Jackson, General White, who had assembled all the detachments scattered through the valley of the Shenandoah at Martinsburg, brought them to Harper's Ferry, placing himself under the orders of Colonel Miles, who was in command of that post. With this small army, Miles had nothing to fear from his adversaries; for, having control of the bridge of boats which connected Harper's Ferry with the opposite side of the river, he could concentrate all his forces on Maryland Heights, and maintain himself in that position for an almost indefinite period. He could even have attacked McLaws with a numerically superior force, and perhaps have crushed him before Jackson, who was separated from his lieutenant by the river, could have come to his assistance. But, from the beginning, the incapacity of Miles and the weakness of his subordinates created a great deal of confusion among the defenders of the place, and disheartened everybody. At a short distance from Maryland Heights there is a most difficult pass called Solomon's Gap, where McLaws could have been held in check for a long time. Miles was unwilling to occupy it. He had done nothing to fortify Maryland Heights, although McClellan had already given special instructions to that effect previous to the Peninsula campaign; he did not even furnish the necessary tools to improvise parapets, but contented himself with leaving Colonel Ford with two or three thousand men in the place

without any directions. Construing Halleck's orders literally, he obstinately shut himself up in the village of Harper's Ferry, and, in order to concentrate himself in this place more effectually, did not hesitate to sacrifice Maryland Heights, which formed its citadel.

On the morning of Saturday the 13th, McLaws attacked this position. The ridge of South Mountain, in stretching down to the Potomac, forms a succession of *echelons*. The last of these, which commands the river in front of Harper's Ferry, alone bears the name of Maryland Heights. At the same distance in the rear there is a more elevated ridge, which extends northward as far as Solomon's Gap. The Federals had intersected the ridge with a wooden breastwork, constructed in haste. The northern extremity was only occupied by a small detachment, which McLaws drove back in taking possession of the defile. Following the ridge, he encountered the Federals, who had rushed forward to meet him, and drove them back to their entrenchments in disorder. After receiving some reinforcements, he renewed the attack about nine o'clock in the morning. The Union troops, protected by the breastwork, inflicted at first considerable losses upon the assailants, but soon gave way to a disgraceful panic and fled toward the lower *echelon*, abandoning to the enemy the position which they could have indefinitely defended with ease. Ford tried in vain to recapture it; his soldiers were unable to climb the acclivities, which their comrades had descended so rapidly, under the enemy's fire. He nevertheless remained in possession of Maryland Heights, while his adversaries, not profiting by the advantage thus acquired, suffered the rest of the day to pass without seriously molesting him. McLaws was unwilling to advance too far without being sure that Jackson was before Bolivar. It was well he acted thus; for during the night he was informed by Lee of McClellan's march, and received orders to dispute the mountain passes with the Federals. He therefore sent Cobb with a large portion of his forces to Crampton's Gap, where we have seen him contending with Franklin on the 14th, and he remained in person to watch Harper's Ferry with but the number of troops strictly necessary to occupy the heights he had so easily carried the day before. Meanwhile, by a strange coincidence, at the very

moment when McClellan's approach prevented McLaws from seizing the prey which he held almost within his grasp, Maryland Heights were spontaneously abandoned by their defenders. During the night of the 13th-14th, while McLaws' movement was being counter-ordered from headquarters, Ford was bringing back his troops to Harper's Ferry, astonished and mortified at so fatal a retreat. The greatest portion of the 14th, however, passed without any attempt on the part of McLaws to come out of the position he had conquered the day previous. Maryland Heights thus remained unoccupied between the two armies, and some Federal soldiers were enabled to scale them with impunity, to carry off the four guns that had been abandoned at the moment of retreat. It was only at two o'clock in the afternoon that McLaws decided at last to plant himself on the heights; he placed a few light field-pieces in position, not so much for the purpose of participating in the combat taking place on the other side of the river, as to be able to make Jackson aware of his presence.

The latter had, in fact, been waiting since the 13th for Harper's Ferry to be completely invested, and every avenue of egress closed against its defenders, in order to commence the attack. His officers of the signal corps had hitherto waved their little flags in vain; no answer had come from Maryland Heights. As soon as McLaws had shown himself, Jackson gave orders for feeling the extreme left of the Bolivar works. But before attempting a decisive assault, it was necessary to wait until Walker had hoisted his guns upon the steep acclivities of Loudon Heights. This first attack, therefore, was not intended to be decisive. Toward sunset, however, Jackson, taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's line of defence along the ridge of Bolivar Heights was very much extended, and consequently very weak, carried a great portion of those heights. During the night he placed most of his field-pieces in position himself; the remainder, having been conveyed across the Shenandoah, were planted at the foot of Loudon Heights, so as to take the Federals, whom the infantry were to attack in front, between the two rivers, in the rear. When the protecting shadows of night fell over the defenders of Harper's Ferry, the situation, as may be perceived, was extremely perilous; they had, however, one chance of safety still left, for they could pro-

long their resistance for at least a portion of the following morning, and might thus have secured their deliverance at the cost of some sacrifice. But an invincible enemy was in their ranks. Disorder and discouragement deprived the commanders of all presence of mind, and their still numerous troops of all energy. They were conquered before they had fought. During the evening Walker had succeeded in planting his batteries on Loudon Heights, and as soon as daylight appeared he opened, simultaneously with McLaws, a plunging fire upon Harper's Ferry, the amphitheatre of which seemed to have been arranged expressly to serve as a target. Jackson on his side cannonaded the Federal batteries from Bolivar Heights. This was enough to put an end to a contest so feebly sustained. The bombardment had not lasted one hour when Miles called his corps commanders together, and announced to them his determination to capitulate. Every one assented. The situation, however, was so far from being desperate that the evening previous all the Federal cavalry had been able quietly to leave the place by the left bank of the river. Passing between McLaws and the rest of the Confederate army, it had reached Pennsylvania, and had even captured a convoy of Longstreet's corps on the way. If the eleven thousand five hundred men who were yet at Harper's Ferry after the cavalry had left had followed the same road, McLaws could not have barred their passage, and they would not have had to go far to effect a junction with Franklin. The latter, in fact, was only separated from them by four or five kilometres, and he did not cease firing alarm-guns to announce his approach.

But the distant echo of this friendly voice was unheard amid the thunder of the Confederate artillery, whose fire was becoming more and more vigorous, in order to hasten the capitulation of Harper's Ferry before the arrival of the reinforcements which were known to be at hand. It was one of those questions of a few hours—minutes, even—upon which at times hangs the issue of the most important events. If Miles had complied with the promise he had made to McClellan on the evening of the 13th—if, as the latter had requested him through an officer who had crossed the enemy's lines, he had held his ground till the evening of the 15th—he would have seen Franklin's heads of column appear on Mary-

land Heights, driving McLaws' weak forces before them, and the defenders of Harper's Ferry, by joining this army corps, would have increased his strength by more than ten thousand men. But Miles seemed to be in haste to consummate the disaster, and hoisted the white flag before eight o'clock in the morning. Fortunately for him, he did not survive this disgrace. The Confederates, not seeing the signal of surrender, fired a few shots more, the last of which killed this unfortunate officer.

Jackson, leaning against a tree, was sleeping soundly when A. P. Hill, approaching him, shook him for the purpose of introducing the Federal general White, who had come to settle the terms of the capitulation. "Unconditionally," murmured Jackson, and immediately sunk again into a deep sleep which had scarcely been interrupted. The Federals were so utterly disorganized and discouraged that this answer was to them an order which they could not gainsay. Before noon the Confederates entered Harper's Ferry, and received eleven thousand five hundred and eighty-three men as prisoners of war, with their arms and seventy-three pieces of artillery. Harper's Ferry was the counterpart of Donelson. This event did not have the same disastrous consequences to the Federals as Buckner's capitulation did to the Confederates; but if it did not involve the irretrievable loss of a whole State, it robbed them of the only opportunity, perhaps, of inflicting an irreparable defeat upon Lee's army.

CHAPTER IV.

ANTIETAM.

ON the morning of September 15th, while Franklin was resuming his march toward Harper's Ferry, ignorant of the disaster we have just related, McClellan was quickening the pace of the long columns that were filing through the ensanguined gorges of Turner's Gap. The enemy had abandoned during the night the positions which the darkness had alone enabled him to hold the day before, while D. H. Hill, preceded by Longstreet, was hastily falling back toward Boonsboro'. This village is situated at a point where the Middletown road, after descending from Turner's Gap, divides into four branches; one is a continuation of the main road to the west-north-west, toward Williamsport; another, running to the south-west, strikes the Potomac near Sharpsburg; the third, to the north-west, leads to Hagerstown; and the last, to the south-east, is that of Rohrersville. The first three cross the Antietam, which flows directly south from Hagerstown to the Potomac. The hills bordering this small river lie parallel to the crests of South Mountain; they have neither the elevation nor steep acclivities of that chain, but are the more easily defended, because the Antietam, sluggish and deep, has only a small number of fords, that are almost impassable. Having been unable to defend South Mountain, Lee was obliged to halt in the rear of this water-course to hold McClellan in check and wait for Jackson. The rapid march of the Federal army compelled him to fight before resuming his project of invading Pennsylvania. By continuing his march upon Hagerstown, as he had originally intended, he gave McClellan an opportunity to place himself between him and the conquerors of Harper's Ferry. It was essential, above all, to draw near them, which obliged him to hug the shore of the Potomac, while his heads of column,

turning to the left at Boonesboro', proceeded in the direction of Sharpsburg. He thus found himself within the acute angle formed by the Potomac and the Antietam, and was only nineteen kilometres from Harper's Ferry. His front was covered by a difficult stream, and he could recross the river behind him, if he should be vanquished in the defensive battle he was preparing to fight, or if Jackson should need his assistance. If victorious, he could at his option either enter Pennsylvania or drive McClellan back upon South Mountain and Washington. On the morning of the 15th he established himself in this excellent position.

Meanwhile, McClellan, who displayed great activity, was following him very close. A brilliant skirmish marked the entrance of his cavalry into Boonesboro'. He was in hopes of being able to attack the Confederates the same day, the 15th, for he was aware that Lee had only D. H. Hill and Longstreet with him, and that the remainder of his army could not yet have joined him. But he also knew almost certainly that Harper's Ferry had capitulated, and that consequently the indefatigable Jackson must already be on the march to join his chief. In fact, he had learnt from Franklin that at eight o'clock that very day the cannonade around Harper's Ferry had suddenly ceased, and that very shortly after he had met a considerable number of the enemy's forces in Pleasant Valley. In the presence of these forces he had halted, justly deeming it too late to attempt to rescue Miles' troops, and imprudent to proceed farther in that direction. Upon this intelligence McClellan immediately ordered his lieutenant to come back, directing him to follow the Boonesboro' road; and the distance the latter had to overcome led him to hope that he would be able to unite the greater portion of the army before Jackson, on his side, should join the enemy. At all events, Lee's movement upon Sharpsburg rendered the chances in the race between Jackson and Franklin about equal, and the junction of these two corps with their respective armies was the aim of all the manœuvres which were to result in a great contest on the borders of the Antietam. Lee knew it as well as his adversary; he was therefore waiting with great impatience to hear from Jackson. At last the news came to Sharpsburg of the capitulation of Harper's Ferry and its twelve thousand defenders. The

Confederate army looked upon this success as an evidence of its good fortune, and derived from it fresh confidence in its superiority over adversaries who had made so poor a defence. As to its chief, it afforded him above all a guarantee of the near approach of Jackson, without whose presence he would undoubtedly have been obliged to recross the Potomac immediately. He sent him orders to come back with all possible haste; and Jackson, leaving A. P. Hill to attend to the execution of the capitulation, started on that very day with his two other divisions under Lawton and Starke. The remainder of the troops—Anderson's, McLaws' and Walker's divisions—which had been united under his command, were to follow, and rejoin him as soon as possible at Sharpsburg. Thoroughly convinced of the necessity of promptly reinforcing the main body of the army, he left nearly fifteen thousand men behind him, in order to proceed himself to the front with about eight or nine thousand; and imposing upon his tired soldiers a fatiguing night-march, he reached Sharpsburg on the 16th, early in the morning.

He arrived in time, for McClellan had not been able to attack Lee's positions the day previous. Two weeks only had elapsed since he had taken command of this army, or rather this disorganized mob. He had not been able to transform it sufficiently to secure that regularity and perseverance in the march which even more than steadiness under fire constitutes the superiority of old troops. When, therefore, he reached the borders of the Antietam on the afternoon of the 15th, he had only two divisions with him, those of Sykes and Richardson, belonging to Sumner's corps. The obstructions of the road, the fatigue of the soldiers, want of exactitude on the part of some of the commanders and the indifference of others, had kept back the rest of the army, which stretched out in interminable columns between Boonesboro' and Antietam. It was impossible for him to attack twenty thousand men strongly posted behind a river with only two divisions. He was therefore obliged to postpone the battle till the following day, and to limit himself to reconnoitring the enemy's positions and selecting those he intended his troops to occupy as they should come up. On the morning of the 16th the Federal line was not yet completely formed.

Lee on his part, as we have stated, had not stirred, and at the moment when the Union troops were deploying in his front, through the rich crops that reached down to the steep banks of the Antietam, Jackson was bringing him the moral support of his presence with the reinforcement of two divisions. The situation of the Confederate army, however, was very critical, and its commander must have been a most resolute man not to have recrossed the Potomac under cover of the night, and sought a more favorable position in the valley of Virginia. The invasion which this army had undertaken with so much confidence was, in fact, interrupted. Driven to the frontier of Maryland, it was reduced to the defensive and compelled to fight, with a river at its back, against an adversary who possessed a vast numerical superiority over it. Moreover, the rapid movements which had brought it from the Rapidan to the Potomac had not been performed without great sacrifices. The main body of the army had marched forward; but like those comets which, we are told, leave a portion of their substance in the region of space, it had left a swarm of stragglers behind which had increased at every stage. These were the sick, men utterly broken down, lame, or exhausted for want of food, but still animated by the desire and sustained by the hope of joining their more able-bodied comrades, in order to participate in their glorious labors. Every army is followed by such a tail; but in this respect Lee had an immense advantage over McClellan in Virginia. Whilst the latter beheld his stragglers repulsed in every direction, tracked and captured by partisans, and sometimes even treacherously murdered, those belonging to the Confederate army found everywhere shelter, food, together with the care and encouragement calculated to renew their strength. Their coat was a passport which secured to them the sympathies of all the inhabitants and the means of joining their respective corps. Consequently, they were soon seen rushing in crowds to the shores of the Potomac, but only to learn that their comrades had entered Maryland. They could not follow them thither, for the river was to them an insurmountable obstacle; the Confederate army had disappeared on the other side, and the Federal pickets had again taken possession of the opposite bank, which they guarded with care. But Lee had left written

directions in all the habitations adjoining the place through which he passed, directing them to rally at Winchester, which he intended to make his base of operations. For a few days the passes of the Blue Ridge were thronged with these men, numbering, it is said, from twenty to thirty thousand, who were struggling with great difficulty to reach the rendezvous which had been indicated to them. The booming of cannon in the direction of Harper's Ferry, the distant echo of which resounded through the deep gorges of the Alleghanies, hastened their uncertain steps; for if their band no longer constituted an army, it still contained many gallant soldiers. These, however, were of no use to Lee so long as the campaign was prosecuted in Maryland. To their number must be added the killed, wounded and sick; so that the Confederate army, reduced by one-half when it crossed the Potomac, had then less than forty thousand combatants.* In short, the long marches and frequent privations had greatly debilitated the combatants themselves. In consequence of insufficient means of transportation, the small amount of resources the Southern States were able to forward, and the defective system of the military administration, they were equally in want of provisions and ammunition. The latter especially, which had to be brought from Richmond without the aid of railroads, had become of infinite value to Lee, and its scarcity might be sufficient to embarrass all his movements.

He nevertheless determined to accept a battle on the soil he had invaded. The political causes which had rendered that invasion an imperative necessity did not admit of its being abandoned without trying the fortune of arms. Besides, the position chosen by Lee compensated to some extent for the numerical inferiority of his army. Obligated by the rapid manœuvres of McClellan to halt before having penetrated into Pennsylvania in force, he had abandoned Hagerstown and the upper course of the Antietam. We have described this stream as forming an acute angle with the Potomac in its general course; the peninsula comprised between these two water-courses is contracted through a large bend in the

* In his report General Lee gives the figure as thirty-three thousand; but other documents lead us to believe that, according to the practice of the Confederates, the actual strength of his army had been underrated.

second, which, inclining eastward before their point of confluence, approaches within four kilometres of the valley of the Antietam. It was in this peninsula that Lee awaited McClellan's attack. Its centre is occupied by the small town of Sharpsburg; the ground is extremely undulating, bristling with rocks, about equally covered with woods and cultivated fields, and interspersed by a large number of farms and cabins. Four principal roads start from Sharpsburg. One, to the north, crossing the isthmus between the Antietam and the Potomac, runs in the direction of Hagerstown. The second, to the south-west, leads to Sheppardstown, on the right side of the river, by an excellent ford in dry weather. The third, to the south-east, leads to Rohrersville, crossing the Antietam over a stone bridge at a distance of sixteen hundred metres from Sharpsburg. The fourth, to the north-east, leads to Boonesboro', through Keedysville, a village situated on the other side of the Antietam, and crosses this stream sixteen hundred metres above the preceding one. It was by the last road that the first two divisions of the army of the Potomac had emerged on the evening of the 15th, in front of the enemy's positions. Among the numerous roads of less importance which furrow the peninsula, we must mention two—that of Harper's Ferry, which winds along the left bank of the Potomac, crossing the Antietam near its mouth, and that which connects Williamsport, a large village situated higher up on the Potomac, with this same village of Keedysville. Before crossing the Hagerstown pike, this road crosses the Antietam four kilometres above the bridge of the Sharpsburg and Keedysville road—that is to say, nearly on a line with the point where the isthmus commences. There are consequently four stone bridges spanning the Antietam. Those of the roads from Boonesboro' through Keedysville, from Rohrersville and Harper's Ferry, are thrown across the river in that portion of its course where it is no longer fordable; they present, therefore, the only practicable passages for surmounting this obstacle; they are very narrow, difficult of access, and entirely commanded by the heights on the right bank. Setting aside the one situated at the lowest point as too distant to be dangerous, Lee had only to guard the two other bridges in order to effectually cover his front on that side. Above the bridge of

the Sharpsburg and Keedysville road, on the contrary, there were several fords quite accessible at that season of the year. Consequently, instead of seeking to defend this part of the Antietam, and thereby extend his left in a dangerous manner, Lee had drawn back the latter *en potence* in the direction of the Potomac, thus closing the isthmus and resting the extremity of his line upon the river. On the evening of the 15th he had as yet only succeeded in posting two brigades of Longstreet's corps on that side commanded by Hood; for, as we have said, he had then only twenty thousand men with him, and had remained with the main body of his forces in front of the positions that McClellan was beginning to occupy. Longstreet and Hill had deployed on the heights bordering the Antietam, the former on the right and the latter on the left of the Boonsboro' road; the ground they had chosen was admirably adapted for defensive purposes. From the summit of the hills, which rose on the other bank of the Antietam, whence McClellan was watching him, this ground appeared smooth and quite open; but in reality it was extremely uneven, rendering any combined manœuvres difficult. The centre of the Confederate positions was marked by a modest wooden church destined to witness a carnage equal to that which had imparted such terrible celebrity to the church of Shiloh. Situated at an equal distance—about sixteen or eighteen hundred metres—from the Potomac, the Antietam and the town of Sharpsburg, Dunker Church stands west of the Hagerstown turnpike, near the junction of an important cross-road leading in a north-easterly direction and a thick wood which skirts the road at this point. Beyond, toward Hagerstown, the road encounters a vast oval clearing, about thirteen hundred metres in length, almost entirely surrounded by woods. To the west the edge of this clearing only swerves for about three or four hundred metres from the road, to rejoin and follow it again for some distance; to the east this same skirt describes a large arc, intersecting the cross-road at a distance of about one kilometre from Dunker Church. It was in this clearing, and the two woods extending, one west of the turnpike, the other between the turnpike and the cross-road, that the contest was to be fiercest. The two woods are interspersed with rocks, affording an easy shelter to sharpshooters; but beyond it,

north and west, between these woods and the Potomac, there is a chain of hills whose bare slopes command these woods, taking them completely in reverse. The ground between Dunker Church and the Antietam is equally difficult ; but immediately on coming out of the wood which intersects the cross-road, we find ourselves in sight of the hills skirting the left bank of the Antietam, and commanded by them. At four or five hundred metres from Dunker Church a sunken road strikes the cross-road to the east, following a south-easterly direction, and, after several zigzags, connects with the road from Sharpsburg to Keedysville. Such was the ground selected by Lee. It will be observed that if on the evening of the 15th he appeared to neglect his left, he could, with troops taken from his right, forestall McClellan at this point, the latter being obliged to make a large circuit in order to reach the Antietam fords. Then, having only two bridges on the right and a narrow isthmus on the left to defend, he was always at liberty, in case of a reverse, to recross the Potomac at the Sheppardstown ford.

On the morning of the 16th the whole Federal army was assembled on the borders of the Antietam, with the exception of the two divisions of the Sixth corps and those of Couch and Morrell. From the morning of the 15th, Franklin, with the first three divisions, had, in fact, allowed himself to be deceived by McLaws. When the cannonade, ceasing at Harper's Ferry, had revealed to him the surrender of the place, he had very leisurely proceeded up Pleasant Valley, halting at Brownsville. McLaws, despite his numerical inferiority, had followed him step by step, while Franklin, still imagining that he was confronted by forces superior to his own, passed the whole day of the 16th in watching the enemy, in a condition of fatal inaction. As to Morrell's division, it had left Boonesboro' on the morning of the 16th to march toward the Antietam, under the immediate direction of Porter. In the course of this same morning Jackson arrived at Sharpsburg through Sheppardstown, with the two divisions of Starke and Lawton, or rather the remnants of these two divisions, for they did not together number more than four thousand men. The advantage of concentration was, therefore, still in favor of McClellan ; for the divisions of McLaws, Anderson and

A. P. Hill—that is to say, more than one-third of Lee's army—were still on the right side of the Potomac; the opportunity for making a sudden and decisive attack, which had been lost the day before, presented itself again to the Federal commander, and the very elements seemed to conspire in his favor. The scorching day of the 15th had been followed by one of those clear, fresh nights which, in that climate of opposite extremes, announce the approach of autumn, and from early dawn on the 16th a thick fog, rising from the humid plains which border the Potomac and the Antietam, enveloped both armies in an impenetrable veil. This mist would have concealed the movements of McClellan if he had been ready, and enabled him to mass all his forces upon such a point of the enemy's line as he might have thought proper to attack; it was, however, only the cause of fresh delays for the Federal army. The latter, in fact, had only taken its positions for battle after the very tardy arrival of the ammunition trains; and when ready to march, it had to wait until the sun had dissipated the mist, and had lighted up the passes of the Antietam, which it had not been possible to reconnoitre the day before. Precious time was thus lost, and half the day had already passed before McClellan was able to fix upon his plan of battle. Meanwhile, his several corps had deployed along the heights which border the valley of the Antietam to the east, and kept up a brisk artillery combat with the Confederates. Burnside, with the Ninth corps, occupied the hills south of the Rohrersville road. On those over which the Keedysville road passed were ranged in first line Sykes' division on the left of the road, and Richardson's on the right, in the position they had taken the day previous. The other two divisions of Sumner's corps were massed in rear of Richardson. More to the right, Hooker, with the heads of column of his first division, had also planted himself the evening before upon the heights whence the road from Keedysville to Williamsport, inclining to the right, descends toward the Antietam. The remainder of his army corps had joined him during the night. He was closely followed by Mansfield's small corps, which had halted behind him. Finally, Pleasanton with his cavalry already occupied the fords and the upper bridge of the Antietam. Thus McClellan had then in hand thirteen divisions of infantry and

one of cavalry, raising the nominal effective to sixty-six thousand men, no less than forty-five or fifty thousand of whom were certainly ready for battle.

Lee, who had scarcely more than twenty-five thousand men to oppose him, had confined himself to rectifying his line of battle. Longstreet formed his right and D. H. Hill his centre; both occupied the hills which commanded the Keedysville and Rohrersville roads; the general-in-chief had concentrated nearly all his artillery in front of them, so as to cover the passes of the Antietam against all attacks on that side. Hood, at the head of two brigades, guarded the important position of Dunker Church on the extreme left. Jackson, with his two small divisions, had been posted in the vast space which separated Hood's right at Dunker Church from Hill's left on the Antietam, so as to connect them as far as possible.

From early dawn both sides waited for the signal of battle; and whenever a slight clearing of the fog permitted, the hostile batteries posted on each side of the river exchanged their murderous salutations. At last, toward two o'clock, McClellan's plan was decided upon; the positions were reconnoitered, the orders given, and Hooker put his troops in motion. He was to cross the Antietam at the fords and the upper bridge, which were already in possession of the Federal cavalry, and come by way of the isthmus to attack the left flank of the enemy. He was not, however, to be alone in this movement, for it was against that point that McClellan directed his main effort. Recognizing the difficulty of charging the enemy's positions in front, and carrying the Antietam passes, he resolved to turn them. Burnside, with the Ninth corps, was to remain alone across the Rohrersville road, Sykes' division facing the bridge of the Keedysville road; and all the other troops present on the ground—that is to say, Mansfield's and Sumner's corps, commanded by the latter—were to hold themselves ready to cross the Antietam in the rear of Hooker, and to support him in his attack. The latter met Jackson's outposts on the cross-road we have before mentioned, three kilometres on the other side of the Antietam. The Confederate sharpshooters were promptly supported by Hood, who had hastened from Dunker Church, and the battle was engaged in the woods sur-

rounding the large clearing adjoining this church to the north and east. But as nearly the whole day had been devoted to the preparations for battle, this first engagement began very late, and the combatants were soon separated by the darkness. Owing to the facilities offered by the ground, the resistance encountered by Hooker had been very spirited; and the extension of the Federal columns, as the consequence of a rapid march, did not permit the assailants to engage all their troops.

Mansfield's corps crossed the Antietam during the night, and took position at a distance of two kilometres in rear of Hooker's. Sumner was to follow him at daybreak at the head of the second corps. Franklin, with the divisions of Smith and Slocum, was to leave his bivouac in Pleasant Valley at six o'clock in the morning; taking the Keedysville road, he would be able to reach the field of battle toward ten o'clock. Porter, with his second division, Morrell's, was also to reach it in the course of the morning. The entire Federal army, except Couch's division, would then be concentrated on the Antietam, and the opportunity for crushing a divided enemy—an opportunity which it could not seize on the evening of the 15th nor during the whole of the 16th—would perhaps again present itself early on the 17th. Indeed, McLaws, A. P. Hill and Anderson were yet at some distance from Sharpsburg, on the right bank of the Potomac. Lee, who had easily fathomed the plan of his adversary, reinforced his left wing. Jackson, separating himself from the centre, came to relieve Hood's brigades in the woods they had so stubbornly defended the previous evening, and in which they had sustained great losses. The centre, formed by D. H. Hill, was to support him if necessary.

Without losing an instant, Hooker renewed his attack against the adversary he had been feeling the day previous, imparting to his soldiers that dash which constituted him so good a division commander. McClellan desired to draw all the enemy's forces to the environs of Dunker Church, and thus to compel him to weaken his centre and right, and then to take advantage of it to enable Burnside to carry the bridge of the Rohrersville road over the Antietam. Having once control of this crossing, the Federals, who were menacing Sharpsburg and the Williamsport ford,

could compel the Confederates to a speedy retreat. The numerical superiority of his army enabled McClellan to attempt such a manœuvre; but in order that the attack of his left might prove successful, and enable him to gather in this direction the fruits of the battle fought on the extreme right, it required a degree of precision in the movements of his troops upon which he could not rely.

On the morning of the 17th a brilliant sun, unobscured by the slightest fog, shed a flood of light upon the woods which separate the Antietam from the Potomac. Hooker deployed his three divisions, Doubleday on the right, Ricketts on the left and Meade in the centre. The latter was the first to encounter the small division of Starke, which had relieved Hood, and which, sheltering itself behind trees, rocks and wall fences, opposed a desperate resistance to the vigorous attack of the Federals. Meade's Pennsylvanians, inured by the severe ordeals of Beaver Dam, Gaines' Mill, Glendale and Manassas, charged the enemy with impetuosity. The possession of the wood was disputed with great spirit. The fierceness of the struggle was equal on both sides, and the losses enormous; nearly all the chiefs were cut down; and according to the statement of soldiers who participated in that contest, it was more sanguinary than any of those they had hitherto witnessed. But the efforts of Hooker's three divisions, all of which soon became engaged, were supported by the fire of the Federal batteries posted on the left bank of the Antietam, which enfiladed the feeble line of Jackson's soldiers. This distant fire could not inflict upon them a damage comparable to that of the incessant discharges of musketry to which they were exposed. In every war, however, the least danger on the flank frequently suffices to throw the combatants, exhausted and excited by the conflict, into confusion; and this was especially the case in the war we are describing, where the armies were wanting in that element of stability elsewhere furnished by veteran soldiers. At the expiration of an hour the Confederates were driven out of the wood; and crossing the large clearing, they rushed into the forest adjoining it on the east, beyond the Hagerstown pike, in search of shelter. Hooker followed them close, and debouched behind them in the open space, which was strewn with the dead, the wounded and

débris of every kind. But in this victorious march he counted upon too easy a success. This confidence, peculiar to his character, and which gave him so much dash, deceived him regarding the importance of the advantage he had just gained. He did not summon Mansfield to join him, who had been held in reserve in the positions he had occupied during the night. Simply bent on pushing forward, he neglected to take possession of the heights, which gradually receded from the Hagerstown turnpike. He would soon have cause to regret this; for those heights, forming the boundary of the belt of woods which surround the clearing of Dunker Church to the west, commanded the new positions in which the Confederates have sought refuge. Stuart's horse artillery soon occupied the first slopes, and sufficed to hold Doubleday's division in check. On the left Ricketts had encountered three brigades under D. H. Hill, which he had detached from the Confederate centre to support Jackson. In the clearing itself Meade, who remained alone, and was greatly weakened by the losses he had sustained, and the disorder that had introduced itself into most of his regiments, received a sharp fire of musketry as he approached the Hagerstown road. Jackson had caused Lawton to advance with the division he held in reserve near Dunker Church, to the relief of Starke. Posted at the edge of the wood, these fresh troops opened a murderous fire upon the Federals, who, being without shelter, halted and fell back. Lawton, perceiving some hesitation in their thinned ranks, at once resumed the offensive, supported by Starke's soldiers, who had formed again into line. The first line of the Federals was broken; but fortunately for it, Mansfield arrived at that instant to its support. Summoned by Hooker when he had met with such unexpected resistance near Dunker Church, this vigorous old man had hastened to the rescue at the head of his troops. It was seven o'clock in the morning. The reinforcement was opportune, for Hooker's corps was melting away visibly. Its chief, however, would not give up the hope of victory. He re-formed his shattered line, recalled Hartsuff to the centre, with the best brigade of Doubleday, and returned to the charge. He reached once more the edge of the wood; but there again all his efforts failed. Mansfield resumed the offensive—it was high time—and deployed his two

divisions in a semicircle in the centre of the clearing. On the left, in the woods adjoining it to the east, Green, with one of these divisions, attacked Hill's troops, who were sustaining the combat against Ricketts. On the right, Williams, resting against the Hagerstown turnpike, quickly crossed it, and tried to carry the woods and the hill which stretched to the west, in order to flank and thus take in reverse the defenders of Dunker Church. Jackson's troops gave way before this new attack. They had witnessed the fall of their two division commanders, Starke and Lawton, who had recently been called to this post of honor and danger, where the succession was very rapid. The first was killed, the second wounded. Many other generals and nearly all the colonels had also been wounded. Some brigades had left one-third, others one-half, of their effective force on the ground. Jackson's corps was annihilated for the time.

The Federal losses, however, were equally heavy. Mansfield had been killed at the beginning of the action. His two small divisions, composed partly of soldiers who had only enlisted within a few days, had already lost a considerable portion of their number on the march. Exposed to a very violent fire, they paid dearly for their success. On the right, along the slopes of the hill which commanded the wood, Williams had found wall fences, and in the wood itself ridges of rock, affording an easy shelter to the enemy's sharpshooters, and obstructing his march.

Lee, in the mean while, feeling all the importance of the struggle that was going on in that direction, and wishing to sustain his left at all hazards, did not hesitate to strip his centre entirely, and sent D. H. Hill with the rest of his division to Jackson's assistance. Hood, who had been held in reserve since the day previous, joined him, and these two generals resumed the offensive, Hood against Williams, Hill against Green.

The remnants of Hooker's corps were fighting in line of battle with Mansfield's two divisions, but before this new attack the Federals were obliged to abandon the open ground they occupied; they retired as far as the wood from which a few hours before they had dislodged Starke's division. Hooker was severely wounded and carried off the battle-field where he had fought so gallantly. Hartsuff and Crawford had fallen as well as he. The soldiers,

deprived of nearly all their commanders, grouped at random to resume from behind the trees a musketry fire against the enemy. The artillery, that arm for which the volunteers of the North always displayed a peculiar aptitude, sustained the battle with great stubbornness; there was a moment when a single battery was sufficient to cover the whole of Hooker's centre. On the left, however, Green had not quitted his hold, but maintained himself in the woods, which extend from that side as far as Dunker Church. But the exhausted combatants on both sides were waiting for reinforcements to resume the offensive, for it appeared that the fate of the battle was to be decided within this narrow space of ground.

On the side of the Federals, Sumner had crossed the river at daybreak, following Hooker, and was marching rapidly, directing his course by the sound of the cannon. Lee had only left two divisions of Longstreet's corps—that is to say, from nine to ten thousand men—to guard the entire line of the Antietam, and he could not detach another man. Fortunately for him, McLaws, having outstripped Franklin, came to join him, after having twice crossed the Potomac, and this timely reinforcement was immediately directed upon Dunker Church.

Sumner, however, reached the field of battle before him, and the presence of the Second corps was likely to restore victory to the Federals. It was nine o'clock; the opportunity was favorable for attacking in front the positions of the Confederates on the Antietam, which Lee had stripped for the purpose of sending a portion of their defenders to the left. Porter with Morrell's force rejoined Sykes' division, and thus formed the centre of the Federal line, while Burnside with the Ninth corps, thirteen thousand strong, occupied the left. McClellan, who from a commanding point overlooked the whole front of his army on both sides of the Antietam, had as early as eight o'clock, just as Hood had resumed the offensive, despatched an order to Burnside directing him to commence the assault, carry the bridge and attack Longstreet on the other side. Unfortunately, Burnside, instead of conforming to this order by making a general attack, contented himself with sending Crook's small brigade against the defenders of the bridge. This movement was only supported by two regi-

ments of the division of Sturgis. Crook, received by a vigorous discharge of musketry, was promptly repulsed. Rodman's brigade, which was to have crossed at a ford below the bridge, met with no better success. Sturgis then sent his two regiments to renew the charge; but notwithstanding his perseverance, he could not even reach the bridge. Two hours were thus wasted in successive efforts on the part of detachments too feeble for the work—efforts that were at once sanguinary and fruitless. Thus, while the contest was increasing on the right, the left still continued motionless. In vain did McClellan send messenger after messenger to Burnside with the order, more and more urgent, to try a general attack. It was noon, and this general with his four divisions had as yet only brought three brigades into action, and had sent but two or three regiments at a time to attack the bridge, around which all the enemy's means of defence were concentrated. Much valuable time was thus lost in weak and impotent attempts.

Meanwhile, Sumner, with the Second corps, had resumed the combat on the right, which had been temporarily suspended. Sedgwick was in advance, French followed him closely. Richardson, who the day before occupied the first line, found himself in the rear, and crossed the Antietam at half-past nine. Forming his division in column by deployed brigades, Sedgwick entered the large clearing on the east side, passed first beyond Green's soldiers, who had not abandoned the contest, then Williams, beyond the line of and crossing the clearing diagonally, swept before him Hood's two brigades. He thus reached the Hagerstown turnpike, crossed it, still pursuing a westerly course, and finally entered the woods, before which all the efforts of Hooker and Mansfield had previously proved unsuccessful. In this vigorous attack Sumner naturally advanced at the head of his soldiers. Alone in front of his line, his head bare, and quickening his pace to the noise of the balls, which shattered the branches of the trees around him, the "old bull of the woods" displayed as much energy as at Fair Oaks.

Nothing could arrest Sedgwick—neither the thickness of the forest, nor the rocks which formed so many natural fortifications under the trees; and he quickly reached the opposite border of the

clearing, on the side of Sharpsburg; Dunker Church was occupied, as well as the intersection of the two roads, and the Confederates were driven in disorder across the wide open fields extending beyond. The success of the Federals seemed decisive; the position they had just gained was the key to the battle-field; but it was far in advance of the rest of the Federal line, and in occupying it Sedgwick had exposed his flanks. On the right he was somewhat covered by the woods and by Doubleday, but on the left a large space separated him from Green, whose division, reduced to a handful of men, could no longer afford him a very firm support. The two other divisions of Sumner had not yet made their appearance on the battle-field. The Confederates this time were the first to receive reinforcements. McLaws, with his own division and Walker's brigade, five thousand or fifty-five hundred men in all, arrived at last from Sharpsburg by the Hagerstown turnpike. Before approaching Dunker Church he encountered scattered groups of fugitives and wounded. These were the *débris* of Jackson's and Hood's divisions, that Sedgwick had just driven out of the wood. McLaws, without losing a moment, hurled Kershaw's brigade into the unoccupied space, which, as we have just said, separated Sedgwick's positions from those of Green, and supported this attack with all his troops. His right met the second of these two generals, and soon compelled him to lose ground; his left threw itself upon Sedgwick's flank, taking him almost in reverse. The latter caused his third brigade, under Howard, to face about, but it was too late. Before they were able to perform this dangerous movement, Howard's soldiers were received by a terrible fire which threw them into confusion. The first brigade of Williams' division, commanded by Crawford before he was wounded, had been posted so as to support Howard; it was carried along with him. The disorder soon reached Sedgwick's two other brigades, which already believed themselves turned and surrounded. Despite the efforts of the general, who had been wounded three times without quitting his post, these troops abandoned Dunker Church and the adjoining woods, which had been so dearly won a short time before. Williams' second brigade, under Gordon, returned to the charge, and penetrated once more into these woods, under favor of a clearing off of the

thick smoke which enveloped the combatants ; but it soon found itself exposed to a concentric fire, and was obliged to retire in haste to avoid being captured. The retreating Federals crossed once more the large clearing, which had already been watered with so much blood. But McLaws, who wished to pursue them, was received by an artillery fire which compelled him to halt in turn.

In the mean while, the combat had extended along the line. In order to avert the disaster which menaced Sedgwick, Sumner had ordered his two other divisions to hurry on, to form upon his left, and to attack the enemy without delay. But these divisions were marching at great intervals. If French and Richardson had appeared on the field of battle at the same time as Sedgwick, they would have turned his first success into a decisive victory ; now they could only prevent his defeat. French was marching in three columns, the left formed by Max Weber's brigade, the centre by Morris' new recruits, the right by Kimball's brigade. Having reached the cross-road leading to Dunker Church, near which Green had just been repulsed, he made each of them wheel to the left in line of battle ; and thus formed in three lines, he passed round the extremity of the wood to the east to attack the right of McLaws. The first line advanced boldly ; but while it was gaining ground, the second was exposed to an enfilading fire, proceeding from the wood, which threw the inexperienced soldiers of Morris into confusion. Kimball proceeded past them and deployed on Weber's left. Richardson arrived immediately after French, and extended his line still more to the left with Meagher's Irish brigade, supported at a short distance by those of Caldwell and Brooks.

The ground upon which these two divisions were about to fight was interspersed with natural and artificial obstacles. It is intersected by the hollow way which, as we have already said, connected the cross-road coming from Dunker Church with the Sharpsburg and Keedysville road. To the north-east of this hollow way—that is to say, nearer the Federals—stood the Roulette farm, surrounded by cultivated fields ; on the other side, within a few hundred metres of the Hagerstown pike, and nearer Sharpsburg than Dunker Church, was Doctor Piper's house. This house, strongly built, was situated on a commanding posi-

tion, which was to give it a great importance in such a struggle. Between the Roulette farm and the Piper house extends a range of hills, some covered with wood, others with fenced corn-fields, and separated by deep ravines. It was between these hillocks, and occasionally along their sides, that the hollow way wound.

French and Richardson soon encountered Hill's soldiers near the Roulette farm. It was half-past ten, the very moment when Sedgwick was sustaining the attack of McLaws at Dunker Church. The battle was therefore once more raging along the whole Federal right. On the left still the same silence. Burnside had not stirred. Sumner listened in vain, hoping every moment to hear from that direction the sound of the attack which was to divert the enemy's attention. McClellan in vain sent his lieutenant orders more and more precise, directing him to act at once and with all his forces. The battle was still confined to the right. Lee took advantage of this to detach another division from Longstreet's corps, and sent R. H. Anderson to oppose French and Richardson, whose progress had become menacing. Longstreet was thus charged with the defence of the whole line of the Antietam with a single division, that of James, numbering at the most from four to five thousand men.

While Anderson was uniting with the tired troops of Hill to attack Richardson, McLaws, abandoning the idea of looking for Sedgwick in the wood, to which he had fallen back, and unable to maintain himself in the clearing, where his soldiers were too much exposed, threw himself upon French's right flank, which had been uncovered by the retreat of Sedgwick and Green, but failed to break it. Farther on, along the Federal left, the Irish brigade resisted all the assaults of the Confederates with uncommon energy. Its commander, General Meagher, was wounded. He was replaced by Colonel Burke, who led his countrymen with equal intrepidity and coolness. Following their usual tactics, the Confederates massed all their forces for a sudden attack, sometimes on one point of the enemy's line, sometimes on another, taking advantage of the intervals which the battle had opened between the different brigades composing it. But a warm reception awaited them at every point, and the Federals soon resumed the advantage. The Roulette farm was occupied, the range of

hills was captured, and the contest extended to the vicinity of the hollow way, which still afforded shelter and an excellent means of defence to the Confederates. French could not dislodge them from it, but on his left Richardson followed up his success. Caldwell's brigade, by a well-executed movement, had taken the place of the Irish. Two of his regiments, commanded by a young officer of promise, we might almost say a youth, Colonel Barlow, took the hollow way in flank, which could not be carried in front, and compelled the enemy to abandon it, leaving behind three hundred prisoners and three flags. The Confederate brigades of G. B. Anderson and Rodes, of D. H. Hill's division, were driven at the point of the bayonet by Richardson across a large field extending as far as the Piper house. R. H. Anderson sought to repair this reverse by attacking his left flank, but Barlow, anticipating this movement, drove him back into the orchard, and at last gained possession of the Piper house. It was about noon. Richardson was only a few hundred metres from the Hagerstown road, almost within cannon-shot of the first houses of Sharpsburg. By thus advancing he had turned Dunker Church. A little farther advanced, and he would oblige the Confederates to leave a clear field to Sedgwick, and surrender to him not only the clearing, but the woods that had been so often disputed since morning. On his left, Pleasanton was following his movement with three batteries of horse artillery, and covering his flank. Occupying the ground which separated him from the Antietam, he dislodged the detachments left by Lee to guard the bridge of the Keedysville road. This passage was therefore free, and Porter could now cross the Antietam with his two divisions without difficulty.

But Richardson could not follow up his advantage alone. On the right, Sedgwick's division was mixed up with the *débris* of the corps of Hooker and Mansfield. French was arrested by the enemy's batteries posted in the vicinity of Dunker Church, which enfiladed him every time he attempted to advance. Porter remained in reserve at the very time when he should have come to attack the troops opposed to Burnside in the rear. In short, this latter general had not yet emerged from his fatal immobility.

The Federals, however, had received a timely reinforcement ;

it was Franklin, with the two divisions of the Sixth corps. Since ten o'clock in the morning his heads of column had appeared on the banks of the Antietam. McClellan had promptly sent him to the support of the right, and about half-past twelve he came into line.

This, then, was the situation of the Federals. Six divisions, which in the morning numbered thirty-one thousand men, had suffered so severely as to be unable to renew the contest. The battle was only sustained by two divisions and Pleasanton's artillery, about thirteen thousand men and twenty guns. In fine, eight divisions which in the morning numbered thirty-nine thousand men were under arms near the field of battle; and excepting a few regiments engaged by Burnside near the bridge, they had not as yet fired a single shot.

Lee, on his side, had sent Jackson's two divisions and that of Hood, decimated and disorganized. They were no more able to resume the offensive than their adversaries. McLaws and Walker had sustained on their side enormous losses in the fatal clearing, and were exhausted. After a prolonged struggle, D. H. Hill had been driven in disorder beyond the Piper house. R. H. Anderson had failed to break French's lines, and was compelled to fall back before the well-sustained fire of Pleasanton's artillery. Longstreet had deployed the four brigades he still had at his command, to cover the whole Confederate right, and had only two thousand men left to oppose Burnside. Lee, therefore, had not a single available combatant, nor a battalion in reserve; and far from being able to take advantage of the exhaustion of a few Federal divisions to break the enemy's lines, he had the utmost difficulty in preserving his own.

Consequently, in order to contract his line, he had abandoned the ground so hotly disputed in the morning; his left wing had left Dunker Church, which was at once taken possession of by one of Smith's brigades sent by Franklin to that part of the field. The right brigade of the same division had come to rescue a battery which was in great peril on the Hagerstown pike; the third, on the left, had gone to the relief of French, who was short of ammunition. Pushing forward, Smith finally encountered McLaws' soldiers in the woods adjoining Dunker Church,

and the first troops he sent to dislodge them were repulsed. Thinking, then, that a great blow could and must be struck in that direction to ensure victory, Franklin massed the whole of Slocum's division in the rear of Dunker Church, and prepared to make a vigorous attack upon the Confederate left wing. It was one o'clock. The divisions of French and Richardson, without quitting their positions, occupied the enemy with a spirited fire of musketry, during which the latter of these two generals fell mortally wounded—a cruel loss, especially at this moment, for, in spite of his somewhat rough manners, Richardson knew how to make his soldiers love him, while his intrepid courage urged them forward at the trying moment. The support of artillery was wanting on this side, where only a few pieces had succeeded in coming into battery. More to the left, Pleasanton's cannon had enabled Porter to take possession of the bridge of the Keedysville road, and to cross it with six battalions of regular infantry, who came to support the mounted batteries of the cavalry division. Burnside, urged again by McClellan, who had sent a superior officer to him with instructions to see that his orders were strictly carried out, was at last roused from his inaction. We dwell upon this delay not only because it made McClellan lose all the fruits of his victory, but especially as illustrating the difficulties which in those improvised armies a general-in-chief encountered in endeavoring to secure the success of his combinations—an example which is the more remarkable because Burnside was a personal friend of McClellan, an extremely brave officer and a loyal man, who at Roanoke had displayed true military capacity.

It was about one o'clock when he finally decided to make a great effort to carry the passes of the Antietam. The bridge, on the Confederate side of the river, was commanded by an acclivity, on the summit of which some parallel wall fences formed excellent parapets for its defenders. The fire of Longstreet's entire artillery was concentrated upon this point; hence it is that the partial attacks which had been made to force a passage had invariably failed. But when Burnside pushed forward the four splendid regiments of General Ferrero at once, supported by a considerable force, the small Confederate brigade of Toombs was unable to withstand them. The assailants left two hundred men upon the

ground; at this price the bridge was carried and the passage free. At the same moment Rodman's division crossed the Antietam at a ford which had just been discovered lower down, and the Ninth corps, led by Cox and Burnside, both of whom bravely exposed themselves, occupied the heights situated between Sharpsburg and the river, along the sides of which wound the Rohrerstown road. There was nothing to be done but to advance in order to turn this success to advantage. If Franklin on the right, Porter in the centre and Burnside on the left attacked the enemy simultaneously, he would be driven into Sharpsburg, and the disaster would be complete. But at this critical moment the Federal chiefs were wanting in decision. Burnside halted to re-form his line, and to enable the rest of his corps to cross the river; two precious hours were thus wasted. On the right Sumner arrived at Dunker Church, and, struck with the disorganization of Sedgwick's troops, took upon himself to forbid the grand attack which Franklin was about to commence. The latter urged in vain the imperative necessity; the old soldier, who was as obstinate as he was brave, kept him where he was with all his troops, to repel a supposed attack on the part of the enemy, who, however, was far from contemplating it. In the centre McClellan, deceived by the exaggerated reports of spies and deserters, as he had been before Richmond, regarding the number of his enemies,* kept the greater part of Porter's corps in reserve, in order to parry any aggressive return on the part of the Confederates. Two army corps—that is to say, nearly twenty-five thousand men—were thus kept from being seriously engaged, at a moment when Lee had his very last man under fire.

Nevertheless, if Burnside had obeyed the orders of his chief more strictly, if he had made a general attack in the morning, and if, after crossing the Antietam, he had not waited two hours before resuming the offensive, he would certainly have placed Lee in a very dangerous position. But these two hours had given A. P. Hill, who had arrived from Harper's Ferry with his fine

* In his report General McClellan estimates the numerical strength of the Confederate army at ninety-seven thousand four hundred and forty-five men. If Lee had really had such a force under his command, the dispositions of his adversary, so far from being too cautious, might very properly have been considered rash.

and numerous division, time to cross the Potomac and participate in the battle. It was three o'clock. Burnside was already driving Toombs' weak brigades before him, and was rapidly gaining ground. He had ascended the hills on the right which separate the Antietam from the Sharpsburg plateau; the enemy's artillery was about to fall into his hands; he had almost reached the town, south of which Longstreet was endeavoring to re-form his lines, when A. P. Hill fell suddenly upon his left flank. The aspect of the combat was at once changed; the contest along those hills became more and more violent, and the Federals, surprised at this new resistance, came to a halt, to fall back immediately after.

As yet no diversion had been made on the right, which in turn remained inactive. Seeing the condition of the three corps that had just sustained the brunt of the battle on that side, McClellan, following Sumner's advice, only employed Franklin's troops in reconstructing and consolidating his line. It was, therefore, on the left, upon Burnside, that the main effort of the enemy was now directed. The four small divisions of this corps, which scarcely numbered more than three thousand men each, were thus disposed: Wilcox on the right and Rodman on the left of the road, Cox in second line to support both, and Sturgis near the bridge.

Hill's attack fell upon Rodman, who was obliged to face to the left, thus leaving an empty space between his right and Wilcox's left, into which Archer's brigade, followed by Branch and Pender, penetrated immediately. This attack in front was supported by Toombs, who joined Hill in pressing the left flank of the Federals. Exposed to a concentric fire, Rodman's division suffered terribly, saw its chief mortally wounded, and lost ground. The disorder soon spread. Fortunately for it, Scammon's brigade of Cox's division, making a change of front to the left, arrived in time to support it, and to check Hill's success. But the Confederates returned to the charge, determined to stop the progress of the Ninth corps at all hazards. The latter found itself, as Sedgwick had a short time before, compromised by the very progress it had made. Compelled to fight on its left and front at the same time, it found its right no less exposed. A single brigade, Warren's of Porter's corps, had been sent to support it in that direction; the rest of the army had not moved. Cox, who com-

manded the Ninth corps, summoned Sturgis' division to his aid, and sustained the combat a little while longer; but his losses were increasing, night was approaching, and it was evident that the enemy would never allow him to reach Sharpsburg. Isolated, pressed more and more closely, he was forced to fall back upon the range of hills which border the Antietam and command the passes conquered a few hours before.

The Confederates contented themselves with following him at a distance, keeping up the fire with their artillery; and darkness soon brought the contest to a close. The battle of Antietam was ended. It was the bloodiest that had thus far been fought during this war. The Federal losses amounted to two thousand and ten killed, nine thousand four hundred and sixteen wounded, and one thousand and forty-three prisoners—all together twelve thousand four hundred and sixty-nine men, among whom were eight generals, two corps commanders and three division commanders. Those of Lee, compared with the number of his troops, were still heavier. He had nearly sixteen hundred killed, including two generals, Starke and French. His wounded numbered about seven thousand, without including those who had fallen into the hands of the enemy. His little army had been reduced by at least ten thousand men in that single day. He himself acknowledged a total loss of one thousand five hundred and sixty-seven killed and eight thousand seven hundred and twenty-four wounded, in the battles of Crampton's Gap, Turner's Gap, Harper's Ferry and Antietam. These figures do not exactly agree with those of his subordinates, which, for the most part, are a little higher. Lee makes no mention of the number of able-bodied prisoners left in the hands of the Federals; but Longstreet acknowledges one thousand three hundred and sixteen for his own corps, and D. H. Hill nine hundred and twenty-five for his division; McClellan says five thousand; they may, without any exaggeration, be estimated at three thousand five hundred, which, according to the account of the general-in-chief of the Confederate army, would make his losses for the five days amount to fourteen thousand men, four-fifths of whom, at least, were incurred during the last day.

These material losses, however, could be more easily repaired

than the moral injury which the reverse of Lee's army had inflicted upon the Confederate cause. This army, through its courage and tenacity, had no doubt averted a great disaster; but it had not succeeded in keeping victory perched upon its standard. The battle of the 17th was a defeat for the Confederates in the triple point of view, of tactics, strategy and politics. On the field of battle they had ended by losing considerable ground throughout the whole extent of their line, from Dunker Church to the last bridge of the Antietam; they had left behind them cannon, flags and several thousand prisoners. On the evening of the 17th the army was so totally broken down that it could not think of resuming the offensive; a return to Virginia had become a necessity. The political results of the battle of Antietam were equally damaging; the Confederates were obliged to abandon the last inch of ground they occupied in Maryland; they ceased to menace Pennsylvania; and instead of having obtained the recognition of neutrals by a bold stroke, they had shown that in assuming the offensive they had lost their chief strength.

The error which Lee expiated by this great defeat is evident, and its consequences may be traced throughout the events we have just related. This error was in dividing his army for the purpose of capturing Harper's Ferry in the presence of McClellan, and of counting too much upon the tardiness of his adversary. If he had not made such a division of his forces, he would have had the choice either to fight a decisive battle under much more favorable circumstances, upon the steep acclivities of South Mountain, or of continuing the campaign on the upper Potomac with all his troops. The mistakes of his enemies repaired to some extent those committed by himself. Through the disgraceful capitulation of Miles, the slow movements of Franklin on the 14th and 15th, and the delays which prevented McClellan from attacking him on the 16th, he was enabled on the 17th to mass all his troops on the field of battle. The issue of the contest, however, would probably have been different if A. P. Hill, instead of arriving at three o'clock in the afternoon, had been able to take part in the struggle early in the morning, and add his efforts to those which kept the Federal right so long in check. There were, moreover, many other causes which prevented Mc-

Clellan from achieving a more complete victory, and taking advantage of this opportunity to strike an irreparable blow at Lee. The first is to be found in the moral condition of his troops. The army which had been entrusted to him was partly composed of the vanquished soldiers of Manassas, and the remainder consisted of soldiers who had only been one or two weeks in the service, who had never marched, never been under fire, and knew neither their commanders nor their comrades. They fought with great bravery, but could not be expected to perform what Lee easily obtained from his men. Their ranks had not that cohesion which enables a commander to follow up a first success without interruption. The Union generals may be censured for having divided their efforts on the right in successive attacks, and thereby impaired their effectiveness. The corps of Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner, in all from forty to forty-four thousand men, instead of being brought into action one after the other, for the space of four hours, might have been united, so as together to strike the Confederate left, which they would no doubt have crushed. McClellan and several of his lieutenants, as we have said, had also overrated the number of their adversaries—an error which had the effect of keeping back Franklin and Porter, whose co-operation at the close of the battle would have been decisive. Finally, Burnside by his long inaction upset all McClellan's plans, enabled Lee to mass all his forces on his left, and thus deprived the Federals of the principal advantages which a more energetic action on his part would certainly have secured.*

The sun of September 18th rose to light up one of those scenes of suffering and anguish which humble the pride of man by the exhibition of his weakness and cruelty. Twenty thousand men, killed or wounded the day before, were lying on that narrow battle-field. Their comrades were exhausted by the struggle, by fatigue and by the want of both sleep and food. McClellan had, indeed, thought of resuming the offensive that very day, of making new and greater sacrifices, perhaps, in order to complete the victory so dearly bought the preceding day. Many generals, Franklin among the rest, urged this. Others, like Sumner, tried to dissuade him from so rash a purpose. Such an attack afforded

* See Appendix to this volume, Note E.

great chances of success ; but with raw troops panics and unforeseen accidents were always to be apprehended, and might jeopardize all the results already obtained. Pennsylvania protected, Washington freed from danger, and the invasion definitely repulsed, the Union general was not willing to run this risk. His duty as a commander and a citizen required him thenceforth to strike only when certain of success ; for as he himself said, "one battle lost, and almost all would have been lost." The army of the Potomac was greatly reduced, not only by the absence of soldiers killed, wounded or captured, but especially by the disorganization of the corps which had suffered most in battle. Thus, Hooker's, which, out of fourteen thousand eight hundred and fifty-six men, had two thousand six hundred and nineteen disabled, only numbered on the morning of the 18th six thousand seven hundred and twenty-nine ready for action. Important reinforcements were, moreover, expected, which had to be waited for. The two divisions of Couch and Humphreys joined the army in the course of the morning. As soon as they made their appearance, McClellan, feeling henceforth certain of success, gave orders for attacking the Confederates on the morning of the 19th, in the positions they had occupied since the battle.

His prudent adversary, however, did not wait for him. He also had received a reinforcement during the day of the 18th, consisting of the last division, which had been left at Harper's Ferry ; these fresh troops, however, did not compensate him sufficiently for his losses. The campaign on the left bank of the Potomac was ended, and could not be renewed. From that moment it was useless to persist in maintaining himself in the angle between this river and the Antietam, where so much blood had already been shed to no purpose for the Confederate cause. This would have been to expose himself without object to an attack which might degenerate into a disaster. During the night of the 18th-19th the whole of Lee's army, taking advantage of the low water in the Potomac, crossed silently into Virginia. It left behind in Maryland, besides a large number of its best soldiers killed or wounded, many disappointed hopes and dispelled illusions. The Confederates, however, left this region, which had proved so fatal to them, like gallant soldiers, leaving

not a single trophy of their nocturnal retreat in the hands of the enemy.

The next morning a portion of Porter's corps crossed the river in pursuit, driving before them Lawton's brigade, which had made a faint attempt to dispute the ford of Sheppardstown, losing some cannon in that affair. The Confederate army retired toward Martinsburg and the western section of the valley of Virginia. Jackson was to form the rear and defend the line of the Opequan, a tributary of the Potomac. Fearing to be too closely watched by the Federals, he determined to deal them an offensive return blow. At the head of two divisions, he surprised Porter on the morning of the 20th, whose troops had not all yet crossed the Potomac. Forming in two lines, A. P. Hill attacked the Federals in front, while Early formed an ambush in the woods adjoining the heights where they were posted. A charge by Hill, which the Union artillery failed to check, staggered Porter's soldiers, who, being finally routed by Early, gained the other side of the Potomac in haste, leaving a considerable number of killed and wounded behind them, together with two hundred prisoners. Jackson returned before night to take position on the Opequan. McClellan, on his side, occupied Harper's Ferry a few days after. The Maryland campaign was ended.

In the succeeding chapters, which will embrace the second part of the year 1862, we shall see what was the influence of this campaign on military operations in the West, and how the army of the Potomac acquitted itself in the East of the new task imposed upon it by the retreat of its adversaries into Virginia.

BOOK IV.—KENTUCKY.

CHAPTER I.

PERRYVILLE.

THE defeats of Pope in Virginia, followed by the invasion of Maryland, had reawakened the aggressive ardor of the Confederates in the West. Believing that Baltimore, Washington and Philadelphia were already in the power of Lee, both soldiers and officers in Bragg's army dreamed in their turn of the conquest of Cincinnati and Louisville, the deliverance of Nashville, Memphis, and even of New Orleans. The secessionists, who were numerous in Kentucky and in the majority in Tennessee, were becoming bolder every day; the expeditions of Morgan and Forrest during the month of July, 1862, had restored all their confidence. These two daring partisans had admirably opened the way for the campaign which their commander was contemplating, and had overrun the States he intended to invade, like a sudden and subtle blast which penetrates the forest and then vanishes before some great storm of which it is the certain precursor.

But we must resume our narrative from the early days of July. We have said that Buell's army, drawn up a little in rear of the right bank of the Tennessee, rested its right wing upon Huntsville and Athens, while its left extended from Stevenson to opposite Chattanooga. Its supplies were obtained through the two railroads which leave Nashville, one for Athens, the other for Stevenson. The capital of Tennessee was therefore the centre of his dépôts, which in turn could only be supplied from the Northern States, depending entirely for that purpose upon the railroad coming from Bowling Green and Louisville. In fact, the waters of the Cumberland were then too low for navigation, and the

line of railway from Nashville to Columbus through Union City passed through regions infested by guerillas. This army, therefore, which occupied the ground last conquered by the Federals on the banks of the Tennessee, only communicated with its true base of operations, the river and State of Ohio, by a single line of railway, five hundred kilometres in length, from Stevenson to Louisville; it was, besides, liable to the incursions of the Confederates, who, being masters of the Alleghanies and West Virginia, found themselves much nearer Louisville and the Northern States than Buell.

Bragg, encouraged by Lee's victories before Richmond, resolved to take advantage of the situation to strike his adversary at this weak point, and restore the Confederate flag to those States in which large numbers of partisans were ready to welcome it.

Murfreesborough, a small village of Tennessee, situated at fifty kilometres from Nashville, on the Stevenson Railroad, had become one of Buell's principal intermediate dépôts; it was also the headquarters of a provost-marshal, who, under pretext of pursuing guerillas, had undertaken the impossible task of arresting all the inhabitants who secretly sympathized with the enemy. The immense quantity of provisions to be captured, and the large number of prisoners to be freed, were a sufficient incentive to induce the Confederates to attempt a sudden dash against Murfreesborough, especially as this position was poorly defended. No entrenchment of any importance surrounded it; its garrison, numbering eight hundred men, consisted of two regiments, which, espousing the quarrels of their commanders, had had so many disputes among themselves that it was found necessary to send one of them, the Third Minnesota, to camp at some distance from the village; moreover, a new commander, General Crittenden, who had just arrived, had no knowledge whatever of the country. The Federals were only roused from their fatal security on the morning of the 13th of July, when they were startled out of their sleep by the tramping of two thousand horses coming at full gallop along the railway track. Some negroes had indeed told them the day before of having met the terrible Forrest and his mounted men, but no one would believe them: "Negro yarns!" everybody exclaimed. It was he, nevertheless. In an instant the

streets of the village were invaded, the houses attacked, and a large number of Federals either captured or killed before they had time to defend themselves. The others, however, soon rallied and attacked the invaders; Forrest's horsemen, being very much exposed in their turn, were for a moment staggered, when they were joined by a timely reinforcement, and the whole of the Ninth Michigan was captured. The other regiment, which was encamped at some distance, with a battery of artillery, was only feebly attacked; it was on the way to relieve Murfreesborough, when it received information that it would arrive too late. It could have retired, and would certainly have escaped the disaster, but its colonel became confused and surrendered, despite the protests of his officers. It was Forrest's only exploit, but for a time it seriously interrupted Buell's communications with Nashville, compelling him to scatter his troops along the railroads through which he obtained his supplies in order to protect them more effectually.

During this time Morgan had also put himself in motion. Leaving Knoxville on the 4th of July, he crossed the mountains which separate the Tennessee valley from that of the Cumberland, with only nine hundred horse; and marching directly east, he encountered the first Federal detachments at Tompkinsville, on the other side of the Cumberland, near the point where it emerges from the State of Kentucky. After driving them back with ease, he reached Glasgow on the evening of the 9th, where he found supplies, and the next day, his men having rested and being well fed and well armed, struck the important line of railway between Nashville and Louisville near the famous grottoes called the Mammoth Cave. They destroyed the bridge which spans Barren River, and Buell's communications with the North were thus interrupted. For a few days Morgan scoured this line and destroyed it entirely, avoiding the troops in pursuit of him, falling unexpectedly upon isolated posts and constantly deceiving his foes, thanks to the connivance of the majority of the inhabitants, his own daring and the admirable use he made of the telegraphic lines of the enemy. An agent skilful in handling this instrument accompanied him everywhere with a portable apparatus, and, whenever he found a wire, detached it and adjusted it to his own machine. In this way he intercepted all the signals

that were being exchanged along the line; to messages coming from Louisville he replied in the name of the Nashville office, to those from Nashville in the name of the Louisville office. All the despatches passed through his hands, revealing to him the movements of troops destined to surround his little band. This clever trick was repeated everywhere and with the same success. When any private despatches thus fell into his hands, he says that he kept no copies of them, but availed himself of the opportunity to give his Federal interlocutor some startling information regarding Morgan's movements; he thus engaged in telegraphic conversations, by means of which he learned a great deal about the enemy, and by his false representations frustrated the best plans the latter might have formed. We can form an idea of the confusion prevailing among the Northern generals, who believed they were communicating with each other, while all their despatches were intercepted and modified by a skilful adversary. Ellsworth, the Confederate telegrapher, played his part with imperturbable presence of mind, representing several offices at once; he had scarcely ceased holding conversation in one direction when he commenced again in another. At one time he tried, but in vain, to persuade a train of cars to fall into an ambuscade prepared by Morgan. At another time he surprised a Federal employé, and compelled him to send off some unimportant despatch in his presence, in order that he might see how he handled the instrument, what was his handwriting, as it were, so that he might imitate it closely. Some registers he had succeeded in procuring revealed to him all the secret signals; and if the meaning of some of these symbols escaped him, he would soon find the means of unravelling it. Thus one day he receives despatches signed Z; not knowing whence they came, he telegraphs to Z: "One of my friends bets you cigars that you cannot spell correctly the name of your station." "Done!" answered Z. "*Lebanon Junction*. How did you suppose I would spell it?" "We have lost; I thought you would spell it with a double b," ingeniously responded Ellsworth, who had obtained all he wanted. In conclusion, the intercourse being ended, he did not withdraw without ironically expressing his thanks to his correspondents. Having nothing more to fear, and suddenly transformed again into a

Confederate agent, he poured despatch after despatch into the telegraphic offices of Kentucky signed by his own name or that of his chief. We quote but one of these, addressed by him to the Federal general J. Boyle, who had been sent in pursuit of him; it was couched in these terms:

"Good-morning, Jerry! This telegraph is a great institution. You ought to destroy it, for it keeps me too well posted. My friend Ellsworth has in his portfolio all your despatches since the 10th of July. Would you like a copy?

"JOHN MORGAN, *Commander.*"

Meanwhile, after cutting the Louisville railway track at Barren River, Morgan, leaving this line on his left, had reached by a long march a bridge adjoining Lebanon, on the evening of the 11th; he easily took it, and the next day surprised the small garrison of Lebanon, which he captured. Guided by the information obtained through his telegraph, he menaced at once the two important positions of Frankfort, the capital of the State, and Lexington; and passing between the two, he boldly pushed forward in the direction of Cincinnati. At Cynthiana he struck the railroad leading from that city to Frankfort, and after a brisk fight captured the Federal detachment stationed at that post, numbering four hundred and fifty men. The excitement was intense among his enemies. Even the State of Ohio felt threatened by this demonstration; but Morgan was well aware that the most propitious time for retiring was when he inspired the greatest fear. He had obtained all the advantages he could possibly have anticipated; the railroad tracks were cut, he had procured nearly three hundred recruits, reconnoitred all the weak points of the enemy and thrown his camps into confusion. He rapidly fell back upon Paris, Winchester, Richmond, Crab Orchard, Somerset and Monticello, picking up arms and ammunition on his route, and releasing the prisoners he had taken on parole. Finally, on the 28th of July, he again entered the Confederate lines, after an expedition in which he had not experienced a single check of any importance.

We cannot give the details of the partisan war waged in Tennessee by isolated bands fighting under the Confederate flag at

times when the large armies were inactive. The smaller they were, the more were they generally inclined to plunder and to acts of violence. The villages which lacked either the force or the will to protect themselves were constantly occupied by these bands, which penetrated far forward among the Federal posts. One of them was even seen to take possession of Clarksville, on the Cumberland, between Nashville and Fort Donelson. Among their misdeeds we have to mention the assassination of the Federal general Robert McCook, near Decherd, on the 6th of August. This officer, being seriously ill, was travelling alone with a small escort several kilometres in advance of his brigade. About one hundred partisans rushed upon him, and the Confederate mounted men, galloping alongside of his carriage, whose frightened horses the drivers were unable to control, riddled him with pistol-shots. The men capable of such atrocious acts dispersed as soon as they found themselves pursued, and returned apparently to their plantations to resume their rural pursuits; but when they had not arms in their hands, they served the Southern generals still more effectively in the capacity of spies. These chiefs, therefore, afforded them a protection which was anything but creditable to themselves. When these partisans were caught with arms in their hands and treated as assassins, the Confederate government protested, just as if the laws of war had been violated; when they were arrested in their own houses as spies, it set up the cry of oppression, and these cries were repeated even in Europe.

The position of the Federals was a difficult one. They had to guard an immense arc extending from Memphis, on the Mississippi, to Cumberland Gap, recently occupied by the brigade of the Federal general Morgan. Their troops were too much scattered to support each other effectively and with promptitude, or to intercept the guerillas that slipped in between them, and yet they were divided into such small detachments as to offer here and there an easy prey to an enterprising enemy. Besides, the large army which had besieged Corinth was weakened not only by the excessive development of its lines, but also by the reduction of its effective force. On one hand, the volunteers who had enlisted for one year after the battle of Bull Run were being discharged; on the other hand, at this hot season, the army was pay-

ing its tribute to the fever climate of the banks of the Tennessee by the number of its sick. Furthermore, to the numerous convalescents which the military hospitals were pouring into the Northern States were to be added many able-bodied men, who took advantage of the want of vigilance on the part of inspectors, to go and breathe their native air under the pretext of sickness.

The Confederates, on the contrary, owing to the strict application of the conscription law, were speedily filling the *cadres* of Bragg's army. In the beginning of August, a few days after Morgan's return, this army was entirely massed in the valley of the Tennessee. It was not able, however, to move at once, for want of sufficient means of transportation. This branch of the service, always so important and so difficult to organize in America, was, in fact, to be the principal resource of the great expedition prepared by Bragg. To enable him to undertake it, he required an enormous *matériel*; and the convoy which had left Tupelo in the middle of June, after the evacuation of Corinth, had been obliged to perform a long and tedious journey in order to rejoin him. The wagons, and even the artillery, being deprived of the resource of railways, drawn by jaded horses first across the swamps, then among the steep mountains, of North Alabama, were nearly two months in accomplishing the painful journey. At last everything was ready toward the middle of August. Kirby Smith, who occupied Knoxville with a strong division, was placed under Bragg's orders, who sent him the two splendid brigades of Cleburne and Preston Smith, thus swelling his forces to fifteen thousand men. Bragg himself was in the neighborhood of Chattanooga with the army of the Mississippi, numbering about forty-five thousand men of all arms, divided between his two former lieutenants, Polk and Hardee. The time for action had arrived; for in Virginia, Lee had again faced his soldiers toward Washington, and was about to attack Pope's army on the Rapidan. Along the whole of this immense line, laid out across the continent by the belligerents, the Confederates were resuming the offensive. Bragg's plan was simple and reasonable, and calculated to secure important results. His object was to throw himself upon Buell's left flank, to cut off his retreat by reaching Kentucky before him, and to establish himself there in

sufficient force to dispute its possession. He was well aware that if the war was again transferred to that State, Tennessee, situated farther south, would be wrested from the Federals without striking a blow.

The position of Buell's army favored the execution of this plan. His right was at Huntsville; his centre, posted *en echelon* along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, beyond Decherd, was watching the crossings of the Tennessee and the mouth of the Sequatchie at Jasper; the left extended as far as MacMinnaville. Thinking that this last position was the most important, the Federal general-in-chief had entrusted its defence to his best lieutenant, Thomas, the conqueror of Mill Springs. But while the right and centre were covered by the course of the Tennessee, which separated them from the enemy, the left was entirely unprotected (*en l'air*). Between MacMinnaville and the river extends a range of mountains difficult of access, consisting of vast plateaux, without water, and intersected by deep valleys lying parallel to the Tennessee, the most important being that of the Sequatchie. Unable to occupy this inhospitable mass of rocks, the Federals had pitched their camps along the western slopes, where they could easily obtain supplies, and, fearing to extend their lines too much, had only prolonged them north of MacMinnaville by a few trifling detachments of cavalry.

In order to deceive them as to the real movements of the army which was to attack them, the Richmond government determined to menace them simultaneously at various points far remote from each other. Humphrey Marshall in West Virginia and Van Dorn in Mississippi, who were separated from each other by more than nine hundred kilometres in an air-line, were simultaneously ordered, one to support the invasion of Kirby Smith, the other to harass Grant around Memphis and Corinth, so as to oblige him to shut himself up in these two places. On the 21st of August, Bragg's army crossed the Tennessee, above Chattanooga, near Harrison—an operation which occupied considerable time, as he was not provided with a sufficient quantity of bridge equipage, and was obliged to convey all his troops from one bank to the other, by means of a few small steamers and some boats which he had collected from all parts. But the mass of moun-

tains which separated him from the enemy's camps at MacMinville enabled him to effect this passage in perfect safety. We shall leave him for a short time while he is taking position on the right bank of the river, and follow his lieutenant, Kirby Smith, who had left Knoxville at the same time as he, and was about to precede him into Kentucky.

We have spoken elsewhere of the vast region of country without railroads and navigable rivers extending between the Ohio and the Alleghany ridge, a portion of which forms Eastern Kentucky. We have explained how inaccessible it was to large armies for want of ways of communication. But Kirby Smith, taking with him six or seven thousand men accustomed to long marches and to forage on the march, did not hesitate to venture in it. His first object was to wrest from the Federals the impregnable position of Cumberland Gap by turning it. This important pass, which, before the introduction of railroads, was the most frequented thoroughfare between east and west, had been abandoned in the spring by the Confederates, and occupied on the 18th of June by Morgan's Union brigade, which had strongly entrenched itself there. Kirby Smith crossed the Alleghanies at Big Creek Gap, thirty-five kilometres south-west of Cumberland Gap, and proceeded direct toward the centre of Kentucky, the richest and most populous part of that State. He thus cut the communications of the Federal Morgan with the dépôts from which he obtained his supplies, leaving to Humphrey Marshall on one side, and to John Morgan the partisan on the other, the easy task of preventing a single wagon from carrying him provisions. The Union brigade, thus besieged, held its position for three weeks; finally, on the 17th of September, when its provisions had become exhausted, it blew up the works it was entrusted to guard, and, descending the slopes of the Alleghanies, forced a passage into Ohio, despite the guerillas who harassed it during the whole of that painful retreat.

Meanwhile, Kirby Smith was rapidly advancing through Kentucky with his small force, the numerical strength of which was daily increased by public rumor; a thousand horse preceded it, scouring the country for the necessary supplies, which by active exertions were obtained from the inhabitants and brought

each evening to the Confederate column. His adversaries had made no preparations to receive him. Believing Kentucky to be protected by Buell's army against any serious invasion, they did not anticipate any raid except from guerillas. Consequently, their active forces consisted merely of cavalry and a few infantry regiments scattered along the lines of railways. The latter were posted behind the stockades, a species of small wooden fortifications resembling vast block-houses, very useful for repulsing a band of partisans, but incapable of resisting a regular attack. At the first news of the invasion of Kentucky, a feeling of uneasiness had spread on both sides of the Ohio.

General Lewis Wallace, extremely popular in that country, had hastened to Louisville with a regiment from Indiana. The important post of Lexington, the principal intersection of the railways of the State, had been entrusted to his care, and he had soon gathered around him some Ohio regiments which came over from Cincinnati, and the Unionists of Kentucky who swelled the ranks of the troops raised in that State. His forces amounted to about ten thousand men at the utmost, to whom he had imparted his own ardor; but as they had only been eight days together, they had neither experience nor cohesion. The removal of Wallace deprived his soldiers of the only incentive that could have sustained them—confidence in their chief. Kirby Smith had it all his own way. All he had to do was to push forward rapidly, which he knew how to do; besides, the character of the country through which he was passing did not allow him to stop. The first object of his expedition was to reach Lexington. He had started about the 22d of August, following the route which leads directly northward through Jacksboro' and Big Creek Gap, while his cavalry, nine hundred strong, with several light batteries, which had left Kingston a few days before, had made a large *détour* to the west in order to secure his left flank. This cavalry, under Colonel Scott, passing through Montgomery, Jamestown in Tennessee and Monticello, had crossed the old battle-field of Mill Springs, then Somerset, and had finally reached Loudon on the very day that Smith had taken up the line of march with his column. A small body of Federal cavalry under Colonel Metcalfe was encamped on the other side of the Big Hill pass, which

the Confederates took by surprise and occupied. On the 23d, Metcalfe made an attempt to recapture it, but his troops, being quite undisciplined, were soon routed, and despite his efforts he only succeeded in rallying them at Richmond, twenty-four kilometres from that place, on the Lexington road. The Confederates, after having followed him for some distance, fell back upon their main column, which was approaching Loudon by the direct route. Smith, in fact, by means of forced marches, had traversed the vast region of the Cumberland Mountains in three days. During this rapid march his soldiers had found neither provisions, nor even enough water at times to quench their thirst; they however reached the comparatively rich and populous plain extending north of Big Hill in excellent order on the 28th. On the 29th they continued their march toward Richmond, driving before them a few Federal mounted pickets. Nelson had placed Cruft's and Manson's brigades in this village, under command of the latter, numbering between six and seven thousand men. These were the only well-organized forces remaining in Kentucky; moreover, with the exception of two old regiments, these soldiers had never been under fire.

At the news of the enemy's approach, Manson, whose camp, commanded by the surrounding heights, was difficult to defend, determined to anticipate the attack with which he was threatened, but he committed the error of leaving Cruft's brigade in Richmond, taking only his own with him. After having repulsed the Confederate vanguard, he took a favorable position near the village of Rogersville on the evening of the 29th; the next day, instead of waiting for the enemy, he sought to advance a little farther; this was to induce an untimely fatigue for men little used to marching, and to widen the space which separated him from his reserves, to whom he had just sent a tardy order to join him. He soon fell in with the small army of Kirby Smith; the fight took place on both sides of the road and in fields interspersed with clusters of trees. Kirby Smith placed Cleburne's division on the right and Churchill's on the left. The latter, while endeavoring to flank the enemy, became separated from Cleburne, who remained alone, exposed to Manson's fire. The Federals, despite their inexperience, gallantly sustained the com-

bat. Cleburne was wounded, and his troops began to waver. But at this moment the Federal right gave way before Churchill. Cruft, who had just arrived with one regiment and two batteries, tried in vain to repair this reverse. Manson was obliged to weaken his left. Preston Smith, who had succeeded Cleburne in command of his division, took advantage of this to resume once more the offensive. The Federals were short of cartridges, their boxes were empty, they could no longer hold the positions, which the chances of the march had enabled them to occupy without having time to establish themselves firmly. At last Manson ordered a retreat toward Rogersville, but his soldiers could not keep their ranks, and the remainder of Cruft's brigade, which might have rendered great service if it had arrived sooner, struggled in vain to cover their rout. At last the Federals formed again at Rogersville behind some hedges and along the woods near the causeway; they steadily waited for the enemy, whose attacks they resisted for nearly an hour, but their right wing was finally broken. Again falling back in great haste, they reached Richmond, where Nelson, who had hastened from Lexington, endeavored to organize a last effort at resistance; this time the Union soldiers did not stand for more than a quarter of an hour before the Confederates, who in a single day and through three battles had overcome the enormous distance between Big Hill and Richmond. The *débris* of the small Federal army were then thrown into a frightful state of confusion, and the disorder was increased by the precipitate flight of the cavalry. The convoy of the army, which had been sent some time before to Lexington, was soon joined. The exhausted enemy had given up the pursuit, but a long train of fugitives was still hurrying in the direction of Lexington. Suddenly it wavered and halted, a few musket-shots had been heard in advance, and the fatal cry, "We are cut off!" passed rapidly from mouth to mouth. It was Kirby Smith's cavalry coming to complete the disaster of the Federals. Colonel Scott, who was in command, had started in the morning, confidently relying upon the success of his comrades, and by making a large circuit across fields he had succeeded in placing himself on the other side of Richmond, on the line of retreat of the vanquished. While Nelson, severely wounded in the last battle, succeeded in escaping,

Manson could not gather more than about a hundred men around him, who tried in vain to force a passage; in an instant they were all either killed or dispersed; Manson himself was taken prisoner along with the bravest of his men. The entire convoy and all the artillery of the Federals fell into the hands of Kirby Smith; the prisoners picked up on every side soon exceeded three thousand. The conquerors had only lost two hundred and fifty killed and five hundred wounded. This was a considerable number for so small an army, but the success they had achieved was well worth the price paid for it; they had annihilated the only force that could arrest their progress, and the whole of Kentucky was at their mercy.

On the first of September, Kirby Smith entered Lexington amid the plaudits of a population passionately devoted to slavery, and his soldiers found in well-deserved rest ample compensation for all their fatigues. It was, however, necessary to act promptly to turn this victory to advantage. Two roads of nearly the same length opened before him, one leading northward to Covington, a suburban town, situated on the left bank of the Ohio, opposite Cincinnati; the other, running westward, led to Louisville. Kirby Smith decided to take the first, by which he could more directly menace the soil of the free States. The sequel of the campaign showed that this was a mistake; for in order to strike at the communications of Buell, the only foe he had to dread, it was necessary to occupy Louisville. Here was the junction of the railways connecting Nashville and the Tennessee with the valley of the Ohio; here were gathered all the stores which supplied the Federal armies as far as Chattanooga; by establishing himself here, Kirby Smith would have been able to protect the right flank of Bragg, who had just then entered Kentucky. But in marching toward Cincinnati, on the contrary, he moved away from the main army of invasion, and could only cause temporary alarms to the Federals. After having reorganized his troops and seen their number trebled by volunteers, who flocked to his standard from every part of the country, he started for Cynthiana. General Heth, who led the advance with his division, about twelve thousand strong, appeared before Covington on the 15th. But instead of finding a defenceless town, and

seeing, as he had hoped, the great city of Cincinnati imploring for mercy, and even aiding his soldiers to cross the river, to escape a bombardment, he found every preparation for an energetic resistance. At the news of the Richmond disaster, Wallace had been summoned to Cincinnati by the governor of the State. His first act was to close all the shops and places of business; then, calling all the citizens to the public squares, he had furnished them with implements. Forty thousand men were set to work in raising entrenchments around the suburbs of Covington, while all the steamers were hastily armed with cannon.

Seeing that he would not be able to seize this rich prey by a sudden dash, Heth withdrew the same evening, September 15th, and fell back upon the town of Frankfort, which a portion of Smith's troops had just occupied. The capture of the latter town might have produced a certain effect upon the vacillating population, ready to group themselves around the secession authorities whom the Confederate generals were about to install in the official capital of the State. In a military point of view, however, this town had but one advantage—that of enabling these generals to cross the Kentucky River without difficulty, and was in reality but the first stage toward Louisville, which city he could have entered that very day without making an unnecessary circuit northward.

Besides, Kirby Smith was about to surrender the principal part in the drama to the two large armies which had just come upon the scene under the orders of Bragg and Buell. We left the Confederate general crossing the Tennessee, above Chattanooga, on the 21st of August, at the head of about forty thousand men. An almost impenetrable barrier of rugged mountains separated him from the left of the Federals. Since the 19th of August the latter had got wind of his preparations for crossing that river, but were unable to ascertain on which side he would attack them. Thomas had correctly guessed his intentions, and on the 22d he notified his chief that the enemy was certainly trying to turn his left to enter Kentucky. Buell, however, believed, on the contrary, that he would cross the mountains to attack him in front; he even entertained fears for his right, and attributed to Bragg the strange design of invading North Alabama. Instead of concentrating his

forces upon his left, as Thomas had requested him to do, and placing himself so as to command the road to Sparta, the only one by which Bragg could reach Kentucky, he desired to take a position which would cover his centre, and he selected Altamont; but this village, situated in the barren and mountainous region, was almost inaccessible, and afforded none of the resources necessary to an army. Thomas, who arrived there on the 25th, was obliged to leave it for want of provisions, and returned to Mac-Minnville, which he had very imprudently been directed to abandon. McCook replaced him at Altamont on the 29th, to be soon compelled, in turn, to draw near his dépôts; the other divisions, stationed *en echelon* along the line of railway and the road which passes through Hillsboro', Tracy and Battle Creek, faced to the north. The Federals were thus waiting for the enemy, who was turning his back upon them on his way to invade Tennessee through the open gap before him. Meanwhile, Forrest, with four regiments numbering fifteen hundred or two thousand horse, made a demonstration against their lines to mask this movement, and the wooded, uneven nature of that region enabled him to pass almost unperceived between their divisions. On the 29th a detachment of his brigade, which had struck the Mac-Minnville railroad between that point and Manchester, tried in vain to capture a Federal post stationed in a stockade. The next day, Forrest, seeing that his adversaries were preparing to surround him on all sides, bethought himself of retreat, and tried to get away by turning suddenly to northward. He intended to pass between MacMinnville and Murfreesborough, in order to join Bragg on the Cumberland; but a brigade of infantry, consisting of three regiments and two sections of artillery, under Colonel Fyffe, who had been sent in pursuit, overtook him by a forced march at a junction situated in the centre of a large clearing. On seeing these troops, the Confederates believed them to be a convoy of the enemy, an easy prey, which they prepared to capture, when they were received by volleys of musketry and grape. In the twinkling of an eye they dispersed and fled in every direction, leaving a large number of killed and wounded behind them. This reverse paralyzed for some time the movements of Forrest.

Morgan, on his side, describing a complete circle, re-entered

Middle Tennessee. He had escaped the pursuit of De Courcy's Federal brigade, which had come down Cumberland Gap as far as Tazewell; and, after a slight skirmish at that place, he had reached Knoxville, where he only stopped a few days, and then, pursuing once more a westerly course, he attacked Buell's left, and crossed the Cumberland in the vicinity of Hartsville without opposition. The Federals, being at length apprised of this bold movement, which threatened to cut the communications between Nashville and Kentucky, went in pursuit, and General Johnson, with about six hundred horse, overtook him a little beyond Gallatin. Morgan, finding himself too closely pressed, turned in his track, and the two troops, having dismounted, met between this village and Cairo. At the first onset the Federals fled in a disgraceful manner, leaving behind them their general and a handful of gallant soldiers, who defended themselves for some time, and were finally made prisoners.

Morgan, encouraged by this success, and learning that the Unionists occupied Bowling Green and Munfordsville in force, bore to the north-east for the purpose of ascending the valley of the Cumberland in the direction of Jamestown (Kentucky) and Somerset. By a still more eccentric march he thus covered the circular movement of Scott's cavalry, intended, as we have seen, to mask the expedition of Kirby Smith. Having accomplished this task, he again joined the latter in the plains of Kentucky, and continued to form part of his small army during the whole of the campaign we are about to describe.

Buell had at last discovered his error; but Bragg had already obtained great advantage over him. The Confederate army, after resting at Dunlap, had on the 28th of August crossed the first mountain ridge, known by the name of Waldren's Ridge, which separated it from the Federals, and had debouched into the valley of the Sequatchie; then, turning to the right, it had proceeded up this valley, and reached Pikeville on the 30th of August, the day that Forrest was put to flight near MacMinnaville, and that Kirby Smith in Kentucky dispersed Nelson's division at Richmond. It was on this same day that Buell took up his march to cover Nashville. He was too late to bar the entrance into Kentucky against the Confederates. The capital of Tennessee should

at least be protected. Buell had with him five divisions of the army of the Ohio, three of which were under Generals Schœpf, McCook and Crittenden, and the other two, designated as the fourth and sixth, under Thomas. These troops reached Murfreesborough between the 3d and 5th of September. The two divisions of Palmer and Negley were already at Nashville, with all the dépôts and a large number of convalescents. The first division came to rejoin them, and on the 7th of September Thomas was placed in command of all these forces, with instructions to defend the capital of Tennessee. Imperative necessity had summoned Buell into Kentucky; Bragg had just preceded him into that State.

On the 30th of August, whilst the Federals were proceeding from Decherd and MacMinnville toward Murfreesborough and Nashville, Bragg ascended the Sequatchie as far as its sources, and going through the pass of Grassy Cove arrived at Crossville with his heads of column, where Forrest found him the next day. The *détour* he had thus made to the north-east had again disturbed Buell's mind, and had retarded the movement of the Union army for a day. This *détour*, however, had no other object than to bring back the Confederates upon one of those turnpikes the scarcity of which, in America, invests them with exceptional importance. This was the Knoxville and Nashville pike, which on one side afforded great facility for penetrating into the heart of Tennessee, and on the other, by extending into the eastern section of that State, enabled him to receive the supplies he needed. Bragg, having struck this turnpike at Crossville, at once proceeded westward, passed through Sparta, and, rapidly following a direction parallel to that of his adversary, had taken possession of the village of Carthage on the Cumberland, which made him master of both banks of the river. From this point he threatened Nashville, from which Buell's army was still far distant; but whether he found that city defended by too large a garrison, or whether he had only made this feint to westward for the purpose of detaining the Federals in Tennessee, and of getting still more in advance of them, he suddenly turned northward in the direction of Glasgow. His heads of column crossed the Kentucky frontier on the 5th of September, at the very moment that Buell's

army was being massed with difficulty between Nashville and Murfreesborough.

Bragg had under his command many of the soldiers and officers who had evacuated Bowling Green with Sidney Johnston six months before, who had participated in the bloody battle of Shiloh and defended Corinth, and who, in short, after an extremely long march through Mississippi, Alabama and Tennessee, were returning to Kentucky full of ardor and confidence. This confidence was well founded: thanks to the combinations of their chief and the slow movements of their adversary, they found themselves placed between the latter and his base of operations. Henceforth Kirby Smith, protected by them, had nothing more to fear. The railroad which connected Nashville with the great cities of the North was at their mercy; the free States on the right bank of the Ohio were menaced, and Buell would be compelled to attack the Confederates whenever they might please to make a stand against him in order to ensure his retreat.

Leaving to General Thomas the care of organizing the defence of Nashville, Buell, on hearing of the arrival of the enemy at Carthage, had proceeded as far as Lebanon in the direction of that city. Bragg, however, still pushed forward without waiting for him. On the 12th of September the first detachments of Confederate infantry reached Glasgow, while their cavalry was destroying the track of the Nashville and Louisville Railroad between Franklin and Bowling Green. Buell followed them at a distance, feeling his way. On that day he had not gone beyond the frontier of Kentucky near Mitchellville; and still fearing an attack upon Nashville, he sent back one of the divisions of his army to Thomas. On the following day every doubt was dispelled. An intercepted despatch had informed him, it is said, what might, for that matter, have been easily guessed—that Bragg was marching upon Louisville. The Federals had but little chance of winning the race of which that city was the prize. Thomas was summoned in great haste with the first division. Leaving two at Nashville, he started on the 15th. On the 18th the whole of Buell's army was concentrated at Bowling Green. Bragg, however, had turned these six days to good account, and the two adversaries found themselves nearly in the same situation

as Lee and Pope three weeks previous, each almost turning his back upon his true base of operations. Buell had cause to fear a similar disaster to that which the Federals had experienced at Manassas.

Leaving one division with Breckenridge on the frontier of Tennessee to check any aggressive movement on the part of the Nashville garrison, Bragg had marched in two columns, Hardee's corps taking the left, through Cave City, Polk's bearing more to the right; and on the 14th his vanguard had reached the borders of Green River. This important tributary of the Ohio runs nearly from east to west, forming an obstacle upon which Bragg, once master of the northern bank, could long hold his enemy, coming from the south. The railroad crossed this water-course at Munfordsville; on the left or south bank of the river the crossing was defended by a block-house to the west, and a small fortification, called Fort Craig, to the east, of the railway. These two works, which were connected by a long breastwork, only mounted four guns in position. The Federal garrison, commanded by Colonel Wilders, consisted of two batteries of field-artillery, about two thousand men belonging to the dépôts of five or six different regiments, and a company of regular infantry. Two brigades, under General Chalmers, formed the advance of Hardee's corps, which was marching at the head of the Confederate army. They arrived in front of the Federal entrenchments on the evening of the 13th, which they vigorously attacked at early dawn the next day. Fort Craig, recently constructed in the centre of a wood, was surrounded by large abatis. A fierce fight was engaged among the fallen trees; the Federals were soon driven back into their works, but the assailants could not dislodge them, and finally retired after having sustained considerable losses. Encouraged by this success, the small garrison resolved to continue the defence of the positions confided to its honor. On the 15th it received a reinforcement of five hundred men from Louisville and another on the morning of the 16th, which swelled its numbers to nearly four thousand men. But the apparent immobility of the Confederates, which had drawn these new victims into the trap, concealed a manœuvre destined to render their safety impos-

sible. Whilst the greater part of Hardee's forces were being massed in the rear of Chalmers' brigades, Polk had crossed Green River, sixteen kilometres higher up, had descended the right bank, and had come to complete on that side the investment of the small garrison. To seize this prey, Bragg, following Lee's example at Harper's Ferry, did not hesitate to concentrate his army at the risk of an entire change in his order of march. To detain the Federals up to the moment when they could not escape, he ordered Hardee to attack the works on the west. The Confederates were repulsed, but the sacrifice of a few lives was not without its compensation. Bragg, being now certain of success, sent a flag of truce to Wilders, inviting him to come and see for himself the numerical superiority of the forces that were about to attack him on all sides; he even granted him a suspension of hostilities till evening—not a very dangerous concession, for he knew that Buell had not yet left Bowling Green. On the morning of the 17th the Federals, surrounded by more than twenty-five thousand men, capitulated with the honors of war, and were released on parole. They had bravely done their duty; their chiefs had left them without assistance or instructions; Buell had allowed Bragg to gain a sufficient advance to invest them; General Gilbert, who was in command at Louisville, had sent them just enough troops to aggravate the disaster; and whilst keeping up his telegraphic communications with them till the evening of the 15th, he had given them no orders for a retreat, which would have saved them. It is true that in sacrificing themselves they kept the whole of Bragg's forces on Green River for two days, when the existence of the Federal army depended upon the progress, more or less accelerated, of the latter. This was probably paying a moderate price for such a result; for the time consumed by the Confederates before Munfordsville enabled Buell to gain two marches on the road to Louisville.

This rich and populous city, numbering more than seventy thousand inhabitants, was menaced on every side at once; it was the very day of the investment of Munfordsville that Heth, as we have seen, appeared before Cincinnati, and that the remainder of Kirby Smith's troops occupied Frankfort. The recruits, collected in haste, who crowded the streets, could not have protected

the city against a serious attack, and Kirby Smith needed no reinforcement to take possession of it.

On the other hand, the position of Buell's army afforded Bragg an opportunity for attempting a much more important and promising operation than the capture of a defenceless city. This army had just made very long marches, was short of rations, and felt itself cut off; it was, therefore, in the worst condition for fighting a battle, which, however, it could not possibly avoid. Bragg, by imitating the successful manœuvres of Lee, had turned his adversary: by attacking him during his precipitate retreat, he could have achieved a decisive victory; but he failed to avail himself of this opportunity. After the capitulation of Munfordsville, he left on Green River a simple rear-guard, which Buell's heads of column dislodged from Prewitt's Knob (or Glasgow Junction) on the 20th of September, and scattered his troops through the country to take possession of it, to install the authorities devoted to his cause, and, above all, to gather the largest possible amount of booty. He thus slowly advanced in a northerly direction, loading his wagons not only with provisions, but with commodities of every kind, followed by immense droves of cattle, providing fresh horses for his cavalry, and collecting a large number of recruits among the young farmers of those regions. Being chiefly anxious to secure to the already impoverished Confederacy the product of this great raid, he no longer thought of leading his brave soldiers to meet an enemy whom he almost held within his grasp. Master of Salt River, which runs from south-east to north-west, and on the borders of which he could compel Buell to fight an offensive battle, he hastened, on the contrary, to abandon its banks and fall back upon Bardstown. He thus left the direct road to Louisville, which was only fifty kilometres distant, and allowed the Union army quietly to enter that city. Leaving Polk with his corps stationary at Bardstown, he bore to the right, turning his back upon Ohio, and marched through Harrodsburg upon Lexington, which he entered with Hardee's corps on the 1st of October, having thus taken sixteen days to march less than two hundred kilometres. The two Confederate armies which had started, the one from Chattanooga, the other from Knoxville, to rendezvous in Kentucky, were thus at last united. But this

junction lost nearly all its importance in consequence of Bragg's error, of which Buell had skilfully availed himself. The Union general, making a circuit to westward, had followed a road parallel to that which his adversaries had just marched over; his vanguard, which had left Prewitt's Knob on the 21st, were four days in advance of his rear, it having been found necessary to move his divisions *en echelon*, in order to subsist them upon the resources of the country. Once across Salt River, Buell had forcibly drawn near the positions occupied by Polk's troops, less than forty kilometres from the Ohio; and it was within this narrow space between a large river on the left, and an enemy admirably posted for attacking his right flank, that Buell's whole army had defiled without being molested; on the 25th his vanguard had entered Louisville; on the 29th the whole army was reunited there.

A new campaign was about to begin. The Federal government and the people of the North had set everything in motion to stop Bragg's victorious march and reconquer Kentucky. Buell found in Louisville volunteers flocking from all the Western States, and a considerable detachment of Grant's army, hastily sent over from Corinth. These reinforcements swelled the army of the Ohio to nearly one hundred thousand men; and notwithstanding the diversity of the constituents thus brought together, this army was reorganized by the 30th of September. The transportation service was sufficient for a new advance, the baggage had been lightened, and the new recruits had as far as possible been brigaded with regiments composed of experienced soldiers. The active army numbered about sixty-eight or seventy thousand men, nearly thirty thousand of whom had recently enlisted, and was divided into three corps, under the command of McCook, Crittenden and Gilbert. Each corps comprised three divisions, formed of two or three brigades, with two or three batteries of artillery and some cavalry, forming an effective total of eighteen to twenty-two thousand men. On the very day he was to begin his march Buell was relieved from command, and the President designated Thomas as his successor. But the latter declined, and pleaded so earnestly in behalf of his chief that Buell was reinstated in the command. These orders and counter-orders caused the loss

of twenty-four hours, and the Federal columns only left Louisville on the 1st of October.

This was the day, as we said before, that Bragg reached Lexington. His army had also been reorganized; Humphrey Marshall, who had arrived from West Virginia, was ordered to collect the volunteers furnished by Kentucky, and form them into a division, which, together with those of Churchill and Heth, constituted Kirby Smith's corps. The latter transferred the troops sent to him from Chattanooga to the army of the Mississippi. This army was divided into two corps; the right, under Polk, comprised the divisions of Cheatham and Withers, the left, under Hardee, the divisions of Anderson and Buckner. These divisions were much stronger than those of the Federals; they were composed of at least four brigades, with an effective total of from seven to eight thousand men each. The army of the Mississippi therefore counted from thirty to thirty-five thousand combatants of all arms, while the forces under Bragg amounted to fifty thousand men at the utmost, comprising in this calculation the strong escorts necessary to protect the immense convoy which carried the fruit of his requisitions. The opportunity for attacking Buell was henceforth lost to him; and he was soon about to be himself menaced in the positions he occupied in the heart of Kentucky; but whether he should be able to maintain himself in those positions or not, it was necessary first of all to give his convoys time to reach the dépôts situated in the interior of the Confederacy, where they were impatiently looked for. The measures adopted by him led to the belief that he expected to be able to resist Buell, and to preserve the best portion of his conquest. The river from which the State derives its name afforded him an excellent line of defence. The Kentucky, after running from east to west as far as the centre of the State, turns directly toward the north, and passing Frankfort discharges itself into the Ohio. At the point where its direction thus changes it receives the waters of a small river, which also runs from south to north, the source of which lies in the mountainous country which separates the valley of the Cumberland from that of the Ohio. The shores of this stream, called Duck River, are steep bluffs, among which only two or three practical crossings are found. Below the con-

fluence of Duck River the Kentucky is a stream of considerable size. These two water-courses, therefore, constitute an obstacle, which traverses the whole State in a direct line from south to north, dividing it into two almost equal parts. Bragg might hope to preserve this line; but as it was very much extended, he should have gone to meet his adversary, in order to ascertain his intentions, so as not to be taken by surprise, and this is what he failed to do, notwithstanding the slowness with which the Federal troops were advancing, nearly one-half of whom were not broken in to marching.

The Union general had designated Bardstown, where Polk had left his rear-guard whilst Bragg was marching upon Lexington, as a rendezvous for the various columns which had left Louisville. Only one Federal division, that of Sill, detached from McCook's corps, proceeded in the direction of Lexington to cover the left of the army. An extraordinary drought prevailed at that period in Kentucky; the streams, generally so full in those wooded regions, only presented here and there pools of stagnant water to the soldier parched with thirst from the heat and dust. For the first time we see the scarcity of water becoming a subject of serious anxiety to combatants in America. The march of the Federals was considerably delayed by it, and they only reached the vicinity of Bardstown on the 4th of October, the possession of which the parties of cavalry that had been watching them showed no disposition to dispute.

This was the day fixed for the installation of the new secessionist governor of Kentucky at Frankfort; Kirby Smith was there with his corps; Bragg had come in person. But at the very moment of the ceremony, some scouts who had encountered Sill's troops arrived with the announcement that the whole Federal army was marching upon that capital. Every man ran to his post, the solemnity was interrupted, and whilst they were preparing for battle the new functionary, already forgotten, sadly took the road to Lexington. The same road was soon to lead him out of the State he had aspired to govern.

Convinced for several days past that Buell would march upon Frankfort, Bragg had sent Polk, who had remained in the vicinity of Bardstown, an order to proceed northward to attack the

flank of the Federals, while Kirby Smith was to go out of the city and check their progress in front. But Polk, being no doubt better informed, and knowing that the whole Federal army was approaching, had the good sense not to execute the dangerous movement he had been ordered to make, and adhered to the letter of his original instructions; these directed him not to risk a general engagement, and in case of necessity to retire toward Bryantsville, a village situated a little to the east of Duck River, from which he could easily defend the precipitous banks of that stream. Polk had the more easily guessed Buell's plan, because this plan was in itself simple and well conceived. In fact, instead of going to strike the line of the Kentucky River, the Federals, by marching direct upon Frankfort, had only to bear to the right to menace Bragg's communications, draw him upon Duck River, and thus compel him to abandon Frankfort, Lexington and the richest portion of the State, without a fight. The two railway lines from Bardstown and Lebanon afforded them easy means of transportation in that direction. They could, in short, if necessary, extend their flank movement across the mountainous country in which Duck River takes its rise.

The most direct road from Bardstown to Bryantsville passes through Macksville and Harrodsburg; another, more to the south, goes through Springfield, Perryville and Danville; other roads still, coming from the north and the south, meet at Harrodsburg. Polk reached this last village with his army corps on the 6th of October. That of Hardee, which had been sent by Bragg on the most southern of these roads, at the time when Polk had been called back to Frankfort, was that day encamped in the vicinity of Perryville; he there found—a great blessing at that season of the year—copious springs of water, around which he had vainly requested Bragg to concentrate his army. Kirby Smith was in the neighborhood of Frankfort, and had written to his chief that a considerable portion of the enemy's army was in front of him. Hardee, on his side, felt closely pressed, and communicated the fact to headquarters. Troubled by these contradictory reports, Bragg imagined that his adversary was marching toward him on a front of one hundred kilometres, and that his columns were spaced along parallel roads from Lebanon on the

right to Shelbyville on the left. Acting upon this supposition, he divided Polk's corps, took from it Withers' division, which he sent to reinforce Kirby Smith, and ordered him to go with Cheat-ham's division to join Hardee at Perryville. His intention was to take command of the three divisions massed in the neighborhood of this village, to fight the only corps of the enemy he expected to find there, then to bring them back to the right, so as to form a junction with Kirby Smith. The latter was to draw near him by ascending the Kentucky as far as the neighborhood of Salvisa, where he expected to find the main body of the Federal army. These movements, ordered on the 7th, were executed at an early hour on the morning of the 8th.

Meanwhile, instead of dividing his columns, Buell kept them as close to each other as the scarcity of water permitted. Persuaded that the enemy had divined his intentions, he took it for granted that the latter would wait for him at Perryville to dispute the possession of the springs we have already mentioned, and he concentrated all his forces to take possession of them. On the 6th, McCook's corps, on the left, had encamped halfway between Bardstown and Macksville; Gilbert's, in the centre, at Springfield; and that of Crittenden, on the right, between Springfield and Lebanon. They were thus in a position to give reciprocal support. On the morning of the 7th, McCook posted himself at Macksville, whence he could march either upon Harrodsburg or Perryville; Crittenden, following the direct road from Lebanon to Danville, which passes at a distance of six kilometres south of Perryville, bivouacked near the point where the cross-road leading to the latter village connects. Gilbert was also approaching this point by the Springfield road, driving Hardee's pickets before him.

A few kilometres before reaching Perryville this road encounters a stream called Doctor's Creek, which, although dry at that time, still presented a few muddy pools in its bed; it was the only water within reach of the Federals. Sheridan, whose division formed the head of Gilbert's column, took possession of it on the evening of the 9th, and placed his outposts along the ridge of the hills which rose on the other side. These hills separated the valley of Doctor's Creek from that of another stream, Chap-

lin's Creek, which, after following the same direction from south to north, joins the former not far from there. The village of Perryville is situated at a point where the road crosses Chaplin's Creek, the sources of which are somewhat higher up. The whole of this region is deeply ravined and thickly wooded; it is impossible either to see or to hear for any great distance.

Hardee, with his two divisions, was encamped on the heights, which beyond Perryville border the left bank of Chaplin's Creek. At daybreak on the 8th he tried to dislodge Sheridan from the positions he had occupied during the night. But as Polk had not yet arrived, his attack was not very vigorous, and the resistance offered by McCook's brigade was sufficient to check him. During this time the combatants on both sides were hastening toward Perryville. The preceding evening Buell had ordered his two wings to close on his centre. Crittenden, who, for want of water, had not been able to bivouac at the place which had been indicated to him, only got into line toward the middle of the day, and took position on the right, at some distance from Gilbert's troops. McCook started from Macksville at five o'clock in the morning; he crossed Doctor's Creek about ten o'clock, and immediately came to take position on Gilbert's left, and on the same heights. His soldiers came up fatigued by the heat and by thirst. Deprived of Sill's troops, this corps was reduced to two divisions—Rousseau's, numbering seven thousand men, and Jackson's, composed of two brigades of new formation, only five thousand men, most of whom had never been under fire. Consequently, McCook had placed Rousseau's division in front; but during the march it was intersected by Jackson, and its third brigade, under Starkweather, found itself in the rear. The Federal line was thus formed—Crittenden on the extreme right, beyond the reach of sight and sound; on the right of the Springfield and Perryville road, Gilbert's corps, Sheridan resting his left on the road, Mitchell's division on his right, but in his rear and separated from him by a considerable space, Schœpf's division in reserve on Doctor's Creek. At a certain distance to the left of the road, in advance of that he had followed on his way from Macksville, McCook's corps went into bivouac; the arms were stacked, and the men on fatigue duty had gone in search of water and wood. McCook's

right was formed by two of Rousseau's brigades, first Lyttle's, then Harris', which occupied corn-fields intersected by hedges and interspersed with numerous barns; a long and narrow strip of under-wood, reaching down to the edge of Chaplin's Creek, and connecting with the Perryville woods on the other side, separated the left of Harris from the right of Jackson's division. The latter was drawn up in two lines, Terrill's brigade in front and Webster's in reserve. Finally, the extremity of the ridge which separates the two streams, sloping gradually down, was occupied by Starkweather's brigade, which, having struck across the fields in its early morning march, was placed a little *en potence* for fear of being flanked by the enemy under cover of the surrounding woods.

It was two o'clock in the afternoon. At this moment one of those harmless cannonades so frequent in the American army commenced, but it failed to disturb the repose which both armies were taking. While the soldiers were seeking shade or sleep, groups of officers were watching the course of the shells, the white smoke of which was slowly dissolving in the serene atmosphere of that autumnal day. The corps commanders were inspecting their lines, and already preparing for the movement projected for the morrow. They did not suspect that a splendid opportunity was that instant being lost. The well-conducted march of the Federals had, in fact, massed fifty-eight thousand men within reach of Perryville. On the other side of Chaplin's Creek was Hardee, with fifteen thousand men at the utmost. Cheatham's division, which was just arriving, only raised the number of his forces to twenty-two or twenty-three thousand men.* If Buell had then put his three corps in motion and made the attack he contemplated for the following day, without a moment's delay, he would have had such a numerical superiority that all the valor of the Confederates could not have saved them, and Bragg would have paid very dear for the imprudence he had committed in dividing his forces. But Buell believed himself confronted by the enemy's whole army. The Confederates, through an opposite error, imagined they had only to deal with a single Union corps, and were anxious to provoke its at-

* See the reports of the situation in the Appendix.

tack. The arrival of Cheatham's division determined them to assume the offensive, in the hope of preventing a junction of the Federal forces, which had already been effected since morning without their knowledge. Bragg was present on the field of battle, but he left the actual command to Polk. The two divisions of Hardee's corps were separated from the Federals by Chaplin's Creek. Anderson was opposed to Rousseau and Sheridan; Buckner on his right faced Jackson. Cheatham found himself at first on the left of Anderson; but by a fortunate chance he was withdrawn from this position, and, after a fruitless march toward the extreme right, was placed in reserve behind the other two divisions. If he had commenced the battle on the left, he would have roused Crittenden and brought him back to the battle-field, from which he kept away, as will be presently seen. Toward two o'clock Buckner and Anderson put themselves in motion. The latter, with the brigades of Jones and Brown, attacked Rousseau's line formed by the brigades of Lyttle and Harris. The Union troops made a vigorous resistance, compelling the enemy to show himself openly. The assailants sustained heavy losses. Their two brigadiers were wounded; they gained no ground. But on their right Liddell's brigade, led by Buckner, took advantage of the wood which stretched across the valley, to approach Terrill's Federal brigade unperceived. It instantly deployed, and suddenly opening fire marched directly upon the enemy's guns. Jackson was killed at the first discharge. His soldiers, novices in war, could not recover from this surprise, but were dispersed. Terrill sacrificed his life in vain efforts to rally them. Eleven guns fell into the hands of the Confederates. Webster, who came up with Jackson's second brigade, checked for a moment the rush of the victors; but their onset had staggered the whole Federal line. Rousseau, attacked on his left flank, fell back upon Doctor's Creek. Adams came up to take the place of the Confederate brigades of Jones and Brown in front of him. In order to render Liddell's success complete by bearing more to the right, Buckner sent forward Cleburne's brigade, whose intrepid chief, scarcely recovered from the wound received at Rogersville, was again severely wounded. Webster, after having momentarily rallied the *débris* of Jackson's division, was, in turn, mortally

wounded. Out of five thousand effective men this division had lost more than one thousand by the fire of the enemy. It had seen three of its generals fall, and was completely disorganized. On the extreme left Starkweather found himself isolated, and despite a vigorous resistance was also obliged to fall back.

The Confederates were masters of all the positions occupied by McCook between Chaplin's Creek and Doctor's Creek ; but whilst their right, taking advantage of the dominant position it had conquered, was steadily advancing, their left presented its flank to Sheridan, whom they had not yet seriously attacked. The artillery of this general opened an enfilading fire upon them, which compelled them to halt and to turn against him. It was four o'clock. The soldiers who had just fought Rousseau were unable to break the line of Sheridan, who with fresh troops occupied an elevated position easy to defend ; they exchanged volleys of musketry with no effect. Polk caused Smith's brigade of Cheatham's division to support Anderson, the other two brigades of that division being already engaged at the extreme right. All the efforts of the assailants were then directed against Sheridan, but he, being posted along the edge of a wood which crowned the summit of the hills, commanded the open fields through which they were coming to attack him, and inflicted terrible losses upon the enemy. The Confederates returned in vain to the charge. Toward four o'clock Gilbert sent Mitchell's division to take part in the battle ; two of his brigades drew near Sheridan, covering his right ; one of them, under Carlin, joined him in an offensive return, and on that side the enemy was finally thrown back beyond Chaplin's Creek. The Federals passed through the village of Perryville, where they picked up some hundreds of prisoners. Mitchell's third brigade, under Gooding, had gone to the extreme left to McCook's relief, and for nearly two hours it made head almost alone against the attacks of the Confederates, slowly retiring before them, but at the cost of cruel sacrifices, for it left upon the ground its wounded commander and one-third of its effective force. Night came at last to put an end to this combat, one of the most sanguinary of the war, if we take into account the forces really engaged and the short time it lasted. The eleven Federal brigades, numbering about twenty-five thousand men, lost four

thousand in less than four hours, about eight hundred of whom were killed, two thousand two hundred wounded, and one thousand prisoners. The corps which suffered most was that of McCook, which had three thousand men disabled out of twelve thousand five hundred men. The losses sustained by the Confederate army, in seeking to repair the error which had kept a portion of its forces from the field, are attested by the official reports. The three divisions which alone sustained all the brunt of the battle had been reduced by their long marches to fifteen thousand combatants; they left on the battle-field of Perryville five hundred and ten killed, two thousand six hundred and thirty-five wounded, and two hundred and fifty-one prisoners, three thousand three hundred and ninety-six men in all—that is to say, more than one-fourth of their effective force.

One-half of the Federal army, not hearing the sound of musketry, and doubtless attributing the booming of cannon to one of those artillery duels which too frequently took place without cause or results, took no part whatever in the battle. The responsibility of such fatal inaction rests upon the Federal staff; for Buell was not notified until four o'clock of the struggle in which McCook had been engaged since two o'clock. He immediately sent orders to Gilbert, which the latter had anticipated by despatching Crittenden to the scene of action, but this officer only reached the vicinity of the battle-field at dark. The left wing of the Federals had been beaten, the inexperienced soldiers composing it had bravely resisted the attacks of a well-trained adversary, as is proved by their losses, but they quickly exhausted the few cartridges contained in their boxes, and only escaped a complete disorganization by abandoning the greatest portion of the disputed ground. The right, on the contrary, had successfully repelled all the assaults of the enemy. If the battle had commenced earlier, and the general-in-chief been sooner informed, the arrival of Crittenden and Schœpf's division would certainly have changed the issue of the contest.

Buell, however, still adhering to the first plan he had conceived, prepared to assume the offensive on the morning of the 9th, with the two corps of Gilbert and Crittenden, leaving in rear that of McCook, which had suffered so much by the battle

of the preceding day. But the propitious moment had passed. Bragg, conscious at last of the danger he had made his army incur by dividing it in the presence of the enemy, had taken advantage of the night to retire. The combinations he had devised for the purpose of stopping Buell's progress had failed, but the success he had achieved over McCook's corps was calculated to deceive the Federals regarding the forces they had before them, and to delay their movements, thus giving the Confederates time to concentrate themselves to begin a retreat which had now become inevitable. The battle of Perryville may, therefore, be considered as a reverse to both parties. The attack of the Confederates paralyzed Buell at a time when his united army could have crushed them. They did not, however, realize the success they had anticipated, and the resistance they encountered made them despair of securing Kentucky.

On the morning of October 9th the ridge commanding the right bank of Chaplin's Creek was only occupied by a small detachment as a rear-guard. The three divisions which had fought the battle of Perryville, leaving behind them twelve hundred of their wounded and most of the cannon captured the day before, retired toward Harrodsburg, where they arrived at nine o'clock in the evening of the 9th. The next day they crossed Duck River and took position at Bryantsville, while Kirby Smith, recalled in great haste, brought his own corps and Withers' division to Harrodsburg on the same day. On the 11th the whole Confederate army was at last concentrated around Bryantsville.

After crossing Chaplin's Creek, Buell decided to wait for the arrival of Sill before attempting the passage of Duck River, and on the 16th he stationed his army between Dicksville* and Danville, facing north-east across the roads from Macksville to Harrodsburg, and from Perryville to Danville.

On the 11th, Sill reached Perryville, after encountering the rear of Kirby Smith near Lawrenceburg. Frankfort had been occupied by Dumont's Federal division. The whole of Northern Kentucky was freed from the domination of the Confederate

* There are two Dicksvilles—the one we speak of, which is situated on the road from Macksville to Harrodsburg, and another on the road from Harrodsburg to Bryantsville.

army. It was massed in the triangle formed by Duck River and the Kentucky before their confluence, but it could not think of remaining there. The autumnal rains had set in the very day after the battle of Perryville; the reign of mud succeeded that of dust. To prevent the retreat from being turned into a disaster, there was not a moment to lose. The country in which the army found itself was too poor to subsist it during the winter; communications with the South were too difficult to procure supplies from that quarter. Any attempt to occupy again the rich counties which had just been evacuated was out of the question. A chain of mountains, very broad and very difficult of access, rose on the only road which was open to Bragg. It was impossible for him to return by the same road he had followed in the prosperous days of his invasion; he must enter the defiles which Kirby Smith had found so much trouble in passing. His convoys were already proceeding in the direction of Cumberland Gap, leaving *en echelon* at various stages on the route, dépôts of provisions to enable it rapidly to gain an advance on the Federals, who were obliged to draw all their provisions after them. On the 13th of October, Bragg put his army on the march by the roads passing through Lancaster, Mount Vernon, Loudon and Barboursville. On the 19th his heads of column reached Cumberland Gap, and on the 26th his rear was going through this redoubtable pass.

Buell was not able to pursue him closely. Having been informed on the evening of the 13th of his retreat, he immediately put Crittenden's corps in motion through Stanford, to turn Duck River, and cut off the enemy from the direct southern road toward Somerset, which diverges at Stanford from that of Cumberland Gap. Woods' division overtook a body of the enemy's cavalry at Stanford, but was unable to detain it long enough for a fight of any importance. McCook followed Crittenden. Gilbert bore more to the left, crossed Duck River, and passing through Lancaster entered the road through which the greater part of Bragg's soldiers had passed. The latter, however, by draining the limited resources of the country and obstructing the roads, delayed the progress of their adversaries. At Crab Orchard the road entered a sterile country, and presented defiles

easily defended by a simple rear-guard. It was impossible for the entire Federal army to venture into these defiles. Crittenden alone continued the pursuit as far as Loudon and Manchester, without succeeding in overtaking Bragg, who day by day left him a little farther in the rear. It became at last necessary to turn and bring back the army to the vicinity of railroads, without which it could not procure supplies. By using these railroads it would be able to reach the State of Tennessee, which Bragg was re-entering by way of Knoxville, sooner than by crossing the mountains of Southern Kentucky on foot.

The Federals had retained possession of Nashville, but it was by abandoning to the Confederates all the country east of this city. The latter had repaired the railway track from Chattanooga to Murfreesborough; by this means Bragg, once in Knoxville, could easily, as will be presently seen, bring his army into the heart of Tennessee, the capital of which he soon menaced. He thus compelled the army of the Ohio to concentrate itself around Nashville. The greater portion of this army returned to Lebanon, one division of Crittenden's corps passing through Somerset, Columbia and Glasgow. Bowling Green was the first point at which they were to meet, and the principal dépôt. The army arrived at this place between the 26th and 30th of October, about the same time that Bragg reached Knoxville. The immense wagon-train carrying its provisions, ammunition and *matériel* of every description, extending for a distance of twenty-four kilometres, soon joined it. Buell, justly supposing that so rich a prey would afford a temptation to Confederate partisans, had taken good care to deceive them as to the direction of this convoy; and instead of letting it follow the same road as the army, he had caused it to move more to westward, through Elizabethtown and Munfordsville. The cavalry brigade of Colonel McCook, escorting the convoy, had the good fortune to capture a detachment of three hundred mounted men of the enemy on the road. After their bloody encounter at Perryville, the two adversaries had therefore suddenly turned their backs upon each other. They made each on its side, in order to reach the railway lines, an immense *détour*, which was some time after to bring them upon a battle-field far remote from the preceding one.

On the 30th of October, Buell was relieved from command by the President. He had doubtless committed more than one mistake; but as the government had restored him his command at Louisville, it could not allege any serious cause for depriving him of it at the moment when he had just delivered Kentucky from the invasion of the enemy. The coincidence between his dismissal and that of his friend McClellan attracted much comment at the North. Rosecrans, who had just distinguished himself around Corinth, as we shall relate hereafter, was placed at the head of the troops lately under Buell's command. At first he merely continued the movement commenced by the latter in the direction of Nashville. On the 7th of December this city was occupied by several divisions; the remainder of the Union army was posted *en echelon* along the line of railroad in the neighborhood of Gallatin, and as far as Bowling Green. The partisan Morgan had also re-entered the State through the mountains of West Virginia, after having surprised on the 12th of October a small Federal garrison in the town of Augusta, on the banks of the Ohio. Winter had set in, and Bragg took up his quarters between Murfreesborough, MacMinville and Chattanooga. The two adversaries were destined to remain stationary and inactive till the end of December.

The campaign just ended had been commenced two months and a half before by the march of Bragg, who, passing to the left of Buell, had first compelled the latter to hasten to the defence of Nashville, and then to follow him into Kentucky. During this time Kirby Smith, crossing the Cumberland Mountains, had defeated the new Federal levies at Richmond, and occupied the greater part of Kentucky. Bragg, placed between Buell and the Northern States, could have compelled him to fight; but satisfied with the capture of Munfordsville, he had opened to him the road to Louisville by proceeding himself toward Lexington. The second part of the campaign began on the 1st of October. Buell, resuming the offensive, concentrated his army in the vicinity of Perryville. On the 8th of October, Bragg, attacking him with only three divisions, surprised his right wing and defeated it, but failed in his efforts against the Federal centre. The retreat of the Confederates, which only ended at Chattanooga, was for them a dis-

appointment all the more bitter, because it coincided with the abandonment of Maryland by Lee, as Bragg's march had coincided with the aggressive campaign of the army of Virginia. The combat at Richmond in Kentucky took place on the same day that the battle of Manassas was fought. On leaving Kentucky the Confederates charged the population of that State with lukewarmness—a population divided between two hostile factions; but they endeavored to console themselves by calling to mind the immense resources of every description that Bragg's army was carrying away with it. The only lasting result of this campaign for them was the occupation of the whole of Tennessee east of Nashville.

CHAPTER II.

CORINTH.

WE have said in a former chapter that Halleck had been unable to employ, in any important operation south or east, the large forces at his disposal in the month of June. He had allowed the Confederates to establish themselves at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. These two citadels, which reciprocally covered each other, barred the navigation of the Mississippi, and connected the two sections of the Confederacy. Van Dorn had quietly taken possession of these places, and in the month of August pushed his outposts as far as the Memphis and Corinth Railroad. More to the east, Sterling Price occupied the neighborhood of Tupelo with the troops he had brought from Arkansas in the spring.

The Federals were acting on the defensive. Bragg's army, which was concentrating at Chattanooga, and that of Lee, which was marching upon the Rapidan, menaced their actual possessions too seriously for them to think of new conquests on the Mississippi. Besides, the oppressive summer heats would not permit the Northern soldiers to venture with impunity into the marshy regions which border the great river. In short, all the available troops had gone to join Buell's army under Thomas' command; and Grant was left with only a sufficient force to protect the conquests made on the Tennessee and the Mississippi. The districts thus acquired were divided into two military departments; that of West Tennessee, placed under Grant, with the troops which had been left him, was bounded on the south by that of the Mississippi, under Rosecrans, the successor of Pope in the command of the army of the Mississippi; but this division was of a purely administrative character, the supreme control of the defences of all the territory comprised between East Tennessee and West-

ern Mississippi being fortunately reserved to Grant, the ranking officer of the two. The possession of this territory secured the control of the two large rivers as far as Eastport on one side, and Memphis on the other; it was open to attacks from the south between these two towns. It was, therefore, the line from Eastport to Memphis that Grant had to protect; this line was too extended for the small number of troops he had under his command, and the railroad, which directly connected the two water-courses from Memphis to Florence, was too much exposed to sudden surprises to be of any service to him; but the disposition of the other railway lines running through his department afforded him a partial remedy for this inconvenience. In fact, the small town of Humboldt, situated in the centre of the parallelogram formed by the two rivers, was the point of intersection of the two lines coming from the north; after passing this point, one of them runs south-westward in the direction of Memphis, the other to the south-east toward Corinth. This last line again divides at Jackson, some distance from Humboldt, and its western branch runs almost due south to the Memphis and Florence Railway, which it intersects at Grand Junction. The latter point is at an equal distance from Memphis and Corinth. The most important water-course in this region is Hatchie River, which takes its rise near Ripley, in the State of Mississippi, and follows a north-westerly course until it discharges itself into the Mississippi above Fort Randolph. In consequence of the woody swamps which border its banks, it forms, from its very source, a serious obstacle. The most prominent points for crossing this stream are Crum's Mill, on the road from Holly Springs to Corinth, Davis' Mill, on the road from Memphis to Corinth, and, in the immediate vicinity of the latter point, the bridge of the Memphis and Charleston Railway, situated below the confluence of the Tuscumbia River, which runs from Corinth; and finally the viaduct of the line from Jackson to Grand Junction, near the village of Bolivar.

Abandoning Grand Junction, the Federals had posted themselves in the vicinity of this river; Sherman, with the six thousand men of his division, defended the upper course of the Mississippi at Memphis, through which he communicated with

his chief. Grant, in order to be ready to hold the enemy in check at every point along the line of the Hatchie, placed his right, composed of the divisions of Hurlbut and Ord, amounting altogether to about eight thousand men, at Bolivar, and his left, formed by the army of Rosecrans, in the neighborhood of Corinth. The remainder of his own army was at Jackson, in the rear, so that it could easily be conveyed by rail either to Bolivar or Corinth. The extreme left of Rosecrans extended as far as the Tennessee through Iuka; it was scattered in small posts, so as to cover the branch of the Corinth and Iuka Railroad, and the road from Eastport to the Tennessee, these being the lines through which Rosecrans had hitherto obtained his supplies. The drought, however, was so great in the month of August that the Tennessee was no longer navigable to this point, and the soldiers of both Grant and Rosecrans had to depend entirely upon the railroads to bring them provisions, collected in the vast dépôts of Columbus on the Mississippi.

All the troops placed under Grant numbered scarcely forty thousand men. The army of the Mississippi, composed of the divisions of Hamilton, Stanley, Davis and McKean, counted from twenty to twenty-two thousand men; the army of the Tennessee, reduced to the four small divisions of Sherman, McPherson, Ord and Hurlbut, had only eighteen thousand combatants left. The necessity of leaving Sherman at Memphis, and of defending against the guerillas the dépôts and railway bridges through which supplies were conveyed to the army, reduced the active forces under Grant to less than thirty thousand men.

Those of his adversaries were not quite so numerous. Van Dorn's army, composed of the divisions of Lovell and Breckenridge, numbered about fifteen thousand men. Price's troops, comprising the divisions of Maury and Little, consisted of ten thousand five hundred infantry, two thousand five hundred horse under Armstrong, and one thousand artillerists, with forty-four guns. All told there were twenty-five thousand men, five thousand horses and one hundred guns. These two little armies, however, had each a special task; Van Dorn was to defend the Mississippi, and Price to remain in the valley of the Tennessee.

Each believing himself too weak to assume the offensive, the

two adversaries watched each other's movements. Finally, at the urgent solicitations of Bragg on taking the field, the Confederate generals decided to attempt a diversion in his favor. Price sent Armstrong's brigade of cavalry to feel Grant's position on the Hatchie.

On the 30th of August, a bloody day along the whole of the immense line occupied by the belligerents—the day of the battle of Manassas, the Richmond combats and the engagement at Mac-Minnville—Armstrong followed the road from Grand Junction to Bolivar, in the hope of surprising the Federals in that position, or at least of cutting their communications. The latter, however, having got wind of his approach, sent a few hundred horse, with some artillery and mounted infantry, to meet him. These last-mentioned troops, destined to fight exclusively on foot, although transported on horseback, had been organized to resist the inroads of guerillas, and rendered excellent service in that country, where the movements of foot-soldiers are so slow. Although the Federals were only nine hundred strong, they resisted Armstrong's attacks the entire day. It is asserted that during the contest some squadrons of cavalry of the two parties crossed sabres, a rare occurrence at that period of the war. Toward evening the Federals fell back toward Bolivar, and joined the main body of their forces beyond the town, on the north bank of the Hatchie. Armstrong, seeing the impossibility of taking the enemy by surprise, and that the Federal brigade of Crocker was ready to receive him, made a *détour* to the west of Bolivar, and crossed the Hatchie lower down, in order to threaten the village of Jackson and cut the railway between those two important posts. On the 31st, after doing some slight damage to the track, he attacked at Medon Station a post of a few hundred men entrenched behind cotton-bales which they had piled up in haste. Unable to drive them out of this improvised redoubt, and giving up all further attempt, he retraced his steps toward the Hatchie. A column of seven or eight hundred infantry, with two pieces of artillery, under Colonel Dennis, was sent in pursuit, and overtook him at Britton's Lane. The Confederates, full of confidence in their numerical superiority, halted to give them battle. The small band of Federals was surrounded on every side, and lost both its convoy and

the two guns. It, however, preserved its composure, and rallied upon a wooded eminence, surrounded by open fields, whence it repulsed all attacks. Armstrong caused his men to dismount, and led them several times to the assault, while others charged the Federal line on horseback; but his efforts were all in vain; he could nowhere break the little troop which he had already considered captured, and he abandoned the field of battle, leaving on it one hundred and seventy-four men killed and the trophies captured at the beginning of the action. This engagement ended his expedition.

The invasion of Kentucky, however, was to have the effect of compelling the Federals to leave Nashville. Bragg, knowing that Rosecrans and Grant had sent all their available forces to the army of the Ohio, and that they had not yet received the recruits they were expecting, thought they would not be able to defend West Tennessee, and directed Van Dorn and Price to meet him on the borders of the Ohio. Price had received orders to prevent Rosecrans from reaching Nashville; he had immediately collected his scattered forces and started off, expecting to meet his adversary in full retreat. He was to be very soon undeceived. On seeing the Confederate cavalry leave Lagrange, near Grand Junction, and subsequently appear at Ripley, Grant had indeed divined that the enemy had abandoned all intention of attacking his right at Bolivar, and that his efforts would be directed against Rosecrans. He was ready to support the latter at the first call.

On the 13th of September, Price's army was advancing toward Iuka. This movement enabled him to follow the Federals in case they should retire toward Nashville, or cut off their retreat in that direction if they remained at Corinth. Colonel Murphy, who commanded a brigade in Stanley's division, was in charge of the dépôt at Iuka. After assembling all the detachments belonging to his command, which were scattered along the railroad as far as Tusculum, he abandoned the post entrusted to his care, as soon as the enemy appeared, without even destroying the *matériel* that lay there. Before the war the village of Iuka was frequented by the rich families of Mississippi. Magnificent mineral springs, shady retreats such as are only to be found in America, a healthy climate and a beautiful rolling country,—all combined to render it a charming sojourn during the scorching summers of that region.

Price's soldiers, long condemned to the hardest privations, found there all kinds of resources. But they were not destined to enjoy them long. Once master of this position, Price learnt that Rosecrans, instead of crossing the Tennessee to join Buell, was massing his forces at Corinth. He might have left him there and hastened to the north-west to attack Nashville, as Bragg had requested him to do, or to co-operate with Van Dorn to attempt to dislodge him. The latter plan, being the most feasible, was proposed to and accepted by Van Dorn on the 16th of September.

Meanwhile, Grant was preparing to prevent the junction of these two generals by attacking Price in his advanced position. He had put all the troops at his disposal in motion, leaving behind him only a sufficient force for the protection of Corinth. Rosecrans brought him the divisions of Stanley and Hamilton, amounting altogether to about nine thousand men, while Ord arrived with nearly eight thousand taken from the army which occupied Bolivar and Jackson. His forces, therefore, were increased to seventeen thousand men in all; Price had only fourteen thousand.

But instead of concentrating all his troops, Grant thought himself sufficiently strong to divide them and try to hem in his enemy in the village of Iuka. To effect this he ordered Rosecrans to quit the railway track, which led directly to this place, and to go round by way of Rienzi and Jacinto, so as to approach Price on the south and cut his natural line of retreat. In the mean while, Ord was to come up by way of the north-west, and to attack Price north of the town.

In a region the topography of which was so little known, where the roads became broken up at the first rainfall, and the streams, the swamps and the forests combined to retard the movements of armies, and communications between headquarters were extremely uncertain, such a manœuvre, undertaken in the presence of so active an adversary as Price, was full of danger. The result was soon to prove it so.

On the 18th of September, Rosecrans was in the vicinity of Jacinto; Grant was at Burnsville, on the road leading from Corinth to Iuka, waiting to hear that his lieutenant had executed the movement he had ordered him to make; farther on, on the same

road, only seven kilometres from the enemy's outposts, were the troops commanded by Ord; several trains of cars, always with steam up, were ready to bring them back rapidly to Corinth if it should be found that Van Dorn was menacing that place. The general attack upon Iuka was fixed for the following day, the 19th. Rosecrans announced his intention of presenting himself in the morning before this village by the two roads which approach it on the south side, one coming from Jacinto, the other from the village of Fulton, situated more to the east. Ord was to begin the battle on the opposite side at the same hour.

But the muddy, narrow roads and the streams swollen by the rains delayed the progress of Rosecrans' column, and on the evening of the 18th it was still thirty kilometres from Iuka. Grant, having been notified in time, directed Ord not to begin his attack until the booming of cannon should announce the approach of Rosecrans. The latter, in spite of all his diligence, was unable to reach the neighborhood of Iuka till three or four o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th. Before entering this village the Jacinto road ascends a hill, leaving a cross-road on the right, which connects the former with the Fulton road, upon which the right wing of Rosecrans was to take position to begin the attack. Hamilton's first regiments ascended the summit of this hill; but the remainder of the army, drawn up among the thick woods, formed an interminable line winding in the distance without being able to deploy. Infantry, cavalry, field-pieces and wagons were crowded together on a single road, where they mutually obstructed the march. The Fulton road had not yet been reached.

Suddenly the stray shots of Confederate sharpshooters in retreat were followed by violent discharges of musketry; it was Price attacking the advance of Hamilton. Informed by his spies of the movement of the Federals against him, he took advantage of their division and tried to crush them in detail. Proceeding to the front to meet Rosecrans, he hoped to arrest his progress before he could occupy the Fulton road, and perhaps even to disperse the enemy's column, thus surprised in the midst of its march. The three Federal regiments placed at the head of the column resisted the first assault. An Ohio battery, with the

remainder of Sullivan's brigade, soon came to their assistance. A fierce combat took place in the forest, which covered the whole hill. Little's Confederate division gallantly endeavored to carry this position. It was unshaken by the losses it sustained. Its chief was killed and its ranks thinned. It nevertheless reached the summit of the hill, where the Federal battery was posted. A large number of dead horses were strewn upon the ground; the majority of the gunners were wounded and the guns captured by the Confederates, who were driving their adversaries before them. But the rest of Hamilton's division, hastening to the sound of battle, at last surmounted all the obstacles of the road. It regained some advantage over the Confederates, and several of the spiked guns were recaptured in the midst of the dead bodies which surrounded them. The efforts of the enemy to turn first the right, then the left, of the dominant position of the Federals were repulsed. In the woods the fighting was desperate. The growing darkness increased the confusion without abating the violence of the struggle. Finally, the battle gradually ceased, and each man waited for the ending of that dismal night in the position he occupied, under a drenching rain, and surrounded by the wounded, whose cries were heard, but whom it was impossible to find in the brushwood. Hamilton's division, which was scarcely three thousand strong, had lost one hundred and thirty-five killed and five hundred and twenty-seven wounded, but only twenty-six prisoners. The losses of Price, who had all the time maintained the offensive, must have been much greater. He had not been entirely successful. Despite their numerical superiority, the two divisions he had brought on the battle-field had been unable to crush the head of Rosecrans' long column. The vigorous resistance of Sullivan's brigade—a resistance favored by the woods which covered the country and made of every road a natural defile—had kept the Confederates in check. But the combination formed for the purpose of surrounding them had failed; Rosecrans' position was extremely critical, and the Fulton road, which he had not been able to seize, remained under the control of Price. The latter hastened to turn this advantage to account to evacuate Iuka, for he knew that Ord would attack him in his turn the next morning. This general had waited in vain the whole

day for the sound of Rosecrans' cannon, to move forward. But the wind was blowing from the north; and like G. W. Smith at Fair Oaks and D. H. Hill at Malvern, he did not hear this uncertain signal, which the generals of both parties too frequently relied upon, and only engaged one battery, which was soon silenced. He was only informed of the bloody battle that had been fought so near him, in the middle of the night; and when he entered Iuka, he only met the advance of Rosecrans, which was just arriving from the opposite direction. Under cover of the darkness Price had succeeded in conveying the whole of his army to the Fulton road, at a distance of only two kilometres from the Federal lines, without being molested. But during their rapid march his soldiers, irritated by this new retreat, plundered all the houses they met, and the peaceful inhabitants of that country were bitterly to regret the sympathy they had shown for these rough Missourians, whom a few days before they had hailed as their deliverers.

Although obliged to abandon Iuka, Price had not relinquished the attack upon Corinth which had been concerted with Van Dorn. In order to carry out the plan agreed upon between them, the latter had already made a demonstration in the direction of Bolivar. The two Confederate generals needed, first of all, to bring their forces together. They met at Ripley on the 28th of September; Van Dorn, taking command of the twenty-two thousand men thus reunited, marched at once upon Corinth. This intelligent and enterprising general had skilfully selected the objective point of his campaign. The capture of Corinth would have opened to him the whole of Tennessee. Memphis would have been besieged and Grant driven back under the guns of Donelson, his first conquest. The Confederate soldiers, trained by long marches and sanguinary combats, and led by experienced generals, were burning with desire to avenge, in the city of Corinth itself, the humiliating evacuation of that place to which they had been reduced a few months before, and to seize the valuable stores which the Federal government had accumulated there.

After the capture of Iuka, Grant found himself without the means of pursuing his adversaries; he had been obliged hastily to bring back upon the line he was ordered to defend, the troops temporarily assembled for the battle of the 16th. Entertaining

fears for Bolivar as well as Corinth, he had divided the main body of his army between these two posts, entrusting the first to Ord and the second to Rosecrans. The latter, after collecting together all the small garrisons in the neighborhood, found himself at the head of nearly nineteen thousand men. The immense works around Corinth had been so modified as to admit of their being defended by this small force. This entrenched camp had been constructed in the month of May for Beauregard's army, more than sixty thousand strong; it had then been occupied and extended by the one hundred thousand men under Halleck. Looking upon the fortifications of that period as merely advanced works, Grant, assisted by an engineer officer, Major Prime, had surrounded the town of Corinth itself with an enclosure proportionate to the reduced figure of his army. These works consisted of redoubts connected here and there by breastworks more or less considerable, and covered by abatis at every point where the labors had extended through the forest. These lines, constructed in haste, protected the north and west sides of the town, which until then had been but poorly defended; the large works erected by the Confederates during the siege, on the contrary, were designed to protect the east side. The two railroads cross each other at the western angle of the town of Corinth. Two roads, running almost parallel to these two railway lines, follow them, on their left, as the traveller enters Corinth, one coming from Chewalla and Pocahontas, villages situated at the north-west on the Memphis road, the other from Purdy and Jackson, situated on the north. Before reaching Corinth, both wagon-roads and railroads cross Bridge Creek, which, as we have said elsewhere, runs to the north-west and west of Corinth, emptying finally into the Tuscumbia River more to the south; its west bank is commanded by several heights, upon which the Federals had erected two works, Fort Robinett at the north, and Fort Williams to the south of the Memphis railroad; these heights extended southward as far as College Hill, a hillock upon which stood a large college, and their summits were crowned on that side by three redoubts, Philipp's, Annrath and Lathrop, ranged in a semicircle. North of Corinth and east of the stream, the Federals had but a single work of any importance, the Powell redoubt,

separated from Robinett by a considerable space, through which the Chewalla road and the Jackson railway passed. But all the roads were occupied by breastworks sufficiently strong to protect the field artillery, and enable it to command the approaches; these works were strengthened and increased during the latter part of September, in consequence of a somewhat curious incident. A young woman named Miss Burton, who was gifted with true military instinct, played the part of the Confederate spy in Corinth. The Federals had intercepted one of her letters, in which she indicated the north-western side of the town as the weak point in the Federal defence, giving with remarkable precision all the information necessary for attacking it. This letter, carefully resealed, was forwarded to its destination, after which Miss Burton was closely watched, so as to prevent her supplying the enemy with any further intelligence, while the Federals worked without intermission to fortify the weak points she had so cleverly discovered. It was on this side that Van Dorn determined to make the attack; he not only expected to find the place illy defended, but fully relied upon being able to cut off Rosecrans from any reinforcements that Grant might send him. To accomplish his object, he proceeded northward and occupied Pocahontas, at the confluence of the Hatchie and Tuscumbia; in this position, which he reached on the 1st of October, he left his adversaries still uncertain as to the objective point of his attack.

Leaving a brigade of cavalry and some infantry to guard the bridge of the Hatchie, and the greater portion of his convoy, which remained parked in the neighborhood, he proceeded westward and encamped at Chewalla on the 2d, while his outposts, drawing near Corinth, encountered those of Rosecrans, who had gone out to meet him in pursuance of Grant's orders. The latter, having at last been made acquainted with the movement of the Confederates, had put all the forces at his command in motion to fall upon their flank and line of retreat. He sent McPherson in all haste with one of his brigades, direct from Jackson toward Corinth, whilst Ord, at the head of a portion of his division and that of Hurlbut, numbering all together from four to five thousand men, marched from Bolivar to Pocahontas to seize the fords of the Hatchie.

On the morning of the 3d the Confederates attacked the positions that Rosecrans had occupied a short distance outside of Corinth, near some of the old works. McKean, with the two small brigades of Crocker and McArthur, posted himself across the Memphis Railway; the division of Davies deployed on his right, between this railway and that of Jackson; farther to the right, Hamilton's division guarded the Purdy road; these three divisions were drawn up in two curved lines, the convexity of which was turned toward the enemy. Stanley's troops were held in reserve. These dispositions had been made in haste, because Van Dorn's alacrity had deceived the foresight of Rosecrans. He had thought that his adversary would be obliged to cross Bridge Creek under the guns of his works, in order to attack him from the north-west; indeed, at the time of the siege in the month of May, the forest swamps extending north-west of Corinth presented an insurmountable obstacle to combatants, but the heats had since dried them up. It was only during the night that the Federal general became aware that the Confederate outposts, by following roads unknown to him, had avoided this dangerous pass, and that, masters of the Purdy road and the line of railway, they were already threatening to flank his right.

The troops commanded by Van Dorn were composed of the two divisions of Maury and Hébert (the latter having replaced Little, who was killed at Iuka), which formed Price's corps, and Lovell's division, which alone represented the army of the West in that expedition. This division led the march along a road lying south of the Memphis Railway. At some distance from Corinth, Price, who was following the same road, directed his two divisions upon a cross-road on the left, deploying them between the two railroads across the Chewalla road; Maury, with the two brigades of Moore and Phifer in line, and that of Cabell in reserve, rested his right upon the Memphis Railroad. On his left, Hébert, deploying the three brigades of Green, Gates and McLean, the fourth being left in reserve under Colbert, was drawing near the Jackson Railway; on the other side, Lovell had placed his three brigades in line, under the command of Rust, Villepigue and Bowen; his left touched the track of the Memphis Railway, and on his extreme right he was covered by General Jack-

son's cavalry. It was he who commenced the attack. The road he followed was commanded by a height, upon which stood an old redoubt. Oliver's brigade, which had been detached from Davies' division to act as the vanguard of the Federals, had taken possession of this work. It was at once vigorously attacked. McArthur hastened with his brigade to its assistance, and made a powerful stand against the assaults of Lovell's whole division. Seeing the action thus vigorously going on on the left, Davies made a forward movement to place himself on a line with McArthur, and to occupy some old Confederate breastworks on his right; he even placed in battery several twenty pounders he had brought with him. At this moment Hébert's division emerged upon the skirts of the abatis surrounding the works. It was half-past ten o'clock. A fierce musketry fire was kept up on both sides at a distance of eighty metres; the Confederates, however, were superior in numbers, for Maury's division counted five thousand men, with twenty field-pieces, whilst Davies, deprived of Oliver's brigade, which was fighting on the left, could scarcely put three thousand men in line. They had the same advantage on the left, where the two brigades under McArthur and Oliver were contending with Lovell's whole division, numbering more than six thousand men. The latter succeeded at last in carrying the redoubt occupied by its adversaries. Oliver and McArthur were compelled to fall back with a loss of two guns, thus uncovering Davies' left flank; Moore's brigade of Maury's division immediately took advantage of this circumstance, and, throwing itself into the interval thus opened, forced the whole Federal line to abandon the positions it occupied, with two of the twenty pounders that defended them. In the mean while, the extreme Federal left, formed by Crocker's brigade, was holding Jackson's cavalry in check, while on the right Hamilton's division was exchanging shots with Hébert's soldiers, who were massed in the woods. Van Dorn had, in fact, ordered this general to keep out of sight as much as possible, so as to allow the Federals to concentrate their efforts between Lovell and Maury, and to fall afterward upon their uncovered right flank; he was in hopes that through the strength of this division, which numbered more than seven thousand men, and by the forest which masked his movements, and

the absence of fortifications on that side, he would be able to break the enemy's line and penetrate into Corinth at the same time.

After their first check the Federals formed again in front of the second line of works. Davies occupied the positions he had left in the morning; Stanley's division was in the rear, a little to the right, so as to support him; Hamilton, executing a conversion by the left through the forest, was to place himself upon the left flank of the Confederates in the woods facing west. Toward two o'clock, Van Dorn's troops, having finally recovered from the confusion that always follows even the most successful attacks in a country that is so much broken, appeared in sight; Lovell renewed the fight against McArthur and Oliver; Hébert, in accordance with Van Dorn's instructions, joined Maury in his efforts to crush the Federals in the vicinity of the Jackson Railroad. Hamilton, who was at the extreme end of Rosecrans' line, was masked by the woods, where he was endeavoring to change position, and the whole weight of the charge of the Confederates fell upon Davies' division; its two brigade generals, Hackelmann and Oglesby, were struck down, one killed, the other severely wounded; it was losing ground. Stanley arrived in time to check its retreat, but the Confederates had still the advantage of numbers. Hamilton, delayed by the thickness of the wood, could not so soon complete his flank movement as to participate in the struggle. Although closely pressed, Stanley and Davies succeeded, nevertheless, in maintaining their positions until about six o'clock, when night put an end to the struggle.

The Confederates were victorious on this first day of the conflict, but Van Dorn was too hasty in announcing that he should be in Corinth the next day. In fact, his success had been dearly purchased; he had engaged nearly all his troops, and had not yet reached the principal defences of the enemy; he had, moreover, indicated to the latter on which side his defences required to be multiplied, and allowed him the whole night to do this. Rosecrans made good use of this time. Before daybreak the fugitive negroes then in Corinth had thrown up a new redoubt on the Bolivar road, which was called Fort Richardson; in short, the forest roads along the whole line were obstructed by breast-

works roughly built with stumps of fallen trees. The redoubts were well supplied with cannon and foot-soldiers, and the whole front of the Federal army carefully reconstructed. Hamilton still occupied the extreme right, but had been brought to the rear and was facing north, resting his left upon Fort Powell. Beyond this fort was Davies, whose line, contracted on account of the losses of the preceding day, did not extend beyond the Jackson Railroad, having the new Richardson redoubt in its centre. Farther to the left, Stanley had come to fill the space comprised between the two lines of railway, and had bivouacked in front of Forts Robinett and Williams. The latter fort, situated a little to the left and in the rear of the other, commanded it and all the approaches; it had consequently been armed with heavy thirty pounders. The extreme left was formed by McKean, whose lines extended over the college hills to the south-west of Corinth.

Van Dorn had not been less active during this night. His troops had taken position, so as to commence a decisive attack at daybreak; the signal for this attack was to come from the left. Price had placed all his artillery in battery on the west bank of Bridge Creek, so as to take Davies' line obliquely, and throw shells into the midst of the Federal reserves. At daybreak, while the cannon was opening fire, the whole of Hébert's division was to attack the Federal right and try to flank it by massing beyond the Jackson Railroad. Maury and Lovell were to support this attack by occupying the enemy, without seeking, however, to carry his works in front. But, as soon as Hébert should have penetrated the enemy's line, Lovell was in turn to attack the other extremity, surround the heights upon which the college stands, and enter Corinth by the south-west, taking advantage of the woods with which the flat lands lying at the foot of those hills are covered. In the mean time, the cavalry was to destroy the railway tracks, by which reinforcements might be brought to Rosecrans, holding itself ready to harass his retreat in case he should be driven from his positions. This plan, too complicated, like that of Grant's at Iuka, was but imperfectly carried out.

At the first streaks of light, Price's artillery, placed in the positions designated, gave the signal by covering the Federal camps with its projectiles; these even reached the houses in Corinth,

spreading consternation among the inhabitants. The heavy guns of Fort Williams, however, soon found the range of the Confederate batteries, and after a few shots the latter were compelled to retire, leaving one gun upon the ground.

Meanwhile, the Confederate left, which was to have commenced the attack, had not stirred; Van Dorn listened in vain; the sound of musketry, which amid the roar of cannon, frequently harmless, is always an indication of serious fighting, was not heard. Officers who had been sent to the left were unable to find General Hébert. The latter at last presented himself at headquarters in person toward eight o'clock, to announce that he was sick, and had made none of the dispositions ordered. His command was naturally taken from him, but this just punishment could not compensate for lost time. Price's batteries had been silenced along the whole line; the firing of sharpshooters had assumed the proportions of a regular combat, and the battle, thus brought on, rendered the precise execution of the plan conceived by Van Dorn extremely difficult. Finally, at half-past nine o'clock, Hébert's division, led by Green, advanced *en masse* against Davies. After crossing the track of the Jackson Railway it followed the Bolivar road; this road ascended a gentle acclivity, in the centre of a large clearing, until it reached the summit, which was crowned by the new Richardson redoubt. The compact Confederate column debouched into this clearing, where it was at once received by a murderous fire of shrapnels and musketry. Nothing, however, could stop it. Green deployed his division; his left, formed by McLean's brigade, engaged a portion of Hamilton's division in front of Fort Powell; in the centre Gates marched directly against the Richardson redoubt. Cabell's brigade, detached from Maury's division, supported this attack, while Green's old brigade followed the railroad on the right, and Colbert's, at the extreme left, placed itself *en potence* to prevent Hamilton from striking the Confederate line obliquely. The assault of Gates was terrible. His gallant soldiers did not allow themselves to be intimidated by the shower of balls that rained upon them; while this fatal slope was strewn with the dead and wounded, the survivors reached the parapet of the work, and surrounded the guns which were firing into their ranks at

point-blank range. Davies' soldiers, exhausted by the conflict of the previous day, could not withstand them. In vain did the brave Captain Richardson, in the redoubt to which he has given his name, suffer himself to be killed by the side of the guns which he would not desert. Rosecrans, who had placed himself in the midst of the combatants, was carried away by the fugitives, whom he succeeded in rallying only in front of the first houses of Corinth.

Although greatly reduced, the heads of Gates' column reached the town itself; the weak breastworks which covered its approaches, filled with a disorderly crowd, did not stop them for an instant. Fighting went on in the streets, and some of the assailants even pushed as far as the headquarters of Rosecrans. Confusion was at its height among the Federals; but the success of the Confederates was compromised by the very impetuosity of their charge. Those who had penetrated into Corinth were isolated and few in number. The remainder of Gates' brigade occupied Battery Richardson; McLean was still in Fort Powell, of which he had easily taken possession after Davies' check. Rosecrans was everywhere, rallying and encouraging his soldiers; the Tenth Ohio, the Fifth Minnesota and a battery of artillery formed again at the sound of his voice, and the enemy was finally driven out of Corinth. At the same time, Hamilton, who had not been seriously engaged, made an offensive return against the Confederate left, and Sullivan's brigade recaptured the Powell redoubt. The soldiers of Davies, following this example, returned to the charge, and again took possession of Fort Richardson. Cabell hastened in vain to the assistance of Gates' brigade, now reduced to a handful of men; he only reached the parapet of the work to be repulsed from it with cruel losses. In the centre, between the two lines of railway, the combat had not been less desperate. The reverse of Davies had uncovered Stanley's right; Maury's Confederate division took advantage of this to capture all the breastworks the latter had occupied. Some soldiers of Moore's brigade even passed through his line and entered Corinth by the Chewalla road. But all Maury's efforts failed against the position crowned by the two redoubts, Williams and Robinett. The latter, however, which was the most exposed, came near falling

into his hands. A Texan regiment had reached the counterscarp; these hardy soldiers descended into the ditch, scaled the opposite side, and were already forcing their way through the embrasures, led by the intrepid Colonel Rodgers, who was the first to spring into the work, holding a revolver in one hand and waving the flag of his State with the other. But he fell pierced with balls; the bravest among his followers shared his fate, and the others were repulsed. The Federals joined the Confederates in paying homage to this heroic man, and Rosecrans had the good taste to mention his name in the order of the day to his army, eulogizing him as highly as did Van Dorn in his own report. The unsuccessful assault upon Fort Robinett, together with the loss of Fort Richardson by Gates' brigade, determined the retreat of Price's whole army. The latter had done all that its commanders could exact of it; their honor was safe, but the army was beaten, and the sense of defeat soon broke up all the rules of discipline.

Lovell, on the right, had confined himself to some demonstrations against McKean and the Federal works erected on College Hill; but instead of the signal for which he was waiting to make a serious attack, he received orders, at eleven o'clock in the morning, to cover the precipitate retreat of the army. This bloody and decisive battle had not lasted more than one hour and a half. A mournful silence succeeded the tumult of the conflict. The remnants of the Confederate army rallied on the Chewalla road. Villepigne's brigade, of Lovell's division, formed the rear-guard. The Federals were scarcely in a condition to molest it, although McPherson had arrived at Corinth with one brigade just as the battle was closing. Finding the Bolivar road, upon which he was marching, occupied by the Confederates, he passed round their left, and entered Corinth by the east. But with so few troops he could not undertake the pursuit of the enemy; and Rosecrans, halting his soldiers as soon as they had reached the outer works, allowed them until the next day the rest which they so greatly needed. A similar respite was even more necessary for Van Dorn's army, for its defeat had been complete; according to Rosecrans' report, it had left upon the field of battle one thousand four hundred and twenty-three killed, and two thousand two hundred and forty-eight prisoners, nearly all of whom were wounded, fourteen

stands of colors, two cannons and three thousand three hundred muskets. The total of its losses was about four thousand five hundred men, four thousand of whom belonged to Price's corps. This corps, which only numbered fourteen thousand men, had, therefore, lost nearly one-third of its effective force on this fatal day.* On the Federal side there were but three hundred and fifteen killed, one thousand eight hundred and twelve wounded, and two hundred and thirty-two prisoners.

The Confederate army bivouacked on the evening of the 4th at Chewalla, where a portion of Price's corps arrived in great disorder. Van Dorn had been obliged to fall back upon this town in order to join the convoy he had left there. Although the road was greatly exposed to attacks from the enemy, he was not molested, as we have said; but on reaching Chewalla he received most alarming news. Hurlbut, despatched by Grant, had left Bolivar at an early hour that very morning with about four thousand men, and a party of Confederate horse, under Colonel Wirt Adams, had met him in the evening not far from Pocahontas. The Southern general had reason to suppose that the difficult crossing of the Hatchie at Davies' Bridge would be warmly disputed. On the morning of the 5th the Confederates were on the march, pushing forward with speed, in the hope of being still able to cross at that point in advance of the main forces of the enemy. Moore's brigade formed the vanguard, followed by the remainder of Price's corps, which was fearfully reduced. Lovell closed the march, ready to repel the attacks of Rosecrans, who would soon appear upon the rear of the army.

The Tusculum Bridge was crossed and occupied in force.

*The figures presented in Van Dorn's official report of the battle of Corinth and the combat of Hatchie River are: five hundred and ninety-four killed, two thousand one hundred and sixty-two wounded and two thousand one hundred and two prisoners, making a total loss of four thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight men. While adopting these figures in the mass, we may be allowed to call into question the distinction made between the killed, wounded and prisoners, inasmuch as the Confederates were not able to take an exact account of the men left on the field of battle, and it is more natural to rely upon the report of Rosecrans, who counted them. The prisoners being nearly all wounded, the latter may be rated at three thousand five hundred at the least calculation, so that the estimate of one thousand four hundred killed cannot appear extraordinary when we consider that the battle was fought almost muzzle to muzzle.

Moore marched in advance to reach the Hatchie, and had but three hundred men with him when he reached Davies' Bridge. This bridge was yet in possession of the Confederate cavalry, which since morning had been harassing the Federals on their onward march. But the latter already occupied a height called Matamoras, which commanded the passage of the river. Moore, who tried to capture it, was driven back in disorder. Ord, leaving his troops on the road, hastened forward in person, and took command of the Federals; placing himself at the head of Hurlbut's troops, he drove the Confederates back into the Hatchie; they crossed this river with difficulty, leaving eight pieces of cannon on the other side, and he took possession of the bridge, which had not been destroyed. The remainder of Maury's division, which had just joined Moore, disputed its possession in vain. Hurlbut, who had resumed the command, Ord having been wounded, tried to turn this advantage to account, to gain ground, and throw into the whole of the enemy's column the same disorder as was in Maury's division; but he soon found himself confronted by superior forces; Van Dorn had gathered all the men he could find in a fighting condition and concentrated them against him. The position of the Confederate general was, in fact, so critical that he could only escape from it by a desperate effort. Arrested in his march to Davies' Bridge, he expected every moment to hear Rosecrans' cannon thundering in his rear at Tusculumbia Bridge. The only means left to extricate himself from this blind alley was to ascend the course of the Hatchie until he could find a crossing not under the control of the enemy. As soon as he learned that they were waiting for him at Davies' Bridge, he ordered his train of wagons, ambulances and all non-combatants of his army to proceed in the direction of Crum's Mill; but this long, heavy column could not reach the point designated very speedily, for the crossing of the defile formed by the causeway and bridges, amid the swamps adjoining the river, would consume much time. In order to accomplish this movement, it was necessary to detain Hurlbut at Davies' Bridge, and prevent him from ascending the left bank of the Hatchie to seize Crum's Mill, or from crossing to the right bank to menace the road followed by the convoy toward Boneyard. This was the

most pressing, for Rosecrans' attack was as yet but a remote peril. Consequently, after Price's two divisions had become engaged, Lovell was also sent with two brigades to continue the struggle against Hurlbut. The four thousand soldiers of the latter were naturally unable to break the lines of such numerous adversaries. But these adversaries were not seeking to achieve a victory; as soon as Van Dorn saw his convoy sufficiently advanced on the road to Crum's Mill, he took back all the troops engaged in the combat at Davies' Bridge; the Tusculum Bridge, which had been guarded by a single brigade during the entire day, was burnt by Bowen on the evening of the 5th, just as the skirmishers of Rosecrans were beginning to threaten it seriously; finally, on the morning of the 6th, the Confederate rear was directed upon Ripley, after having crossed the Hatchie. It was time for it to place this obstacle behind it, for Rosecrans was following in its tracks as rapidly as possible, anxious to make up for the delay which had caused him to miss the opportunity to strike his foe while in a critical situation. After having deferred his movement till the morning of the 5th, he had mistaken the road and looked for the Confederates on that which runs to the north of the Memphis Railway; hence an additional loss of time, which gave Van Dorn a precious advance. The latter having found leisure to destroy Crum's Mill Bridge, the reconstruction of this large work was difficult, and the Federals only reached Ripley on the 8th; Van Dorn had passed through the day previous, and was henceforth out of reach of their pursuit.

Rosecrans, by Grant's orders, brought back his troops to Corinth. Three weeks later he was called to supersede Buell in the command of the army of the Cumberland. Van Dorn, on the contrary, severely censured by the Richmond government and the Confederate press, was deprived of the chief command. He retained the troops belonging to his immediate command, but General Pemberton, who subsequently acquired such unfortunate celebrity at Vicksburg, was placed over him. The campaign in that quarter had ended to the advantage of the Federals; they had obtained, not a doubtful success, as at Perryville, but a complete and decisive victory. Their military operations had been skilfully conducted. Grant with his small army had defended a

long and vulnerable line against an enterprising enemy ; despite some imprudences, he had turned Price's movement against Iuka to good account. Rosecrans, through his persistency and the courage of his soldiers, had at Corinth repelled the desperate attacks of the whole Confederate army, and the opportune arrival of Hurlbut on the Hatchie had completed their disaster.

The time was propitious for resuming the offensive, for overthrowing the new obstacles raised by the Confederates on the Mississippi, and reopening the navigation of that river by destroying Vicksburg and Fort Hudson. Such was, in fact, the object which from that moment engrossed all Grant's thoughts. But at that period Bragg occupied Kentucky, and the Federals had not yet the means for attempting such an enterprise. In the mean while, we must relate what had occurred on the right bank of the Mississippi during the same time.

CHAPTER III.

PRAIRIE GROVE.

SINCE the battle of Pea Ridge, fought on the 7th and 8th of March, 1862, the great events that have taken place east of the Mississippi have not allowed us to cast a glance over that immense territory, extending between the river and the Rocky Mountains, where the belligerent armies were not proportionate in numbers to the geographical extent of the country, but to the small amount of population which occupies it. Let us return for a while to these regions, not to relate in detail each of the engagements which drenched that almost virgin soil in blood, during the remainder of the year 1862, but in order to collect in a single chapter all those minor military exploits which, to all appearance, have scarcely any connection between them.

We left Curtis in possession of the battle-field of Pea Ridge and the Ozark Mountains, whilst Van Dorn was bringing back his vanquished army to the banks of the Arkansas. Shortly after, the latter descended the river with the largest portion of his troops as far as the neighborhood of Little Rock, then proceeded eastward, reached the Mississippi at Helena, crossed it, and, as we have stated, joined the army of Beauregard at Corinth a few days after the battle of Shiloh.

After his departure there remained but few regular troops of the Confederacy to defend Arkansas, but this State was sufficiently protected by its extent, and the necessity under which the Federals were placed, in their turn, of weakening themselves on that side to concentrate all their forces around Corinth.

Curtis had followed the movements of his adversary at a distance; quitting the high lands, the resources of which his army had exhausted, he had descended into the vast plains as soon as he no longer feared to be attacked by the Confederate cavalry,

which up to that time was vastly superior to his own. He had about seven or eight thousand men with him; ten regiments, or nearly five thousand men, had been called back from Pea Ridge by Halleck, for the purpose of reinforcing the combined army, of which he had assumed the command at Pittsburg Landing. Curtis could not penetrate any farther into a country infested by guerillas without compromising his communications with Missouri, whence he derived all his supplies. He, therefore, marched parallel to the frontier of this State, reaching, on the 6th of May, Batesville, a large village situated on White River. This stream, which takes its source in the Ozark Mountains and waters all the northern section of the State, pursues at first a south-easterly course as far as Jacksonport, where it receives the waters of Big Black River; thence it runs due south to empty into the Arkansas at Wellington. The point of confluence of the latter river with the Mississippi, opposite the village of Napoleon, lies only a few kilometres lower down. Curtis hoped that Halleck's campaign against Beauregard would open a portion of this stream and its tributaries to the Federal flotilla, and that some friendly vessels would make their appearance in the waters of White River. He would then have had a new base of operations, at once shorter and surer; by resting upon this river he could have reopened the campaign, penetrated into the interior of the State, seized the capital, Little Rock, and in his turn opened the whole course of the Arkansas to the Federal gunboats. He, therefore, waited at Batesville for the issue of the siege of Corinth, subsisting with difficulty, because the terminus of the railroad through which he obtained his supplies was at Rolla, in Missouri, and thence all the transportation was effected by means of wagons.

We have related how, on the 6th of June, after the capture of Corinth, the naval battle at Memphis delivered to the Federals the whole course of the Mississippi as far as Vicksburg. A few days after, several Federal gun-boats entered the Arkansas and proceeded up White River. Curtis, on being apprised of their movement, started on the 25th of June for Jacksonport to meet them. The waters in the river were so low that it would be impossible for the vessels to proceed beyond this town. Curtis reached the place on the same day with his vanguard, where he

joined General Washburne, who had arrived with a regiment of cavalry from Springfield, in Missouri, without having encountered a single enemy. But the gun-boats failed to make their appearance. As we have said in a previous chapter, they had found the Confederates entrenched inside of strong batteries near St. Charles, one hundred and thirty kilometres above the mouth of White River. These works had been carried by troops that were landed; but the flotilla had suffered so much as to be unable to proceed farther up the river, the navigation of which was, besides, becoming more and more difficult. At the news of this check, Curtis started again to join the gun-boats below, in hopes of being able to assist them in surmounting the obstacles that had impeded their progress, and to undertake with them an offensive campaign against Little Rock. But the country through which he had to pass offered the greatest difficulties to the march of an army; it was a low, swampy region, intersected by canals or bayous, surrounded by impracticable marshes, poor in resources, and inhabited by a white population extremely hostile to the Federals. After crossing Big Black River by means of pontons, he proceeded along the left bank of White River as far as Augusta; then, bearing to the east, he reached a long water-course running parallel to this stream, called the *Bayou Caché* (Hidden Channel), in consequence, no doubt, of the forests and swamps which defend its approaches. On the 7th of July his vanguard had a spirited skirmish on the borders of this bayou with a brigade of Texan cavalry, which sought in vain to dispute its passage with him. The flotilla he was thus endeavoring to join was accompanied by a brigade of infantry from Indiana. These troops had not remained idle; but being ignorant of his approach, they wasted their time in fruitless demonstrations in the direction of Little Rock, pushing as far as Grand Prairie, where on the 6th of July they encountered some hostile parties. Finally, unable to procure any news, in consequence of the hostility of the inhabitants, and finding the water in White River constantly falling, the expedition of which they formed a part again descended the river as far as Clarendon. It was precisely toward this point that Curtis was marching. Chance thus seemed to facilitate the junction of the two expeditions, but Curtis' march was retarded by the diffi-

culties of the ground; and when he reached Clarendon on the 9th of July, he was informed that the flotilla had left twenty-four hours before. After so long and fatiguing a march, this was a cruel disappointment; the junction he had been on the point of effecting was thenceforth impossible. In coming so far to find nothing but a deserted, arid shore, he had lost, without any compensation, all the advantages of the position he had occupied either at Pea Ridge in the west, or at Batesville in the centre of the State. Meanwhile, he could neither retrace his steps through a country destitute of resources, nor remain on the borders of White River without food, without ammunition, without the means of communicating with any base of operations. There was but one course for him to pursue, and that was to gain the waters of the Mississippi as quickly as possible; so that he was compelled to take up his line of march again with his worn-out soldiers toward the east.

In proportion as one approaches the great river, the country becomes more humid and broken. An almost tropical vegetation transforms every marshy stream into an impenetrable copse. It was, however, necessary to push on at all hazards, and not to suffer himself to be delayed either by the enemy or by nature. Washburne, with all the cavalry, numbering two thousand five hundred horses, accompanied by five howitzers, cleared the road, and traversed the distance of one hundred kilometres intervening between Clarendon and Helena in twenty-four hours. Curtis, following him by long marches, reached the latter point on the 13th of July. He there found the provisions he so greatly needed; but fastened to the banks of the Mississippi, and separated from the Arkansas by the regions he had just traversed with so much difficulty, he found himself utterly powerless, and during the whole summer his troops, occupied in guarding posts along the river, had no other duty to perform than to cover the extreme right of the army, which was operating on the other side. He had thus left the western counties of Arkansas and Missouri at the mercy of all the small bands which his presence had hitherto held in check; and this long march, justified in some degree by the military events of which the valley of the Mississippi was the theatre, actually involved the abandonment of those vast

regions over which the Federal government had established its authority during the last years which preceded the civil war.

At the same period, the volunteers, raised in Northern Missouri and the young States of Iowa and Minnesota, had been mustered into the ranks of Halleck's and Pope's armies to the last man; their departure had left the frontier, constantly menaced by indigenous tribes, almost unprotected. We must therefore interrupt our narrative for an instant in order to show how, by the side of the great conflagration which the civil war had kindled all over the Union, the Indian war was perpetuated like a slow-burning fire, occasionally mingling with the general struggle, without, however, becoming confounded with it. The State of California and the neighboring territories situated on the Pacific basin had furnished the Federal armies with a large number of gallant volunteers, but their geographical position kept them remote from the scene of war. The Confederates had been unable to extend the theatre of hostilities to the western slope of the Rocky Mountains. The centre of the continent was occupied by those Indian tribes with whom the regular army was still at war in 1861; and if their number was greatly reduced, the experience they had acquired during their incessant conflicts partly compensated for this decrease. The civil war, which was absorbing the attention of their eternal enemies, afforded them an opportunity, not for reconquering the territory they had lost, but at least for satisfying their thirst for revenge, increasing the number of scalps suspended in their tents, and massacring the wives and children of the settlers who occupied the hunting-grounds of their fathers. They consequently ranged themselves with almost perfect indifference under the flag of either of the parties contending for the supremacy of the continent, merely taking care to be on the side of the stronger, in order to be surer of shedding the blood of the whites. We have seen their warriors fighting desperately at the battle of Pea Ridge. But the fable of the horse seeking to wreak his vengeance upon the stag is constantly being verified, and the savage always ends by becoming the slave and victim of the civilization in the struggles of which he has sought to mingle.

The Americans, in fact, were not slow to understand the advantage to themselves in employing the Indians against each

other; those who had enlisted in the Federal army, organized into three regiments of cavalry under white officers, and brought under perfect military discipline, were sent to the extreme frontier to fight the independent tribes, to whom the departure of Curtis had imparted fresh audacity. This frontier was designated by several posts, which before the war had served as provision dépôts to the wagon-trains going west. All those situated south of Kansas had been abandoned by the Federals. Separated from each other by great intervals, they were placed *en echelon* through the vast region then called Indian Territory, and divided among several tribes, the most powerful of which were the Creeks and Cherokees. The latter, which had furnished a large contingent to the Confederate armies of Arkansas, had to some extent experienced the influence of civilization; but this very influence had enfeebled it. Several Cherokee villages, surrounded by cultivated lands, rose in the rich prairie extending from the Pea Ridge Mountains to the borders of the Neosho, and the principal chief of the tribe, who had assumed the name of John Ross, resided in a beautiful villa at Park Hill, on the road to Fayetteville. The capital of the tribe, a small village called Tah-le-Quah, although it had been but a few years in existence, was already suffering from the effects of this premature decay, which, like an incurable decline, everywhere attacks the products of an artificial civilization, and these redskins, having acquired sedentary habits, were no longer able to defend themselves against their brethren who had remained in their nomadic state. The latter were very numerous along the borders of the Arkansas River. Southern emissaries had stimulated their warlike ardor, and they found effective support in a new fort, constructed by the Confederates since the beginning of the war, on the southern bank of the Arkansas, opposite its confluence with the Verdigris River and the Neosho or Grand River; this work was called Fort Davis. The village of Gibson, encircling an old fort of the same name, and situated at a short distance on the Neosho, soon became the base of operations of a small army of redskins. This force, under the direction of white officers, undertook to conquer the whole Indian Territory, even threatening to invade the western counties of Arkansas and Missouri. Three regiments of Indian

cavalry in the Federal service were stationed in these counties, where they alone protected the Union flag, since the regular armies of both parties had passed beyond the western boundary of the vast horizon which is visible from the summit of the Pea Ridge hills. Colonel Philipps, with twelve hundred mounted men and two field-pieces, was detached from this force to attack and disperse the Indians of the other party, assembled near the Neosho. These Indians also consisted of three mounted regiments, under Colonel Taylor. They occupied, conjointly with a white company, the village of Gibson and a post called Creek Agency, on the Verdigris River. Philipps divided his forces into two columns, hoping thus to surprise the enemy in the village. Major Forman was ordered to cross the Neosho and descend the right bank of the river, with six hundred men and two guns, whilst Philipps proceeded with the remainder of his forces toward Gibson through Park Hill and Tah-le-Quah.

The attack was fixed for the morning of July 24th. Taylor, having been apprised in time, tried to prevent it. On the 28th he sent three hundred and fifty mounted men to meet Forman, who succeeded in delaying his march. In the mean while, he proceeded to meet Philipps with seven or eight hundred men. On the 28th, toward two o'clock in the afternoon, he suddenly attacked this vanguard with three hundred men between Gibson and Tah-le-Quah, and routed them. But the Unionists fell back upon the principal column, which had had time to deploy, dismount and occupy a strong position along the edge of a wood. Just as Taylor's Indians were advancing in perfect security, they were received by a murderous fire; the Federals, uttering a savage yell, rushed upon them and drove them back in disorder. Their chief, however, succeeded in rallying them upon a ridge commanding the little valley of Bayou Barnard; but they did not long defend this position; at the first fire they abandoned it and dispersed. This double combat had cost them one hundred and twenty-five men disabled. The dead bodies of Taylor and two Choctaw captains were found near Bayou Barnard. Philipps, crossing the Neosho, rejoined Forman, but was unable to cut off the retreat of the enemy's detachment which had been sent against the latter, and which succeeded in making its way to the

south of the Arkansas. The small Federal troop was in possession of the entire left bank of this river; it occupied Gibson; then, satisfied with its success, and fearing to compromise it, it proceeded up the Neosho to join the rest of the Indian brigade, which was encamped upon the upper course of this river.

As we have just remarked, the departure of the volunteers who had been raised on the frontier of the North-western States was calculated to rouse the warlike and vindictive spirit of all the Indian tribes, even including those who were out of reach of the Confederate emissaries. The most powerful was the tribe of Sioux, which still possesses a vast territory in the north-west of the United States, although the inroads of the whites have wrested from it the finest hunting-grounds of which it was in peaceful possession fifty years ago. One of the military posts established for the protection of the conquests of civilization is Fort Ridgely, situated on Minnesota River, a tributary of the right bank of the Mississippi. Above the fort the Minnesota receives the waters of Red Wood River, and farther on those of Yellow Medicine Creek; on the borders of these two water-courses there are Indian agencies of the Federal government. A little below the fort there stood at that time the village of New Ulm. These establishments were a tempting prey for the Sioux, who could not see without bitterness the prosperity of those settlers who had defrauded them. On the 19th of August the Indian warriors surprised at once both the agencies, where they massacred all the employés, and the village of New Ulm, where they ruthlessly put to death about one hundred women and children. Avoiding Fort Ridgely, they afterward retired to their camps, not far from the Yellow Medicine.

The safety of all the settlers could only be assured by a speedy punishment. Colonel Sibley was entrusted with this duty, with detachments from the Third, Sixth and Seventh regiments of Minnesota and some militia, about a thousand men in all, and two guns. On the 19th of September he proceeded from Fort Ridgely against the Indians, who, to the number of more than eight hundred, had remained near the Yellow Medicine with their booty and some prisoners. At the news of his approach the chief of the tribe, called Little Crow, called a council of war, and proposed

to attack the Federals in their camps at night. But his advice did not prevail, and the Sioux warriors decided that, to show their courage, they ought to fight the whites openly in broad daylight. Three hundred of them started on the 23d of September, divided into two parties, so as to approach the enemy's camp on two sides. They made a vigorous attack upon it, uttering savage yells and firing with great rapidity. But the Federals, who kept a good watch, quickly placed themselves in line to receive them. During two hours the Indians tried in vain to break their ranks in front, to turn their right flank, and at the same time to attack the rear of their camp; they were repulsed on every side; the numerical superiority of the Federals was rendered still more effective by the artillery. The Indians, who can display great personal bravery when they believe themselves to be the stronger, are easily discouraged. As soon as they found that their attack was of no avail they retired, leaving about twenty dead behind them, and the remainder of the tribe, declining to fight any longer, desired to treat. This success, which restored security to the frontier of Minnesota, cost the Federals some forty men disabled.

But the march of Curtis eastward had not only exposed the Indian Territory to incursions of tribes hostile to the Federals; it was attended by much more serious consequences, of which the Confederates were not slow to avail themselves—the exposure of Missouri herself. Since the battle of Belmont this State had not been the scene of any important military operation. The evacuation of Columbus and Island No. 10 on one side, and the battle of Pea Ridge on the other, no longer allowed the Confederates to maintain any regular forces there. But civil war was a spontaneous growth of the soil of this State. For many years the two parties had converted it into a political battle-field, and the entire population, extremely divided in opinion, was disposed to come to blows on all occasions, raising the antagonistic flags, not in a town or county as against another town and another county, but in the same city, in the same village, under the same roof. In the midst of such a community we can easily conceive how difficult and dangerous must have been the organization of militia; to enrol and equip such troops was to give organization and arms

to parties always ready for a fight; consequently, in the beginning of 1862, this force only existed upon paper. Fortunately, the task of bringing it into existence was entrusted to an officer who was at once energetic, intelligent, full of good sense, and a stranger to political passions—General Schofield. He saw that it was necessary before everything to enrol only men devoted to the cause they were to serve, and that by the regular application of the conscription law he would be in danger of recruiting as many traitors and deserters as loyal soldiers.

By the month of April he had organized a small army of fourteen thousand men, to which was confided the exclusive duty of occupying Missouri, the Federal troops lately stationed in that State having been sent to Pittsburg Landing immediately after the battle of Shiloh. His army, which in the month of June had reached the figure of seventeen thousand men, was scattered over the immense surface of the State, and was scarcely sufficient for maintenance of public order. This task became still more difficult when the march of Curtis left the southern frontier unprotected, and Missouri was open to the incursions of the Confederates, who were masters of Arkansas.

Instead of sending columns of troops, whose approach could have been signalled from afar, the Confederate generals adopted a much more skilful plan. They furloughed a few Missouri regiments, sending both soldiers and officers to their homes in citizens' clothes, with directions to canvass for recruits and organize small bands everywhere. These bands, coming together at a given signal, were to constitute, in the very heart of the State, a force capable of surprising and destroying the militia enrolled under the Federal flag. They soon attacked the posts occupied by these troops; sometimes victorious, often repulsed, they nevertheless succeeded in procuring arms and coming together. Schofield spared no effort to put them down; a new appeal was made to the militia; some responded eagerly; others, on the contrary, thought the occasion favorable for joining the Confederate standard; an extraordinary tax was imposed upon the city of St. Louis; requisitions were made upon counties where the civil war was raging as a substitute for the contingent, which could not be expected from them. Owing to these measures, Schofield was

enabled to organize his army, and soon found himself in condition to take the field. The northern part of the State, situated on the left side of the Missouri, was subjected to fire and the sword in the latter half of July. Five thousand partisans, under Porter, Poindexter and Cobb, were ravaging the whole of that region. Colonel Merrill was sent to fight them, and he displayed in that difficult conjuncture those rare qualities which subsequently established his reputation as a cavalry officer. Colonel McNeil, one of Merrill's lieutenants, after chasing Porter's troops for twelve successive days, overtook them at last at Kirksville, in Adair county. Although the Confederates were three thousand strong, and McNeil had only one thousand horse, the victory rested with him. Porter's band was almost annihilated; Poindexter, who was farther west, endeavored to join him, or at least to rally the remnant of his command, but was unable to cross the Chariton River, and the Missouri militia chased him with that sanguinary ardor which animates combatants in all civil wars. McNeil himself, far from restraining them, set an example of cruelty by odious executions, the report of which even reached Europe. The day after the combat of Kirksville he allowed a Confederate officer, Colonel McCullogh, to be put to death in cold blood; a few days after, August 15th, he caused ten prisoners to be shot at Palmyra, whom he had selected as hostages to secure the liberation of one of his spies arrested by the enemy. Poindexter's troops, thus tracked and caught between two fires, dispersed toward the middle of August. All the crossings of the Missouri were occupied; armed boats kept watch over the river; scarcely any of those who had taken up arms were able to cross it, to join the Confederate forces in the South. Some hid themselves; others, formed into small bands, long continued to wage a partisan war, which finally degenerated into mere brutal brigandage.

The right bank of the Missouri had also been the scene of blood, but on that side the war had assumed a more regular character. At the first rumor of an outbreak in Northern Missouri the bands which were being organized in the South rallied around one Hughes, in order to put themselves in communication with those of the North across the river. On the 11th of August, Hughes, with about one thousand combatants, surprised the gar-

rison of Independence, a small town situated near its borders, and commanding its crossing; those of the Federals who were encamped outside of the town fled without offering any resistance; the others defended themselves bravely, but in vain, both in the streets and in the houses; they were either captured or dispersed, and Hughes remained master of Independence. This was a position of great importance, and it was necessary to take advantage of this first success to secure others, which might have the effect of rallying to the Confederate cause all the secret partisans who had not yet dared to declare themselves. A strong reinforcement was already on the road to join him. The Confederate colonel Coffey had arrived from the interior of Arkansas with fifteen hundred horse; he had baffled the vigilance of the Federal general Brown, who occupied Springfield, and was marching directly toward Independence, where he hoped to effect a junction with the Missourians, whose numbers had already been increased by the recent success just related. Schofield was anxious to unite all his forces to prevent this junction. Brown despatched twelve hundred cavalry in pursuit of Coffey. General Blunt, commanding in the west of Kansas, also detailed some troops for the same object; finally, General Totten was ordered to attack the troops of Hughes at once. But this concentration, prescribed to troops who had started from such remote points, could not be effected in time. Totten's forces were divided; eight hundred horse and two guns, commanded by Foster, were at Lexington, on the Missouri, east of Independence. Colonel Warren was with fifteen hundred men at Clinton, south-east of that town. Both started for Independence, each taking a different route. Foster, who had the shorter journey to make, met the enemy at the cross-roads called Lone Jack on the 15th of August. Coffey and Hughes were waiting for him at this point with their united forces, amounting to four or five thousand men. After a spirited fight, Foster was beaten, lost some guns, and was driven toward Lexington with heavy losses. This important place was in danger, and it would seem that Coffey, being now free in his movements, should have joined the bands which were waiting for him on the left bank of the river, but the Federal forces concentrated on his rear alarmed him so much, that he suddenly turned back and re-

entered Arkansas. Hughes and Quantrell, thus abandoned, saw their bands gradually dwindle away in small encounters, and by the end of August the whole country was again pacified.

The Confederates, however, were fully determined not to leave their adversaries in peaceful possession of Missouri. The unprotected frontier which had allowed them to penetrate into the State was still open, and Bragg's successes in Kentucky during the early part of September rendered this a propitious opportunity for a new invasion. They made active preparations to this effect. The forces of the secessionists in Arkansas were commanded by Hindman, a former member of Congress. This general, on the plea of military necessity, had arrogated to himself excessive power in this State. Under the name of governor *ad interim*, his despotism, according to the statements of Confederate historians themselves, knew no bounds.* The crops were carried off by his agents; his soldiers plundered with impunity; the conscription law was applied in all its rigor, and confirmed by sanguinary executions. The whole of Arkansas was in a state of consternation, and loudly complained of so onerous a protection. This system, however, had enabled Hindman to assemble forty or fifty thousand men under his banners; these troops were well provisioned, but destitute of arms, the Federal gun-boats having seized on the Mississippi a large cargo intended for them. They were of no use in Arkansas, where not a Federal soldier could be found, and too numerous to be organized into a single army in those regions, so poor in subsistence. General J. Johnston, who had just been placed in command of the armies of the West, added his earnest solicitations to those of General Randolph, Secretary of War, to induce Mr. Davis to issue a formal order, directing Hindman to send twenty thousand men to the other side of the Mississippi to strengthen the army of Pemberton. This timely reinforcement might have changed the whole course of the war in the West; for, by preventing Bragg from weakening himself for the benefit of the army of the Mississippi, as we shall presently see, it would probably have enabled him to come off victorious at the battle of Murfreesborough. But Mr. Davis refused to issue an order which would have caused a great deal of

* See Pollard's *Lost Cause*, p. 354.

dissatisfaction in Arkansas. General Randolph, to the misfortune of the cause he had most zealously served, retired from the cabinet, and Hindman determined to employ the forces he could put in motion for the invasion of Missouri.

He was master of that chain of hills called Ozark Mountains, among which the battle of Pea Ridge had been fought, and which seems destined at all times to play a decisive part in the campaigns of which Arkansas is the theatre. Amid the vast plains by which they are surrounded almost on every side, these hills form a rocky mass, the more easily defended because the communications are always open, owing to the mail route which runs along their base. They extend from north to south for a distance of nearly one hundred and twenty kilometres in length, from Cassville, in Missouri, to the vicinity of Evansville, a village situated thirty-five kilometres from Van Buren and the left bank of the Arkansas; at this point they turn westward, and under the name of Boston Mountains, which has already been met with in our narrative, slope down to the plain in the Creek Indian territory on the borders of the Neosho River. There are three principal passes in the Ozark Mountains, leading from the plains of White River on the east to the Neosho basin at the west. The first, beginning at the north, is that of Elkhorn, or Pea Ridge, on the road from Huntsville to Bentonville, where was fought the battle we have described elsewhere. The second is near the large village of Fayetteville, situated in the very centre of the chain; this is the most important of the three, for no less than six roads start from Fayetteville, running severally in the directions of Bentonville, Maysville and the western frontier, Cane Hill, Van Buren, Ozark and Huntsville. The third is a defile in the Boston Mountains which crosses the road from Van Buren to Cane Hill.

Hindman had divided his forces; Rains, with six thousand infantry, occupied the heights and encamped in the neighborhood of Pea Ridge; Cooper, with seven thousand horse and some artillery, had advanced into the valley of Neosho as far as Newtonia, thereby menacing from the west the Unionists who were stationed at Springfield, whilst a body of four thousand men, massed on the left bank of White River, seemed to be preparing to invade

Missouri and march upon Rolla, the most important of the Federal dépôts; a considerable number of recruits were also assembled at Little Rock.

Schofield resolved to attack the enemy before he was in a condition to take the offensive. He had been appointed, on the 26th of September, to the command of the army of the frontier, consisting of all the available forces scattered through Missouri, and of those of Blunt, stationed in Kansas; Curtis had superseded him in the territorial command of Missouri, transferring that of the forces which had remained stationary at Helena for the last two months, to Steele. On the 30th of September the army of the frontier numbered a little over fifteen thousand men, more than one-half of whom were mounted, with twenty or twenty-five guns. The larger portion of this army, comprising about four thousand eight hundred infantry, five thousand six hundred horse and sixteen guns, was at Springfield; three brigades, nearly all mounted, were at Sarcoxie, on the road to Newtonia, and General Blunt had just arrived from Kansas with some reinforcements. Schofield took up his line of march for Sarcoxie with six thousand men. He left five thousand to guard Springfield and his long line of communication with St. Louis. After effecting a junction with Blunt and the three brigades which were already at Sarcoxie, he was able to put about ten thousand men in line. This was a smaller number than that of the enemy. His undertaking, therefore, was difficult, commencing as it did under unfavorable auspices. On the morning of the 30th, Solomon's brigade pushed a reconnaissance as far as Newtonia. His vanguard had met the enemy in force and was driven back. Solomon, having hastened to its assistance, found himself in front of a large portion of Cooper's cavalry, which was waiting for him in line of battle and on foot. After a lively engagement the Federals were finally repulsed and driven back in disorder upon Sarcoxie. Bell's brigade fortunately arrived toward evening, not in time to succor them, but at least to cover their retreat. It was necessary to repair this check at once. On the 1st of October the troops which had left Springfield, forming a division under General Totten, joined those commanded by Blunt, and the whole of this small army started for Newtonia. The Confederates did not wait

for it. Rains, who was in the mountains, had been unable to form a junction with Cooper, and the latter, finding himself isolated, retired with the utmost haste toward Bentonville. He was hotly pursued; but his troops being all mounted, he was soon beyond reach.

It was evident that the Confederates had not expected this attack. Schofield, taking advantage of their surprise, sent for General Herron, with all the available troops remaining at Springfield, and taking the mail-road at Cassville proceeded toward Pea Ridge to seize at once the already celebrated defile of Cross Hollows. The Confederates did not venture to dispute it with him, and separated. Leaving two or three thousand horse behind him, so as to mask his movement, Rains had retired eastward toward Huntsville with his infantry and artillery, while the rest of the cavalry, under Cooper, proceeded westward down the valley of the Neosho toward Maysville, with a view of menacing the communications and right flank of the Federals. Schofield immediately started in pursuit of Rains with Herron's and Totten's divisions, but was unable to overtake him; and finding Huntsville deserted, he returned to the neighborhood of Pea Ridge.

In the mean while, Blunt with two brigades had followed Cooper, who was moving rapidly in the direction of Maysville to reach the Indian Territory. Continuing his route during the whole night, Blunt with his vanguard reached the outskirts of this village on the 22d of October before daylight. The enemy could not be very far; the Federal general determined at all hazards that they should not escape him, but did not wish to come upon them before his troops had all arrived. With a view of ascertaining his exact position, he disguised himself as a Confederate soldier, and entered into conversation with the inhabitants of the few houses in the vicinity of which Cooper had halted, being well aware that the sight of a Federal uniform would keep all mouths shut. Seven thousand of the enemy's cavalry were encamped in a large prairie surrounded by woods, in the vicinity of an old post called Fort Wayne, six kilometres beyond Maysville. Blunt's cavalry consisted of four Kansas regiments and two regiments of Cherokee Indians, accompanied

by two batteries, about four thousand men in all. But when day broke, he had only a few hundred men around him; it was important, however, to strike before he was discovered, and Blunt, putting on a bold front, determined to make the attack. His vanguard dismounted and commenced firing. Whilst the Confederates, thus surprised, were endeavoring to understand the condition of affairs, the rest of the Union troops, who had come up at a gallop from Maysville, arrived and deployed in the prairie. The Federal guns threw a few shells into their camps; then the whole line advanced at once, overthrew them, scattered them, and took the four guns they had brought with them. The Confederates left but few dead behind them, for they had scarcely made any resistance, despite their numbers, and the engagement only cost the assailants three men disabled.

A few days after the encounter at Fort Wayne, a similar success, achieved on the other slope of the Ozark Mountains, closed for a time the campaign, which had secured the possession of this chain to the Federals. After their departure from Huntsville, the three thousand Confederate horse, which had at first followed Rains in his retreat, had once more drawn near the Ozark Mountains. Learning that they were encamped fifteen or twenty kilometres south-east of Fayetteville, on the borders of White River, Schofield determined to go in search of them. He despatched Totten's division to this town, with directions to proceed beyond it to attack the Confederates in front, whilst Herron, at the head of nine hundred horse, was to make a large circuit to the east to cross White River and take them in rear. But the latter made such a rapid night-march, that he found himself in the presence of the enemy at daybreak on the morning of October 28th, before the infantry had reached Fayetteville. Without waiting for it, he attacked the Confederate camps, captured them, and routed the whole of the enemy's cavalry. He then returned to Pea Ridge by way of Fayetteville with Totten, whom he joined on his way back.

Schofield's army, as we have said, was only sixteen thousand strong; but by its discipline, its organization, its equipment, the quality of its horses and riders, and, finally, the skill of its artillerymen, it was in every respect, except in the matter of numbers,

superior to that of the Confederates. Consequently, Hindman did not for some time venture to dispute with it the possession of the Ozark Mountains. Having control of these heights, Schofield was able to cover Southern Missouri and menace the whole Arkansas valley. Scarcity of provisions in the midst of a country already exhausted compelled him, during the month of November, to bring back a portion of his forces toward the Missouri frontier, but he left Blunt on the western slope of the Ozark Mountains to guard the outlets of the roads leading into the valleys of White River and the Arkansas through Fayetteville and Cane Hill. On the 26th of November he learned that the enemy had at last decided to resume the offensive. General Marmaduke had arrived at Cane Hill with seven or eight thousand men; Hindman was no doubt preparing to follow him. It was important to prevent their junction, and not allow them to obtain supplies in the neighborhood of Cane Hill, one of the richest wheat districts in all Arkansas.

Blunt started for Cane Hill with five thousand men, half of whom were mounted, and thirty field-pieces. On the morning of the 28th he found himself in presence of the enemy, whom he attacked from the north side, where he was not expected, by making a circuit around the woods. But he had withdrawn only a portion of his cavalry and one field-battery, and he was obliged to sustain an unequal struggle. The remainder of his force arrived at last. The Confederates were closely pressed, retired slowly by the Van Buren road, defending themselves wherever the ground offered the opportunity. In this way they reached the ridge of the Boston Mountains, on the summit of which they made a vigorous resistance. But the Second regiment of Kansas cavalry, having dismounted, rushed up to the assault of this position, carried it, and drove the enemy upon the other slope of the mountain. The combat was continued on that side. The Confederates, having quickly rallied, stopped the advance of the Federal column, which in this long march had left a large number of men behind, and the horses of which were beginning to give out. Night overtook both parties on the borders of a stream called Cove Creek, where the roads from Cane Hill and Fayetteville to Van Buren unite to enter a narrow defile; and in this

place, easy to defend, Marmaduke repulsed all the charges of the assailants, who vainly endeavored to capture his cannon.

Immediately after the battle he fell back as far as Lee's Creek, near Van Buren, to wait for Hindman, whilst Blunt, satisfied with his success, returned to Cane Hill. Schofield, who had fallen ill, had entrusted him with the management of military operations in Arkansas. The Federal army was then divided into two corps, far distant from each other. Blunt, with the first division, composed of three brigades and numbering about six or seven thousand men, was at Cane Hill and the hamlet of Rhea's Mills, situated on the Fayetteville road, twelve kilometres north of Cane Hill. The three other divisions, comprising six thousand infantry, eight thousand horse and twenty guns, under Herron, were encamped in the vicinity of Wilson's Creek, in Missouri; they were thus enabled to obtain their supplies more readily, but were separated from Fayetteville by a distance of one hundred and seventy-five kilometres.

On the 1st of December, Hindman, having hastened to Marmaduke's relief, crossed the Arkansas with nine thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry. These two generals, having joined their forces twenty-five kilometres from Van Buren, found themselves at the head of eighteen thousand men. This was more than sufficient to crush Blunt's weak division before Herron could come to his assistance. But Hindman, who had assumed the chief command, wasted the valuable time. He no doubt believed himself justified in despising his adversaries, whom, in a proclamation addressed to his soldiers, he had described as a motley gathering of cowards and rascals.

Blunt, on being informed of this movement, felt the necessity of defending the chain of the Ozark Mountains by covering the Fayetteville and Cane Hill roads on the eastern slope of those hills. He proceeded to this slope, pushing his outposts toward Cove Creek, and on the 2d of December he telegraphed to Herron an order to join him immediately. This general started with all his troops on the morning of the 3d, and by forced marches reached Elkhorn Tavern on the 5th with his convoy. On the same day, Hindman, having at last roused himself from his inaction, met Blunt's outposts, but without having any serious en-

counter with them. On the 6th he again drove them back, seized the junction of the Cane Hill and Fayetteville roads, where the combat of November 28th had terminated, and advanced half-way in the direction of Cane Hill. He could thus march upon either of these two points. But the slowness of his movements had given the Federals time to form a junction. On the evening of the 6th, Herron's cavalry, under Colonel Wickersham, rejoined Blunt at the pass of the Boston Mountains, and his infantry, six thousand strong, reached Fayetteville on the morning of the 7th. Knowing the danger which threatened Blunt, he only allowed his troops an hour's rest. He told his soldiers, who had marched one hundred and seventy-five kilometres in four days, that they had only one more march to make to meet the enemy; and, forgetting their fatigues, they cheerfully resumed their movement. Herron took them upon the mail-road, which leads from Fayetteville to Van Buren, by first skirting along the foot of the hills, then by following the course of Cove Creek, which they were to leave after a certain distance and take the Cane Hill road on the right. He was fully convinced that Hindman was on his way to meet him at that moment and by the same road. The Confederate general had left a few troops with a field-battery in a strong position on the Cane Hill road, at the culminating point of the pass of the Boston Mountains, so as to mask his movement and detain Blunt; he had then taken the Fayetteville road with the rest of his army, and was rapidly proceeding toward the north. He still hoped to be able thus to cut off Blunt's retreat, or at least to crush Herron first, of whose arrival he had just been informed, and to return afterward against the former. His cavalry occupied the road through which the two Union generals had hitherto communicated; and, deceiving Blunt, he got sufficiently the start of him to be able to fight Herron separately, whose forces scarcely equalled one-fourth of his own. Toward eight o'clock the vanguard of the latter, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, met Marmaduke at a distance of seven or eight kilometres from Fayetteville, and was driven back in disorder upon the second division. This division, commanded by Totten, had been joined to the third, which Herron had brought over, Blunt having retained the first with him, which he commanded

before replacing Schofield. Totten's soldiers repulsed the charge of the Confederate cavalry in their turn; and while still skirmishing with them, they reached the borders of Illinois Creek, where Hindman, learning of the approach of the Federals, had taken position with all his army. This stream waters the eastern extremity of a prairie which extends for a distance of about twelve or fifteen kilometres from the little church of Prairie Grove on the east, to the Rhea's Mills farm westward. This *prairie*, to use the phraseology of the Far West, is a vast natural clearing, in the midst of woods and thickets which cover all the surrounding hills. The ground is rough and uneven, and in many places cultivation has superseded the tall grasses which formerly grew there, whilst here and there may occasionally be seen an isolated cluster of trees. The road from Fayetteville to Cane Hill passes at Rhea's Mills; that from Van Buren crosses a ford on Illinois Creek, near the church of Prairie Grove, and then gradually ascends a hill the summit of which is covered with woods, affording excellent means of defence.

When Herron discovered the Confederate army, the whole of it was ranged along these positions; the unclouded sun, which even in winter, in the centre of the American continent, shines brightly, lighted up the field of battle, enabling the Federals to form a precise estimate of the enemy's strength. It was easy to perceive that it was not an even game. Hindman had fourteen or fifteen thousand men with him; the necessity of leaving detachments behind had, on the contrary, reduced Herron's force to four thousand; nevertheless, no sooner had the third division joined the second than he resolved to assume the offensive. It was the only means of keeping Hindman in check and giving Blunt time to come up. To fall back would have been to abandon his entire convoy to the enemy, and to be crushed. Having failed in his endeavors to force the passage of the ford, Herron cut his way through the woods which bordered Illinois Creek, and sent a battery to cross the stream on that side. While this battery was occupying the attention of the enemy, the other three, accompanied by three regiments of infantry, crossed the ford, and at ten o'clock the whole Federal artillery opened fire upon the Confederate positions. The remainder of Herron's small band

crossed Illinois Creek and deployed in front of the enemy. The latter, already decimated by the Federal cannon, massed his forces on the right to crush Herron's left. Then the Federal general assigned to the Nineteenth Iowa and the Twentieth Wisconsin the dangerous task of preventing the movement which threatened him, by carrying a battery that was preparing to support this attack. The two regiments climbed the hill upon the summit of which the battery was posted; they reached the crest in perfect order, and swept everything before them; they captured the guns and passed beyond them; but the Confederates returned to the charge with fresh troops, drove them back, recaptured the cannon which the Federals had taken, and, chasing them down the slope, charged upon the Union guns. These poured grape into their midst, causing them to waver; they hesitated in their turn, halted and finally fell back, leaving the ground strewn with the dead and wounded. Despite this successful resistance, the situation of Herron was becoming very critical. Seeing his left menaced, he sent for a brigade from the right, and hurled it against the enemy. This attack was followed by the same result as the preceding one. The impetus of the Federals at first carried everything before them, but they were soon driven to the foot of the hill by an offensive return of the Confederates. The latter began at last to feel conscious of their immense numerical superiority. Herron had put all his men under fire, and was barely able to hold the ground he occupied. It was but half-past two o'clock, and it would be difficult for him to sustain the struggle alone until night. He had received no message from Blunt, and nothing indicated the approach of this longed-for reinforcement, when suddenly a few cannon-shots were heard on the extreme right, and two or three balls buried themselves in the earth in the midst of the Federal skirmishers. At first this was mistaken for a new attack in flank, but all doubts were soon set at rest; it was Blunt's cannon announcing his arrival on the field of battle. This news, circulated from mouth to mouth, revived the ardor of the Unionists and restored their confidence.

Blunt had quickly discovered that the demonstrations of the enemy along his front were but a feint, and at once guessed the object of the march that Hindman had stolen upon him. He

immediately hastened to the assistance of his lieutenant, and sent despatches, which were intercepted by Confederate troopers. The whole of his convoy had reached Rhea's Mills the previous day; he was therefore able to leave Cane Hill without being encumbered by any vehicle. Wickersham led the advanced guard of the division; he was to take the direct road from Cane Hill to Fayetteville, which connects with the post-road before reaching Prairie Grove, and which would have brought him unexpectedly upon the rear of the enemy. But instead of remaining on this road, the cavalry turned to the left, into a cross-road leading to Rhea's Mills. Afraid of dividing his forces at so critical a moment, Blunt was obliged to follow. On reaching camp, where he found his convoy, he heard the faint echoes of cannon resounding at the other extremity of the prairie; it was Herron fighting at Prairie Grove. He started immediately with the cavalry and two of his brigades, leaving Solomon's to guard the convoy, and directed his course by the noise of battle, which was becoming more and more distinct.

His arrival, as we have said, could not have been more opportune. At this moment the Confederates were massing their forces upon their left for the purpose of flanking Herron's right wing. In the midst of this manœuvre they encountered Blunt's heads of column, which were debouching upon their flank. The struggle began at first with cannon-shot; the infantry soon took part in it. While the cavalry was covering his right, Blunt pushed Weer's brigade into a wood, where the Confederates had been forming for the attack; they were dislodged from it, and their movement arrested. Herron, disengaged, joined his line to that of Blunt, and Dye's brigade, of the second division, repulsed the enemy, who tried to penetrate between that brigade and the third. Cannonading and musketry-fire continued until night, without the Confederates resuming the attack, or making any serious effort to drive their adversaries back upon Illinois Creek.

The losses of the Federals were considerable, amounting to one thousand one hundred and forty-eight men, of whom one hundred and sixty-seven were killed, seven hundred and ninety-eight wounded and one hundred and eighty-three prisoners; out of this total, nine hundred and fifty-three belonged to Herron's

troops. Blunt, therefore, fully expected to be again attacked on the following day by Hindman, who had still the advantage over him in numbers. But the latter did not deem it expedient to renew the struggle. He had lost two fine opportunities; first in not fighting Blunt either on the 4th or 5th, when he had him alone in front of him; secondly, in not taking the offensive against Herron when he met him also alone on the borders of Illinois Creek. The better to conceal his retreat he had the wheels of his gun-carriages covered, and asked for a conference with the Federals during the night on pretence of burying the dead. On the morning of the 8th the Confederates had disappeared, and were moving with great speed along the Van Buren road. The Unionists were not in condition to pursue them; they contented themselves with a dearly-bought victory, which, however, secured them the possession of all the disputed territory and put an end to the campaign.

After the battle of Prairie Grove all the army of the frontier remained in the Ozark Mountains. It was no longer disturbed. In order to secure himself against any new surprise, Blunt, on the 28th of December, led in person an expedition of light troops as far as the borders of the Arkansas. He took possession of Van Buren without opposition, burnt several steamers, destroyed the Confederate dépôts, and then rejoined the main body of his army, which had gone into winter quarters. The year 1862 was thus closed west of the Mississippi with a success for the Federals. Missouri was quiet, the most important section of Arkansas occupied in force, and the superiority of their army unquestionably established in many severe conflicts.

The war of which those distant regions had been the theatre presented some peculiar characteristics which the reader has undoubtedly noticed. Thus, for instance, the small armies that disputed the possession of the territory had generally a very large proportion of artillery, five or six pieces for every thousand men, and the infantry was much less numerous than the cavalry. The latter was, in fact, mounted infantry. Manœuvring at times in bodies of five or six thousand horse, with several batteries of light artillery, they performed enormous marches; then, dismounting, they began firing with rifles, and carried the enemy's

positions by assault; after which, leaping again into the saddle, they pursued them, revolver in hand. The infantry were only there to support the cavalry at a distance, to fight pitched battles when the opportunity offered, and to defend the numerous posts which it was necessary to occupy along the road. These foot-soldiers, however, marched much longer distances than those belonging to the other Federal armies, in consequence, no doubt, of their having been recruited among the pioneers of Kansas and Iowa, accustomed to long journeys across the plains. These small armies were obliged to exercise a great mobility, without which, in so extensive a country, they would have been absolutely powerless. Consequently, they learned to subsist as much as possible upon that country, however small its population. From time to time they required a certain quantity of supplies and a renewal of their dépôts. There was then sent to them a train of wagons resembling those which in times of peace crossed the Rocky Mountains, and this train, to reach them, had to travel two or three hundred kilometres without an escort. Once revictualled, the army retained but a small number of important posts along its route, which, in case of danger, served as a shelter for future convoys.

The vicissitudes of this war may appear very monotonous to those whose observe them from a distance, but it inspired those who participated in it with wonderful zeal. They went into the struggle with much stronger and more ardent feelings than the combatants who took part in the Eastern campaigns. In uniform they continued the mode of the life they had long led in those Territories where the supremacy of the law was not yet recognized. In short, the adventurous marches of those large bodies of cavalry, the surprises by night, the combats alternately on foot and on horseback, and the rapid runs across the prairie after battle, presented in a dry, healthy climate a life full of attraction to the rough soldiers of the far West.

BOOK V.—TENNESSEE.

CHAPTER I.

CHICKASAW BAYOU.

WE have just seen, west of the Mississippi, the Federals remaining at the end of the year masters of the State of Missouri and a portion of Arkansas. Their efforts to extend their power farther south, on the very borders of the Mississippi, and especially on the east bank, in the State which bears that name, had not been so successful. These efforts, however, showed the way they were determined to follow with the utmost perseverance.

Since the victory of Corinth, Grant's only thought was to open communications with New Orleans by the river. He was well aware of what importance the undisputed possession of the Mississippi would be, but in the month of October, as we have before said, he did not have the necessary forces to resume the offensive against the troops of Van Dorn and Price, which had just been united into a single army under the command of Lieutenant-general Pemberton.

The abandonment of Kentucky by the Confederates at the end of October, and the new call for troops during the summer, placed the means for reinforcing Grant at the disposal of the Federal government. That general at once proposed a land expedition against Vicksburg. His project was to follow the line of railway from Memphis to Grenada, and from Grenada to Jackson, taking Memphis, on the Mississippi, as a base of operations. This city would have been connected with the North by the railroad which passes at Humboldt, striking again the great river at Columbus. In order to defend this long railway track, all the secondary lines would have been abandoned, as well as the stations

of Bolivar, Jackson in Tennessee, Iuka, and even the fortifications of Corinth, whose works would have been destroyed, and the dépôts evacuated. Halleck did not approve of this plan, which probably sacrificed too much to an uncertainty. Corinth especially was a subject of great anxiety to the commander-in-chief of the Federal armies, the capture of this position being, in fact, the only event of the war in which he had personally participated. Grant then resolved to advance gradually along the Mississippi Central Railroad, as far as the forces at his disposal would permit him, by feeling his way and repairing the track behind him.

Before we follow him in these operations, we must, in a few words, describe the country where he and his lieutenants were about to fight, which is comprised between Memphis, at the north, the point of departure of the Federals, and Vicksburg, at the south, the principal objective point of their campaign. This country is a vast rectangle, the west side of which is formed by the Mississippi and the others by three railroads; at the north, from Memphis to Corinth by way of Grand Junction; at the east, the section of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad comprised between Corinth and Meridian; at the south, the line from Vicksburg to Meridian, which passes through Jackson. At the four angles are situated Memphis, Corinth, Meridian and Vicksburg. The rectangle is divided in two throughout its length by the Mississippi Central Railroad, which runs parallel to the Mississippi from Grand Junction to Jackson. Between the two extremities of this line, and nearly in the centre of the rectangle, stands the village of Grenada. From this point a line of railway which terminates at Memphis starts diagonally in a north-westerly direction. The largest portion of this country appertains to the Mississippi basin, which receives the waters of Yazoo River above Vicksburg and those of Big Black River above Grand Gulf. These two considerable rivers run from north-north-east to south-south-west at a short distance from each other. A third, Pearl River, after following a parallel direction as far as Jackson, turns directly south and empties in the Gulf of Mexico through Lake Borgne, near New Orleans. Most of this region bears a resemblance to the neighborhood of Corinth; it is a rolling country,

covered with forests, interspersed with cotton plantations; its soil, rich and moist, is irrigated by numerous water-courses. But on approaching the Mississippi the ground becomes more level, sometimes gradually, and sometimes suddenly. In the northern section, the district comprised between the Yazoo and the great river is flat, marshy and intersected by bayous, which flow slowly from the rounded bed (*dos d'âne*) of the latter river; frequently flooded, and covered with cypress thickets, the soil, wherever it has been reclaimed, is of an exceptional fertility. Farther south the undulating ground ends in a series of abrupt slopes, which border the left bank of the Yazoo, and sink at last in the waters of the Mississippi on the shores of Vicksburg.

On the 2d of November, Grant had put five divisions in motion, which swelled the number of his active forces to more than thirty thousand men. Three of these divisions started from Bolivar, the other two came from Corinth, and all proceeded toward Grand Junction. On the 4th the Federal army occupied this point, as well as Lagrange, while the cavalry was advancing toward the south. But the reinforcements, which had long been expected, arrived slowly, and the political influences, which had embarrassed military operations in Virginia, were beginning to be felt in the remote regions where the modest and reticent Grant was in command. His position was envied by many persons, who, in order to prove their capacity, were busying themselves in Washington in projecting expeditions more or less chimerical. Honest Mr. Lincoln was always anxious to accommodate by his tact both the jealousies of ambition and the most divergent plans of campaign; this led to frequent conflicts of authority, especially at that period, when no officer had as yet acquired a sufficiently great reputation to be entrusted by the responsible chief magistrate of the republic with the supreme control of military affairs, with which he was himself invested by the Constitution. Politicians, collected at Washington, were too prone to believe that they could divide the enemy's territory and arrange the plan of conquering it, just as in former days they would have divided the civil offices at their disposal among themselves. It was in this way that Mr. Lincoln had almost promised an independent command to General McClelland, his personal friend. Being unable to obtain

Grant's place, McClernand had asked the President to redeem his pledge by placing him at the head of some expedition on the Mississippi. Warned by the example of what had taken place a few months before, Halleck opposed this fatal dismemberment of the armies of the West, but only succeeded in obtaining a postponement. The reinforcements intended for Grant, instead of reaching the quarters of that general, were assembled at Memphis for the purpose of being formed at a moment's notice into a corps independent of his authority, his own movement being even interrupted for a few days.

Finally, on the 12th of November, Grant was given permission, to quote the words in Halleck's despatch, "to fight the enemy wherever he should think proper," and he set off immediately. His principal object was to attack Pemberton, who must have had from thirty to forty thousand men under his command. He was well aware, in fact, that so long as this army remained intact he should not be able either to penetrate into the country, or even to approach Vicksburg with the least chance of success. If he advanced too far, he exposed his line of communications in his rear; if he embarked his army to descend the Mississippi as far as Vicksburg, he uncovered Memphis, Corinth and the whole of Tennessee. It was necessary, therefore, to find and fight Pemberton. The latter had two lines of defence, formed by two rivers, the Tallahatchie and the Yallahusha, which after their junction take the name of Yazoo, already familiar to us, both of which cross the Mississippi Central Railroad between Grand Junction and Grenada. Pemberton had fortified the banks of the Tallahatchie, and was within reach of that stream with the greater portion of his army.

Grant's army was divided into two separate commands; the two divisions from Corinth were under Hamilton, the other three divisions had been brought over from Boliver by McPherson. The latter had occupied Lamar with ten thousand men since the 8th of November; on the 13th, his vanguard was at Holly Springs, the first important station after Grand Junction. The Federal cavalry, both numerous and active, extended far and wide, and reached the banks of the Tallahatchie, toward which Grant was leading all his forces. He had then seventy-two thou-

sand men under his command, but the necessity of occupying a large number of posts had reduced the number of troops he could place in the field to forty-six thousand combatants. Of these, he had only thirty thousand with him. Sherman was ordered to bring over sixteen thousand from Memphis, and this order was the more pressing because these troops, if once engaged, could no longer be called back to form part of McClelland's independent corps, the formation of which was a constant threat suspended over the head of Grant. The small army of Curtis, which we left at Helena, in Arkansas, on the borders of the Mississippi, in the middle of July, also emerged from its inaction under the direction of Steele, its new commander. About seven thousand men, nearly all cavalry, were transported to Delta, on the other bank of the river, and Generals Washburn and Hovey, who were in command, were ordered to destroy the railway track in the rear of Pemberton, through which he obtained his supplies.

They took the field on the 20th of November. Crossing Cold Water River, one of the natural canals which run into the Tallahatchie from the Mississippi, they captured a Confederate camp, and by a forced march reached, at Granger, the point of junction of the two railroads from Memphis and from Grand Junction to Grenada. After destroying the track as well as they could, they proceeded upward as far as Coffeeville, on the Mississippi Central Railroad, returning to Delta about the 30th of November. They had not irreparably damaged the lines of railway, but they had threatened Pemberton's communications seriously enough to convince the latter of his inability to maintain himself on the Tallahatchie. By a combined march, Grant and Sherman had reached the borders of this river on the 29th of November, one in front of Abbeville and the other at Wyatt. They had anticipated a desperate conflict before this obstacle; the enemy's works had even seemed so formidable that Grant, deeming it impossible to carry them by main force, was preparing to turn them, and had already sent his cavalry across the Tallahatchie on his extreme left, when, on the morning of December 1st, Pemberton evacuated all his positions and retired toward Grenada. The Federals pursued his rear-guards as far as Oxford, halfway between Grand Junction and Grenada; but being obliged to repair the railroad

to procure their supplies, they were not able greatly to harass his march. However, while their infantry occupied Oxford on the 5th of December, their cavalry was already in the vicinity of Coffeeville, thirty kilometres from Grenada; the largest portion of Pemberton's army was massed in this position, behind the Yallabusha, its front being covered by Lovell with two divisions in advance of this river. That very day the approaches to Coffeeville were the scene of a brisk encounter between these troops and the division of Federal cavalry, which was pressing them too closely. The cavalry was driven back upon its infantry reserves, but retired in good order, showing a resistance which elicited commendations even from its adversaries, fighting alternately on foot and on horseback, and availing itself of all the advantages of ground to stop an enemy superior to it in numbers. The losses amounted to about one hundred men on each side. Notwithstanding this aggressive demonstration, it was evident that the Confederates had no desire to dispute the right bank of the Yallabusha with the Federals.

On reaching this river, the Federals would have found themselves only one hundred and sixty kilometres from Grand Junction, and about five hundred kilometres from Columbus, whence they derived all their supplies; but notwithstanding the visit and encouraging words of Mr. Jefferson Davis, it was not likely that Pemberton would wait for them in positions poorly fortified and too much extended, the Confederates having every interest in weakening their adversaries by drawing them still farther into the interior. Grant therefore concluded that he could not push his land expedition beyond Grenada; indeed, at that period, it was not considered possible to subsist an army of thirty or forty thousand men solely upon the resources of a country so sparsely peopled as the State of Mississippi, and to keep them in the field even for a few days without having their communications with the base of operations perfectly secured.

Despairing to overtake Pemberton to inflict upon him a decisive defeat, Grant then fell back upon the plan of attacking Vicksburg by the river, and on the 5th of December he made a proposition to that effect to Halleck, the more earnestly, perhaps, because he dreaded to see this expedition entrusted to McClelland, while he

himself would be left powerless between the Tallahatchie and the Yallabusha. His plan was approved on the 8th. Sherman, who had already succeeded in inspiring confidence in two chiefs so entirely opposite in character as Halleck and Grant, was designated to command the expedition. Returning to Memphis with the two divisions he had brought over, he was to embark them at that point, together with all the troops recently arrived from the North, join Steele's division at Helena and Delta, and, having thus assembled about forty thousand men, descend the river as far as in front of Vicksburg under the escort of Commodore Porter's flotilla.

Grant's instructions enjoined him not to make a direct attack upon this place, before which the navy and Williams' division had already failed during the summer, but to turn it by ascending the Yazoo and placing himself within the space comprised between this river and the Big Black. Vicksburg would thus have been separated from the army of Pemberton, and its defenders, in all probability, would have evacuated the place; if otherwise, an attempt could have been made to carry it by a combined assault on the part of the fleet and army. At all events, the course of the Yazoo would have been opened. Sherman could have ascended it with a portion of the flotilla to join Grant, and Pemberton, caught between these two armies, would have found it impossible to defend Vicksburg and Grenada at the same time. While waiting for the result of this movement, Grant intended to remain on the line of the Yallabusha, to watch it closely by means of his numerous cavalry, and to be able to pursue Pemberton if the latter should attempt to escape him. Sherman set off immediately for Memphis, but the transports he had expected to find in the vicinity of that city were not ready, and ten days elapsed before he was able to embark with the vast *matériel* he required.

In the mean while, Grant had strengthened his position, concentrated his troops, reopened the railroad, and established large dépôts of stores and ammunition at all the principal stations. His cavalry scoured the country far and wide, reconnoitring the various localities, and intercepting, as much as possible, any communications which the enemy might maintain on his flanks. One regiment

even pushed as far as the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, cutting it in several places. On the 18th of December these Federal troopers were quietly passing through a country which they thought to be defenceless, when to their astonishment they learned that they had very nearly fallen in with a body of five or six thousand Confederate horse. They followed in their wake, soon overtook them, and hiding in the woods—for they were not strong enough to attack them—they could see the rear-guard of the enemy, which was proceeding rapidly in a northerly direction. This was Van Dorn, who, burning to avenge his defeat at Corinth, was attempting a bold and well-conceived stroke against Grant's dépôts established at intermediate stations along the railroad. The Federal colonel had the misfortune or the stupidity not to immediately communicate to his chief the important fact that chance had just revealed to him. Grant only heard of it on the evening of the 19th. He at once sent word to all the posts recommending increased vigilance, and despatched at the same time a body of four thousand men by rail to reinforce the garrison of Holly Springs, which was the centre of his dépôts of provisions, arms and ammunition. He had unfortunately entrusted this post to Colonel Murphy, who had already exhibited great weakness in abandoning Iuka at the approach of Price. All the garrisons were on their guard except that of Holly Springs.

This village had become the rendezvous of that floating population which follows armies at a distance, and which the military authorities are always trying to keep at a distance. Adventurous speculators had come over for the purpose of engaging in the cotton contraband trade. All the army sutlers procured their supplies at dépôts which Northern merchants had established in the place. Officers on duty, either in the garrison or in the quartermaster's department, thinking themselves perfectly safe, had taken up their residence with their families in the houses of the village, where they lived on good terms with the inhabitants, although the latter made no secret of their sympathies with the enemy. Hence arose that negligence and carelessness of which Murphy was the first to set the example.

A large hospital had been established for the numerous sick who suffered from dysentery, typhoid or malarial fevers. Murphy

had not turned up a single spadeful of earth to protect the valuables entrusted to his care, and not a solitary officer had been sent from headquarters to watch him. He received Grant's despatch on the evening of the 19th, but this failed to rouse him from his lethargy; he made no preparations for defence, no attempt to barricade the streets with the bales of cotton which filled the warehouses, and did not even put his soldiers under arms. Consequently, on the morning of the 20th, when Van Dorn's cavalry came up at a gallop into the streets of Holly Springs, they only found a few sentinels at the entrance of the village; all the passes were open and the village plunged in profound sleep; they were already masters of the place, and their long columns had penetrated in every direction before a single musket-shot had been fired. And yet there were one thousand eight hundred Federal troops in the place. A detachment of cavalry alone, encamped outside of the village, made any attempt at defence, and amid the confusion opened for itself a passage, sabre in hand, killing or wounding about thirty of the enemy. All the rest were taken prisoners without resistance. Detachments of Confederate soldiers proceeded to search all the houses, and captured most of the Federal officers in their beds. The speculators were imperatively summoned to appear and stripped of their money, after which they were allowed to witness the burning of their cotton without personal restraint. The work of devastation had indeed commenced. The dépôts of provisions were plundered and destroyed; the stores of the sutlers experienced the same fate. Whisky flowed in streams, causing much disorder. The arsenal was burnt in such haste that the violence of the powder explosions nearly overthrew the whole village and wounded twenty sick persons in the Federal hospital. The railway station was set on fire, together with several trains that were there. Finally, when Van Dorn thought the destruction complete, he called together the Federal officers and soldiers and offered to release them on parole. Murphy committed the error of accepting in their name, thus relieving the enemy from all the trouble which the custody of those prisoners would have entailed upon him. After delivering them up without defence, he had no idea that the enemy, anxious to get away, would be compelled to set most of them at liberty

unconditionally. In fact, Van Dorn had resumed his march on the evening of the 20th, and was moving rapidly toward the north, where he hoped to continue his devastations. A few hours after his departure, the reinforcement sent by Grant, which had been detained on the road by an accident, arrived at Holly Springs. This was the only important success obtained by Van Dorn.

On the following day, the 21st, he made an attack on the post of Davis' Mill which was only defended by two hundred and fifty men. Hoping to overcome so small a band, he tried several times to carry it by assault at the head of his dismounted troopers; but being repeatedly repulsed, he was obliged to give up the attempt, leaving a considerable number of wounded upon the ground. Being always in search of some new weak point, he presented himself successively before Cold Water Bridge, Middleburg and Bolivar, but found everywhere the small Federal garrisons so well prepared to receive him that he did not venture to attack any of them seriously.

While Van Dorn was occupying Holly Springs, Forrest had undertaken an expedition still more dangerous to Grant's communications in Western Tennessee. This partisan chief, who had been sent by Bragg to harass Rosecrans, had been for some time overrunning Central Tennessee. About the 10th or 12th of December, he crossed the Tennessee River at Clifton, with three thousand five hundred horse and six pieces of artillery, for the purpose of striking the region of country comprised between its course and that of the Mississippi. This force was not enough to capture the principal fortified posts of the Federals if the small garrisons occupying them knew how to defend themselves behind their parapets and palisades. But General Sullivan, who commanded the district, committed the error of concentrating all of them at Jackson, where he waited resolutely for Forrest, leaving only convalescents and poorly-armed recruits at the other posts. Forrest took good care to avoid him, and presented himself on the 20th of December before Humboldt and Trenton, the defenders of which, being invalids and men without experience, did not make a long stand against his artillery and skilful skirmishers. He was thus able to destroy at leisure the important

branch of railway from Humboldt to Columbus, through which Grant received his supplies. For some days he was master of the whole country, and conscientiously fulfilled his task. At last Sullivan collected a sufficient number of troops to resume the offensive, and started in pursuit of him with one division composed of all arms. Forrest, being closely pressed, took the road by which he had come; but Dunham's Federal brigade, which had been sent to intercept him, met him on the 31st at Parker's Cross-roads, twenty-eight kilometres north of Huntingdon, on the Lexington road. Attacked by superior forces which threatened to surround their two wings, the Federals were on the point of being crushed. They, however, resisted vigorously, facing the enemy on every side, who, from numerical superiority and the power of his artillery, possessed an immense advantage over them. Forrest felt so sure of victory that he proposed to Dunham to capitulate. The latter, being still in hopes of speedy relief, was determined to fight to the last extremity; but his ammunition failed, his convoy was in the hands of the enemy, and it was but two o'clock in the afternoon. He might therefore consider himself as lost, when in an instant everything was changed. Sullivan, who had hastened over from Huntingdon, appeared on the field of battle with Fuller's brigade. A few cannon-shots and some volleys of musketry, taking Forrest's soldiers in flank, who were already worn out by the struggle, sufficed to stop them; a moment after, they took flight, leaving a large number of prisoners and four pieces of cannon in the hands of the Federals. Dunham had two hundred and twenty men disabled; as for Forrest, his losses amounted to more than five hundred. Unable to recover from this reverse, he retired for some time out of reach of the Federals.

But the damage caused by both himself and Van Dorn to Grant's line of communication on the 20th of December, was an irreparable blow to Grant's army. It found itself suddenly deprived of all the resources necessary to its existence. The supplies destroyed at Holly Springs were intended to subsist it for several weeks. In order to replace them, it would have required to put instantly in operation all the capacity and force of the Columbus Railroad; but this line, which was also destroyed

in several places, could not be put in order for two or three weeks, perhaps, and large parties of the enemy's cavalry were scouring the country, ready to renew their destruction in proportion as the damages were repaired.

Grant's position, therefore, had become untenable. It was necessary for him to fall back rapidly in order to reopen communications either with Memphis or Pittsburg Landing, or to boldly push forward, and either to fight or to avoid Pemberton. In the latter contingency, he would have had to descend the Yazoo, subsisting upon the country, until he could communicate with the Mississippi fleet and Sherman, whose troops must have been in the neighborhood of Vicksburg. This course was full of dangers and uncertainties. The resources of the country through which he would have to pass were unknown, nor was he sure that Sherman would be found in the vicinity of Vicksburg; in short, winter had come, and the first rain, by breaking up the roads, might doom the army to a disastrous immobility or to the loss of its entire convoy. Grant was afraid of risking such an experiment. He said afterward that if he had known then, what he subsequently learned from experience, that the country was rich enough to feed an army of thirty thousand men on its passage through, he would certainly have undertaken that movement, and, in all probability, captured Vicksburg at that time. However that may be, his resolution was promptly taken, and on the 21st he recrossed the Tallahatchie. His communications with the North were all interrupted, and necessity compelled him to adopt measures of an entirely new character in order to subsist his troops. He was thus led to resort to the system of requisitions, to which he had been unwilling to trust for a forward march, but which he was glad afterward to have tested. The country through which his army was about to pass was carefully explored, and all that could be found of meat, grain, food of every description and forage, was taken for the use of the army, and paid for in bonds. It was the first time that the Federals had applied this system, always legitimate in war, on a large scale, so much did their regular armies desire to be lenient in their treatment of the conquered country, despite all that their adversaries may have said to the contrary. Thanks to this mode of

proceeding, the army was constantly provided with the means of subsistence. On the 23d of December, it reached Holly Springs, where immense heaps of ashes and blackened walls reminded it of the disaster which had rendered this retrograde movement necessary; a few days later, it again entered Lagrange and Grand Junction, where it found itself once more in communication with Corinth and Memphis. Pemberton, far from pursuing Grant, had taken advantage of his precipitate retreat, in order to withdraw all but a portion of his forces from Grenada, and bring them to Vicksburg, where he fully expected to be attacked before long.

In point of fact, the whole expedition commanded by Sherman had left Memphis on the 20th of December, the very day that Van Dorn and Forrest had struck the blow which compelled Grant to relinquish the part he was to have played in the combined campaign with his lieutenant. By a strange coincidence, it was the interruption of telegraphic communications by the Confederate cavalry, which decided the departure of this expedition at the very moment when its best chances of success were being sacrificed. On the 18th of December, an order from the President directed Grant to divide all his forces into four army corps, to assign one to McClelland and to place him at the head of the troops destined for the attack upon Vicksburg. The drawing up of the new orders, required by this entire reconstruction of the army, occupied Grant during the whole of the 19th, while on the morning of the 20th Sherman, anxious to avoid a counter-order which he dreaded, left Memphis, thus placing himself beyond reach of the telegraph. But at the very moment that he was thus hastily embarking, the capture of Holly Springs upset Grant's plan of campaign, while the interruption of the telegraph stopped at once the despatches he was sending to Memphis, the first of which announced to Sherman the fact of his having been superseded, the second, by far the most important, being intended to suspend the departure of the expedition, which was henceforth beset with dangers.

But for this interruption of the telegraph, the order of recall, conveyed by a light steamer to Sherman's fleet, would have stopped the latter before the outset of the unfortunate campaign we are about to relate. Shall we blame Grant for having delayed

issuing an order which he considered fatal, until the 20th, and Sherman for having hastened his departure because he had indirectly, perhaps, obtained knowledge of it? Certainly not. The reorganization ordered by Mr. Lincoln, accompanied by a change of command, would have caused a loss of time, which then appeared very precious, since it was desired to attack Vicksburg while Grant was detaining Pemberton at Grenada, and it was impossible to foresee the events which were at one stroke to restore freedom of action to the latter, and to separate the Federal general from his lieutenants.

The troops assembled at Memphis formed a corps designated as the right wing of the army of the Mississippi. The reinforcements which Sherman had recently received swelled the number of his soldiers to about thirty thousand, out of which he could count about twenty thousand available combatants; these forces were disposed in three divisions under command of Generals A. J. Smith, M. L. Smith and Morgan. When Sherman gave the order for embarking on the 20th, the preparations for so complicated an operation were not entirely completed. All the steamers that could be found had been collected together on the Mississippi and the Ohio, but the difficulties were even greater than those which had attended the transportation of the army of the Potomac to Fortress Monroe, for the thirty thousand men that McClellan had transported at one time had only been two days on the way, whilst the transportation undertaken by Sherman occupied at least five or six. It was impossible, therefore, to avoid a certain amount of confusion in the embarkation, especially as the preceding day was pay-day. As we have observed elsewhere, the American soldier was only paid once in two months, so that at times, at the moment of leaving a city like Memphis, which, it may be said, was nothing but a vast sutler's store, he found himself exposed, with a considerable sum of money in his possession, to all the temptations which that city offered him. In the camps, owing to the absolute prohibition of the sale of strong liquors, drunkenness was unknown, but elsewhere this vice could not be so completely suppressed. Sherman's orders, however, were promptly executed, and the stragglers soon collected together, seeing that all the fleet had left the piers at Memphis by

the 20th. On the 22d this fleet touched at Helena, where lay the army which Curtis had brought to the borders of the Mississippi in the month of July. The greater portion of those troops were placed on board of the transports, which had come down from Memphis without either passengers or cargo; they formed, in Sherman's army, a new division of four brigades, numbering twelve thousand three hundred and ten men, commanded by General Steele. The expeditionary corps thus consisted, then, of thirty-two thousand men, and a short distance from there, at Friar's Point, it joined Commodore Porter, who had come from the entrance of the Yazoo to convoy it. Although the progress of the vessels was delayed in consequence of the difficulty in procuring fuel to keep the engines working, the whole fleet arrived on the evening of the 24th at Milliken's Bend, a place situated on the right bank of the river, fronting the mouth of the Yazoo, which the fine prairies, the dryness of the land and easy approaches rendered very appropriate for a dépôt of the army.

In this place Sherman found the gun-boats which blockaded Vicksburg and protected the upper course of the Mississippi against incursions from the enemy's vessels. A few days before, they had made a fruitless attempt to ascend the course of the Yazoo and open the route by which he was to try to communicate with Grant. In fact, on the 12th of December, they had appeared before an eminence called Haines' Bluff, which commands the left bank of the Yazoo, and which was surmounted by a few batteries. The Confederates had planted torpedoes all along the river-course for a certain distance below this point. The foremost of the four Federal vessels, drawing but little water, passed over these machines without touching them. But the *Cairo*, which followed, struck one of the torpedoes, the explosion of which tore up her hull and sunk her in five minutes. Her crew was fortunately saved; but the other three small vessels, deeming the chances too much against them, beat a retreat. This trial proved that it would be impossible to obtain control of the Yazoo without a fight, and that in order to open a passage through this river the land-forces would probably have to attack the batteries which defended its course. On the day of his arrival at Milli-

ken's Bend, Sherman ordered some vessels to make a new reconnaissance of the Yazoo. They were stopped by the batteries of Haines' Bluff, and one of them, the *Benton*, was greatly injured by the fire. On the same day the Federal commander landed a strong detachment of troops at Milliken's, and sent them to cut the railway track leading to Shreveport from the right bank of the Mississippi, opposite Vicksburg. His object was to prevent the enemy from receiving reinforcements from the west. It was, however, from the north and east that these reinforcements, so impatiently waited for at Vicksburg, were to arrive, and the two days that Sherman, detained by this expedition, passed at Milliken's Bend, afforded a precious respite to the Confederates. They took advantage of it to make preparations for repelling the attack on the banks of the Yazoo, which the nature of the country and the reconnaissances of the gun-boats clearly indicated as the point selected by the Federal commander.

The latter, in fact, had no choice left. Indeed, the batteries of Vicksburg, greatly strengthened since summer, forbade the hope that Davis' small flotilla would be able to force the passage of the Mississippi; Sherman's army could not, therefore, operate below Vicksburg, where it would not have found a single vessel to transport it from the right to the left bank of the river. Halleck had indeed announced that Banks, who had recently been sent to New Orleans with considerable reinforcements, would go up the river under the protection of Farragut's guns, and join Sherman in front of Vicksburg; but Butler's successor had but just arrived in the capital of Louisiana, and could not think of beginning his march so soon. Besides, if he had undertaken this expedition at that time, it would have been impeded, as it was at a later period, by the fortifications which the Confederates had secretly erected at Port Hudson. It was, therefore, necessary to land above Vicksburg. But, on the other hand, the gun-boats ascending the Yazoo were liable to be stopped by the batteries of Haines' Bluff, and above this point the river presented an obstacle to Sherman which was the more formidable because it was defended, besides the Confederate army, by the vessels lying at the arsenal of Yazoo City. The Unionists were, therefore, obliged to land on the right bank of the Yazoo between Haines' Bluff and Vicksburg.

It was at this place that they were waited for by their adversaries, who had neglected nothing to increase the difficulties which the nature of the ground opposed to an operation of this kind.

The bluff at Vicksburg, as we have remarked, is the last link in a long chain of steep acclivities which stretch out in succession on the left side of the Yazoo, from north-east to south-west, as far as near the point of its entrance into the Mississippi. These acclivities are of an almost uniform height, about one hundred metres, and are separated by ravines through which the roads of the country pass, some of them being very deep and hollow. This configuration bears a strong resemblance, it is said, to the ridge of the Inkermann plateau, the Yazoo marshes occupying the place of the shallows of the Tchernaiia. After skirting the foot of these heights at Haines' Bluff, the Yazoo turns away, and, before discharging its waters into the Mississippi, crosses an old arm of the river which now forms a semicircular lake. The ground comprised between the Yazoo and the ridges which, under the name of Drumgold's Bluff, connect Haines' Bluff with Vicksburg is flat and swampy. This alluvial soil is a mixture of fine sand and pulverized earth, possessing no consistency; easily turned into mud, and sometimes completely broken up by the freshets, it only resists the constant action of the water by means of the strong roots of the trees which it feeds. When the Mississippi is at its height, and its waters, running through the natural levees by which it is embanked, join those of the Yazoo, they submerge the whole of this delta and wash the foot of Drumgold's Bluff. On the contrary, when the Yazoo is low, it flows between two perpendicular banks, which at some points are ten metres high; but the soil, which it no longer covers, remains impregnated with dampness, while at every step one meets with quicksands, which are as dangerous as the moving sands on the seaside. We have purposely bestowed the name of delta upon this locality, because at an almost equal distance from Haines' Bluff and the Mississippi a small arm of the Yazoo, winding along in a deeply-enclosed channel, washes the last slopes of Drumgold's Bluff and finally empties into the Mississippi very near Vicksburg. This water-course is known by the name of Chickasaw Bayou. A little above its present course there are several beds, abandoned

by this same bayou, which mingle with each other, and describing a circular arc join it again at the foot of the bluff. They form a marsh almost everywhere impassable, called Cypress Swamp. It was upon the island, lying between the Yazoo and Chickasaw Bayou, that Sherman determined to land, for higher up the river passes so close to Drumgold's Bluff that these heights, which the enemy could have easily occupied, commanded its entire course. Chickasaw Bayou was laid down in the official maps of the State of Mississippi which the Federals had in their possession; but they had no idea of the difficulties attending the passage of this water-course. Sherman, however, could neither hesitate nor draw back. He had come for the purpose of attempting a bold stroke; and since the Yazoo was not accessible to him above Haines' Bluff, he had to fight within the lists where he was shut up.

The fleet entered this river on the 26th, and after ascending it for a distance of about twenty kilometres was moored in front of the points designated for landing. This operation, which commenced on the evening of the 26th, ended on the morning of the 27th. The first three brigades that were landed, those of Stuart, Blair and De Courcy, proceeded immediately toward Vicksburg, and, driving the enemy's scouts before them, pushed on to the border of Chickasaw Bayou. The remainder of the army required a little time to restore order in its ranks, finding itself upon a ground covered with thickets and wild vines extending all along the river. Steele, leaving Blair on the right, was to form the extreme left with his three other brigades; he landed above the bayou, but near the point where it forks, and between two of the old beds which communicate with Cypress Swamp. The other divisions had landed on the island comprised between the river and the bayou, which had been occupied since morning, and followed the same evening the three brigades that had preceded them—Morgan on the left, M. L. Smith in the centre and A. J. Smith on the right.

Some reconnaissances were made during the night in order to ascertain the character of the ground; but it was found necessary, in order to complete them, to wait for daylight, which fortunately brought with it a thick fog favorable for such an operation. The bayou was found to be a most difficult obstacle to surmount.

Although the waters were stagnant, the Yazoo being too low to feed it, it was only fordable at two points—at a ford fronting M. L. Smith in the centre of the Federal line, and in front of Morgan's division on the left, where a dry footpath, some few metres in width, opened. In trying to turn the bayou Steele encountered still greater difficulties. Cypress Swamp, which stretched out before him, could only be crossed by following a narrow corduroy causeway, which was enfladed by a battery of the enemy throughout its whole length. The banks of the bayou were both high and precipitous; the enemy, on his side, had armed them with rifle-pits and breastworks for his sharpshooters, and in order to facilitate their fire, the forest on the other side had been cleared in various places. Back of this line, between the channel and the foot of the heights, there was a level space only a few metres in width, and partly occupied by a road, which facilitated its defence. In short, if the fog had not interfered with their vision, the Federals would have perceived on the summit of those hills a line of batteries erected some time since and mounting a large number of guns, and along their slopes large furrows of newly-dug earth, which marked the place of more recent works. Pemberton directed the preparations for defence in person. As soon as he was informed of Grant's retreat, he had put in motion a portion of his troops from Grenada toward Jackson. The news of the arrival of a Federal army at Milliken's Bend had brought him in great haste to Vicksburg. That place, which President Davis had visited a few days before, was placed under command of General Martin L. Smith with a garrison of twelve thousand men. Pemberton was closely followed by three brigades, which raised the number of forces at his disposal to twenty thousand men. Other detachments were to join him immediately, and he waited from day to day for two brigades of Stevenson's division, which Mr. Davis had withdrawn from Bragg's army to place them under his command. It was more than he required to defend, against all open attacks, the positions in which Sherman was obliged to seek him.

The Federals were either ignorant or unable to take advantage for crossing the bayou of the fog, which would have masked their movements on the morning of the 28th. They wasted the

whole of that day in skirmishing and vain experiments. The island they occupied was a perfect labyrinth, where brigades and regiments constantly lost their way. The Confederates, crossing the bayou by passes known only to themselves, kept sending small bodies of troops to harass them, without even provoking a serious encounter. The old beds, which pursued their winding course below Cypress Swamp, frequently deceived the Federals. Thus Morgan came upon one of them, upon which he constructed a bridge with the equipage he had brought over to cross the Chickasaw, and was obliged to sustain a hot skirmish with the enemy during the operation. But when he had got over this swampy canal, he found out too late that it was not the real water-course, and that this last obstacle, of much greater magnitude, had yet to be surmounted. While he was advancing with much difficulty, the division of M. L. Smith in the centre approached the bayou, and forced the enemy's skirmishers to retire by the ford we have mentioned. On the other side of the ford the bank was scarped and beetling, and strongly defended by the enemy. Having decided to attempt a passage, Smith determined to reconnoitre the positions of the Confederates in person, but at this moment he fell dangerously wounded, and the officers of his division tried in vain during the remainder of the day to find a less dangerous point of approach. On the extreme right, A. J. Smith had proceeded to within sight of Vicksburg, but had also been stopped by the same obstacle, which was nowhere fordable on that side, and which formed a kind of large ditch covering Pemberton's entire system of defence.

This day, therefore, had been almost entirely lost to the Federals. The Confederates had employed it in further fortifying themselves on those points at which their adversaries might attempt a passage. In the evening, Steele, having become convinced of the impossibility of crossing Cypress Swamp, returned to the island, and proceeded to take position in the rear, on the left of Morgan, near the Lake plantation and above the angle of the Chickasaw. It was hoped that it would be easier to construct a bridge over this arm of the river, by approaching that portion of it which did not lie contiguous to the hills occupied by the enemy. The order was given to attempt the next day at the same hour to

carry all the known passes of the bayou, and, once on the other side, the Confederate works were to be immediately attacked.

But the ground was ill adapted to connected movements, and the attack, which had been ordered to be made at daybreak, could not begin till about noon. In fact, in order to reach the place where he was to throw the bridge across, Blair was obliged to pass under the enemy's fire, which killed many of his men. Morgan had met with such a reception on the border of the water-course in the morning, that he instantly sent for assistance to enable him to force the narrow pass which lay before him. M. L. Smith's division was to have crossed the ford; but as the opposite bank was inaccessible, a company of volunteers went over the water in the morning, amid a shower of balls from the enemy, and took position under the cornice formed by this overhanging bank. These intrepid soldiers were ordered, at a given signal, to fire some bags of powder they had placed against the beetling banks that sheltered them, and quickly cross over to the other side; it was agreed that the instant the mine was sprung the attacking columns were to rush into the breach thus opened. On the extreme right, A. J. Smith was preparing rafts for throwing a flying bridge over the bayou. The signal for the attack was to be given to these two divisions by regular salvos from Morgan's artillery, which he was trying to place in battery in the vicinity of the crossing, for the purpose of covering the offensive movement of his infantry.

Finally, toward noon, Blair, having completed the construction of his bridge, crossed the bayou, followed by a regiment belonging to Thayer's brigade of Steele's division. The remainder of this brigade had been sent to join Morgan through mistake. Steele's two other brigades, having been delayed by the narrowness of the roads, were far in the rear, and could not arrive in time. A quicksand at the end of Cypress Swamp lay in Blair's path; he was fortunate enough to get over it, leaving only the officers' horses behind him, for he had not ventured to take his artillery along through this dangerous pass. Just as he was emerging in front of the open space occupied by the enemy, a terrible discharge of musketry carried death among his heads of column; but instead of stopping them, it had only the effect of accelerat-

ing their march. At the same time, Morgan sent De Courcy's brigade across the bayou with orders to support Blair's attack on the right, but the Federals were only three thousand strong, and the reinforcements were coming up but slowly, while their adversaries, manœuvring upon open ground, could rapidly concentrate all their forces near the point menaced. Blair, however, carried the breastworks extending at the foot of the hills, while his soldiers, who had been trained in the rough campaigns of Missouri and Arkansas, began boldly to climb the slopes swept by the projectiles of the enemy; their efforts, however, against the constantly increasing number of their adversaries proved unavailing. No help reached them, no diversion was made in their favor; De Courcy's brigade, although partly composed of recruits, rivalled them for a moment in ardor, but its march had been subjected to delays which, after the battle, were to be the cause of violent recriminations. It, however, soon fell back in disorder without having been able to reach the enemy's works. Blair, reduced to his own resources, was obliged to retire in his turn. The Federals left more than one thousand wounded, a few hundred prisoners, and four flags in the hands of the enemy. The Confederate brigade of S. D. Lee, which alone had held them in check, protected by its entrenchments, had not lost more than one hundred and fifty men.

The assault was a positive failure. The signal agreed upon had either not been understood or not heard on the right, and the two divisions which were posted there remained immovable, while a handful of men were being crushed in a desperate attempt on the left. The second division, under Stuart, had spent the day in watching the curious position occupied by the company of the Sixth Missouri which was to undermine the bluff. The Confederate sharpshooters were posted along the ridge of this bank, and came every now and then to discharge their muskets perpendicularly downward in the hope of hitting some of their adversaries squatting at the foot of the declivity. A battalion of the Thirteenth Regulars, posted opposite, then opened fire upon them, but more frequently hit their own comrades on the edge of the water. "Aim higher," shouted the latter. "Lower," cried out the Confederates, who were trying to drown the voice of the

former and confound those two shouts into one. On the extreme right, Smith had been unable to place in position the floating bridges he had prepared, and confined himself to exchanging harmless shots with the enemy.

Sherman's check was of too serious a character to admit of his attempting a new attack. The nature of the ground rendered it impossible to concentrate the forces necessary to give such an attempt any chance of success; the Federals had learnt to their cost that the enemy's works were stronger, better armed, and defended by a larger number of troops than they had imagined. It was necessary to profit by this experience. Sherman understood this, and as soon as informed of Blair's failure he countermanded every other movement for that day. The next day, the 30th, after a night of torrents of rain, the situation of his army was still worse. It had had time to count up its losses, which amounted to one hundred and seventy-five killed, nine hundred and thirty wounded and carried off, and seven hundred and forty-three prisoners, most of them also wounded, who had fallen into the hands of the enemy, making nearly two thousand men in all. The losses of the Confederates were but sixty-three killed, one hundred and thirty-four wounded and ten prisoners. No message had been received from Grant, but some alarming rumors were afloat concerning him. The news of the capture of Holly Springs had reached Vicksburg, and the few inhabitants of the country with whom the Federals came in contact took pleasure in communicating the intelligence to them with all the exaggeration usual in such cases. These rumors were an additional cause, in Sherman's estimation, for not giving up the struggle so long as it offered the least chance of success; in fact, the more difficult Grant's position became, the more he felt the importance of relieving him by drawing all the enemy's forces upon himself. He, therefore, remained in his position during the whole of the 31st, threatening Pemberton, apparently, with a new attack, and preparing a movement for turning the obstacles he had not been able to carry in front. Steele's division was embarked; it was to leave with the flotilla on the evening of the 31st, and land under cover of the night at the foot of Haines' Bluff. Sherman was in hopes that it would be able to capture this position before daylight, and

that Pemberton, taken by surprise, would not have time to send reinforcements to its defenders. At the sound of Steele's cannon, the army, which had remained on the island, was, in its turn, to open fire all along the bayou. This cannonading should have been followed up either by a simple feint or a regular attack, according to the forces the enemy might have left along that portion of his line. But on the evening of the 31st there arose such a thick fog that the vessels on which Steele had embarked were unable to ascend the river. The next night the moon set too late to enable the Federals to effect a landing during the few hours of utter darkness which would have preceded sunrise. Sherman, therefore, gave up this plan, which offered, besides, very poor chances of success. The soldiers suffered cruelly from cold and dampness in the swamps, where they had been bivouacking for five days without fire; they sadly pointed out to each other the high-water marks, which had left a slimy circular line around the trunks of trees, from three to four metres above the ground. On the 2d of January, Sherman placed them again on board of the transports, and the fleet sailed for Milliken's Bend, where the troops were enabled to establish themselves comfortably while waiting for a favorable opportunity to begin a new campaign against the stronghold of Vicksburg, which was daily assuming larger proportions, and the importance of which was increased by every unsuccessful attack.

A steamer with General McClelland on board was met at the entrance of the Yazoo. This officer, in virtue of orders from the President, immediately assumed command of the whole expedition. The army, henceforth designated as the army of the Mississippi, was divided into two corps; the Fifteenth, commanded by Sherman, was composed of the divisions of Steele and Stuart; McClelland became titular commander of the Thirteenth, comprising the division of A. J. Smith and Morgan, the latter being temporarily placed in command. At the same period, the rest of the army of the Tennessee was also divided into two corps, the Sixteenth and Seventeenth, under the respective commands of Hurlbut and McPherson. Grant retained the supreme command of these four corps. The same organization having already been adopted in the East, the army corps became from that time

the great strategic unit in all the Federal armies. This was a considerable improvement. These corps, composed of troops of all arms, were, in the hands of the generals-in-chief, an instrument much more easy to handle than the small divisions which had previously existed as separate organizations, and the feeling of comradeship existing among those who composed them, faithfully maintained through all the vicissitudes of the war, increased the individual valor of both officers and men.

Public opinion in the North was greatly agitated by the reverse of Chickasaw Bayou. Grant was already somewhat unpopular; Sherman became the subject of attacks from the entire press—attacks the more violent because he had shown great severity toward the newspaper correspondents who accompanied his army. They even renewed the absurd calumnies which at the beginning of the war had been set afloat against this sagacious and profound mind. It is certain, however, that in many respects his expedition deserved criticism; either through his own fault or the intervention of circumstances, he had been unable, with an army of more than thirty thousand men, to push more than three thousand combatants to the assault of formidable works, and had sacrificed two thousand without any chance of success. He had failed to exhibit on that occasion all those great qualities which finally raised him above the level of his companions in arms, as well as of all his adversaries. But he knew how to profit by experience; while waiting for a more favorable opportunity, this brave and modest general had the merit of openly assuming the whole responsibility of the defeat, and of accepting without a murmur the subordinate's position in which he was placed by McClelland's arrival. Just as his troops were about to embark he felt the necessity of doing something to revive their courage; by agreement with Porter, he determined to lead them to the assault of a fort situated on the Arkansas, whose garrison of four or five thousand men offered an easy prey, but one by no means to be despised. This plan was approved by McClelland, who, it appears, had conceived a similar one. Sherman did not lose a minute's time in carrying it into execution, and on the 4th of January the fleet left Milliken's Bend with the greater portion of the army, and ascended the Mississippi to enter the Arkansas.

The first hill that is encountered in ascending the Arkansas lies on the left bank of the river, eighty kilometres above the point of confluence. The river which cuts into this hill, forming it into a bluff, turns from its direct course after washing its foot, and thus commands the two branches of this elbow, both above and below. The first Europeans who visited this spot planted the French flag there, for the Mississippi then belonged to us. A small fort was erected in 1685 to serve as a refuge against the Indians, which was called *Poste de l'Arkansas*, preserved in the English translation as *Arkansas Post*. Upon this spot the Confederate general Hindman had constructed a large rectangular bastioned work of one hundred metres front, with casemates, surrounded by a ditch of seven metres by three, with an armament of twelve guns, which dominated the whole course of the river. The garrison was commanded by General Churchill. This work, called Fort Hindman, was the key to the whole course of the Arkansas. Its reduction was necessary before the occupancy of Little Rock and the centre of the State could be thought of. It was the shelter of the light vessels which the Confederates sent, when the opportunity offered, as far as the Mississippi, to capture such Federal transports as were so unfortunate as to have no escort. A short time previous these ships had captured a Federal transport loaded with ammunition; there were found on board three nine-inch howitzers, or columbiads, which were immediately placed on the sheltered front commanding the lower course of the river.

The expeditionary corps under command of McClelland numbered from twenty-six to twenty-seven thousand men, comprising forty regiments of infantry, ten batteries, many of which contained twenty pounders, and about fifteen hundred horse. Instead of entering the Arkansas at Napoleon, the fleet, in order to deceive the enemy as to its destination, penetrated into White River through a branch of the latter which empties directly into the Mississippi a little below, and thence reaches the Arkansas through the principal arm, which debouches into this river at Wellington. On the 9th of January, the vessels were moored to the left bank near a plantation called Notrib's Farm, five kilometres below Arkansas Post. The process of disembarkation commenced

immediately, and was ended toward noon on the following day. The approaches of the fort were difficult. It was protected on the west by a stream with steep banks, called a bayou; on the east by a swamp, which did not quite reach the edge of the water. The space comprised between the bayou and the swamp was only about a thousand metres in length. The position could only be approached through this plateau, for between the fort and the swamp there was a ravine which stretched down to the river, and which was difficult to cross. In front of this ravine the Confederates had fortified their right by means of an old causeway, which they had converted into a kind of breastwork, and by raising a second line of defences in the rear. Their cantonments were established in front of the fort, in the centre of the plateau, on an open ground interspersed with clusters of trees. They had also constructed a strong line of entrenchments a little beyond, seven hundred metres in length, the left of which rested upon the bayou, and was occupied by a battery of field artillery.

These outward works were too much extended for the number of the garrison; consequently, the latter did not seriously dispute the old causeway, which was swept by the fire of the gunboats. Whilst Morgan was investing the right of the enemy with three brigades—the fourth brigade of his corps, under General de Courcy, remaining at the point of disembarkation—and whilst Lindsay with the fifth was landing on the opposite side and ascending the river, so as to command its course above the fort, Sherman was obliged to make a large *détour* with his whole corps to get out of range of the enemy's fire, and present himself subsequently before the enemy's left, and that portion of the plateau where his cantonments were established. But, possessing little knowledge of the country, the head of Sherman's column entered the swamp we have mentioned above; on emerging from it with great difficulty, it was found that it would be necessary to march a distance of twelve kilometres to reach the enemy, and that this route would lead them in front of the bayou, of which he occupied the passes. Sherman retraced his steps; and under cover of night his whole corps, by following a road called River Road, which ran between the swamp and the Confederate positions, was deployed so as to complete the investment.

In the course of this day the flotilla, composed of three armed vessels, the *De Kalb*, the *Cincinnati* and the *Louisville*, with a small number of light boats, had opened a brisk cannonade against the fort, occupying its attention by the destructive fire. One ship even tried to pass up beyond the enemy's works; but after having succeeded in the attempt, finding herself isolated and exposed to a concentrated fire, she was obliged to go down the river again. On the morning of the 11th every one was at his post; Steele's division, on the extreme right, rested on the bayou, and Hovey's brigade, from the position it occupied, commanded the river even above the fort. The centre was formed by Stuart's small division, the left by A. J. Smith's division, which connected with the river by Sheldon's brigade. The powerful artillery of the Federals, owing to the protection of the woods they found there, was pushed to within some hundred metres of the enemy's breastworks. The morning was employed in rectifying the line of battle and in making all necessary preparations to secure combination in the attack. Meanwhile, the gunboats had again engaged the fort. The latter sent a few shells into the ranks of the Federals, which, being well directed, killed a number of men; but the fire from the ships soon silenced that of the front overlooking the river. The large projectiles of the Federals finally succeeded in shattering and penetrating the proof-shelters of the Confederates, dismounting their guns and carrying death among those who served them. Porter then directed his fire against the cantonments, which the land-force was about to attack, and threw shells wherever he perceived the enemy, while three of his light vessels, reascending the river above the fort, placed themselves in a position to enfilade and strike in rear the breastworks which formed the Confederate left. But they hesitated to fire upon this point, lest their projectiles should reach their own troops, who had already come into action and were charging these works with great vigor.

About one o'clock the Federal line was put in motion. The Confederates did not persist in defending the weak entrenchments which covered the approaches of the fort, and only made use of them to delay the march of the Federals, who were vastly superior to them in numbers. They fought gallantly. The garrison

was composed almost entirely of volunteers from Texas, accustomed to live with rifle in hand; a regiment of cavalry, which, owing to the nature of the ground, was naturally obliged to fight on foot, distinguished itself among the rest by the precision of its fire, and the fierceness with which it held in check the serried battalions of the enemy. The Confederates, however, were soon compelled to retire behind the parapets of the fort. Unfortunately for them, they had not cut down all the trees in the woods by which they were surrounded, and which enabled the assailants to approach within less than two hundred metres of the counterscarp. Sherman on the right, Morgan on the left, manœuvring with great unanimity, took possession of these woods, not, however, without sustaining considerable losses. Hovey was wounded; and when the Federals emerged into the open space intervening between these woods and the fort, the terrific fire to which they were subjected stopped them at the edge of the wood. On the left Morgan encountered the ravine, which presented an insurmountable obstacle. He sent a few regiments to support the attack on the right. Here again the main effort devolved upon Steele's division, inured by many a battle. The Confederates, being well sheltered, opened a destructive fire upon all who exposed themselves to view. Meanwhile, the Federal artillery was at work, and dismounted one by one all the guns in the fort. Its defenders could only reply by musketry to the shells which poured upon them from every direction. General Churchill set an example of courage to all, but he had evidently lost the game. The moment for storming the fort had arrived. Firing had ceased on the Federal side; the whole of Sherman's corps on the right and two of Morgan's brigades on the extreme left deployed in front of the fort; the assailants were saluted with a few volleys of musketry, but in an instant they were on the edge of the dry ditch surrounding the work. Great excitement prevailed among the defenders, who finally hoisted the white flag. The fort was invaded on every side by the Federals, who had no other task left but to count their trophies and take care of the wounded. Their losses amounted to one hundred and twenty-nine killed, eight hundred and thirty wounded, seventeen missing, making in all nine hundred and seventy-seven men *hors de combat*; those

of Churchill were only sixty killed and eighty wounded. The capture of five thousand soldiers, with all their officers and seventeen guns, amply compensated the efforts of McClelland's troops. His success was complete. The Arkansas River was opened and Hindman's army paralyzed by a blow which cost him the loss of an entire division, composed of three of his best brigades. Sherman wished to push as far as Little Rock, but McClelland was not willing to exceed the instructions he had received, and merely sent an expedition composed of light steamers with Gorman's brigade on board into White River. The latter proceeded up the river for a distance of about eighty kilometres, and again joined his chief, after destroying a camp of the enemy situated at Duval's Bluff, and several dépôts belonging to the Confederate army in the small town of Des Ares. In the mean while, McClelland dismantled the works of Fort Hindman, after which he re-entered the Mississippi with all his forces. At Napoleon he found an order from General Grant directing him to return to Milliken's Bend; this point was about to become the base of operations which the general-in-chief was preparing to undertake against Vicksburg.

In coming pages we shall relate these operations, which occupied all the first half of the year 1863, but before leaving the Mississippi we must say a few words regarding the little campaign undertaken on the lower course of the river by the troops which occupied New Orleans. This campaign had commenced in October, 1862; its object was to extend the Federal authority over the fertile region lying west of the Mississippi. Taking advantage of the natural obstacles which it presents, the Confederates had maintained a few troops in it, which were in communication with Texas, and could at any time serve as vanguard to an army assembled in that warlike region to reconquer New Orleans.

Two large bayous are detached from the Mississippi below the mouth of Red River, and water the lands lying west of the great river. The first, called the Atchafalaya, has its source very near this inlet, and sometimes fed by new water-courses, sometimes becoming itself divided, it finally forms the large lake of Cestimache, in the latitude of New Orleans, whence it emerges to

empty into the sea through a wide mouth. The second bayou has its origin much lower down, in the village of Donaldsonville, and, under the name of Bayou Lafourche, it pursues its winding course among the swamps which occupy the delta of the Mississippi to the west. These water-courses thus constitute two successive barriers, which protect New Orleans on the Texas side. The country watered by them, extremely spongy, intersected in every direction with channels and swamps, and covered with a rich vegetation, is of great fertility wherever the soil is sufficiently firm to admit of the cultivation of the sugar-cane or cotton. It was traversed by but one line of railway, the Great Western Railroad, which started from the right bank of the Mississippi, opposite New Orleans, for the west, crossed Bayou Lafourche a little below the village of Thibodeaux, and terminated at that time at the little town of Brashear City. This town, situated on the left bank of the Atchafalaya, at the point where its waters emerge from the lake to empty into the sea, derived from this position great commercial and military importance. A little below Brash-ear City, the Atchafalaya receives the waters of an important stream running from the north-west, known by the name of Bayou Tèche, a rather inappropriate name, for it does not originate in another river like all real bayous. In approaching Lake Chestimache, the Tèche skirts its borders at a short distance, as if afraid to discharge its waters into it, and, as we have remarked, empties into the Atchafalaya shortly after it has emerged from the lake.

At the end of October, the Federal general Weitzel, with a brigade of infantry, a regiment of cavalry and some cannon, landed at Donaldsonville. On the 26th, he began to descend Bayou Lafourche, keeping the main body of his forces on the left of the water-course, accompanied by a few boats, which enabled him at all times to establish communications between the two banks of the river. The next day, the 27th, he met a small body of Confederate troops, commanded by Colonel McPheeters, near the village of Labadieville, fifteen kilometres below Donaldsonville, and attacked it at once. The engagement was of short duration. After two hours of musketry-fire, McPheeters was killed, and the Confederates, put to flight, left one gun and

two hundred and sixty-eight prisoners in the hands of the Federals. The conquerors lost eighteen killed and seventy-four wounded. After the combat, Weitzel took possession of the whole course of Bayou Lafourche without striking a blow; and on reaching Thibodeaux, he pushed as far as Brashear City, which he found abandoned. The railroad, which had not been running for the last six months, and which lay buried under a thick covering of rank vegetation, was put in working order, and Brashear City, being thus placed in direct communication with New Orleans, soon became the advanced post from whence the Federals controlled the whole of that section of Louisiana. General Butler hastened to devise a pretext of hostility on the part of its principal inhabitants, in order to make a wholesale confiscation of their property. We shall speak further on of his system of government works, the ostensible object of which was to supply the negroes with labor, but the effects of which could not fail in the end to corrupt even those whom it was pretended to protect.

He was not, however, allowed time to put this system into practice to any great extent, for on the 16th of December he was superseded in his command by General Banks. We have already placed our estimate of Butler's administration on record; we must, however, add a few words to what we have already said. It was he who first systematically organized negro regiments, which subsequently rendered such important services to the Federals. It must be acknowledged that this act, so wise and proper—this very natural employment of men whom the North had just emancipated and rescued from their old masters—drew upon Butler more abuse and more attacks than his most tyrannical measures, or the most rotten speculations openly tolerated by him. So true is it that old prejudices have more power over the mind of men than simple good sense and the spirit of equity.

General Banks, whom we have already met on several battle-fields, was one of those officers who seemed predestined to experience striking reverses, but who, even in the midst of defeat, always succeeded in conciliating public opinion by personal bravery, and ended finally by tiring out adverse fortune. He was, moreover, a respectable politician and a distinguished executive officer.

He had been ordered, as we have before remarked, to endeavor to join Sherman in front of Vicksburg by ascending the Mississippi. But on his arrival at New Orleans, he found that he had not sufficient forces to undertake such an expedition. He, therefore, merely sent General Grover, with about ten thousand men, to occupy the town of Baton Rouge, which was to become the base of operations of his future campaign against Port Hudson. It had just been found out, in fact, that the Confederates had turned this place into a formidable obstacle, which it would require a large army and a powerful fleet to overcome.

While waiting for the proper time to devote himself to this great task, Banks bethought himself of extending his positions in the district of Lafourche, and of dispersing the Confederate forces, which were again threatening him in that direction, before ascending the Mississippi. Weitzel, having but few troops with him, had been obliged to abandon Brashear City, and had taken a strong position at Thibodeaux and at the railway bridge on Bayou Lafourche. The Confederates had taken advantage of this to return to the neighborhood of Brashear. They had not occupied that town in a permanent manner, but they were in force at Bayou Tèche, and determined to dispute its possession with the Federals.

Two works, connected by a species of stockade, defended the course of this river near the village of Pattersonville, and a steamer—the *Cotton*—whose guns were protected by bales of cotton, had full control of the river above this point. Weitzel left Thibodeaux on the 11th of January, 1863, with his brigade for Brashear City, where he overtook a naval division consisting of four gun-boats. These ships were under command of a distinguished naval officer, Captain Buchanan, brother of the one who served under the Confederate flag, and who had taken the *Virginia* into battle for the first time.

The infantry was taken on board; the artillery and cavalry, having been left on the other side of the Atchafalaya, ascended the left side of the Tèche between this river and the lake. On the 13th the flotilla appeared before Pattersonville. The obstacle which the Confederates had raised in this place was insurmountable. It consisted of a boat sunk crossways, resting upon the scaffolding of an old bridge; the guns placed on the enemy's

works commanded all the approaches by water. The *Cotton* was stationed on the other side of the bar in such manner as to join her fire to that of the guns posted along the shore.

The attack was nevertheless determined upon. At seven o'clock on the morning of the 14th the three Federal vessels, the *Calhoun*, the *Kinsman* and *Estrella*, ascended the Tèche, whilst the *Diana* was conveying over to the left bank a body of troops which had been landed the day before on the opposite side. The Eighth Vermont, being the first to land, was to endeavor to attack the principal work of the Confederates in the rear, while the flotilla should attract their entire attention. In the mean while, the troops which had remained on the right bank were to make a circuit for the purpose of occupying some point on the margin of the Tèche above the obstacle, so as to cut off all retreat to the steamer *Cotton*, the destruction of which was to be accomplished at all hazards.

Buchanan, full of ardor, arrived in presence of the enemy long before the land-forces, and began the attack without waiting for them. The gun-boats were received by a terrific fire, which swept their decks, covering them with dead and wounded. A torpedo exploded under the hull of the *Kinsman*, without, however, causing any serious leak. But the dread of these fearful engines stopped two of the Federal vessels. Buchanan, on board the *Calhoun*, did not permit himself to be intimidated, and, immovable on the bridge of his vessel, steered it direct against the enemy's works. A shower of balls fell around him, and he was soon mortally wounded. But his daring had not been without effect. Whilst he was thus occupying the enemy, the Eighth Vermont reached the gorge of the work, and captured the breast-works by which it was defended. The garrison, entirely occupied by the naval combat, did not even make an effort to resist this new attack, but dispersed at once. The *Calhoun* was released. The Confederate artillery fell into the hands of the assailants, and the *Cotton* retired slowly up the Tèche, but she encountered the troops that had gone to waylay her above the place of the combat. Her crew, seeing no hopes of saving her, set her on fire, and after landing on the opposite shore turned the burning hull adrift. The Confederate troops numbered not over fif-

teen hundred men, forty of whom were taken prisoners. The Federals had about two hundred men disabled, and did not push their success any further. The naval force, deprived of its commander did not renew the attempt to surmount the obstacle placed in the vicinity of the fort; the expedition returned to Brashear, and thence to Thibodeaux. We shall see this same Bayou Tèche becoming the object of another and more important campaign a few months later. But we must now turn our attention in another direction.

We have shown how Grant's expedition in the interior of the State of Mississippi failed in consequence of the excessive length of his line of supplies, which was easily destroyed by the cavalry of Forrest and Van Dorn; how that of Sherman failed before the obstacles that lay on the borders of Chickasaw Bayou, and how the Federals had subsequently indemnified themselves for these two reverses by the capture of Fort Hindman. Finally, in concluding our review of the operations of which the regions adjoining the Mississippi were the theatre at the close of 1862, we have pointed out the small expeditions undertaken west of New Orleans. It remains for us now to relate the last effort that the Confederates, still cherishing the remembrance of the invasion of Kentucky, made to wrest from the Federals the State of Tennessee, and the sanguinary battle which closed the year 1862 on the heights of Murfreesborough.

CHAPTER II.

THE PARTISANS.

SINCE the capture of Fort Donelson, the Federals had occupied the central portion of the State of Tennessee. The Confederates, who had once before made an unsuccessful attempt during the short campaign of Shiloh to wrest it from them, believed themselves for a brief season masters of it when Bragg invaded Kentucky. The city of Nashville, owing to the stubborn resistance of its garrison, had alone escaped; the surrounding country had been given over to incursions of their cavalry, which had cut all the railroads connecting the Federal armies stationed near the Mississippi with the Northern States, leaving them only the course of this river itself through which to obtain their supplies.

Buell's army, now commanded by Rosecrans, and that of Grant, were, in a strategic point of view, but the two wings of a single army, designed to operate between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies. They were dependent upon each other, as the troops of Price and Van Dorn, which the Confederates had left before Corinth, were connected, despite the distance, with those that had invaded Kentucky under Bragg. The Richmond authorities had committed a serious error in thus dividing their forces. If, instead of fighting the fruitless battles of Iuka and Corinth, and massing a large army under Pemberton in front of Grant, they had left the task of harassing the latter entirely to their cavalry, and had given two or three additional divisions to Bragg, this general would undoubtedly have occupied Louisville, and probably destroyed Buell's army on Green River. The forces of Price and Van Dorn, too numerous to remain on the defensive, were not sufficient to enable the Confederates successfully to

assume the offensive at the southern extremity of their line; beaten in two bloody encounters, they were not even able to prevent Grant from sending reinforcements to Buell, which, by giving him a great numerical superiority, ensured the success of the Perryville campaign. But shortly after, the Federals committed the same mistake, and also divided their forces in order to advance by the Vicksburg road and that of Chattanooga at the same time. We have already seen how this error caused the reverse sustained by Grant on the Yallabusha. We shall show the danger to which it exposed the army of Rosecrans, on the other hand, and the helpless condition to which the latter was reduced, after having escaped the danger by a dearly-bought success. At the time of which we are speaking, the two armies, one of which was entering Tennessee after the battle of Perryville and the other of which had been repelling the attacks against Iuka and Corinth, were therefore closely connected. They covered each other mutually, and Grant could not be at ease regarding his rear in Western Tennessee, unless Nashville should be occupied by friendly forces. Consequently, as we have elsewhere observed, Rosecrans' first thought, on assuming the command of the army, was to relieve the small garrison stationed in that city.

In order to follow him, we must take up the thread of our narrative from the end of October—that is to say, two months before the sanguinary reverse of Chickasaw Bayou. The army, which had just conquered at Perryville, was at last about to enter the State of Tennessee under its new chief. At this juncture it dropped the name of the army of the Ohio, as if to show its determination henceforth to leave that river far behind, and assumed the more appropriate designation of the army of the Cumberland. The new recruits it had found at Louisville had raised its nominal force to nearly one hundred thousand men, but the long marches through a country destitute of water soon increased the number of sick and stragglers; ten thousand men in the hospitals, twenty-three thousand absent either with or without leave, reduced the number of soldiers present for active service to sixty-five thousand. Rosecrans retained the division of his forces into three army corps, designated as the right wing, the centre and the left wing. The old centre, comprising three divisions, became

the right wing, and was placed under command of McCook; the right wing, consisting of three divisions, remained under Crittenden, becoming, however, the left wing; finally, the left wing became the centre, and was increased to four divisions; McCook transferred the active command of it to Thomas, who had performed the undefined duties of second in command under Buell. Gilbert, who had previously commanded the centre, was instructed to protect the communications of the Federals in Kentucky with the tenth division. On the 30th of October, the day of Rosecrans' installation, the army of the Cumberland was stationed along the line of the Memphis and Louisville Railroad from Glasgow Junction to the famous intersection at Bowling Green. On the 4th of November, McCook took up his line of march with his army corps to relieve the garrison of Nashville, which was then seriously menaced. In fact, Forrest and Morgan, at the head of five or six thousand mounted men, were overrunning Tennessee, and, counting upon the fame of their former exploits to worry their adversaries, were then both marching upon the capital of that State.

The raids of the Confederate cavalry under these two officers exercised so great an influence on the general conduct of the campaign that we must describe them in detail, to give a succinct narrative of the rapid and devastating inroads of this cavalry across regions into which the regular armies of the Confederacy could no longer penetrate; we will follow them without interruption till the close of the year 1862, resuming the recital of the battles which these regular armies had to fight at the same period in the next chapter.

The two guerilla chiefs, who had distinguished themselves with a handful of adventurers in 1861, were now each at the head of nearly three thousand mounted men, all armed with rifles, who could fight both on foot and on horseback. They had, moreover, several batteries of light artillery. These two small corps were perfectly organized and in a condition to rely upon themselves. We have already seen them at work preparing the preliminaries of Bragg's offensive campaign into Kentucky by means of audacious expeditions.

Forrest, whose soldiers had been sorely tried by the disaster of

MacMinville, had not been able, like Morgan, to take an active part in that campaign. But the promotion to the rank of general had rewarded him for his brilliant exploit at Murfreesborough, and his band, increased by the volunteers, who were as much attracted by his faults as by his abilities, finally numbered three thousand men, giving his force the strength of an actual division. Meanwhile, the seat of war had been removed into Kentucky. Forrest remained in Tennessee; he overran the centre of that State; he did not, however, succeed in doing much damage, most of the small Federal garrisons, dépôts and convoys having been placed in safety by Buell, under the protection of the guns of Nashville and Fort Donelson.

We left Morgan in Kentucky, where, during the month of September, he shared the fortunes of Kirby Smith's army corps. When Bragg retired to the south-east, after the battle of Perryville, Morgan remained in that State in order to embarrass Buell's movements, and oblige him to weaken himself by numerous detachments. He acquitted himself of this task with his usual skill, its fulfilment being rendered very easy by the exhaustion of the enemy's cavalry. In fact, the Union armies of the West exhausted their supplies of horses much faster even than those of the East; and most of the Kentucky horses having been carried off by the Confederates, the Federals had been unable to obtain fresh supplies since their fruitless pursuit of Morgan at the end of July. They were not in a condition to cover both their front and flanks, whilst, through the connivance of the inhabitants of Southern Kentucky and Tennessee, the movements of Morgan and his lieutenants were wrapt up in the most profound mystery. It was to be expected, therefore, that they would appear sometimes at one point, sometimes at another; and, as it would have been too late to send reinforcements to the points menaced, it was necessary to place a small garrison at each important station and at every prominent railway bridge capable of resisting a first assault. This parcelling out of forces, which at times reduced the number of combatants engaged in regular operations by one-half, did not, however, secure to the Federals anything more than the possession of the ground which they occupied.

Morgan, therefore, who had full confidence in the mobility of

his troops, remained in Middle Kentucky long after Bragg's retreat. On the 17th of October, nine days after the battle of Perryville, he was still in the neighborhood of Lexington, with three thousand cavalry and six field-pieces, and repulsed the attacks of a small body of Federal troops which had imprudently advanced in that direction. The next day, another detachment of about three hundred mounted men having also ventured within his reach, Morgan surprised it, captured the entire force, and did not hesitate to suddenly enter the town of Lexington itself. After remaining in possession of the place for a few hours, instead of retiring eastward or southward, he took the direct route to the west, and marched upon Versailles. At this point he divided his force in order the more easily to avoid the Federals. A portion of his cavalry proceeded south-eastward by way of Richmond and Mount Vernon. On the 23d of October, the day when Bragg was passing from Kentucky into Tennessee, these troops were attacked by Colonel McCook at the pass of Big Hill, and left a considerable number of prisoners in the hands of the Federals. On the following day, the 24th, we find another detachment at the other end of the State forcing the passage of Green River at Morgantown after a brief engagement.

For fifteen days Morgan disappeared from the scene of action. He had been assembling his men in the valley of the Cumberland, and had rallied around him the numerous partisans who were masters of that region since the 1st of October, when they had routed a Federal detachment commanded by Colonel Stokes at Gallatin, Tennessee. He was not, however, to remain long inactive. The Confederates, responding to the appeal of the population of Nashville, which was ardently secessionist, had conceived the idea of taking the garrison of that city by surprise, while Buell was not within reach to succor it. In the early part of October Anderson's brigade had already made some demonstration in that direction for the purpose of feeling the enemy; but General Palmer, who had remained at Nashville with his brigade and that of Negley, attacked Anderson on the 7th of October at Lavergne, and compelled him to retire. Shortly after, Forrest reappeared in the neighborhood, destroying all the ways of communication which might at any time be of service to the Federals,

shutting up the latter closer and closer within the limits of the capital of Tennessee. On the 20th of October a portion of his troops encountered a regiment of Union cavalry on the borders of the Cumberland, a little below the town. After losing a few men, the Confederates were obliged to recross the river. But Forrest returned to the charge on the 22d; assembling his forces and marching upon Nashville by the left bank, he drove the Federals back into their lines of defence. These entrenchments could not have sustained a long siege; their profile was slight, and they were not sufficiently extended for the garrison; the guns they mounted were not sufficiently numerous, and they only rested upon a small work closed at the gorge, Fort Negley, crowning a height near the Lavergne road. They were, however, sufficient to keep Forrest's troopers at a distance.

This general, therefore, before attempting a serious attack, waited for the arrival of Morgan, whose assistance he had requested, and some reinforcements of infantry, with which he expected to be able to carry that obstacle by storm. Finally, on the 4th of November, the day when McCook started for Nashville, everything was ready for the assault. Forrest, who was encamped south of the town, near Lavergne, on the Murfreesborough road, had been joined by the Kentucky brigade of Roger Hanson, and two regiments from Tennessee; Morgan was posted at a short distance north, on the right bank of the Cumberland. The Confederates took up their line of march in the evening, and in the middle of the night, toward two o'clock in the morning, the Federal outposts were driven back on both sides of the river. But the garrison was on its guard. A regiment was sent to meet Forrest in order to draw him within range of the guns of Fort Negley; and the fire of this work soon stopped the assailants, who tried in vain to dismount its guns without venturing a near approach. Meanwhile, Morgan, hoping to surprise the Federal post which guarded the large railroad bridge over the Cumberland, made a vigorous attack upon it with his cavalry and one field-piece, the only one he had brought along. But he was promptly repulsed, and fell back upon Gallatin, leaving a flag in the hands of his adversaries.

On his side, Forrest had retired in the direction of the Frank-

lin road, and Palmer had pursued him with his cavalry for a distance of more than twelve kilometres. Seeing this small body of troops venture so far, the Confederates determined to make them pay dear for their imprudence; concealing themselves behind a rise in the ground on the left, they allowed the Federals to pass, and then tried to cut off their retreat, but in vain. Palmer's infantry and artillery followed his cavalry close; and when Forrest presented himself to bar their passage, his soldiers, finding that they had too large a force to contend with, soon gave up the contest.

Palmer returned to Nashville, which he was henceforth certain of being able to defend; nor had he long to wait for the assistance which had been promised him, for the vanguard of McCook entered the works which Morgan had unsuccessfully attacked the day before, in the afternoon of the 6th. Forrest, on receiving these tidings, quickly fell back in a south-westerly direction.

After this combat a few weeks elapsed, during which no engagement took place between the two armies. The greater part of Rosecrans' forces was concentrated around Nashville; he only left two or three divisions north of this town, which were necessary to secure his communications. The others, sheltered under tents, or in improvised barracks among the hills by which the capital of Tennessee is bounded on the south, were reorganizing, drilling the recruits recently arrived from the North, and receiving arms and equipments, while the commissary department was collecting large supplies of provisions, *matériel* and ammunition in the dépôts of Nashville, in view of the winter campaign that Rosecrans had determined to undertake.

Bragg's army, on the other hand, had completed the long and painful march it had commenced after the battle of Perryville. It had left the territory of Kentucky on the 25th of October. Kirby Smith had again entered Tennessee by way of Cumberland Gap, and the rest of the Confederate troops by passes situated more to the west. His soldiers had scarcely reached East Tennessee, fatigued, badly off for shoes and discouraged by the unlucky issue of a campaign which had commenced under such flattering auspices, when they were obliged to start off again. They had no time to lose if they wished to retain some of the advan-

tages they had gained during the last campaign and save Middle Tennessee. Forrest and Morgan alone could not dispute the possession of this rich country with Rosecrans; if he was allowed to advance once more as far as the positions he had occupied in the month of July, the central point of Chattanooga would again be menaced, and the armies which covered the Alleghanies on one side, and the course of the Mississippi on the other, would no longer have been able to support each other. Bragg, therefore, determined to transfer the scene of the forthcoming campaign as near Nashville as possible. Leaving Kirby Smith in East Tennessee, he led the remainder of his army to Chattanooga, and thence to Murfreesborough. He established his headquarters and principal dépôts in this village, extending his camps on the right and left of the railroad from Caneville to Eagleville. He thus made sure of giving effective support to Morgan and Forrest, who were only waiting his instructions to attempt new raids along the line of the Federal railroads. He threatened Nashville at the same time, and held himself in readiness to move forward to separate from Kentucky that portion of Grant's army which Price had vainly sought to dislodge from Corinth. Meanwhile, his troops went into winter quarters, where they at last found the rest they so much needed. Polk's corps occupied the centre of the Confederate positions; that of Hardee extended to the left; while the extreme right was covered by Kirby Smith, who had come from East Tennessee by the Knoxville and Nashville turnpike, and had sent one of his two divisions, under McCown, to join Polk's troops. The cavalry, which was closely pressing the Federal pickets, was thus distributed: the two independent corps of Morgan and Forrest, one on the extreme right, and the other on the extreme left; Wheeler's and Wharton's brigades, which were not separated from the main army, along his front, one at Lavergne and the other at Nolensville.

We shall leave the army in this position for a moment, to follow once more the bold troopers who had already rendered it such essential service. Their task, on this occasion, was the more important because the Federal cavalry, remounted, reorganized and commanded by an energetic officer, General Stanley, had undertaken to relieve Rosecrans' army from that kind of investment

which had already so many times paralyzed its operations. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, destroyed during the fall, was at last, after much labor; about to be put again in running order along the whole line. The completion of this line would render Rosecrans once more free in his movements; but it was above all necessary to protect him against new devastations.

The skirmishing warfare, which had been interrupted for a short time, was resumed during the latter part of November. On the 10th a detachment of Federal infantry repelled at Rural Hill, east of Nashville, the attack of a body of guerillas which had tried to capture a convoy destined for the left wing of the army. A few days later, Morgan, having sent part of his cavalry on a reconnaissance along the right bank of the Cumberland, was attacked by Colonel Kennett, who captured all the booty which the Confederates had collected, and drove them to the other side of the river. On the 27th, this same Colonel Kennett, crossing over to the left bank, defeated a Texas regiment which had ventured as far as the vicinity of Nashville, and pursued it toward Franklin, in Tennessee. In short, on the same day several brigades of Federal infantry, leaving their camps near that city, made a forward movement in the direction of Murfreesborough. General Kirk dislodged Wheeler from Lavergne; Sheridan and Colonel Roberts drove the Confederates back upon Nolensville and the Charlotteville turnpike; finally, Colonel Hill had a successful engagement near Hartsville, on the Cumberland, with a party of Confederate troopers who had captured a Federal convoy.

On perceiving these movements, which denoted fresh activity and improved organization on the part of the Federals, Morgan could not remain inactive. He took the field, and commenced his operations by one of those fortunate bold strokes which he knew so well how to conceive, and always executed with so much audacity. The Federal division of Dumont, of Thomas' corps, was stationed at Gallatin and in the village of Castalian Springs, where it covered the right bank of the Cumberland. In order to accomplish his task most thoroughly, Dumont sent about two thousand men, under Colonel Moore, to occupy Hartsville, an important crossing of the Cumberland, of which the Confederates had already many times availed themselves in their incursions on

the right bank of the river. The village of Hartsville is situated about two kilometres north of the right bank; it is separated from it by a rather steep hill, the approaches of which are interspersed with woods, its summit bare, and which, terminating in a peak above the waters, commands the ford connecting with the Lebanon road; it is bounded on the east and west by two ravines. Colonel Moore occupied it with three regiments of infantry, the One Hundred and Sixth and One Hundred and Eighth Ohio, the One Hundred and Fourth Illinois and the Second Indiana cavalry. Forgetting that he was exposed to sudden attacks on the part of a shrewd and determined foe, or perhaps thinking that the inclemency of the season would render such attacks impossible, he had not cut down a single tree nor turned up a shovelful of earth to prepare the defences of a post naturally very strong, and which it would have been easy to render impregnable. Morgan, always well informed regarding the position of his adversaries, resolved to take advantage of their negligence. In the afternoon of December 6th he left the neighborhood of Caneville at the head of thirteen or fourteen hundred men, his brigade of cavalry, composed of four small regiments, having been reinforced by a battery of artillery and some detachments from two regiments of infantry, the Second and Ninth Kentucky. This small band, braving the cold and the snow, made a night-march of more than forty kilometres, and reached the borders of the Cumberland before daylight. On nearing the river the force was divided; one detachment crossed it above and another below Hartsville. Notwithstanding the steepness of the banks and a swift current of deep, freezing water, the passage was promptly and secretly accomplished. The detachment which had crossed higher up, making a large circuit, so as to surround Hartsville, came up to join the rest of the band west of this village at eight o'clock in the morning. Morgan at once advanced upon the Federal camps. The surprise of the latter was complete, and they had barely time to form where they stood, while their grand-guards were captured or driven into the ravine by which their position was bounded on the west. Finally, they succeeded in getting into line along the edge of this ravine in front of the Confederates, who occupied the opposite side. The sharpshooters

of both parties descended to the bottom, where a brisk encounter took place. The Federals, however, being unskilfully handled, soon lost the advantage of the defensive position they occupied. In his anxiety, Colonel Moore left his soldiers, to go to the rear to bring up his two field-pieces, and during his absence his line fell back. It still rested upon the woods, and one of the guns opened fire upon the enemy's left, which had crossed the ravine. Morgan's artillery, however, was not slow in recovering the advantage. Moore was trying to take his soldiers to the rear to rally them on the summit of the hill, but unfortunately he thus caused them to abandon the sheltering positions which had protected them, and their retreat was rapidly changed into a rout. He had scarcely reached the open summit, which was already ploughed by the enemy's missiles, when he found himself surrounded by a panic-stricken crowd. He gave up all further attempts at resistance; and finding at last an officer, from whom he borrowed a handkerchief, he fixed it on a bayonet in token of capitulation. While he was thus surrendering, the One Hundred and Sixth Ohio, which had remained in the woods, continued the combat, but this handful of men, being soon surrounded on all sides, was obliged to surrender in its turn. After fighting an hour and a half, Morgan and his thirteen hundred men had in their hands two thousand prisoners, with their arms, two guns, their tents and provisions. The infantry that had participated in this success belonged to regiments which less than a year previous had capitulated at Fort Donelson, and the hope of effacing this sad remembrance had increased their ardor and doubled their strength. Morgan started off again without losing a moment's time. His troopers took behind them the most fatigued among their prisoners. The wounded, who numbered about one hundred and fifty on each side, were left at Hartsville, and the Confederates retired so rapidly as to escape from General Dumont, who had hastened from Gallatin with some troops at the first news of the fight. The next day the two thousand prisoners arrived safe at Murfreesborough, where they were released on parole.

At the same period, the pickets of both armies were continuing to feel each other south-east of Nashville, and the Federals, in

proportion as they felt stronger, pushed reconnaissances in the direction they intended to follow, as soon as their preparations were completed. On the 27th of November, Sill's division thus advanced as far as Lavergne, where it encountered some partisans, with whom it exchanged a few shots. Another engagement took place at the same point on the 9th of December. On the 12th, General Stanley, with some regiments of cavalry, surprised the Confederate pickets at Franklin, took possession of this village, and destroyed all the dépôts and mills which served to supply Bragg's army.

It was evident, however, to the Confederates that Rosecrans was about to undertake operations on a much larger scale. It was important to be prepared either to forestall him by assuming the offensive in advance of him, or, after waiting for him, to take advantage of a first success to hoist the Confederate flag in sight of the capitol of Nashville. Bragg's army received the recruits and *matériel* needed to repair the losses of the last campaign. It was placed under the chief command of an officer calculated to inspire entire confidence, and before whom Bragg himself bowed in un murmuring submission, and who might perhaps have brought back victory to the Confederate side if his authority had not been more nominal than real. On the 24th of November, General Joseph E. Johnston, scarcely recovered from the severe wound he had received at Fair Oaks, was placed as commander-in-chief over Generals Bragg, Kirby Smith and Pemberton. He reached Murfreesborough on the 4th of December, where he established himself, leaving Bragg in immediate command of the troops. A few days later, the President came in person to visit the army in its cantonments and to raise its hopes. Confidence was then great, and no one doubted the final success of the Confederacy. Improvised festivities marked the presence of Davis in the midst of the army; the sufferings of the war were for a moment forgotten, and a large number of officers took advantage of this momentary lull to get married. Most conspicuous among them was the brilliant Morgan, still more admired since his exploit at Hartsville; and as if to impart a stronger tinge of romance to his union, he requested the nuptial benediction of Bishop Leonidas Polk, who, on this occasion, laid aside

his lieutenant-general's epaulettes and put on for a day his episcopal robes.

Meanwhile, Grant's march in pursuit of Pemberton caused serious alarms to Mr. Davis and his advisers. They did not agree as to the means to be used for assisting Pemberton. Johnston, rightly believing, as we think, that the greatest danger to the Confederacy would be the defeat of Bragg, was opposed to any attempt to weaken his army, and had asked, as we have before said, that a portion of the army of Arkansas, which unfortunately was not under his command, should be sent to the relief of Pemberton. Mr. Davis thought otherwise. Holmes, at Little Rock, received, instead of formal instructions, a simple recommendation to detach a part of his forces eastward, and the President, interfering in person, took from Bragg's command Stevenson's division and one of McCown's brigades, amounting to about nine thousand men, who were despatched to Vicksburg. These troops did not reach Pemberton for more than three weeks, when Grant had already resumed his march toward Memphis; and it may be affirmed, without exaggeration, that if these troops, instead of moving in this manner, had been on the battle-field of Murfreesborough, the issue of that contest would have been very different from what it was. The news of their departure, which was soon communicated to Rosecrans, contributed, no doubt, to induce the latter general to undertake shortly after the campaign of which we shall presently give a narrative.

The first care of the Confederates was to conceal their weakness, to menace Grant if possible and to prevent Rosecrans at all hazards from sending him reinforcements; in short, in the event of his invading Middle Tennessee, the campaign, although strictly defensive, was nevertheless to be preluded by cavalry raids. It was necessary to strike at the communication of the army of the Ohio, so as to paralyze it if victorious, and harass its retreat if vanquished. Forrest and Morgan placed themselves once more in the saddle. The former was to operate at first as near Nashville as possible, and thence to proceed into Western Tennessee to destroy the railroads by which supplies were obtained for the army, at the head of which Grant had just left Corinth, to penetrate into the South. In the mean while, Bragg, for the third

time in six months, pushed Morgan into Kentucky, with directions to carry once more the axe and the torch into the midst of Rosecrans' dépôts.

Forrest profited by the skirmishing that took place in the neighborhood of Nashville, between the 9th and 13th of December, to disguise his movement from the Federals. Marching toward the south-west, he followed nearly to Waynesboro' the Nashville and Eastport Railroad, which was then abandoned, and on the 13th of December he crossed the Tennessee at Clifton. He then found himself in the district of East Tennessee, near the network of railway lines through which Grant's army received its supplies. We shall leave him there, for we have given an account of this part of his expedition in the preceding chapter. It is sufficient to state again in this place that after destroying considerable portions of the railroad and taking a large number of prisoners, Forrest was himself completely beaten at Parker's Cross-roads on the 31st of December. He crossed the Tennessee at Clifton immediately after, and, carefully avoiding the Federals, rejoined Bragg's army about the same time as Morgan.

The latter set off a few days later than Forrest. Throwing small parties of cavalry in different directions, so as to mask his movements, he crossed the Cumberland at Gainesville (or Gainesborough), and occupied the village of Glasgow, in Kentucky, on the 24th of December. He had thus avoided the vicinity of Rosecrans' left wing; and without meeting any other foe than the small garrison of Glasgow, which he soon compelled to beat a retreat, he found himself in close proximity to the principal line of the Kentucky railways. This line leaves the banks of the Ohio at Louisville; running directly south, it reaches the village of Elizabethtown, after passing through a tunnel of considerable length and crossing the chain of hills which separates the waters of Salt River from those of Green River, and crosses the latter water-course at Munfordsville; a little beyond this point, at the Mammoth Cave station, formerly frequented by tourists in consequence of the celebrated caves, the principal line inclines to the south-west, whilst a branch of it follows the original direction as far as Glasgow. At Bowling Green, on Big Barren River, we

find another branch of the same: the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, which we have followed from the first of these two cities, resumes a southerly direction, and, after forming an angle toward the east leading to the village of Gallatin, it reaches the capital of Tennessee, on the banks of the Cumberland. The other line is the Memphis and Ohio Railroad, which, extending to the south-west, reaches the banks of the Tennessee by way of Russellville, Clarksville and Dover. The Federal general Gilbert was charged to protect these railway tracks. It was a difficult task in presence of such a foe as Morgan, who was at the head of more than three thousand mounted combatants. Gilbert had under his command, more or less directly, his old division, the Tenth, and a large number of *dépôts*, detachments and incomplete corps, which occupied a considerable extent of ground, but were imperfectly connected; these forces, comprising twenty-four regiments of infantry, nine regiments of cavalry and three or four batteries of artillery, did not amount to more than eight or ten thousand men in all. The important pass of Munfordsville, carefully fortified in remembrance of the disaster in September, was occupied by Colonel Hobson with six regiments of infantry and two of cavalry. The large stores collected at Elizabethtown, and the important tunnel which lies in the neighborhood, were only guarded by a single regiment, the Ninety-first Illinois, recently enlisted and commanded by Colonel Smith. The entrenchments and block-houses which were to cover this post and the bridge of Bacon Creek more to the south were not completed. The brigades of Craddock and Reed, with two regiments of cavalry, were at Lebanon under Colonel Hoskins. Baird's division, consisting of six regiments of infantry, was at Danville, and Woolford's brigade of cavalry at Greensburg, on Green River, above Munfordsville. Morgan, with his light and compact body of troops, fully relied upon his ability to pass through all these separate detachments and effect his escape before they had time to contrive any plan for crushing him.

The news of his arrival at Glasgow was brought to Munfordsville by a small body of mounted troops, the Second Michigan, which had followed in his tracks from Gallatin. Hobson immediately sent his three regiments of cavalry to watch him. They

fell in with him on the 25th at Bear Wallow and Green's Chapel, but were unable to prevent his taking possession of the railway track, which he destroyed immediately. Morgan, making a feint against Munfordsville, which he considered impregnable, described a circuit around that place, and struck the railroad again more to northward, at Bacon Creek bridge. He captured the palisaded camp, with all the troops which defended this bridge; and being now certain of having the start of any force that might be sent from the south in pursuit of him, he quickly proceeded toward Elizabethtown. On the morning of the 27th he surrounded this village and the small garrison stationed in it. The latter, having no fortified place of shelter, took refuge in the houses, where Morgan bombarded it without any regard for the inhabitants, who were, however, thorough secessionists. He then began the attack, but at the first volley of musketry the Federal soldiers, without heeding their commander, in a cowardly manner hoisted the white flag. Five hundred prisoners and a large amount of provisions fell into Morgan's hands; the men were released on parole and the *matériel* destroyed. Before leaving their conquest the rough Confederate partisans plundered all the stores, stripped the prisoners of their garments to clothe themselves, and did not even respect the sick in the hospital.

Meanwhile, Harlan's brigade of infantry, which had been sent from Munfordsville in pursuit of them, was approaching. Morgan resumed his march; he began by capturing another small garrison in a palisaded camp at Sulphur Ford bridge, burnt this bridge, crossed over and destroyed the tunnel, and finally reached the other side of the hills in the valley of Salt River, where he expected to levy contributions, and, above all, to procure fresh horses for his cavalry. Taking the direction of Bardstown, he slackened his march, for he knew well that the destruction of the railroad and telegraphic wires would paralyze the movements of the detached bodies of troops scattered all around him. In fact, these various detachments were trying in vain to approach each other, while avoiding a serious conflict with an enemy superior in numbers to each of them. On the 29th, whilst Harlan's brigade was reaching Elizabethtown, Morgan was approaching Bardstown, and his scouts were already in Fredericksburg. But

fearing to be caught between the troops of Baird at Danville and those of Hoskins at Lebanon, he suddenly retraced his steps, passed through Hayesville and encamped at Rolling Fork. On the 31st he crossed the Muldraugh Hills, which lie south of Lebanon, and re-entered the valley of Green River. Baird, at Danville, made no effort to meet him; Woolford, at Greensburg, seemed to have no suspicion of his being so near him at Campbellville. Hoskins alone started in pursuit of him with all his forces. He left Lebanon on the 31st, crossed the Muldraugh Hills on the 1st of January, 1863, and after a forced march reached Green River bridge, which the rear-guard of the enemy had just passed on the same evening. On that very day Morgan passed through Columbia and entered the valley of the Cumberland. He was now out of reach of his enemies; and whilst Hoskins halted his exhausted soldiers before Columbia, he quietly proceeded through Jamestown to join the left flank of Bragg's army in the positions which the latter had just taken on Duck River, as will be seen presently. This new expedition was thus accomplished without the least opposition; but it could not have been productive of great results, unless the fortune of war had declared in favor of the Confederates on the battle-field of Murfreesborough. Their retreat, on the contrary, rendered Morgan's raids almost fruitless.

The Federals on their side were determined that their adversaries should not enjoy all the advantages of these incursions, and at last decided to imitate them. General Carter, an intelligent and energetic officer, was directed to organize a raid on the Confederate railroads at the very time when Forrest and Morgan were taking the field. At the beginning of this work we spoke of the great artery which connects the two important centres of Lynchburg and Chattanooga, under the name of the Virginia and East Tennessee Railroad. This railway follows throughout the whole distance one of the small valleys formed by the parallel ridges of the Alleghanies; it was then the only direct communication between Virginia and the slave States of the Southwest, between the capital of the Confederacy and Bragg's army. As this line is separated from the Kentucky districts by several mountain ridges, where the partisans carried on hostilities far

from the large armies, it seemed to be protected against even the most daring of sudden attacks. The principal of these chains is that of the Cumberland Mountains, whose precipitous slopes and lofty defiles were, at the time of which we speak, covered with a thick layer of snow and ice; it marks the frontier between Kentucky and Virginia, separating the basin of the Cumberland from that of the Tennessee. This was the railway line, so important and so well protected by nature and the season, that the Federals resolved to strike and destroy as their first attempt at a raid.

Eleven hundred troopers, bold and resolute, picked from several regiments, were assembled near Manchester, a village situated at the foot of the mountains and at the entrance of the plain of Kentucky. On the 25th of December they took up their line of march under General Carter, carrying absolutely nothing but such provisions as could be placed upon their saddles. They soon penetrated into the mountains through War Gap, and crossing the first ridge descended into the gorges of the Cumberland at Mount Pleasant. A few log huts scarcely justify the appellation of "Mount Pleasant" given to this village; and the Federals found no resources in those rugged valleys, the inhabitants of which, few and poor, were, moreover, bitterly hostile to them. Nevertheless, on the evening of the 28th, they at once began to ascend the road, dangerous at that season, which leads into Virginia across the Cumberland Mountains. No enemy was looked for in that direction, and the passes were entirely unguarded. This night-march, despite the cold, was successfully accomplished. Allowing his horses only one hour's time to feed, Carter, after descending into the valley of Jonesville on the morning of the 29th, proceeded up the smaller ridge of Powell's Mountains, and entering the State of Tennessee reached the borders of Clinch River before sunset. Both men and horses were exhausted. Some rest was taken; each trooper ate his last biscuit, then jumped into the saddle to follow the indefatigable general, who had already given the signal of departure. Success was the prize of speed. That night saw the Federals cross the silent and gloomy gorges of Clinch Mountain; their column, almost constantly at a trot, emerged before daybreak into the rolling land which forms the undulating valley which is the central drain

of the Alleghanies. Every now and then some farmer, armed with a rifle, perceiving, not without surprise, the long file of hostile troopers, would place himself in ambuscade within range of the road they had to follow. A shot was fired, the ball most frequently whistling by without hitting any one; occasionally a man would fall. The wounded soldier was picked up, and the march continued without stopping to avenge him. Finally, after following for a considerable distance a road adjoining the frontier line of Virginia and Tennessee, Carter reached Blountsville at eleven o'clock on the morning of the 30th. The object of his expedition was now evident; it was the destruction of the railway which passed near this village. Consequently, his march was accelerated as he approached this objective point. He proceeded toward a station formerly called Union, which the Confederates had named Zollicoffer, as the former appellation clashed with their political prejudices. It was guarded by three hundred mounted men, under Major McDowell. This officer, having but an indefinite idea of the approach of the enemy, and not wishing to believe the report, was proceeding alone in search of information regarding the Blountsville road, when he was met by General Carter, marching with an escort in advance of his column. McDowell was captured; and finding the Federals in such force, he sent to his soldiers an order to surrender without resistance. Carter thus took possession of the large wooden bridge which spans the Hobston River near the Union station. He hastened to burn it; then, after releasing his prisoners on parole, he followed the railroad southward, taking care to destroy the track. The cross-ties were piled up together, forming so many fires, upon which the rails were heated to be twisted out of shape. The Federals afterward got possession of a second bridge, thrown across the Watauga River, which they also burned. They thus rendered a section of sixteen kilometres entirely unserviceable, which, being comprised between two burnt bridges, formed a gap which could not again be thrown open to traffic so long as one of these two bridges should not be reconstructed. This interruption, which was the main object of the enterprise, was destined to cause serious inconvenience to Bragg's army, especially when it would have to fight a great battle involving the necessity of repairing

its losses in men, arms and *matériel*. From that moment the Federals had nothing else to do but return as quickly as possible into Kentucky. They accomplished this difficult retreat successfully, the Confederates having no force in the neighborhood capable of resisting them. On the 31st of December, when they recrossed the Hobston River at Kingsport, they had but a few shots to fire, and on the 2d of January, 1863, Carter, crossing the Cumberland Mountains, re-entered a friendly region with all his troops. He had left behind him a considerable number of dead and lame horses, but the dismounted troopers had followed their comrades on foot; and the expedition, after having accomplished seven hundred and fifty kilometres in nine days, had only lost two men killed, five wounded and fifteen prisoners. The charm which hitherto seemed to have paralyzed the Federal army was broken. Carter had opened the way in which Streight, Grierson, Kautz, Kilpatrick, Stoneman and Sheridan were to follow him, not without glory, although with varied fortunes.

The recital of these preliminary operations was necessary in order to exhibit the great war which engages our attention in all its aspects. We may now resume the narrative of the more important events of which, at the same period, the banks of Stone River were the theatre.

CHAPTER III.

MURFREESBOROUGH.

CHRISTMAS day of 1862 found the two armies of Bragg and Rosecrans quietly settled in their cantonments. But both sides were preparing for the struggle. The Union general was at last in a condition to resume the offensive. The railroad, which had been reopened for a month past, had enabled him to collect, both in Nashville and in his camps, the *matériel* and provisions required for a campaign which the season would render very severe. He wanted for nothing in the matter of food, arms and wagons. His artillery had its full complement, and his cavalry was well mounted; the young soldiers of which the cavalry was composed were beginning to learn their business, under the direction of the indefatigable Stanley, and it was in a condition to render him the services he expected from it. The numerous recruits who filled up the ranks of his infantry had also been drilled, and the new regiments had been, as far as possible, brigaded with soldiers already broken in to war. His army numbered forty-six thousand combatants, comprising forty-one thousand four hundred and twenty-one infantry, two thousand two hundred and twenty-three artillerists with one hundred and fifty guns, and three thousand two hundred and sixty-six cavalry. It was divided, as we have said, into three corps, under Crittenden, Thomas and McCook.

On the morning of December 26th, which was cold and rainy, this army emerged at last from its inaction. In forcing this apparent inaction upon it, Rosecrans had not only given it time to recover strength, but he had drawn Bragg toward him, and was now able to attack him without exposing his army to the immense difficulties it would have had to encounter in a long winter-march beyond Nashville. In order to be able to advance as far as Chattanooga in the spring, it was necessary to fight the enemy's

army first; and whatever might be the issue of the battle, it was better for the Federals that the struggle should take place at the commencement of the campaign. Rosecrans selected the moment to take the field when he saw Morgan and Forrest both engaged far away from Murfreesborough, because their absence deprived the Confederates of their superiority in cavalry, which had proved hitherto so useful to them.

Bragg had not changed his position. Polk's corps and three brigades of Breckenridge's division of Hardee's corps were at Murfreesborough; the remainder of the latter corps, comprising a brigade of Breckenridge and the division of Cheatham, formed the left wing, which was stationed at Eagleville, about thirty-two kilometres west-south-west of Murfreesborough, on the road from Nashville to Shelbyville; the right wing was placed at Reads-ville, twenty kilometres east of that point, and consisted of McCown's division, detached from Smith's corps. These two wings were thus slightly refused. But on the left Hardee had sent from Eagleville, on the Nashville road, a division charged to watch the Federals; it was posted near the village of Triune, and occupied Nolensville, a little beyond that point. The outposts, which were advancing as close to Nashville as possible, were ordered to fall back in case the Federal army assumed the offensive.

The latter was put in march by three different roads, leading from Nashville in a south-easterly and southerly direction. The right wing, under Thomas, took the Franklin road; McCook, with the centre, that of Nolensville; and Crittenden, on the left, that of Murfreesborough. The right and left thus flanked the position occupied by Hardee at Triune, ready to unite in a combined attack upon him if he sought to hold that position. If he should fall back upon the remainder of the enemy's army, Thomas and McCook were both to bear to the left and approach the road, followed by Crittenden, in order to present themselves simultaneously with him before Stone River, a small stream which covers Murfreesborough, and on the borders of which Bragg could not fail to stop if he desired to defend those cantonments.

The last conjecture proved to be correct. McCook encountered Hardee's pickets a short distance from Nashville, and his heads

of column took possession of Nolensville after a sharp engagement, in which they lost seventy-five men, and at the end of which they captured one gun. McCook continued his march, but was delayed by a thick fog, and did not reach Triune until the 27th. Hardee had left this village the day before, and all his army corps was already far advanced on the road to Murfreesborough. Crittenden on the left, advancing slowly, so as to allow McCook time to feel the enemy, reached Lavergne on the evening of the 26th, after exchanging a few musket-shots with the enemy's skirmishers. The next day he reached Stewart's Creek, and his cavalry, by a bold manœuvre, succeeded in carrying the bridge thrown across this water-course before the Confederate brigade entrusted with its defence was able to destroy it. Thomas, on the right, finding no one in front of him, approached the other two corps; one of his divisions, under Negley, joined Crittenden at Stewart's Creek on the 27th; the other, under Rousseau, encamped on that day at Nolensville.

On the 28th the whole of the Confederate army was united in the neighborhood of Murfreesborough; according to Bragg's report, it only numbered thirty-five thousand combatants all told. Three brigades of infantry, three batteries of artillery and four or five thousand horse had remained behind for the purpose of watching the Federals and delaying their movements by fighting them in detail. Rosecrans was obliged to grant complete rest to the greater part of his troops during that day; if he had led them as far as Murfreesborough without interrupting their march, he would have exposed himself to the necessity of fighting with fatigued troops, and his wagon-trains would have stuck in the mud in the cross-roads, which the torrents of rain had broken up under the soldiers' feet. He had, in fact, but a single railway, that which Crittenden had followed from Nashville, by which to approach Murfreesborough. The other two corps, in their efforts to concentrate, had struck into bad roads, which it was frequently necessary to widen at the expense of the thick brushwood by which they were bordered, thereby greatly delaying the march.

As the Federals were approaching Murfreesborough, it is proper that we should devote a few words to describing the ground the possession of which was to be so obstinately dis-

puted. Stone River is a tributary of the Cumberland; emptying into it a little above Nashville, it runs from south-east to north-west, following a parallel direction with the railroad and the Murfreesborough turnpike, which run a few kilometres from the left bank. It receives on that side the waters of two principal streams, Stewart's Creek, which we have already mentioned, and, higher up, Overall's Creek. The latter tributary lies at a distance of eight kilometres from Murfreesborough, in the direction of Nashville. After crossing it, the road and the railroad, which are only separated by some few hundred metres from each other, approach the valley watered by Stone River. They reach its borders after a course of three kilometres, follow it for a distance of four kilometres, and end by crossing each other—the turnpike passing east of the railroad; finally, crossing the river over two bridges very near each other, they reach the village of Murfreesborough, one kilometre beyond. Before passing under these bridges, Stone River runs from south to north. Above its confluence with Overall's Creek, the river is almost everywhere fordable even in winter. The ground comprised between Stone River and Overall's Creek formed the battle-field on which the two armies were about to meet. It is a slightly-rolling plateau, with a clayish soil, in which the roads are tortuous and easily broken up, and the clearings alternate with thick and almost impenetrable copses. The chief growth of these copses is the red cedar, a species of juniper plant of pyramidal shape, the blackish foliage of which covers all the ground, which the industry of man has not yet reclaimed, with a dark and heavy verdure. Three roads traverse this plateau after crossing Overall's Creek, and converge upon Murfreesborough. The first, near Stone River, is the Nashville turnpike, a wide and straight road, the only practicable one for an army, then the bad and narrow road which at the hamlet of Wilkinson's Cross-roads branches off from that of Nashville and Shelbyville, which has already been alluded to, and, farther yet, the Franklin and Murfreesborough road, which runs directly from the west, crossing Overall's Creek near its source.

On Sunday evening, the 28th the Federal army, after having rectified its positions, found itself massed upon two roads; McCook, who continued to occupy the Nashville and Shelbyville

road, had the main body of his troops in the vicinity of Triune. Thomas had joined Crittenden's corps on the causeway from Nashville to Murfreesborough, not far from Stewart's Creek, and had taken position behind him. The entire army was put in motion on Monday morning, the 29th. On the right, McCook reached Wilkinson's Cross-roads, where he halted the greater part of his corps, but his advanced brigade, under Woodruff, having taken the Murfreesborough road, which the remainder of the troops were to follow the next day, arrived that very evening on the margin of Overall's Creek ; it took possession of the bridge thrown across the stream, and thus secured a commodious outlet to the plateau we have just described, for the right wing of the army. The left wing, owing to the facilities afforded by the turnpike and the railroad, advanced still farther. Crittenden, after crossing Stewart's Creek, pushed on with all possible speed, followed by Negley's division of Thomas' corps, the other division of the same corps under Rousseau having remained near Stuart's Creek to wait for its wagon-train. Palmer's division, which was in advance, soon met the Confederate outposts, and, without allowing them time to burn the turnpike and railroad bridges on Overall's Creek, secured the means for easily crossing this stream, as McCook had already done on the right. Palmer, pushing his heads of column in the direction of Murfreesborough, threw himself at last, at a distance of five kilometres from this village, upon a line of breastworks which lay across the road, and behind which the Confederate skirmishers had been promptly rallied. The thick wood of red cedar which stretched out in front prevented him from forming a correct idea of the positions and strength of the enemy ; but the officers of the signal corps, having ascended a neighboring height, whence they could see the buildings on the outskirts of Murfreesborough, notified their chief that the enemy seemed to be on the point of evacuating that place. Misled by this information, Crittenden took Harker's brigade of Wood's division to the left, and caused it to ford Stone River on a line with the positions before which Palmer had halted, in order to avoid the necessity of crossing this water-course in sight of the enemy, and to reach Murfreesborough on the side which was easiest of approach. Harker had scarcely got

on the other side of the river, when, falling upon the outposts of Breckenridge's division, he surprised one regiment, which he put to flight after capturing some prisoners. The statements made by these prisoners, however, showed that Bragg's army, far from thinking of retreat, was entirely massed between the Federals and Murfreesborough, and Harker, glad that he had not advanced farther, took advantage of the increasing darkness to recross Stone River. He fell back toward the bivouac-fires of Crittenden's corps, who had massed his three divisions, with that of Negley, on the right and left of the road, at about seven hundred metres from the positions occupied by the enemy.

On the evening of the 29th the Federal army was therefore divided into two sections, which were separated by a considerable interval. Crittenden's corps and Negley's division, from twenty-two to twenty-three thousand men, were in presence of the Confederates on the Nashville and Murfreesborough road, Rousseau's division having remained on Stewart's Creek, about twelve kilometres behind. The other body of troops consisted of McCook's divisions, which had halted at Wilkinson's Cross-roads, about three kilometres on this side of Overall's Creek, the bridge over which was in Palmer's hands, and eight kilometres from Crittenden's troops. The position of the four divisions which found themselves alone facing Bragg was not without danger. In fact, on the evening of the 29th, the whole Confederate army was under arms, ready for fight and massed within a narrow space in front of Murfreesborough. Its camps had been struck, its barracks abandoned, and all its *matériel*, collected around the Murfreesborough station, could be speedily loaded to follow its movements. Hardee's corps was on the right bank of Stone River, Breckenridge occupying the front line in the positions that Harker had reconnoitred, with Cleburne behind him. Polk's corps occupied the left bank; Withers' division, placed in front, because it had not been engaged since the battle of Shiloh, rested on the river, lay across the railroad and the turnpike, a little above the point of intersection of these two lines of communication, and extended southward across the Wilkinson road; it thus formed on that side a sinuous line, adapted to the irregularities of ground, which stretched as far as the Franklin road. Cheatham's divis-

ion was in second line behind Withers; still more to the left and in the rear was McCown's division of Smith's corps, which had arrived from Readsville, and was to cover Polk's flank in case McCook should debouch by the Franklin road. Bragg had thus five divisions in hand, which he himself estimated at thirty thousand infantry and artillery. Wheeler's brigade of cavalry, with a portion of Pegram's, had started on the 29th for the purpose of harassing Rosecrans' rear and capturing his wagon-trains; Wharton, with two thousand horse, cleared the front of the army. Bragg had no more reinforcements to expect; if he was to assume the offensive, it was essential for him to do so on the morning of the 30th, when he had but twenty-two thousand men before him. It was the easier for him to avail himself of this advantage, because, being near the point of junction of all the converging roads followed by the Federals, he could concentrate his forces upon any portion of his line with much greater rapidity than the latter. But having overrated their number, he waited the whole of the 30th to be attacked, and thus permitted them to mass all their forces to fight on the next day the battle they had already planned.

The following were the movements of Rosecrans' army during that day. Crittenden remained in the positions he had taken on the evening of the 29th, leaving Palmer on the road facing Withers, Wood on the left, along the river, fronting the fords, which Harker had already twice crossed the day before, and Van Cleve in reserve. The engineer brigade opened roads leading to three of the principal fords of Stone River through the thickets of red cedar. Thomas resumed his regular position in the centre of the army; Negley's division made a flank march across the woods to take post on the right of Palmer, and to extend its line as far as the Wilkinson road; whilst Rousseau, after leaving two brigades behind, one at Smyrna and the other at Stewart's Creek, to protect those important points, proceeded with the other two to take position in rear of the right of Palmer's division. McCook on his side had put his troops in motion, crossed Overall's Creek, and was advancing along the plateau, preceded by two brigades of cavalry. Rosecrans' orders directed him to leave the Wilkinson road and bear to the south-east, so as to place himself

near the Franklin road, facing south and *en potence* on the line occupied by Negley. The ground he had to traverse was difficult, the roads scarce and in bad condition; of this the Confederates took advantage to delay his march as much as possible. Toward evening the musketry firing among the outposts in the vicinity of the Wilkinson road actually assumed the proportion of a positive engagement between Woodruff's Federal brigade and the left of the Confederate division of Withers. This affair, which was soon interrupted by darkness, cost McCook about one hundred and thirty-five men in killed and wounded, but did not prevent him from getting into line before sunset. A brigade of cavalry which had been left at Triune joined him during the night. The Federal army, therefore, was at last united and ready to assume the offensive.

On the evening of the 30th, Rosecrans explained his plan of attack to his corps commanders. He had ascertained that the Confederate army lay across Stone River. The hillocks on the right side, beyond which stands Murfreesborough, were only occupied by Breckenridge's division, whose encampments could be distinguished at a distance, for Cleburne had crossed over to the other side of the river during the day of the 30th. Rosecrans had determined to concentrate as large a force as possible in front of this division. While his right would hold the enemy in check in case of his assuming the offensive, his left was to cross Stone River and take possession of the heights occupied by Breckenridge; from this point his artillery was to attack the rest of Bragg's positions in the rear, whilst the whole of this wing, bearing toward the south, would proceed along the river to drive back the right wing of the Confederates and place itself between the latter and Murfreesborough. The conception of this plan was all the bolder because Rosecrans had overrated the strength of his adversary, estimating his forces at fifty thousand men. Still, he had a chance of success, for the density of the forest, which gave the assailant an advantage by enabling him secretly to concentrate his forces upon a given point, also rendered the defence of the right wing of the Federals easier, resting as it did upon impenetrable thickets, while the bare hills occupied by Breckenridge were exposed to all the power of their artillery.

In order to execute this movement, the two divisions of Wood and Van Cleve were to cross the fords, which had been rendered passable by the engineers. The centre, formed by the divisions of Palmer and Negley, and reinforced in second line by Rosecrans' two brigades, was ordered to remain motionless until the attack from the left had put the enemy in motion in front.

The right wing was the weakest part of the Federal line. In fact, McCook, with his corps alone, occupied more than one-half of this line, say nearly three thousand metres, across the Wilkinson road, and extending as far as the Franklin road. Each of his three divisions had two brigades in front and one in reserve. That of Sheridan was on the left, that of Davis in the centre, and that of Johnson on the right. It was probable that, the battle once engaged, the enemy, whose main forces were on the south side of Stone River, would attack the right of the Federals in order to make a diversion in favor of their left. Rosecrans' success, therefore, depended upon the resistance which this portion of his army would be able to make; but he had reason to hope that Bragg, taken by surprise, would not have time to devote a large force to this diversion, but be soon obliged to defend his own positions. Unfortunately for the Union troops, their topographical officers had neglected to make drawings of this region of country during the four or five months that Buell had occupied it, so that the Confederates, who were perfectly familiar with it, had thus great advantage over them. The Federal right, formed in the centre of the woods, was absolutely ignorant of the nature of the ground which lay before it, and could not imagine what was passing behind the curtain of trees which intercepted its view. Rosecrans, full of anxiety respecting this danger, recommended to McCook to bring to the rear his extreme right, which extended as far as the Franklin road, as it was only protected by a single brigade of Johnson's division placed *en potence*. He desired that Davis should face south-east instead of east, and that the whole of Johnson's division should be held in reserve. McCook, however, availed himself of the latitude that had been granted him, and did not rectify his position. He felt certain of being able to maintain himself in it, and promised his chief to defend it for at least three hours.

But a singular coincidence, which it was impossible to foresee, frustrated all Rosecrans' plans. After remaining inactive during the whole of the 30th, and having lost the opportunity of fighting the Federals before they had been able to join their forces, Bragg had suddenly determined to take the offensive on the following day—a change of tactics which he does not explain in his report, having been governed by precisely the same inspiration that had actuated the commander of the army of the Cumberland. He resolved, like the latter, to mass all the troops he could spare on his left to crush the right of his adversary, and then to make a half conversion, so as to take the enemy's line in reverse. If Bragg had known the intentions of Rosecrans, he could not have made better dispositions; for instead of being surprised by an attack on the part of the Union troops, he found himself fully prepared to strike a blow calculated to interrupt their manœuvre on the weakest point of their line.

In the struggle which was thus about to commence with a reciprocal offensive, the Federals had the advantage of numbers. They were forty-three thousand against thirty-three thousand Confederates; but they had a much larger number of recruits in their ranks than the latter, who were nearly all experienced soldiers, schooled in the campaigns of Shiloh, Corinth and Perryville. The chances, therefore, were nearly equal on both sides, and success must fall to the party whose aggressive movement was the most important or the quickest. In this double aspect the best chances were on the side of the Confederates. On one hand, the two Federal divisions which were to make the attack did not number more than ten thousand men, whilst the forces that Bragg was preparing to hurl against the Federal right, although forming also but two divisions, amounted to nearly fifteen thousand men, with ten thousand more ready to support them. On the other hand, the Confederates were not obliged, like the Federals, to cross a river extremely difficult to ford, to approach the enemy's right. So that Rosecrans, having been the first to put himself in motion, had just barely time to push a portion of his forces to the right bank of Stone River, and not to seriously engage the battle on that side.

Bragg had made every preparation for the conflict during the

30th. Hardee, leaving Breckenridge alone on the right bank of Stone River, had, as we have said, crossed over to the left with Cleburne's division, and placing it behind that of McCown had taken command of these two united divisions. On the evening of the 30th, therefore, the Confederate army occupied the following positions: Breckenridge on the right, on the other side of Stone River; Polk in the centre, between the river and the Wilkinson road, with Withers' division in first line and that of Cheat-ham in second line; Hardee on the left, with McCown's and Cleburne's divisions under his orders; the first, two brigades of which had gone to the front, extended to the Franklin road, which gradually draws nearer to the other two roads; the second had remained in its positions, and found itself in the rear a little to the right of the latter. The convergence of the three roads had enabled the Confederates to mass their centre and left upon two lines separated by an interval of from seven to eight hundred metres; but in proportion as their movement developed itself, they were to deploy and occupy a more extended front. McCown, whose pickets were facing those of Johnson and Davis, was ordered to follow the Franklin road to attack the extreme Federal right, whilst Cleburne, after marching in his rear, was to deploy on his right as soon as the success of this attack had uncovered McCook's centre. Polk, with his two divisions, was to take the offensive at the same time. Breckenridge, remaining in the positions entrusted to him, held himself ready to forward reinforcements to the rest of the line. Pegram's brigade of cavalry scouted the Lebanon road on the extreme right, along which it was thought that bodies of troops belonging to the enemy had been seen; Wharton's brigade extended to the left beyond the line occupied by McCown. Finally, Wheeler's, as we have already mentioned, had started on the evening of the 29th for the purpose of cutting off Rosecrans' communications with Nashville. By this great movement by conversion from right to left, Bragg was in hopes of pushing the enemy's army into the north-west angle of the plateau, and forcing it into a corner between Stone River and Overall's Creek.

On the 31st of December, 1862, during a calm and mild morning, Van Cleve's division, of Crittenden's corps, had been en-

gaged since daylight in crossing the fords of Stone River, situated below the position occupied by Wood ; the latter was to cross the river in front of the locality where he was stationed as soon as Van Cleve had reached the other side ; Palmer and Negley had placed all their troops under arms ; Rousseau held himself in reserve along the turnpike, ready to support either the centre or the left wing of the army. Rosecrans superintended in person the crossing of the troops at the head of which he was preparing to carry out the most important part of his plan. He saw the moment approaching, when he could throw himself, with a vastly superior force, upon the isolated division which Bragg had left on that side. But at this juncture the sound of sharp musketry burst forth on the extreme right. Could Bragg have guessed the movement by which he was menaced, and was he endeavoring to forestall it? or was it only one of those encounters between pickets, such as the army had daily witnessed during the last week, in which a great deal of powder was burnt without much damage being done to either side? However that might be, there was nothing to be done but to attack Breckenridge without delay, for McCook had promised to defend himself alone for the space of three hours, and it would not require more time to secure some decisive advantage on the left.

Let us, therefore, leave Rosecrans on the margin of Stone River, and transfer ourselves to the other extremity of his line, where the battle had commenced, and where the Confederates, by taking the initiative, had secured an advantage which they would retain for nearly the whole day. The slightest inequalities in the ground between the Franklin road and the Nashville causeway played so important a part in this sanguinary struggle, that we must here find room for a detailed description of its configuration. From the bridges of Overall's Creek to those of Stone River, near Murfreesborough, the two straight lines formed by the railroad and the Nashville causeway are seven kilometres in length, and intersect each other at a distance of seventeen hundred metres from the last-mentioned bridges, at an angle of from six to seven degrees. Proceeding from west to east, we at first encounter some clearings lying fallow ; then, at two kilometres from Overall's, a patch of woodland extending for a distance of fifteen hundred

metres in the direction of the road, and one thousand metres in width. The road runs through the wood, whilst the railway skirts its edge to the north-east. On the south side the open lands surrounding this wood rise gradually, and form a rolling plain, extending from east to west, from the borders of Stone River to those of Overall's Creek. The first of these water-courses, being made to change its direction by the obstacle which this undulation of the ground presents, runs away from the line traced by the railroad, to draw near it again lower down, and thus envelops the extremity of those slopes on three sides; at this point its waters, embanked between two steep acclivities, are of considerable depth and seldom fordable. In emerging from the wood the road ascends this sort of plateau, whilst the railroad, which is only separated from it by a space of one hundred to one hundred and twenty metres, traverses it in a deep cutting, forming an obstacle easy to defend. More to westward the slopes become less precipitous and the plateau widens. Its soil, bristling with rocks, is covered with thick copses of red cedar; this wood, extending to the east, descends upon the other slope of the plateau, terminating at a distance of two hundred metres from the causeway; at the south it extends as far as the Wilkinson road, from which it twice turns away to make room for two clearings; then it stretches westward as far as the margin of Overall's Creek.

On a line with its eastern extremity, and at eight hundred metres beyond the railroad cut, the causeway and the railroad, which almost touch each other, traverse a small patch of woodland, lying isolated in the centre of the plain, called Round Forest. Five hundred metres farther, a little to the left, stands a dwelling which was burnt at the time we are speaking of, and was known by the name of the Cowan house. The railroad, which for a certain distance runs along the summit of the acclivity at the foot of which flow the waters of Stone River, strikes the causeway at last, intersects it, and turns away from the margin of the river. The field-works behind which Bragg had established the centre of his line were placed a little beyond this intersection, perpendicular to the road. They extended south over small barren hills as far as the Wilkinson road, which at this point was only seven hundred metres from the Nashville causeway.

The parallelogram comprised between the Wilkinson road and the Franklin road formed the southern section of the field of battle; it was covered with scanty patches of woodland, intersected here and there by open spaces, some uncultivated and others lying fallow. The country adjoining the Franklin road was itself destitute of trees, with the exception of a narrow patch of woodland, prolonging the southern extremity of the large thicket of which we have just spoken, across the plain as far as this road. Here the two roads became separated by an interval of two thousand five hundred metres: a very narrow cross-road, known by the generic appellation of Dirt Road, which connected the former by winding along from clearing to clearing, presented the only wagon communication between the two wings of the Federal army.

Rosecrans' left was massed in the kind of peninsula formed by the angle of Stone River; Wood and Van Cleve were placed in the rear, to cross over to the other side; there was only in front of the enemy's works Palmer's division, drawn up across the railroad and resting against Round Forest. Negley, behind whom was Rousseau with two brigades, extended to the right of the road and along the eastern margin of the cedar wood. Two of Sheridan's brigades, under Roberts and Sill, formed a continuation of the Federal line along the margin of this wood as far as the Wilkinson road; they were supported by Schaeffer, with the third brigade of the same division. The large interval of two thousand five hundred metres, which separated this same road from the Franklin road, was only occupied by the other two divisions of McCook's corps. Davis' left and right, formed by Woodruff's and Post's brigades, were in the woods; Carlin's was between the two, a little in the rear, in a clearing where the artillery of the division had taken position. Johnson, as we have already said, occupied the extremity of the Federal line; Kirk's brigade was ranged in front of the strip of woodland extending to the Franklin road, while that of Willich was placed *en potence* parallel to this road, with one regiment entirely drawn back and facing the west; the third brigade of this division was posted upon the Dirt Road at a considerable distance in the rear. The front of

the Federal army thus extended for more than five kilometres, along which communications were rather difficult.

The movement of Bragg's left wing had commenced at the same time as that of the Federals on Stone River; but McNair's brigade having failed to take the place during the night which Hardee had assigned to it in the front line on the right of McCown's division, the attack was not made until after seven o'clock in the morning. McCown, crossing over to the left of the Franklin road, deployed in the fields for the purpose of flanking the extremity of Johnson's positions; Cleburne followed him close on the road. The Federals were not expecting such an attack, but the open country which lay before them enabled them to perceive, at a distance of about eight hundred metres, the compact lines of the enemy advancing silently and resolutely toward them. The soldiers were in their tents, the officers scattered; General Willich was with his chief, McCook, and the artillery horses had been taken out to water. All hastened to get under arms; each regiment assembled in front of its camp without waiting for orders, and the line of battle was formed at random. The Federal troops had scarcely taken position when the three brigades of McCown's division, Rains on the left, Ector in the centre, McNair on the right, opened a terrific fire upon them. The fighting was carried on at a short distance and without shelter; every shot told. The Confederates advanced at every new discharge. The Federal artillery, posted near the road, ploughed their ranks in vain; they pressed forward, and finally reached Johnson's line, the positions of which he was trying in vain to rectify. The two forces were for a moment mingled, and fought hand to hand amid a musketry-fire which struck friends and foes alike. Johnson's soldiers held their ground, for they had already passed through many murderous struggles; but they could not long withstand the impetuous rush and the numerical superiority of the assailants. Their line was pierced in many places; the guns, deprived of horses, fell into the hands of the Confederates; regiments fought in small groups without any connection between them. Willich, who had hastened up on hearing the fire of musketry, was made prisoner, and his brigade routed; Kirk's brigade, which was still resisting, saw its flank thus uncovered, and was subjected

to an enfilading fire, which compelled it to a speedy retreat. The Federals were driven back upon the clearings situated west of the wood and north of the Franklin road; Johnson's third brigade came to their assistance too late; it was swept away in its turn by the Confederate general Liddell, commanding the left of Cleburne's division, who had deployed on McCown's right. This first combat did not last more than three-quarters of an hour.

The sound of battle, as we have said, had reached the ears of Rosecrans just as he was commencing his movement at the other extremity of the line.

The remnants of Johnson's division were falling back in disorder to the west in the direction of Overall's Creek; they soon met Wharton's Confederate cavalry, which, prolonging to the left the movement of McCown's, fell upon their flank and captured more than a thousand prisoners, several guns and much camp furniture. Hardee had recommended his two division commanders to bear to the right as soon as the extremity of the enemy's line had been driven in, but McCown, carried away by the heat of the battle, pursued the troops he had just routed in their flight westward. Liddell took the same direction, followed by Johnson's brigade,* which also belonged to Cleburne's division. During this time the other two brigades of this last division, under Polk and Wood, executed the movement of conversion prescribed by Bragg, for the purpose of striking the Federal division of Davis in front and in flank at the same time, and they thus left a space which grew wider and wider between them and the right of Johnson's brigade, posted on their left.

Davis had been allowed time to form his troops, and he received without flinching the onset of Cleburne's two brigades, which, being obliged to extend themselves, attacked him in a single line. He repulsed their first assaults; but attacked on the right by Liddell and Johnson, his troops were exposed to a converging fire which rendered it impossible for them to preserve their position. Post's brigade, which was in most danger, was dispersed, and in its turn uncovered that of Carlin. This gallant officer encouraged the soldiers under him by his example, and

* This Confederate brigade of Johnson must not be confounded with the Federal division of his namesake.

arrested for a considerable time the effort of Cleburne; but death was committing terrible ravages around him. The Federal guns, the gunners of which had nearly all been killed, were silenced, and he found himself obliged to yield ground. He led his brigade back in good order to the vicinity of a dwelling situated on a hillock and surrounded by fences, which had been converted into a hospital. The guns remained on the ground in the power of the enemy. Woodruff's brigade, placed on the left of Carlin, followed his movements.

The hospital presented a point of resistance to the Federals, of which they energetically availed themselves. From this commanding position they enfiladed Liddell's and McNair's brigades, which had ventured too far, inflicting upon them severe losses. Hardee, feeling the danger he would incur by extending his lines on the left, gathered all his forces to break down this new resistance. Cleburne, after joining Johnson, vigorously charged Woodruff's positions in front with three brigades, and then debouched into the Wilkinson road near the point where this road passes between two woods. The Confederates deployed in front of Sheridan's right and commenced an attack upon Sill's brigade; following the clearings, they turned one of the woods which covered the front of this portion of the Federal line. Whilst the combat was thus extending from the left to the right of the assailants, McCown had at last succeeded in executing his movement of conversion, and the two brigades of McNair and Liddell, turning north-eastward, marched against the hospital, around which the largest portion of Post's brigade had rallied. Everything gave way before such an effort. The hospital was captured, not, however, without great losses, and the whole of Davis' division was driven back upon the skirts of the cedar wood lying beyond the Wilkinson road. The brigades of Rains and Ector, which had the longest distance to march in order to accomplish the movement, had not even had time to participate in this new success.

It was a critical moment for the Federals. They had lost the entire part of the battle-field situated south of the Wilkinson road. Johnson's division, entirely scattered, rallied with difficulty far from the scene of action. Wharton's Confederate cavalry,

which had started in pursuit, was only stopped by the timely intervention of the Fourth regiment of regular cavalry, which, by a successful charge, prevented it from seizing the wagon-trains loaded with ammunition, provisions and the wounded, and even the guns, with which the Wilkinson road was crowded in the rear of the battle-field. Davis' division, driven back to the other side of this road, could only re-form in the midst of the thick cedar grove where it had found shelter. Bragg's plan was carried out from point to point, and his entire left wing, under Hardee, formed a regular line, which, facing north-north-east, already threatened to take the centre of the Federal army in reverse. The Confederate commander, being desirous to make a decisive effort, had instructed Polk an hour before to put his two fine divisions in motion. That of Withers occupied the front line behind the breastworks, between the Wilkinson and Nashville roads, his four brigades being deployed in the following order from left to right: Loomis, Manigault, Anderson and Chalmers along the railroad; five hundred metres behind the latter in second line was Cheatham, whose four brigades, under Vaughn, Maney, Stewart and Donelson, were also deployed and ready to support him. In order to facilitate the command, Polk had entrusted the right of these two lines to Cheatham and the left to Withers. The attack would thus be made by two masses, each composed of four brigades, with a front of two, by two deep. Cheatham was to attack Sheridan, whose right was already menaced by Cleburne; Withers to engage Negley and the right of Palmer, formed by Cruft's brigade. However, before we proceed to describe this new attack, we must go for a moment to the opposite extremity of the line, where the patient and tenacious commander of the Federal army was attending to the execution of his plan without suffering himself to be excited by the distant booming of the cannon which thundered on his right.

A first despatch of McCook had arrived a little after eight o'clock to inform him of the attack made upon Johnson, but this message did not announce the defeat of the latter—a defeat which was not yet known at the headquarters of his corps commander. McCook had promised to hold out for three hours; if he could only gain two, the diversion attempted against him by Bragg

would only tend to favor the counter-movement of the Federals. Rosecrans, therefore, merely sent an order to McCook to defend the ground entrusted to him foot by foot. Being convinced that the attack he was about to make on the left would compensate for all the checks his right could experience, Rosecrans saw nothing in this news but an additional reason for hastening the movement from which he anticipated a decisive victory. Van Cleve was already on the other side of Stone River. Wood was preparing to follow him, when the noise of the battle which was being fought on the left, and to which each person around the general-in-chief was anxiously listening, seemed to grow louder and to draw nearer. The rattling of musketry became more and more distinct and the cannon was silent, for the Federal guns were in Hardee's hands, and those of the Confederates had been unable to follow the rapid movement of their infantry; but when the few field-pieces that had escaped the disaster reopened fire, their discharges resounded ominously as far as the enclosed valley into which the Federal left wing had descended to cross the waters of Stone River. At the same moment a second despatch from McCook informed Rosecrans at last of the rout of the right wing. The Federal commander resolved at once upon what course to pursue. It was no longer a question of trying to repair the reverse of the right by a success achieved on the left, but rather to save the army, the whole of which was in jeopardy. There was not a moment to lose in order to stop the enemy, who was already threatening to cut off his communications and drive him back upon the borders of Stone River. The right wing must be succored without delay, and all the forces massed on the left wing pushed forward to oppose the victors.

The movement which Rosecrans had been urging a moment before was countermanded, and the troops who were marching northwardly, facing about, turned toward the south in the direction of the cedar wood, the density of which concealed from view the combatants engaged on the right wing. Rosecrans had brought back Van Cleve to the left side of Stone River, and sent him along with Wood's division to the point where the Nashville road crosses the rolling plain we have already mentioned, the defence of which was of paramount importance; for

if the left wing of the enemy, taking advantage of its success, should seize this position, the Federal army would be completely turned. Without waiting for the execution of these orders, Rosecrans started at full gallop in the direction of his centre, called thither by a new battle which had just begun.

Withers' division had, in fact, attacked the Federal positions on that side with a fierceness equal to that of Cleburne and McCown, but it had not obtained the same success as the latter. Sheridan, who had been expecting this attack since daylight, was fully prepared to receive it. Sill on the right, Robertson on the left, were posted along wooded slopes and among rocks, whence they commanded several large cotton-fields, which the enemy would have to cross without shelter; their batteries were planted in the most prominent positions, whilst Schæffer's brigade stood ready to support them.

It was about the time when Cleburne was stopped in front of the hospital, that Polk made his great attack upon the Federal centre. The left column, under Cheatham, marched against Sheridan; Loomis' brigade on the left, that of Manigault on the right, bravely advanced amidst a shower of balls and shrapnels which thinned their ranks. They compelled the Federals to abandon a portion of the ground they occupied, but they had scarcely taken possession of it when they found themselves exposed to a still more furious fire than at first. Loomis was wounded, and his brigade, after a desperate struggle, was driven back; on the right Manigault had also been repulsed with considerable losses. Cheatham pushed his second line forward, Vaughn's brigade resumed the fight on the left, and that of Maney on the right, but this attack was fruitless, although fully as sanguinary as the first. Sheridan was in the midst of his soldiers, whose efforts he directed with the quick glance of a warrior who knows how to turn the least obstacles to account. Just as Vaughn's troops were beginning to give way, Sill, boldly resuming the offensive, charged them at the head of his soldiers, and drove them back in disorder. In this short space of time the Confederate brigade lost one-third of its effective force. But the heroic Sill, a victim to his zeal, fell mortally wounded in the very midst of the enemy's battalions. Maney's brigade, which

Cheatham had hurled on the right, became engaged with Roberts' troops without gaining ground; it had not, however, been as completely repulsed as those of Loomis and Vaughn.

But a fresh danger was about to compel Sheridan to surrender to the Confederates part of the position which they had so unsuccessfully attacked in front. Davis had just been dislodged from the hospital, and his whole division, as we have said, was violently driven back upon the Wilkinson road. Polk's and Johnson's brigades, of Cleburne's division, struck the extremity of Sheridan's line, where stood Sill's soldiers, scarcely recovered from a too-dearly-bought success; and almost at the same time, Liddell's and McNair's troops, extending on his right, in pursuit of Davis, who was in full retreat, threatened to surround him completely. But neither himself nor his soldiers felt disconcerted on finding themselves in this dangerous situation. Instead of allowing himself to be carried away by the movement of his neighbors, he did not hesitate to make, under the very fire of the enemy, a change of front, which enabled him to preserve the important position he occupied with the least possible loss of ground. He could not abandon this position without uncovering the centre of the army, as he had himself been uncovered by the rout of the right. The cedar wood, the eastern margin of which he had so successfully defended, extended to the Wilkinson road at the south-east, but the southern border soon receded again, to make room for a square-shaped clearing; it was upon this receding margin of the woods that Sheridan resolved to rest his new line, facing south. His left still lay joined to Negley's right, which he thus continued to protect, and he only abandoned the extreme end of the wood, which stretched out as far as the Wilkinson road, where he ran the risk of being surrounded. In order to effect this conversion, he brought the brigades of Sill and Schæffer to the rear, and, as soon as the Confederates started in pursuit of them, Roberts' brigade made a vigorous charge upon them, thus freeing the wood and enabling the other two brigades to effect their change of front; after which the former came in its turn to take position alongside of them. Shortly after Cheatham's first attack upon Sheridan, Withers, on his right, had directed one of his brigades, under Anderson, against Negley's Federal division, in

conformity with Bragg's instructions, who desired that the battle should be gradually extended from the left to the right. But this isolated brigade was received by a terrific fire, and the Federal artillery, excellently handled, caused such destruction in its ranks, that it was soon obliged to fall back upon Stewart's brigade, of the second line, which had just come to its assistance. One of its regiments alone, the Thirteenth Mississippi, out of a total of less than four hundred men, lost sixty-two killed and one hundred and thirty-two wounded. This figure will suffice to convey an idea of the losses sustained on both sides in these combats, fought between two woods and almost muzzle to muzzle.

It was nine o'clock when Anderson commenced the attack; about half an hour later, Sheridan, being menaced by Cleburne and Cheatham at once, fell back in order to secure a better position. From this position his artillery flanked a portion of McCown's troops, which had attacked his right wing. His shells, bursting in the rear of the Confederate ranks, gave Hardee to understand that he could not advance further without danger, and that, before following up his successes on the extreme left, it was necessary for him to overcome the formidable adversary who by his tenacity paralyzed the whole movement of the Confederate army. While bringing back his extreme left for the purpose of dislodging Sheridan, he requested Bragg to order the troops forming the Confederate centre to support him, and Withers received an order to attack the Federals posted in front of him with all his forces.

About this time, half-past nine o'clock, the movements ordered by Rosecrans, for bringing the troops massed on the left into line, commenced. Thomas had posted Rousseau's division along the northern margin of the cedar wood, behind Sheridan, so as to support him in case of necessity. Van Cleve's division deployed on his right, between the wood and the railroad, and, still more to the right, was placed Harker's brigade of Wood's division, the latter general remaining in reserve with his other two brigades. The engineer brigade occupied the highest point of the strip of land through which the railroad passes in a cut. This important position could not have been entrusted to a body of troops more worthy to defend it. As a glance at the map will show, the new line

extended from south-east to north-west, in front of the Nashville road, and in rear of the cedar wood, the eastern extremity of which was still occupied by Sheridan, the remainder, on the west side, being full of the *débris* of the divisions of Johnson and Davis.

These movements, however, could not be accomplished with sufficient rapidity to prevent the Confederates from obtaining new successes. Rosecrans had proceeded in person to the line occupied by Negley, on the Nashville road. On his arrival there the combat was resumed with renewed violence. The four brigades forming the right column of Polk's corps were executing the order issued by Bragg. Whilst Stewart, having rallied Anderson's scattered troops, was renewing the assault against Negley, Chalmers, supported by Donelson, was advancing through the open space, in the midst of which stood the Cowan house, and, following the road, vigorously attacked Palmer's division. The battle was now going on along the whole line. On the left wing, Hardee, after recalling McCown's brigade, which, as we have said, had taken too eccentric a direction, attacked Sheridan's division with his entire corps, flanking it on the west, despite the change of front which the latter had effected. This gallant troop was obliged to perform a second manœuvre, still more difficult than the first, in order to avoid being taken in flank, but it had a skilful and determined commander, who was resolved to dispute every inch of ground and keep his lines unbroken. Falling back a few hundred metres before the enemy, who was pressing him on every side, he ordered his two brigades on the right to face to the west, and they thus found themselves back to back with Negley's division; Roberts' brigade, having turned toward the south, placed itself at right angles to these two bodies of troops, so as to cover their flank. This formation in a sharp angle, which was only feasible in the midst of woods and under the protection of their thickness, presented a solid obstacle against the attacks of the Confederates. In order to render the position still stronger, Sheridan had massed all the cannon he had in front of Roberts, which was the point most menaced, and the key to the whole position. His energy thus enabled him to resist all Hardee's assaults for nearly an hour; and it may be said that this hour saved the

Federal army from an irreparable disaster. In fact, whilst Polk, who was obliged to charge Negley's and Palmer's positions in front, and across large open fields, was exhausting himself in fruitless efforts against them, Rosecrans formed a new line with his fresh troops from the left, which alone could enable him to check the victorious march of the foe. Sheridan, however, could not prolong his resistance in such a hazardous position. His soldiers were thinned out; they had seen their three brigade commanders fall successively, Roberts and Schæffer having both been killed, as Sill had been an hour before; the enemy, no way discouraged by three fruitless attacks, still returned to the charge; in short, Wharton's cavalry having either captured or dispersed all the wagon-trains of McCook's corps, the ammunition was beginning to fail them. The time had arrived for yielding; Sheridan rallied around him the *débris* of his division, which left behind, on the ground so stubbornly disputed, and around the dismounted guns which could not be taken along, one thousand eight hundred men killed or wounded, and proceeded to re-form his lines in rear of the cedar wood.

Rosecrans, having at last posted the new troops he had collected, also found himself in this part of the battle-field; he at once ordered Rousseau to enter the wood, in order to prevent the enemy from taking his entire centre in reverse, and to cover Negley's right flank in the place of Sheridan. But the first named general had scarcely retired when the Confederates assailed the second on every side at once. The Federals, favored by the thickets, were able to open a passage for themselves at the point of the bayonet through the enemy's lines which surrounded them; they did not, however, get back to the plain without leaving a large number of prisoners in the enemy's hands.

Rousseau had formed his division in column on his right, in order to reach the position which had been assigned him, and he had hardly time to deploy his first brigade, when the latter met the enemy, to whom the retreat of Sheridan and Negley had imparted new ardor. This brigade, consisting of four battalions of regular infantry and the Fifteenth Kentucky, under command of Colonel Shepherd, opened its ranks to let the fugitives whom the enemy was driving before him pass, and steadily waited for the Con-

federate attack. It had traversed the wood at its narrowest point, and had formed in the vicinity of one of the clearings by which it is contracted west of the position that Sheridan had just taken. The remainder of the division, which had borne more to the left by two narrow roads, had, on the contrary, the densest portion of the forest before it, and found itself fronting the main forces, which had just crushed Sheridan and dislodged Negley. The wood was full of disbanded soldiers. The enemy could not be seen, but the rattling of musketry, the smoke and the swarms of fugitives announced his approach; all the artillery blocked up the roads, whence it was impossible to extricate it. Rousseau felt that a speedy retreat could alone prevent a new disaster. Whilst Shepherd's brigade was covering this movement by vigorously resisting the enemy, he caused his artillery to describe a semi-circuit, and brought back all his forces into the open fields, extending between the road and the cedar wood. He hastily re-formed his lines under the fire of the enemy, who had closely followed him, and was already hovering on the skirts of the wood. This delicate operation, which consists in halting a body of troops in retreat and deploying them in line of battle under a shower of missiles discharged by an invisible foe, was successfully accomplished. Thomas and Rosecrans had hastened to the spot to direct the operation in person; for if Rousseau fell farther back, they would no longer be able to connect the left with the new line that was forming on the right, parallel to the road. Thomas, dispassioned and unmoved in the heat of battle, directing the movements of troops as if he were on parade; Rosecrans, excited by the contest, galloping in every direction where danger seemed to be most imminent, giving direct orders to all the chiefs he encountered,—both sustained their soldiers by the courage they displayed and the confidence they inspired. The three batteries of Rousseau's division proceeded to take a commanding position on a height over which the railroad passes through a cut. Placed in front of this cut, their fire covered all the space extending as far as the cedar wood. On their right was the engineer brigade, which, up to this time, had alone kept the hill. More to the right, Van Cleve's division, and then Harker's brigade of Wood's division, had deployed along the margin of the wood which the

road traverses; they allowed the soldiers of Johnson and Davis to pass through their ranks, who, being closely pursued by the enemy, finally reached the Nashville road, where they could recover from their confusion and re-form their ranks. The batteries of Rousseau's division were supported by Shepherd's brigade. The brigades of Beatty and Scribner, of the same division, extended to the left over the plain in front of the turnpike. In the rear of this line, and under its protection, Sheridan's and Negley's soldiers found that rest which they so well deserved. Rosecrans' left was formed by Palmer's division, which, having alone preserved its position, and facing westward, terminated the Federal line *en potence*. It rested on one side upon the wood which Sheridan, Negley and Rousseau had successively abandoned, on the other side upon Round Forest. Wagner's brigade, left by Wood to guard the fords, connected it with the river.

It was in the midst of a swarm of fugitives and unutterable disorder that Rosecrans and his generals succeeded in forming this line; Hascall's brigade of Wood's division had even been detained on the Nashville causeway because it could not stem the current of fugitives. As soon as the latter left the place free, the Confederates, invigorated by success, were seen emerging from the wood; although their lines were attenuated by the murderous struggle they had just sustained, they advanced in perfect order, entering upon this new combat with the confidence of soldiers accustomed to victory.

Whilst Cleburne was pursuing through the cedar wood the troops that Rousseau was leading back toward the position just described, McCown's division, having re-formed and replenished their cartridge-boxes, had taken on his left a similar direction toward the north-west. By following this course it would reach the centre of the clearing, which extended beyond the cedar wood in front of the dwelling known as the Burrows House. Hardee led it in person; he had asked Bragg to send him two or three brigades of Breckenridge's division as a reinforcement, and the general-in-chief had hastened to comply with the request, for the position of the latter division was in no way menaced. This reinforcement, which had been solicited at ten o'clock, could not reach Hardee before one or two o'clock in the afternoon, and in

the mean while he had to continue fighting and manœuvring with troops who had been under fire since morning. Bragg, in fact, did not wish to allow his adversaries time to recover from the blows he had dealt them; and although McCown's division was considerably reduced both by the fire of the enemy, and the absence of men who had dropped down from exhaustion, he did not hesitate to push it forward against the new Federal line formed by Van Cleve and Harker's brigade. Rains, whose troops had been less exposed than their comrades, was placed on the right, fronting the hill occupied by Rousseau's artillery. Liddell, McNair and Ector deployed on his left.

They had just dislodged the *débris* of Davis' division from the cedar wood after a hard fight, when they emerged into the plain. Received in front by the fire of the new line, which they found drawn up in force where they expected to meet only a mass of fugitives, they were taken by the oblique fire of Rousseau's guns, which Rains tried in vain to capture; he exposed his brigade to be decimated to no purpose, and was himself struck to the heart by a bullet. His soldiers hastened back to the wood, and Hardee was unable to protect the retreat of the other three brigades, which were in great jeopardy in the centre of the clearing, except by bringing all his artillery to the front, so as to occupy that of the Federals. Whilst McCown was rallying his battalions along the margin of the wood, Cleburne had come to take position on his right in front of Thomas, but he simply exchanged a few volleys of musketry with the latter, without venturing into the open space before him. At this point the Confederates were entirely exhausted, and required either rest or reinforcements.

But it was not so with the centre, where the fighting commenced much later, and where Polk's soldiers had not been on the march since daybreak, like Hardee's troops. As soon as he saw Negley driven out of the wood by Cheatham, Withers, on the right of the latter, concentrated all his forces against that portion of Palmer's division which was deployed from Round Forest to the extremity of the cedar thicket, consisting of Cruft's brigade in first line and Grose's in second line. Thomas' movement having entirely uncovered Palmer's right, the latter was soon turned by Cheatham, while a vigorous effort on the part of Withers drove

the brigades of Cruft and Grose upon the Nashville road. This last check rendered the situation of the Federals much more critical; indeed, Thomas' left flank, placed in front of the road, and separated from Palmer by a considerable space, found itself thus absolutely isolated. The extreme left of the Federal army, which rested upon Round Forest, was the only section of the line that had not yet been weakened. It clung to this position as to a last anchor of safety; for if the Confederates had succeeded in carrying it, they would have taken Rosecrans' entire left in reverse as they had turned his right in the morning. Fortunately for the Federals, this important point was confided to one of those indomitable, strong-minded men who can conquer adverse fortune by their courage. The Union army, once saved by Sheridan, was saved a second time by General Hazen. He had already successfully repulsed all the attacks directed against him by the brigades of Chalmers and Donelson. The first had lost its commander and a large number of men; both had been stopped by the enemy's fire every time they attempted to pass beyond the Cowan house. But when Anderson's and Stewart's Confederates had driven in the Federal line on Hazen's right, the latter found himself in a much more dangerous position; he nevertheless resolved to defend it to the last man. Strengthening the margin of the wood south and west, he took a firm stand, and repulsed the enemy's line that was bearing down upon him. This resistance broke the force of the assailants' onslaught for a time. The latter, then massing their forces at the extreme end of the cedar wood, opened a deadly fire upon the Federals, which compelled them to run for shelter to the other side of the railway, one hundred metres in rear of the road; but they did not attempt to follow them there, nor did they venture into the open space which separated them from Hazen. From noon to two o'clock the battle was almost suspended, preparations being made on both sides for a last effort. The two brigades which Bragg had demanded of Breckenridge did not arrive when they might have exercised a decided influence upon the issue of the battle. Breckenridge had replied to his chief that his own position was menaced by considerable masses of the enemy; and yielding to these suggestions, Bragg had not dared to weaken his extreme right. It was only toward the mid-

dle of the day that, having ascertained how groundless were the fears of his lieutenant, he ordered him to cross over in person to the left bank of Stone River with the brigades of Jackson and Adams. The day being too far advanced to admit of his reaching the left wing in time to be useful, Breckenridge was to join Polk in an attack upon Round Forest and the adjoining positions. Bragg hoped thereby to shatter the whole of his adversary's line and enable Hardee to resume the offensive. The Federals took advantage of the respite so opportunely granted them. The greater part of Palmer's division rallied around Hazen, and Wagner took a strong position on his left. The remainder of his line was straitened, and order was nearly restored along the turnpike.

At last the firing of musketry, which had continued more or less briskly along the entire front of the two armies, recommenced with new fury. It was getting late, and Bragg, in order to secure victory, must possess himself of the Nashville causeway before dark. The greater the sacrifices he had made and the greater the results he had obtained, the more necessary it was for him to complete his success without delay; to-morrow he might not be able to obtain from his soldiers an effort equal to the one they had just made. Toward three o'clock Cleburne advanced alone against the positions occupied by Van Cleve in the clearing, for McCown's division was too much reduced to afford him any support. For the first time during the day the combatants were all fighting openly, and the Unionists could at a glance embrace the collective movements of the battle-field from one extremity of their lines to the other; the road parallel to these lines afforded them great facilities for defence. It was an exciting moment for all those who were witnesses of this imposing scene. Cleburne, however, quickly perceived that the well-sustained fire of the Federals, and the sight of their reconstructed battalions, had shaken the confidence of his soldiers. Seeing no friendly troops on their right, they imagined themselves turned, and Wood's brigade dispersed despite the efforts of Colonel Smith, who had been in command of it since his chief was placed at the head of a division. The other two, stopped by the fire of the Federals, were once more exposed to the oblique discharges of Rous-

seau's guns, which at the same time inflicted great damage upon Polk's artillery.

The whole of Cleburne's division regained the wood in disorder; but in the mean time the Federal left wing was in the greatest danger. The brigades of Preston and Palmer of Breckenridge's division having arrived in their turn, Polk attacked Round Forest with renewed vigor. Fortunately, Rosecrans had sent Hascall's brigade in time to succor Hazen, and was himself encouraging by his presence the soldiers who so gallantly defended the key of his position. The Confederates did not tire of returning to dispute it at close quarters with the six thousand fresh troops that Breckenridge had brought upon the field of battle. Several regiments lost one-half of their number in a few minutes; but the Federal ranks were thinned off with equal rapidity, notwithstanding the reinforcements brought by isolated battalions re-formed by their respective chiefs from time to time. Rosecrans, always at the post of greatest danger, had just lost his chief of staff, Colonel Garesché, whose head was shot off by a cannon-ball. Nothing daunted by the danger, Rosecrans recommended his soldiers to fire low and close. "Some brave fellows must be sacrificed for the sake of victory," said this fervent Catholic; "cross yourselves and march forward." At last the Confederates stopped before a last discharge, still more destructive than those preceding. It was certainly not victory, but the salvation of the Federal army; not a breach had been made in its last positions when the battle suddenly ceased, just before night had spread her dark mantle over this field of carnage. Soon after dark the commanders rectified their positions on both sides. Rosecrans abandoned Round Forest in order to concentrate all his forces around the hill upon which Rousseau's artillery was posted. McCook's corps, which had been nearly reorganized, proceeded to occupy some of the points that Van Cleve had defended during the afternoon, so that the Federal line described a semicircle, resting on the left upon the river, and covering its line of retreat toward the north-west. The Confederates, on their side, drew back their left into the cedar wood. A profound silence, only interrupted by the plaintive groans of the wounded, prevailed along the line of the two armies, both exhausted by a strife of ten hours'

duration, and of such sanguinary character as the New World had never yet witnessed.

The Confederates had achieved a considerable success, which came near proving a decisive victory. Thanks to their courage, their perseverance, and the vigor with which they renewed the combat after each retreating movement on the part of their opponents, they had preserved the advantage obtained at the outset by their concentration, until their physical strength gave way. On the side of the Federals, Sheridan and Hazen had signalized themselves among all for their indomitable tenacity; officers and soldiers had exhibited the rare merit of not despairing of success during the most critical moments of the conflict. Their artillery had particularly distinguished itself. Operating under the most unfavorable circumstances, in the midst of dense forests where its field of fire was extremely limited, it had sustained terrific losses in men and *matériel*, but, as soon as it found itself once more on open ground, it had again displayed a superiority over that of the Confederates which it retained during this entire war, and which its opponents on this occasion were the first to acknowledge. Nevertheless, despite the failure of Bragg's last attack, the situation of the Federals was grave and alarming; they had left twenty-eight pieces of artillery, nearly three thousand able-bodied prisoners, a very large number of wounded, their camps, provisions, with a vast quantity of arms and ammunition, in the hands of the assailants. Wheeler's cavalry, which had been detached on the 29th from the right wing of Bragg's army, had struck Rosecrans' line of communication with Nashville in the vicinity of Lavergne during the battle. Repulsed by a Federal regiment, the First Michigan, which guarded the bridge at Stewart's Creek, it had reached the village of Nolensville, whence on the following day it again joined the left wing of Bragg's army, after having created the greatest consternation among the wagon-trains of the Union army. It was not the only damage caused to the Federals by the enemy's cavalry; whilst Wharton was picking up hundreds of prisoners on the Wilkinson road, dispersing the convoys and destroying the wagons belonging to McCook's corps, Pegram, with a brigade of cavalry attached to Breckenridge's division, had crossed Stone River below the fords guarded by the

Federal left wing, and had also captured a considerable number of prisoners on the Nashville road. These raids had entirely interrupted the transportation of provisions, and the soldiers who on this mournful evening gathered around the bivouac-fires, counting the number of comrades either dead or wounded, whom they had left among the thick bushes of the cedar wood, anxiously asked each other what the next day would bring forth. No rations were distributed; and what alarmed them most in this want of provisions and ammunition was the idea they had formed that the army was surrounded and separated from its base of operations. In short, with the exception of the two brigades of Walker and Starkweather, which had rejoined the army at the close of the day, there was not a single regiment but what had been seriously engaged, and no assistance from any fresh troops could be relied upon for the morrow. More than seven thousand men were missing at roll-call; Sheridan had lost one-third of his division; two division generals, Wood and Van Cleve, were wounded; three brigade commanders, Sill, Schæffer and Roberts, had been killed; a fourth, Kirk, was wounded, and a fifth, Willich, taken prisoner. The anxiety of those in command was equal to that felt by the soldiers, but they had already passed through the ordeal of war, and were accustomed from their prairie life to struggle obstinately against all difficulties; in short, they had a commander who fully understood that in certain situations the rashest course in appearance is often the least dangerous. "Gentlemen," said he to his generals as soon as they were assembled inside of his tent, "we will conquer or die here." In refusing to consider himself as vanquished, Rosecrans made sure of victory almost without any further effort on his part. If, on the contrary, he had taken advantage of the night to retire, the battle of the 31st would have entailed upon him all the consequences of a crushing defeat.

Bragg counted upon this retreat; on finding himself in possession of one-third of the artillery and more than one-sixth of the effective force of the enemy's army in killed, wounded and prisoners, he could not believe that Rosecrans would seek to maintain himself in the positions to which he had been driven with the river at his back. He thought he had only to wait to

gather the fruits of victory. But he waited in vain. When the sun of the first day of the year 1863 shone upon the two armies, the Confederates found that Rosecrans had abandoned Round Forest; they at once took possession of it, thus connecting the right wing formed by two of Breckenridge's brigades which had recrossed Stone River with their left, the line of which had been strengthened by some abatis thrown across the cedar wood. They remained under arms, ready to harass the enemy in case he should fall back; but when they saw that his front, compacted since the last evening, was resting on one side upon the hill crowned by Rousseau's artillery, and followed the margin of the wood on the other side under the protection of breastworks hastily constructed, they did not dare to resume the offensive.

On the morning of the 1st of January, Rosecrans had just enough cartridges left to repel an attack. His first care was to procure provisions, and several strong detachments which had been sent to Overall's Creek escorted wagon-trains of provisions and ammunition, which restored vigor and confidence to the soldier. Presently, finding that the day was advancing without any demonstration being made against him on the part of the enemy, the persistent Rosecrans resumed the plan of battle he had so reluctantly given up the day before. Almost all the enemy's forces having been massed in front of his right, he was now able to cross Stone River in rear of his own centre without running any risk. Colonel Beatty, who commanded Van Cleve's division, took position on the bare hills commanding the right bank, at the point where Stone River bears away from the Nashville causeway. Lower down, as we have before said, this river draws near the road; on a line with the angle it describes in effecting this turn there is a height separated from the first hills by a ravine. Grose's brigade of Palmer's division occupied this elevated position. Negley deployed his two brigades, under Stanley and Miller, upon the slopes adjoining the left bank, from which he could easily support the troops stationed on the opposite side, Stone River not being very deep at this point.

This movement was the more menacing to Bragg's right flank and his communications with Murfreesborough, because the conversion of his whole army had drawn away the left from his

base of operations; it showed, above all, that, so far from thinking of retreat, Rosecrans was preparing to resume the offensive. The Confederate commander only made this discovery on the morning of the 2d, for his cavalry, worn out by its exertions on the 31st of December, had needed the whole of the 1st to recuperate; and being, besides, under the impression that an offensive return was impossible, he had not deemed it necessary to feel the enemy except along the Nashville road. He at once determined to forestall the Federals, and to attack them so vigorously in that direction as to compel them to acknowledge themselves beaten. The hills occupied by Beatty enabled the Union artillery, once planted there, to enfilade Polk's line from across the river. It was necessary, in the first place, to recapture this position. The task was entrusted to Breckenridge, whose whole division was assembled on the right bank of Stone River and massed in an isolated wood south-east of the hills. Toward four o'clock in the afternoon, having at last completed the formation of his line, the five brigades of Breckenridge emerged from the wood, and, preceded by a swarm of skirmishers, deployed on two lines. A battery of ten guns and two thousand horse, under Wharton and Pegram, supported this movement, while at the same time Polk's artillery opened fire upon the Federal troops posted in front of it on the left bank.

Rosecrans, who just then happened to be in person in the position thus attacked, had only Beatty's two brigades with some cannon planted at a short distance to defend it against all of Breckenridge's forces. This feeble force, exposed to a well-sustained fire, and, doubtless, not yet recovered from the struggle of the two days before, gave way at the first onset; its retreat soon degenerated into a rout, and the Federals rushed down in confusion to the margin of the river, which they hastily crossed. The Confederates followed in close pursuit, while some of them, crossing over, even tried to take position on the other bank; but here they found themselves caught between two fires, Negley's, on one side, and on the other side that of Grose's brigade, which, as we have said, was placed more in the rear on the right bank, so that the first rush of the pursuers was immediately checked. Rosecrans took advantage of this to resume the offensive at once. Hazen's bri-

gade, which had behaved so gallantly on the 31st, occupied a position in front of Grose's on the right bank. It crossed Stone River to join the latter, and they both fell upon the right flank of the Confederates, whose ranks had been broken by their too rapid success. This unexpected attack, at a moment when they were engaged in fighting Negley's troops and exchanging a sharp musketry-fire across the river, threw Breckenridge's soldiers into the utmost confusion. The fugitives from Beatty's division had not yet come to a halt when their adversaries were already in full retreat in an opposite direction, closely pursued by Grose and Hazen, and riddled by shells from fifty-eight guns, which Rosecrans had posted on the commanding points along the left bank. At this sight Negley's two brigades also crossed the river, anxious to participate in this retaliation, and to complete the rout of the Confederates. Before the close of the day the Federals had recaptured all the positions from which they had momentarily been dislodged; and if they had been more numerous, they might have pushed as far as Murfreesborough, so irreparable was the defeat of Breckenridge. In this fight of less than three-quarters of an hour the five Confederate brigades lost nearly fifteen hundred men and four guns; Hanson, one of their generals, was killed, and another, Adams, was wounded.

During the evening, part of McCook's corps, having recovered from the effects of its disaster of the 31st, came to take position on the reconquered heights; but the rain had softened the soil to such a degree that, on the morning of the 3d, Rosecrans deemed it impracticable to put his troops again on the march in order to complete the movement he had been contemplating for the last three days. He soon perceived, moreover, that this manœuvre would be productive of no results; his persistency had discouraged the enemy, who, having given up all hopes of seeing him retire, and not daring to dislodge him, abandoned a position which was henceforth useless and dangerous to maintain.

This retreat, occurring immediately after Breckenridge's reverse, justified the Federals in regarding as a victory the sanguinary struggle we have just been describing. The greater the efforts of the Confederates, and the nearer they had been to achieving success, the more keenly this unlooked-for denouement was felt by

them. In the course of the day, on the 3d, their columns again took up their line of march for Murfreesborough sadly, but in good order and without discouragement; they carried with them the glorious but barren trophies of their victory of the 31st, consisting of twenty-eight guns, some stands of colors, a large number of wagons and several thousand prisoners. The total number of the latter, according to Bragg's report, amounted to six thousand two hundred and seventy-three; but it is proper that we should deduct about three thousand wounded in order to arrive at a correct estimate of the number of effective prisoners. The losses on the part of the Confederates were enormous; they themselves acknowledged nearly eleven thousand men, more than nine thousand of whom were either killed or wounded, which is equivalent to about one-third of the effective force engaged. The Federals, on their side, counted one thousand five hundred and thirty-three killed, and seven thousand two hundred and forty-five wounded, making a total of eight thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight men who fell by the fire of the enemy. By adding to this the approximate number of able-bodied prisoners, the Federal army may be said to have been diminished by twelve thousand men, or two-sevenths of its total effective force.

Thus weakened and deprived of a portion of its *matériel*, it could not undertake the vigorous pursuit of an enemy whose retreat was protected by swollen streams and the muddy condition of the roads. It was not until the 5th of January that the Confederate cavalry surrendered the town of Murfreesborough to the Federals. Bragg's army halted on the same day behind the line of Duck River,* which it occupied from Manchester to Shelbyville, the Tullahoma Junction becoming the central dépôt of its supplies and the headquarters of the general-in-chief.

Rosecrans did not proceed beyond Murfreesborough, and his army, having taken up its quarters in the neighborhood of this town, soon found itself in communication with Nashville by means of the railroad, which was easily repaired. The battle of which the banks of Stone River had just been the theatre was

*This Duck River in the State of Tennessee must not be confounded with Duck River in the State of Kentucky, to which allusion has been made in another place.

destined to produce important results, although, so far as the ground upon which it was fought is concerned, neither of the two parties had cause to consider it a victory. If the Federals had been decidedly beaten, Nashville would have been besieged and the war carried back into Kentucky. Rosecrans, on the contrary, by entering Murfreesborough on the 5th. of January, notwithstanding his losses and first reverse, already menaced the town of Chattanooga from a distance, the objective point of the whole campaign; but in order to gather the fruits of his stubborn resistance on the battle-field of the 31st of December, he had to wait for reinforcements and a more favorable season.

We shall give an account of this new campaign in a later chapter, for it is time to resume the narrative of the operations of the army of the Potomac during the latter part of the year 1862.

BOOK VI.—VIRGINIA.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE POTOMAC TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

HAVING followed the struggle which took place in the West down to the close of the year 1862, we must now return to the two large armies of Lee and McClellan, which we left fronting each other on the opposite banks of the Potomac after the sanguinary battle of Antietam. It was the end of September. The Northern States had recovered from the great excitement into which they had been thrown by Lee's march upon Pennsylvania; they had eagerly responded to Mr. Lincoln's new appeal for troops to fill up the gaps in the armies caused by fighting, sickness and desertion. Thanks to the energetic and intelligent direction of its old commander, the army of the Potomac had taken heart again, and blotted out on the heights of Sharpsburg the fatal remembrance of its previous defeats. This army, which, three weeks before, vanquished and disorganized, had retired in dismay to Washington, had achieved a great victory and driven the enemy back into Virginia. If McClellan, after the check he experienced before Richmond, had lost a portion of his popularity with his soldiers, the errors of his successors and the manner in which he set to work to repair them had regained him all their confidence; they felt at last that they were led by a chief capable of coping with the Confederates.

In the South, on the contrary, a bitter disappointment had taken the place of overweening confidence, and the advantages obtained by Bragg in Kentucky could not compensate for the evacuation of Maryland in the eyes of those who already expected to see Washington and Philadelphia fall into the power of

Lee. Injustice was done to this illustrious general, and the inhabitants of Maryland were denounced in unmeasured terms for having looked upon his invasion with indifference, or having confined themselves to the expression of barren wishes for his success.

These different sentiments, however, only served to rekindle the ardor of the combatants on both sides and to spur them on to new efforts. The soldiers raised in the North were being rapidly organized, and public opinion impelled the government to spare no means for striking a decisive blow. The very magnitude of the sacrifice required by such a project imparted a new aspect to the war, and the earnestness with which the South proclaimed her attachment to the institution of slavery demonstrated to all clear-sighted people that the hardest blow that could be dealt her would be by striking her directly through this interest. This stern necessity overcame the constitutional scruples of many persons who had hitherto been anxious to smooth the way for reconciliation between the severed States. These were so many recruits for the Republican party, which from the first had probed the very depth of the disease, and was the only political organization that had not cherished patriotic but false illusions. President Lincoln simply endorsed this sentiment when on the 22d of September he issued a proclamation, as a war measure, declaring that from the 1st of January, 1863, all slaves residing in the States which should still be in rebellion at that period would be free. This great measure, of which we shall speak hereafter, was differently commented upon in the Federal armies, where all opinions were represented and freely expressed, without, however, at all interfering with discipline; but nearly all the commanders received it either with mistrust or regret. Before 1861 most of them had entertained sentiments opposed to the abolition of slavery; and, as they might be led into the midst of Southern communities by the war, they preferred not to present themselves before the latter as irreconcilable enemies of their institutions. The most prudent among them confined themselves to the task of executing, without comment, the instructions they received regarding this new policy, of which they were to be to a certain extent the instruments. General McClellan issued a general order to his

soldiers, reminding them, on one hand, of the restraints which their military duties imposed upon political discussions, and referring, on the other hand, to the ballot-box, through which, at the next election, they could ratify the errors of their government. Mr. Lincoln felt extremely hurt on finding himself thus put directly upon trial by one of his generals, in an official military document. At the South the proclamation of the President was received as a new challenge, and the very dangers which it had in store for them in the future increased, for a time, the energy of the Confederate States.

Instead of bringing back his army into the interior in order to protect Richmond, Lee boldly placed himself in the angle formed by the Potomac and the Shenandoah, continuing to menace Maryland with an offensive return. The rich valley of Virginia, whence his soldiers could perceive the heights of Sharpsburg and the hills of Harper's Ferry, the scenes of their exploits, promised him resources which he would have failed to obtain elsewhere. This land of wheat and forage had not been ravaged during the summer, and could supply his men and horses with abundance of food. His army, encamped on the borders of the Opequan, among the splendid farms lying between Winchester, Martinsburg and Charlestown, found the repose it had so well deserved. It received numerous reinforcements of recruits raised by the iron hand of the Confederate government. It was able, above all, to rally that second army of which we have heretofore spoken—that army of stragglers, sick and lame, which amounted to more than thirty thousand men when Lee had crossed the Potomac three weeks before, and which, being stopped by the river, had proceeded gloomily in long columns in the direction of the passes of the Blue Ridge. Owing to the active sympathy of the inhabitants for the cause of the South, all who had really been unable to follow the rapid march of Lee were protected, fed, and often even equipped, whilst the voluntary stragglers—and their number was enormous, according to the statements of Confederate officers themselves—were obliged, willingly or otherwise, on finding themselves strictly watched, to rejoin their comrades. The army, therefore, which did not number forty thousand men when it recrossed the Potomac on the night of September 18th or 19th, found, a

week later, its total effective force raised to nearly seventy-four thousand combatants. These ragged soldiers—as they were contemptuously styled by the inhabitants of Maryland, who had refused to compromise themselves for their sakes—found themselves at last in the midst of a population ready to share all their sufferings and sparing no efforts to alleviate them. The summer heats had been followed by a lovely Virginian autumn; the pure air, the dry soil, the wide open country, and the fresh waters rushing down from the Alleghanies, made the sick forget the forest swamps of the Chickahominy and the mud of Bull Run. The army of the Potomac also greatly needed reorganizing and rest. We have seen that when McClellan resumed the command of it, after Pope's disastrous campaign, it seemed to be on the point of dissolution, and the despondency which had invaded it looked like the certain prelude to new defeats. McClellan had infused fresh vigor into it, but had not been able, during the marches which preceded the battle of Antietam, to eradicate the evils which had been introduced into its organization, nor to repair the enormous losses it had previously sustained in stores and equipments. The regiments, deficient in their complement, and greatly reduced by fighting and desertion, only represented the strength of two or three companies each. Unable to *consolidate* them—that is to say, to merge several into one—McClellan requested that the regiments recently raised might be brigaded with them, so as to combine the two elements, thereby forming brigades, to which the new recruits would impart a numerical, and the old soldiers a moral, strength. The short time during which the army had been encamped in the neighborhood of Washington, before marching to meet Lee in Maryland, had been employed in effecting its reorganization and in arming the recruits and stragglers. But it had commenced the march without the necessary *matériel* for a long campaign. There was a great scarcity of saddle-horses and draught-horses, wagons and articles of clothing, especially shoes, nor had it any *dépôts* or storehouses for collecting such materials.

Under these circumstances, McClellan did not deem it expedient to undertake an offensive campaign in Virginia when Porter's unfortunate reconnaissance had shown him that the enemy was disposed to offer resistance. He did not dare to take position

with a large river behind him whose sudden overflows were always to be feared, nor to renew the attack upon the army that had so gallantly fought at Sharpsburg, before he was fully prepared to undertake an offensive campaign. According to his own calculation, he did not then possess the means of subsisting his large army at more than one day's march from a railroad or canal. His soldiers could not make long marches, some of them having marched during five weeks, almost without interruption, from the borders of the Rapidan to those of the Antietam, the others being newly-enlisted troops, a large number of whom had been wholly disabled by the last ten days' campaign. The rapidity with which the Confederate army had dwindled away during the three weeks intervening between the battle of Manassas and that of Antietam, although entirely composed of tried soldiers long inured to every kind of hardship, fully accounts for all the difficulties which kept McClellan on the left bank of the Potomac. A general-in-chief, especially one whose army has just made a victorious effort, is alone able to judge what he may expect from his troops. Consequently, although his inaction after Lee's retreat in Virginia was entirely to the advantage of the latter, we should unquestionably defer to his judgment, if this judgment had not been influenced by an overestimate of the enemy's forces. In fact, as we have already said, the staff department of the army of the Potomac had from the very first contracted the habit of making no abatement from the figures given by deserters and fugitive negroes, and thereby furnished General McClellan with statements regarding the condition of the Confederate army which had no foundation in fact. Thus, for instance, whilst Lee was only able to oppose forty thousand men at Sharpsburg, McClellan imagined that he had to deal with ninety-seven thousand combatants.* As will presently be seen, Grant committed a contrary error in his campaign against Vicksburg, when, thinking that his adversary was not so strong as he really was, he attacked him with a degree of boldness which proved successful, but which such a general as Lee would probably have made him pay dear for.

On the 22d of September the Federals entered Harper's Ferry without opposition, of which place they were already virtually in

* See state of the situation in the Appendix.

possession through the occupation of Maryland Heights. As a *tête de pont* this point possessed but little importance at this time of the year, for the Potomac was then fordable in many places; and if the waters of the river had risen so as to render the fords impassable, there was cause to fear that the same freshet might carry off the frail bridge of boats that McClellan had just thrown over the river at Harper's Ferry. In order that this little town might serve as the base of an offensive campaign in the valley of Virginia, it would have been necessary to rebuild the railroad bridge, which would have enabled the supply-trains to proceed directly from Washington to Winchester. Such work, however, would have consumed much time. The army of the Potomac, therefore, took up its quarters on the left bank of the river from Williamsport to the mouth of the Monocacy, watching the passes through which an offensive return of the enemy might be apprehended, and McClellan devoted himself exclusively to its reorganization. But his inaction during the most favorable season for campaign purposes soon stirred up the impatient public, and reminded them of his temporizing policy at Washington in 1861, and in the beginning of the following year before Yorktown and on the Chickahominy. This impatience was fully shared by the Federal government.

The difficult relations which had always existed between General McClellan and the Secretary of War had been aggravated by Halleck's appointment to the post of commander-in-chief of the armies. These two functionaries had set themselves earnestly to work to provide the army of the Potomac with all that it needed for beginning the campaign. But every request for reinforcements or supplies, addressed to Halleck by McClellan, was the occasion of complaints and mutual reproaches, which could not but prove detrimental to the welfare of the service. When this controversy is impartially examined, containing, as it does, the most contradictory assertions concerning matters of fact, one is naturally astonished that for more than a month General Halleck did not think of taking the cars, which would have brought him to Harper's Ferry in five hours, to ascertain for himself the extent of the wants of the army of the Potomac and the validity of the complaints of its commander. Honest Mr. Lincoln could not

escape from the influence of the military authorities around him, and even his good intentions only served to render his orders painfully contradictory. Thus, for instance, after having visited the army on the 1st of October, and having seemed satisfied with the explanations that McClellan gave him regarding his delay in the field, he sent him an order on the 6th of the same month, directing him to cross the Potomac and assume the offensive at once. He advised him at the same time to effect his passage east of the Blue Ridge, so as to keep his army between the enemy and Washington, promising him in that case a reinforcement of thirty thousand men. If McClellan, who had expressed a preference for a campaign in the valley of Virginia, persisted in attacking Lee in front, between Martinsburg and Winchester, he was at liberty to do so, but then the reinforcements drawn from the garrison of Washington would be reduced to fifteen thousand men.

What was called the garrison of Washington, so far, at least, as relates to numbers, was a real army, partly composed of old troops who had been in the peninsula campaign, and partly of recruits scarcely drilled. It numbered, as we have before said, seventy-three thousand able-bodied men present for field duty. General Banks was in command. It nominally formed part of the army of the Potomac, but in reality it was under the direct orders of the President and General Halleck.

The President's plan offered General McClellan great advantages; it not only ensured him considerable reinforcements, but the sincere co-operation of the Washington authorities and the approval of public opinion, of which those authorities were then only the interpreters; and, by menacing Lee's communications, he would certainly have compelled him to evacuate the valley of Virginia. But still dreading an offensive return into Maryland on the part of his opponent, so long as that State was not protected by a rise in the waters of the Potomac, McClellan did not adopt this programme. It may be presumed that if he had known the real condition of the Confederate army he would not have entertained such fears. But whatever his plan may have been, he was not in a condition to take the field when the orders of the President reached him. The fifteen days that had elapsed since the 22d of September had been of more benefit to his adversary

than to himself; and having once stopped for the purpose of reconstructing and reorganizing his army, it was incumbent upon him to finish that work before leading his troops into new combats.

It was Lee's interest to keep his opponent in this purely defensive attitude. By menacing Maryland, at least apparently, he satisfied public opinion in the South, which his retreat had exasperated; he both afforded relief to his army and lessened the burdens of the poorest sections of Virginia by subsisting on the resources of the rich valley of the Shenandoah; in short, he was approaching the bad season of the year, which would render any serious campaign against Richmond impossible. In order to detain McClellan on the banks of the Potomac, it was expedient to disturb and harass him. Stuart, who had already displayed his aptitude for leading an independent corps of cavalry before Richmond, was entrusted with this task.

A demonstration was made along the Upper Potomac for the purpose of diverting the attention of the Federals; they still occupied West Virginia, whither General Cox, who had been in command of the Ninth corps since the death of Reno, was then proceeding with considerable reinforcements. A long chain of posts, connecting this region with the positions occupied by McClellan, was especially intended to cover the Upper Potomac, and protect Maryland and Pennsylvania in that direction against the inroads of Confederate partisans; west of Hancock, which is the northernmost point of the course of the Potomac, their troops lined the right bank of the river in order to keep possession of the railroad which runs along that bank. Since the battle of Antietam these posts had been guarded by General Averill, who employed the largest portion of the Federal cavalry for that purpose. This cavalry had just been relieved by other detachments, and was occupying the Cumberland and Hancock road, when, on the 6th of October, it was ascertained that the enemy had shown himself in force in the valley of St. John's River, a small tributary of the right bank of the Potomac. Averill was immediately ordered to proceed toward this point in order to protect the railroad and the river crossings. This was precisely what the Confederates desired; and while their adversaries were thus detained above Hancock, Stuart was preparing to cross the river lower down.

At early dawn on the 10th of October his cavalry division, comprising the three brigades of Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee and Jones, eighteen hundred strong, accompanied by four pieces of artillery, crossed the Potomac at McCoy's Ferry, near the mouth of Back River. By a fortunate chance he kept clear of some Federal troops on the Hancock and Williamsburg turnpike; the day previous part of Cox's division had crossed at this point on their way to West Virginia, and the next day Averill was following the same road in a contrary direction eastward, for he had soon discovered the mistake which had detained him higher up. Stuart had the good fortune to slip, almost unperceived, between these two troops; not daring to attack Hagerstown, which he knew to be well defended, he pushed on to Mercersburg, continuing in a north-easterly direction as fast as he could travel, and arrived in front of the little town of Chambersburg on the same evening. He was already in the heart of Pennsylvania, where no one was expecting such visitors. It was on a dark, rainy night that some fugitives came running at full speed to announce the approach of the enemy. There were no means of defence in the town, the garrison of which consisted only of a few militia officers who had never been under fire; and Stuart's cavalry, although worn out by their long march, entered Chambersburg without resistance. They took special care to show the utmost consideration for this town, the first in the free States in which the Confederate flag had yet appeared. No pillaging was allowed; men and horses bivouacked in the wide streets under the trees which shaded them, and conducted themselves so well that the inhabitants soon began to treat them more as friends than foes. Nothing was destroyed but the dépôts of the Federal government, and Stuart only took what was necessary for his troops; among the farmers of this town he found valuable booty—a large number of excellent horses. His troopers mounted these fresh animals, and, leading the old ones by the bridle, left Chambersburg on the 11th before daylight; they had thus gained a new advantage over their adversaries, who did not dare resort to such an expeditious mode of recruiting in a friendly country. After entering the Gettysburg road, so as to elude pursuit, Stuart soon turned to the right, and re-entered Maryland through Emmetts-

burg. The movements of Cox, whom he came near meeting, decided him not to return by way of the Upper Potomac, but to push along into the valley of the Monocacy. In that way he placed the chain of South Mountain between McClellan and himself, and was free to cross the Potomac near Leesburg, which at that period did not present any serious obstacle.

The news of this raid reached McClellan's headquarters on the evening of the 10th; the fact of Stuart's crossing the Potomac became known when that general was already quietly bivouacking in a town of Pennsylvania. Averill was at once ordered to start in pursuit. Pleasanton, who protected the encampments of the army of the Potomac, with the remainder of the cavalry, was also ordered to Hagerstown, and proceeded as far as seven kilometres beyond the Hancock road. Stuart was on his way back when the Federals were still vainly endeavoring to discover his tracks; it was only on the 11th that McClellan was finally apprised of his march toward the east. He immediately made all necessary dispositions for intercepting him, if possible, before he could reach the Potomac. At one o'clock Pleasanton was ordered to proceed eastward, to occupy Mechanicsville, beyond the Blue Ridge, and to send his scouts in every direction, in order to discover the enemy; Cox's division was ordered to halt on its march westward, and to guard the crossings of the Upper Potomac; Burnside, whose corps was encamped in Pleasant Valley, one of the lower valleys of the Blue Ridge, was directed to occupy the railroad bridge on the Monocacy, and to watch that river. Lower down, Stoneman, who was stationed near Poolesville, was instructed to distribute his troops so as to protect all the fords of the Potomac, and to dispute their passage with Stuart wherever he might present himself. McClellan hoped thereby to retard the march of the latter, and to concentrate a crushing force against him; but Stuart, thanks to his own daring, the quickness of his movements, the connivance of the inhabitants and his own good fortune, managed to escape from this well-laid trap. Once out of Chambersburg, he did not stop except for just such time as was necessary to feed his men and horses; passing through the village of Emmettsburg amidst the loud huzzahs of a population intensely secessionist, he took the Frederick road by descending

the right bank of the Monocacy. Night overtook him when he was within a few kilometres of Frederick; then, bearing suddenly to the left, he crossed the water-course, and continuing his march toward Monrovia, he eluded the Federals, who were looking out for him at Frederick. In the mean time, Pleasanton had hastened to Mechanicsville, but only to learn that the enemy had passed eight kilometres east of this village an hour before. Burnside had also sent a detachment of troops to Frederick; but these troops had halted in that town, instead of pushing eastward as far as the valley of the Monocacy, where they would undoubtedly have met the Confederates, who were following the same road on their way down toward the Potomac.

Pleasanton, however, in his efforts to reach this river before Stuart, struck the mouth of the Monocacy on the 12th, at eight o'clock in the morning, where he found a regiment of Federal infantry; the enemy's cavalry had not been seen in this place; they had reached Hyattsville at break of day, and passing through Barnsville had taken the road to Poolesville, in a totally different direction. This town was occupied by Stoneman; consequently, before reaching this place, about the same time that Pleasanton made his appearance on the banks of the Potomac, Stuart threw himself suddenly into the woods, on the right of the road, leaving Poolesville four or five kilometres on his left, and gained the Georgetown and Hauling Ford road. Pleasanton was proceeding to meet him by the same road; having failed to find the Confederates at the mouth of the Monocacy, he felt sure of meeting them below, and was in hopes of stopping them long enough to give the infantry time to come up. His scouts had not proceeded more than three kilometres when they ran into Stuart's advanced squadrons. The Confederate troopers, disguised in Federal uniform, were four times as numerous as their adversaries. Dismounting, they made a stand against the latter, and soon compelled them to retreat. Whilst Pleasanton's column, thus interrupted on its march, was waiting for the arrival of the infantry to resume it, Stuart, screening his movement behind a line of skirmishers, made a *détour* to the left, and speedily gained the shores of the Potomac at White's Ford. A detachment of two hundred Federal foot that Stoneman had placed at that point was easily

driven off by the fire of a few squadrons, and by one o'clock the whole division had crossed the river. It had scarcely reached the other side when it saw Pleasanton approaching in one direction, whose march had been retarded by the slow movements of the infantry and artillery, and in another direction a brigade which had left Poolesville since morning, and which had lost much valuable time on the road.

Stuart quietly encamped at Leesburg, and on the 13th he again crossed the Blue Ridge to rejoin Lee, followed at a distance by detachments of Federal cavalry, sent against him from Washington. He had not done much damage in the course of this rapid expedition, but had supplied his cavalry with fresh horses at Chambersburg, thrown alarm and confusion into the Northern States, and inflicted a serious injury upon McClellan by obliging his cavalry to make forced marches, which rendered more than half of his horses unfit for service. The facility with which the whole division under his command baffled the pursuit of the Federal columns showed, that in order to make an effective stand against expeditions of this kind, nothing but cavalry should be employed, and in considerable masses. Indeed, one thousand or fifteen hundred infantry were not too many to oppose Stuart's eighteen hundred mounted men, armed with repeating rifles. It was impossible to station such a force at each of the Potomac crossings, and yet, if a single one of them was neglected, the Confederate troop, swifter in its movements than its adversaries on foot, and more numerous than its mounted adversaries, would take possession of it before the former and in spite of the latter.

The pressing demands of McClellan for a fresh supply of horses for his cavalry subsequently to this affair increased the number of subjects of recrimination between this general and the departments at Washington. There were controversies on statistical questions; and efforts were even made to pick a quarrel with the commander-in-chief of the army of the Potomac on account of a mistake in figures which occurred in the transmission of one of his telegrams; it was sought to prove that he had more horses than he required. A large number had, in fact, been forwarded to him; he had received about seven thousand in two months, but during that time a terrible epidemic, combined with the prostrat-

ing effects of hard work, had rendered forty-five hundred of them unfit for use, and the addition of twenty-five hundred was far from meeting the exigences of an army about to take the field. The responsibility for this scarcity, fatal at such a juncture, partly rested upon the soldiers, who did not bestow sufficient care upon their horses, and partly upon the system of military administration. The demands for remounts and the forwarding of the animals were delayed by incessant wranglings, and the quartermaster of the army was only once authorized to make a direct purchase of twelve hundred horses, without procuring them from the dépôts at Washington. It thus happened that the army, a victim to the despotism of administrative formalities, was in want of saddle-horses and draft animals in a country which possessed both in great abundance, and in which the enemy, by a raid of only two days, had picked up as many as he wanted. In order to show how large was the number of animals required by this army as soon as it commenced marching, it will be enough to say that in order to feed for the period of ten days the one hundred and twenty-two thousand mouths for whom rations had to be provided, it required wagons drawn by ten thousand nine hundred and eighty draft animals; the artillery horses numbered six thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, and those belonging to the cavalry five thousand and forty-six, making in all a total of twenty-two thousand eight hundred and sixty-two animals. But in order to feed these twenty-two thousand eight hundred and sixty-two animals during the same period of ten days, it was necessary to provide a certain quantity of forage, which required seventeen thousand eight hundred and thirty-two extra draft animals to wagon it; and as the latter ate a portion of the forage they transported, the available rations were reduced by nearly one-half, so that the forty thousand six hundred and ninety-five horses or mules belonging to the army had only, in reality, provisions for six days.

The same difficulties retarded the supplies of every kind asked by McClellan. For some days despatches were constantly passing between his headquarters and those of Halleck, asserting, on the one side, that so many thousand overcoats and pairs of shoes had been forwarded, and on the other that such articles had not been received. Finally, about the 25th of October, large

supplies of clothing were received, and on the 31st the army was completely provisioned.* McClellan had not waited until this last date to put his army in motion.

We have entered into some details for the purpose of showing all the difficulties which, especially at that period, embarrassed the movements of the Federal armies. As we observed in the beginning of this work, some of these difficulties were peculiar to the very nature of the country, but they were increased by the defects of organization and the want of experience in the supply departments. We have already remarked that sufficient advantage had not been taken of the vast number of horses with which the farms of Pennsylvania were stocked. In the same way, instead of collecting around the cantonments of the army of the Potomac the provisions required for its consumption by a system of regular requisitions, they were forwarded from Washington by rail, which encumbered the track, delaying the arrival of the *matériel* and equipments asked for by McClellan. In short, it is impossible to conceive how cavalry campaigning in a country which is certainly not a wilderness, but is covered with farms and interspersed by vast pasture-lands, should be obliged to carry its own forage along, and that five thousand horses should occupy a number of draft animals nearly equal to their own for the performance of this service. Nor was Lee's army free from these difficulties; and a Prussian officer, M. de Boreke, who was then serving with distinction on Stuart's staff, also complains, in an interesting work he has published on these campaigns, that the largest portion of the provisions was brought with much trouble from Richmond, whilst the counties adjacent to the encampments of the Confederate army abounded in resources which they did not know how to employ.

The task that McClellan had undertaken was far from being completed on the 25th of October, when he put his army in motion. Many articles were delivered to the soldiers during the first few days of the march, but a large number had to be left behind

* In the list of articles supplied for the army of the Potomac, for the month of October alone, we find among other entries the following: Thirty-three thousand eight hundred and forty pairs of boots, sixty-one thousand pairs of shoes, and ninety-seven thousand seven hundred pairs of drawers.

in the dépôts for want of time to distribute them. Cavalry horses were still wanting. Most of the new regiments which were to be brigaded with the old organizations had not arrived. But a regard for higher orders did not admit of any further delay in taking the field. The waters of the Potomac having risen, McClellan had nothing more to fear for the safety of Maryland, and he intended to follow the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, so as to menace the communications of his adversary while covering the capital, and receiving the reinforcements which had been promised him in case he should adopt this plan. It was the one that Mr. Lincoln had recommended to him three weeks before, so that it was approved at the White House without any difficulty.

On the 25th of October a bridge of boats was thrown across the Potomac at Berlin. Higher up, at Harper's Ferry, there were two others, one over the Potomac, the other over the Shenandoah. The crossing of the river began the day following. The organization of the army was the same as at the battle of Antietam, but the bullets of the enemy had caused many changes in the *personnel* of the generals. Burnside was still in command of the First and Ninth corps; Reynolds had superseded Hooker, wounded, and Wilcox occupied the post in which Reno had met his death. The Second and Twelfth, under the orders of Sumner, had seen their two commanders, Richardson and Mansfield, fall on the borders of Antietam; they had been replaced by Couch and Slocum. The Fifth and Sixth corps, each reinforced by a new division, had remained under the orders of Franklin and Porter, and two divisions, commanded by Stoneman and Whipple, were not incorporated into any army corps. The movable portion of the garrison of Washington was composed of the two corps of Heintzelman and Sigel, with a division of cavalry commanded by Bayard.

McClellan left the Twelfth corps on the borders of the Potomac; Slocum, who commanded it, was ordered to occupy Harper's Ferry and its environs with the largest portion of that corps, about ten thousand men. Morrell, with detachments drawn from various points, forming three brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, was charged to guard the Upper Potomac from Cumberland to the mouth of the Antietam.

On the 26th of October two divisions of the Ninth corps, with Pleasanton's cavalry, crossed at Berlin, and occupied the village of Lovettsville, at the foot of the Loudon Hills. On being informed of this movement, the President sent a despatch to General McClellan to congratulate him upon his having taken the field. Notwithstanding the rain, which was falling in torrents, the army and its chiefs hailed with joy and confidence this first step taken once more on the road to Richmond. In following the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, General McClellan intended to occupy its passes successively in proportion as he came on a line with them. If the enemy lingered in the vicinity of the Potomac, he could thus throw himself upon his rear; if, on the contrary, Lee proceeded up the valley, he counted upon compelling him to fall back as far as Gordonsville, after which means would be devised for approaching once more the capital of Virginia. The line of march adopted by the army of the Potomac followed a valley lying parallel to that of the Shenandoah, comprised between the Blue Ridge westward and the Bull Run Mountains eastward, an open valley intersected by numerous roads. The passes of the Blue Ridge beginning at the north are Vestal's Gap, Gregory's Gap, Snicker's Gap, Ashby's Gap, Manassas Gap and Chester Gap. The railroad called the Manassas Gap Railway leaves Strasburg on the Upper Shenandoah, passes through this defile, intersects the valley which the army of the Potomac had entered, crosses the Bull Run Mountains at the pass of Thoroughfare Gap, and joins the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in the vicinity of Bull Run, giving to this junction the already famous name of Manassas. McClellan was to receive all his supplies by way of the bridge of boats at Berlin until he could strike this line; once within reach of Thoroughfare Gap, he could revictual his army directly by the Washington Railroad and abandon his communications with the Potomac. It was also at this place that he was to rally the reinforcements which Heintzelman and Sigel were commissioned to bring him.

The cantonments of the army in Maryland were considerably scattered. It required several days to enable him to concentrate his forces and cross over the two bridges—an operation which was only terminated on the 2d of November. The Ninth corps, the

reserve artillery, Stoneman's division, the First, and lastly the Sixth, corps, crossed the bridge at Berlin. In the mean while, the Second, followed by the Fifth corps, crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and then the Shenandoah, emerged from the valley by skirting the extremity of Loudon Heights. They thus struck into the road, followed by the troops who had crossed the river east of the Blue Ridge, while the latter continued to advance toward the south. All the corps marched in sufficient proximity to each other to be able to afford one another mutual support in case Lee should cross the mountains and come to attack the army either in front or in rear.

On the 2d of November, the day when the rear-guard, consisting of the Sixth corps, reached at last the right bank of the river at Berlin, Burnside caused the Ninth corps to occupy Bloomfield and Union; the Second, bearing to the right, took possession of Snicker's Gap; the Fifth and First were at some distance in the rear; one reached Snickersville in the evening, the other was encamped at Purcellsville since the previous day; Pleasanton's cavalry cleared the march. The first three passes of the Blue Ridge—Vestal's Gap, Gregory's Gap and Snicker's Gap—were, therefore, either masked or occupied. Lee had not defended them, and had merely directed the brigades of Gregg and Thomas to make an insignificant demonstration on the 2d against the troops posted in the last-mentioned defile.

He had, in fact, guessed the purpose of the Federals; and being well aware that he could not maintain himself in the valley of Virginia, he was proceeding rapidly toward the borders of the Rappahannock with the greater part of his army for the purpose of forestalling them. On the 1st of November a considerable portion of his artillery, his reserves and stores had been sent by way of Thornton's Gap to Culpepper Court-house, where they arrived on the 4th. Longstreet, following this movement, proceeded up the Shenandoah, crossed it at Front Royal, and passing through the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap emerged in the vicinity of the sources of the Rappahannock. The streams which form this river presenting no serious obstacle, he fell back as far as Culpepper, where he arrived on the 3d of November. The first tributary of the Rappahannock of any importance,

Hedgeman's River, presented a line a little above that village, along which he hoped to be able to arrest the Federals, while his right flank was covered by the Rappahannock, which, below the confluence of this river, assumes the proportions of a large water-course. Jackson, meanwhile, remained in the valley of Virginia with his corps and Stuart's cavalry. Breaking up his camps, which for the last six weeks had been at Martinsburg and Bunker's Hill, he proceeded to take position at Millwood, on the Shenandoah, at the foot of Ashby's Gap, in order the better to watch the movements of the Federals. Stuart pressed the latter very closely, sometimes remaining on the crest of the Blue Ridge, whence he could perceive their long columns from a distance, at other times descending into the valley which stretched out below him and boldly disputing the ground with them whenever he found an opportunity. His battery of artillery, almost entirely served by Europeans, was of powerful assistance to him in this kind of warfare, and was remarkable for its precision of aim—a very rare thing in the Southern armies. But, since the time when the inexperience of the Federal cavalry made Stuart's task an easy one, his adversaries had learned much. Pleasanton and his brigade, who cleared McClellan's march, asked nothing better than to measure strength with the Confederate cavalry, and revenge themselves for not having been able to catch them in their raid across Maryland. A favorable opportunity for accomplishing this presented itself to the Union troops on the 2d of November. While the Second corps was occupying Snicker's Gap, Pleasanton pushed forward in the direction of Ashby's Gap. At Union village he met a brigade of the enemy's cavalry, which he dislodged after a sharp fight. The next day, having been reinforced by Averill, he continued his march. Stuart was waiting for him with his entire division in front of the village of Upperville, determined to resist as long as he could in order to defend the pass of Ashby's Gap. But the Federals attacked him so vigorously that he was soon overthrown and driven in disorder through Upperville as far as the village of Paris, at the very entrance of the pass.

In the mean time, the Federal infantry followed the movement

of its cavalry, and the Second corps reached Paris on the 4th of November. Stuart's division, which on that day was commanded by General Rosser, endeavored for a moment to make a stand against it, but was soon dislodged; and while the Federals occupied Ashby's Gap, the Confederate cavalry retired by the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge to cover Longstreet along the line of Hedgeman's River, and they did not halt during this rapid retreat until they had reached the village of Orleans. Jackson, meanwhile, still continued inactive at Millwood, allowing the Federals to occupy Ashby's Gap, and seeming to take no notice of their columns, that were advancing along the road through which he communicated with the rest of the army. The passage of this road at Chester Gap was guarded by D. H. Hill's division, which was to join Longstreet whenever it should find itself too seriously compromised by remaining in the defile. In order to protect its approaches as long as possible, Stuart, who had rejoined his division alone and after passing through many dangers, brought it to the front on the morning of the 5th and took position at the junction called Barbee's Cross-roads, where he waited for the enemy on carefully chosen and prepared ground. Pleasanton was not slow in bringing up his brigade, and immediately attacked him, notwithstanding the disproportion of numbers. The Eighth Illinois, led by Colonel Farnsworth, a distinguished officer, whose career was to be soon cut short by a glorious death,* gallantly charged on the left on the Warrenton road, but was stopped by a barricade which had been raised across it. On the Chester Gap road to the right the Federals steadily waited for their adversaries, whom they received with a well-sustained fire, which threw their ranks into confusion. At the same time, Colonel Davis, ordering the Eighth New York to draw their sabres, threw himself upon their flank, and after a hand-to-hand fight of a few minutes' duration drove them back in disorder. Stuart, unwilling to continue the fight, retired toward Flint Hill; Pleasanton followed him as far as Sandy Hook, thus occupying

* John F. Farnsworth, of the Eighth Illinois, is still living, and was lately a member of Congress. He was promoted to brigadier-general November 29, 1862. The author has confounded him with Brigadier-General E. J. Farnsworth, of Michigan, killed at Gettysburg.—ED.

all the roads east of Chester Gap, whilst Averill took possession of Manassas Gap after a slight skirmish.

On the 6th of November the army's change of base was therefore accomplished. All the corps had reached the Manassas Gap Railroad, or were sufficiently near this railway to seek their supplies at some of its stations. This line established direct communications with Washington, the capital was covered, and the reinforcements promised to McClellan were beginning to arrive. Bayard's cavalry had joined him a few days before, and on the 6th of November the Eleventh corps, which Sigel brought him, was at New Baltimore and Thoroughfare Gap; after this corps followed Sickles' division, which encamped that day at Manassas Junction and Warrenton Junction. The whole army thus extended from the passes of the Blue Ridge to the isolated chain of hills adjoining the Bull Run Mountains. The First corps already occupied Warrenton, the Ninth had reached Waterloo on the Rappahannock, the Second was at Rectortown on the Manassas Gap Railroad, the Fifth and Sixth closed the march, and were proceeding in the direction of this railway, one from Snicker's Gap and the other from Upperville. Warrenton was the place selected by McClellan as a point of concentration; it was the terminus of a railroad which offered great facilities for the transportation and distribution of rations. His columns were to march upon this town, leaving the Rappahannock on the right, whilst Pleasanton, remaining on the left bank of this river, was to watch Thornton's Gap, the only pass in the Blue Ridge through which Jackson communicated with Longstreet. These two Confederate generals were posted, one at Millwood, the other at Culpepper, more than seventy kilometres apart in a direct line, and more than one hundred by the pass of Thornton's Gap, which was occupied by D. H. Hill's division, whose duty it was to keep up a connection between the two points. The Federal army was placed almost between the two; it needed but one day's march to separate them, and two or three for the whole of it to assemble at Warrenton; it would thus have found itself fronting Longstreet, who had only about fifty thousand men under him, and could have attacked him with every chance of success. Jackson and Lee, who had a thorough knowledge of the situation, had

certainly projected some bold movement upon McClellan's rear, similar to that which had proved so successful against Pope two months and a half before, but they were playing a very dangerous game, for never had the army of the Potomac manœuvred better, nor been better prepared for a great struggle, and never had the mutual confidence between general and soldiers been greater than at that moment. It is useless to inquire whether victory would have been the reward of Jackson's audacity, or the result of McClellan's combinations; a political intrigue concocted at Washington suddenly interrupted the campaign, and delivered the Confederates from an adversary whom they had learned to respect.

On the evening of November 7th, during a snow-storm somewhat early in the year for that climate, McClellan was in his tent with General Burnside, when the bearer of a despatch from the President was announced. This was General Buckingham, an officer unknown to the army of the Potomac, who brought him an order contained in three lines, and signed by Halleck. This order relieved him from the command of the army and appointed Burnside as his successor. News so utterly unexpected fell like a thunderbolt upon these two officers, who had long been on terms of strictest friendship; but the only one who exhibited any emotion was the one upon whom fell the weight of a responsibility to which he had never aspired. After reading the despatch, without betraying any feeling McClellan handed it to him, simply remarking, "You command the army."* Burnside declined to

* This account of the relief of McClellan and the appointment of Burnside is not quite correct, but the slight error, which, after all, concerns only a mere incident of the great events, would be of little moment, were it not that it has brought out the true details, which are not without interest. In a letter to the *Chicago Tribune* of September 4, 1875, General Buckingham takes exception to the author's account, both as to the facts, and as to the statement that he was "an officer unknown to the army of the Potomac." With regard to the facts, Colonel John P. Nicholson writes to the *Philadelphia Times* under date of September 18, 1875, showing that the Comte de Paris had taken the details from Hurlbut, Swinton and Lossing, authorities unchallenged on this point for years past. The following is General Buckingham's account:

"I was at that time on special duty at the War Department, my office being adjoining the Secretary's private room. On the evening of the 6th of November, about ten o'clock, the Secretary sent for me to come to his office, where I found him with General Halleck. He told me that he wanted me to go and

accept for some time. All his friends and his late commander insisted, and finally succeeded in overcoming his scruples, which find the headquarters of the army of the Potomac, and spent some time in giving minute directions as to the route I should take. Just before I left he handed me two envelopes, unsealed, telling me to take them to my room, and, having read them, to seal them up. I was thunderstruck to find that one of the envelopes contained two orders for McClellan—one from the President, relieving him from the command of the army, and the other from General Halleck, ordering him to repair to some town in New Jersey and report by letter to the War Department. The other envelope contained two orders for Burnside—one from the President, assigning him to the command of the army, vice McClellan, and the other from General Halleck, directing him to report what were his plans.

"Before leaving next morning, I saw the Secretary at his house, and he explained to me his reasons for sending an officer of my rank on an errand like that. The first was that he feared Burnside would not accept the command, and my instructions were to use, if necessary, the strongest arguments to induce him not to refuse. The second reason, though a characteristic one, had very little foundation. The Secretary had not only no confidence in McClellan's military skill, but he very much doubted his patriotism, and even loyalty, and he expressed to me some fear that McClellan would not give up the command, and he wished, therefore, that the order should be presented by an officer of high rank, direct from the War Department, so as to carry the full weight of the President's authority. He directed me to see Burnside first and get his decision. If he consented to accept, I was then to see McClellan; but if not, I was to return at once to Washington.

"I found Burnside about fifteen miles south of Salem, where his division was halted and he alone in a little chamber. Closing the door, I made known my errand. He at once declined the command. Whatever my private opinion may have been, my duty was to follow the directions of the Secretary of War, and, if possible, overcome his objections. It happened, however, knowing, as I did, that the President was resolved at all events to remove McClellan, that I felt fully satisfied that he (Burnside) ought to accept, and urged him to do so. Among other objections, he urged his want of confidence in himself and his particularly friendly relations to McClellan, to whom he felt under the strongest obligations. I met these objections by stating that McClellan's removal was resolved upon at any rate, and that if he (Burnside) did not accept the command, it would be given to Hooker, who became, in fact, Burnside's successor. He at length consented to obey the order, and I requested him to go with me to find McClellan. We returned to Salem, whence I had ridden on horseback through a snow-storm, and I had my locomotive fixed up the same evening, and on it we proceeded about five miles up the railroad to McClellan's camp. About eleven o'clock we found him alone in his tent, examining papers, and as we both entered together he received us in his usual kind and cordial manner.

"My task was not only a painful one, but particularly distasteful to me in view of my friendly feelings for McClellan. But as the blow had to come, I was glad that it was not to be given through an unkind hand and in a mortifying way. General McClellan has himself borne testimony to the kind manner

the future was unfortunately to justify in a striking manner. On the morning of the 8th the army of the Potomac learned, with astonishment and grief, that it had lost the chief who had called it into existence and led it for the first time into battle—the chief who had shown them the spires of Richmond, and who on the morrow of a great disaster had restored their self-reliance, and who, in short, had just led them to victory. We are not called upon to pass judgment upon General McClellan's military career in this place. In spite of our sincerity, such an estimate on our part might look like the reflection of our sentiments of profound gratitude and abiding friendship for our old chief; but every reader may judge for himself in accordance with the facts we have impartially related. We will simply state that the Washington authorities took all sorts of precautions to prevent the soldiers of the army of the Potomac from manifesting any sympathy for McClellan, which would have been too severe a reflection upon their conduct, and that the news of his departure caused universal rejoicing among the adversaries whom he had met on so many battle-fields.

The displacement of a general-in-chief in the midst of a campaign, just as he was about to attack or to be attacked by the enemy, is not only a severe condemnation of the individual whom it affects, but it is a serious, and we may add a dangerous, measure, and the chief magistrate of a great nation should never resort to it, unless public interest requires it. The motives which decided Mr. Lincoln, the real causes of complaint he may have had against McClellan, have always remained enveloped in mystery.

in which I communicated the order, and I can bear testimony to his prompt and cheerful obedience to it."

In a letter to Colonel Nicholson, dated October 26, 1875, the Comte de Paris writes: "Allow me only, before concluding, to answer two of the assertions of the latter (General Buckingham). He says that fears were entertained in Washington that General McClellan would not submit to the President's order; such a suspicion is a wanton offence against General McClellan's loyalty, for it means nothing less than that he was suspected of treachery and rebellion against the Constitution which he was fighting to uphold. He objects also to the qualification I give him of being a stranger to the army of the Potomac. He might have been known to some of the high officers in the army; but not having taken any part in its campaigns, he was unknown to the army and a stranger among the troops."—ED.

The general order issued by the latter regarding the proclamation of September 22d was dated one month back; his correspondence on the subject of army supplies had closed a fortnight since. His delay in taking the field, notwithstanding the order of the President, could no longer be alleged against him now that the army was in motion, and that he had been congratulated thereupon. He had, moreover, adopted the plan of campaign which had been sent to him from Washington.

It was impossible, therefore, to find any plausible pretext for his dismissal, and the attempt was not made. The real causes were, on the one hand, the hostility of General Halleck and the Secretary of War, and, on the other, that of the Republican party, which some political friends of McClellan had irritated and alarmed by their imprudent language. What finally determined this step, it is said, was the result of certain partial elections which turned out in favor of the Democratic party. Mr. Lincoln was made to believe that this result was the beginning of a political movement of which General McClellan would be the leader; it is even possible that, in order to control his action, they may have placed before him the danger of a military revolution, which the enemies of republican institutions in America were always predicting, and the measures taken for carrying out the order of the President in an army so foreign to all ideas of *pronunciamientos* justify this supposition. Mr. Lincoln, well acquainted with political intrigues, could no longer resist the evil influences by which he was beset. As it frequently happens, unfortunately, with honest people who have been guilty of some weakness, he made up his mind, after much hesitation, at a time when such an act was most unaccountable, and when it might have been productive of most disastrous consequences.

CHAPTER II.

FREDERICKSBURG.

WITHOUT uttering one word of complaint, McClellan announced to the army that he had ceased to command. He remained for three days longer in the midst of it, sparing no pains to make the new general familiar with its organization, and gave the latter a last proof of his friendship by accompanying him as far as Warrenton, where he took leave of his companions in arms for the remainder of the war. The affable manners, high character and disinterestedness of the new general-in-chief, together with the remembrance of his success at Roanoke, secured him the regard of all his comrades; but it soon became evident that when he thought of declining the dangerous honor of commanding an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men, his instinct and presentiments had not deceived him. The orders that McClellan had issued for the two following days were strictly carried out; and on the 9th of November this army found itself concentrated in the vicinity of Warrenton, within one day's march of the positions occupied by Longstreet on the other side of the Rappahannock; it was ready to attack this general and wrest Culpepper Court-house from him before Jackson could come to his assistance. But if the impetus had been given, the impelling power no longer existed; for Burnside had already submitted a new plan of campaign to the authorities at Washington, differing entirely from that of his late chief. Meanwhile, he paused, for he had not taken a sufficiently strong hold of the reins, so suddenly placed in his hands, to conduct his soldiers immediately to battle. A fine opportunity was thus lost, less through his fault than that of the authorities, who had selected such an unpropitious moment for making a change in the supreme control of the army.

This army, on the 7th of November, numbered one hundred and twenty-seven thousand five hundred and seventy-four able-bodied men. Burnside began by introducing into it a new organization which was to lessen the administrative labors of his headquarters. He divided the army into three grand divisions, each composed of two corps, forming in reality three small armies of twenty-five to forty-five thousand men each. Their headquarters, in all that related to leaves of absence, discharges and numerous other details of the service, were to report directly to the departments at Washington. The left grand division, under General Franklin, consisted of the First and Sixth corps, commanded by Reynolds and Smith; the centre, under Hooker, of the Third and Fifth corps, commanded by Butterfield and Stoneman; and the right, commanded by Sumner, of the Second and Ninth corps, under Couch and Wilcox. The Sixth corps had hitherto been commanded by Porter, but the latter was involved in the disgrace of his chief, and, as we have before said, brought before a court-martial.

On the 7th of November, at the moment McClellan was informed of his dismissal, his cavalry was obtaining a brilliant success over one of Stuart's brigades, which had ventured on the left bank of the Rappahannock; but this success could not long conceal from the Confederates the sudden pause that had taken place in the movements of their adversaries, which was to be followed by a week of inaction.

On the 11th of November, General Halleck visited the headquarters of Burnside in person for the purpose of discussing with the latter his new plan of campaign. The character of the country and the relative position of the two armies left the Union generals the choice of but two spots as the objective point of the campaign—Culpepper, south-west of Warrenton, and Fredericksburg, south-east of it. McClellan's intention had been to march upon the first; Burnside proposed to lead his army against the second.

No obstacle of any importance could have interfered with the execution of the first plan. The Federals had control of both banks of the Rappahannock, which, before its confluence with the Rapidan, is sufficiently narrow to admit of trestle-bridges being rapidly thrown from one bank of the river to the other. Nor

does the Rapidan present any impediment of a more serious character beyond Culpepper, and the Confederate army would certainly have been obliged to retire to Gordonsville, an important railway junction, where it would undoubtedly have been difficult to follow it, without extending the line of communication to an excessive length, which could not be easily maintained. But the army could have advanced as far as the Rapidan; Pope had done so with inferior forces, and had only been dislodged from it owing to a succession of mistakes and blunders which it would have been difficult to repeat. After having driven the enemy as far as Gordonsville, McClellan had intended to march back upon Fredericksburg, either to embark at Aquia Creek with the best portion of his army, and attack Richmond by way of the James, or to march upon the capital of Virginia by way of Bowling Green.

Burnside's plan was to leave the enemy at Culpepper, keep on the left bank of the Rappahannock, descend the river as far as Falmouth in front of Fredericksburg, and crossing it at that point to take possession of Fredericksburg. Fredericksburg, therefore, was still the objective point; but McClellan, by driving the enemy to Gordonsville, and crossing the Rappahannock and its tributaries near their sources, would have had but one movement to make to the rear, to obtain possession of Fredericksburg, and perhaps of Bowling Green also, where he would have been halfway to Richmond. The result of Burnside's plan, on the contrary, would be to place a great obstacle between himself and the enemy, and to make the army march a very long distance, so as to reach one of the points where the river is most difficult to cross, in the vain hope of seizing it by surprise. This surprise was the more improbable because the bridge equipages of the army had been left at Berlin, where it had crossed the Potomac. It had been deemed useless, or perhaps impracticable, to drag them through the bogs of Virginia; in order to find them in readiness at Fredericksburg, they should have been sent to Aquia Creek by water, to be wagoned from thence to Falmouth. The success of this plan, therefore, required that the army should reach Falmouth on the same day that the pontons should be landed at Aquia Creek, and that the latter could be taken across the peninsula which at this

point separates the Potomac from the Rappahannock, in one or two days; without this perfect coincidence, the presence of the pontons at Aquia Creek before the arrival of the army at Falmouth, or the arrival of the army before the pontons, would disclose Burnside's plan to the Confederates, and give them time to forestall him by occupying Fredericksburg.

General Halleck, perhaps for the first time approving a plan conceived by McClellan, was strongly in favor of the movement toward Culpepper, but returned to the capital without having been able to convince Burnside. He authorized the latter to make every preparation for marching upon Fredericksburg pending the decision of the President, and promised him so far as it lay in his power to see that his orders were not contravened at Washington. On the 14th of November he informed him by telegraph that the President, without approving his plan, accepted it, provided it should be promptly carried out.

Burnside set himself at once to work. On the 6th of November, McClellan had ordered his pontoniers at Berlin to pack up the bridges and take them back to Washington. This order was repeated on the 12th from Warrenton by Halleck himself, and Burnside naturally believed that the latter had also taken upon himself to superintend this part of the plan of campaign, which lay within the sphere of his authority. Consequently, he made all his arrangements in full expectation of finding his bridge equipage at Aquia Creek as soon as his heads of column should arrive at Falmouth. He was the more desirous to leave this responsibility with the Washington authorities because he was about to be deprived of all communication with the capital for several days, and would be unable, therefore, to direct the movements of his pontoniers even from a distance.

He would have felt less confident if he had remembered the disappointments experienced by McClellan and Pope under similar circumstances; in fact, the troops assembled at Washington being nominally all under the orders of the commander of the army of the Potomac, Halleck, once back at his office, gave himself no further trouble about the sending forward of the pontons. General Woodbury, who commanded the engineer brigade that had special charge of this equipage, received no positive instruc-

tions as to the time it was required to be at Aquia Creek, nor the part it was to play during the campaign. This officer, however, who was a man of great zeal and intelligence, called upon Halleck on the 14th to tell him that if the date of the arrival of the pontons was to coincide with that of the army at Fredericksburg, the departure of the latter should be delayed for at least five days. Halleck not only refused to grant this delay, but even neglected to communicate Woodbury's remarks to Burnside, or to give the former any positive instructions. No steps were, therefore, taken to hasten the departure of the bridge equipages, upon which the success of the campaign depended, and they were forwarded according to the ordinary routine prevailing in the departments. The pontoniers, commanded by Captain Spaulding, had arrived in Washington on the 15th. Forty-eight boats, carrying the flooring and forming two equipages, each sufficient for crossing the Rappahannock, were on the 16th placed in tow of a steamer, which after many accidents brought them into the bay of Belle Plaine, near Aquia Creek, on the 18th. No Federal soldier had as yet appeared on that side, and the pontoniers who accompanied the boats were obliged, on landing, to disperse a few Confederate troopers who were watching them. But these boats were useless without the wagons especially detailed for transporting them; and when they reached Belle Plaine, these wagons were still in Washington. Burnside having answered for the safety of the road, it had been determined to wagon a portion of the equipages to Fredericksburg, but unfortunately, instead of forwarding a set of planks forming a complete equipage from each direction, the vehicles and nearly all the materials appertaining to the forty-eight pontons which had come down the Potomac were sent with the twenty boats that had to follow the land route. The departure of this convoy, under the supervision of Captain Spaulding, was subjected to all sorts of delays. At the relay stations there were no teams in readiness for this service; the orders necessary to collect them had not been issued. It became necessary to take unbroken horses, to unpack hundreds of boxes containing harness, and to engage drivers; so that the convoy, instead of leaving on the 16th, was not able to start until the 19th. Then came the rain, swelling the streams and breaking

up the roads; the wagons, overloaded and drawn by wretched teams, moved on slowly, and on the 22d they had not proceeded beyond the village of Dumfries. It would have required three weeks to reach Falmouth at this rate of travelling. Captain Spaulding sent to Washington for a steamer, which came to meet him at the entrance of the Occoquan into the Potomac. Rafts were constructed, upon which were placed all the vehicles, as well as the rest of the materials, and the steamer, taking them in tow, brought them to Belle Plaine on the evening of the 24th. The animals, which had started at speed on the morning of the 23d, arrived there about the same time. On the 25th the three equipages, again placed upon the wagons, left Belle Plaine, and finally reached Falmouth. Burnside had been there for the last six days, and, what would seem incredible if he had not himself attested the fact, he was completely ignorant of the presence of the forty-eight boats at Belle Plaine, which he could have sent for and brought over by his wagons, and for which the carpenters connected with his army could easily have improvised in one or two days the flooring which was lacking.

The delay in the arrival of these pontons, which was attended by such fatal consequences to the Federals during the remainder of the campaign, is one of those questions, like many that are almost invariably started after an unsuccessful operation, concerning which controversies are still carried on to this day in America. We have entered into some details on this subject for the purpose of pointing out one among the thousands of difficulties that were calculated to cause the happiest combinations to miscarry during that war. From what we have just stated, it is evident in our judgment that every one concerned in that affair had his own share of responsibility. In the first place, Burnside was to blame for having made the success of his campaign depend upon a coincidence difficult to calculate upon; then, as he has himself acknowledged, for not having despatched an officer to Washington to superintend the sending of the pontons, in order to render such coincidence possible; finally, in not having discovered the presence of the boats that had been lying in the bay of Belle Plaine since the 18th, which he could have turned to account before the arrival of the rest of the equipages. Halleck alto-



gether neglected to see to the execution of an order of which he knew the importance; he neither hurried those who had charge of it, nor notified Burnside of a delay of which he had himself been apprised. General Woodbury committed a serious mistake in not forwarding the two complete equipages by water, and in despatching Spaulding's convoy with a load which could not fail to render the trip impossible at that season of the year. If the wagons and the *matériel* which were shipped on the Occoquan on the 24th had followed the forty-eight boats that came down the Potomac on the 16th, the whole equipage would have reached Belle Plaine on the 18th; and in default of horses from Washington, the army teams could have conveyed them immediately to the borders of the Rappahannock.

We have said that, on the 14th, Burnside issued all the necessary orders for marching his army from Warrenton to Falmouth. Besides the pontons he expected to find at this place, he had asked for the construction of landing-piers at Aquia Creek, but this work, which the shallow waters in the bay rendered indispensable, could only be undertaken under the protection of the army. On leaving Warrenton he struck the Orange and Alexandria Railroad near Elktown; his troops had to be revictualled on their passage along this railway, and after three days' march to find fresh supplies near Aquia Creek. Sumner was the first to start, on the morning of the 15th, and arrived at Falmouth during the 17th.

This village is situated on the left bank of the Rappahannock, at a point where the river, meeting a line of steep hills, whose foot it washes, describes an angle and changes its course from east to south-east. The hills on the right bank, known by the name of Marye's Heights, recede from the Rappahannock a little above the angle, and gradually descend in gentle and open slopes as far as a small plain, about eight hundred metres in width, where stands the town of Fredericksburg, seated on the edge of the water a little below Falmouth, and on the opposite side. A stream called Hazel Run borders the plain to the south. More to the east, the heights are covered with woods, and recede still farther from the river, and, forming a small arc of eight kilometres in length, as far as the margin of another water-course of

larger dimensions, called the Massaponax, leave a width of from two to three kilometres to the plain adjoining the Rappahannock. A third tributary of the latter, Deep Run, pursues its winding course, after intersecting the arc of the wooded hills, through a deep hollow. The turnpike and the railway from Aquia Creek to Richmond followed this plain in the direction of the river, after crossing from the left to the right bank over two wooden bridges, which were destroyed at the time of which we speak, and passing through a portion of the town of Fredericksburg. The roads leading to Orange Court-house and Spottsylvania Court-house, on leaving this town, ascended directly upon Marye's Heights, and soon separated, one running westward, the other southward.

The heights on the left bank throughout the entire extent of the ground we have just described completely commanded the opposite bank. Consequently, as soon as Sumner had established himself there on the 17th, he found it easy to silence a Confederate battery of light artillery, which had commenced firing upon his heads of column from across the river. Fredericksburg lay below him; and with the exception of this battery and a few detachments of infantry and cavalry, no enemy was there to dispute its possession. The water in the Rappahannock was low, and the fords, although extremely difficult, were yet passable. Sumner would have desired to take advantage of this to establish himself at once on the right bank, but a formal order forbade his crossing the river. Besides, the possession of Fredericksburg was of no importance unless he had taken possession of Marye's Heights at the same time, and had the means of defending them against Lee, who would not fail to come over at once and dispute their occupancy. Without bridges he could not, in the middle of winter, place at his back a river subject to sudden freshets, and he had to wait for the remainder of the army, which had started on the 16th. Burnside, with Franklin's grand division, arrived at Falmouth on the 19th. Hooker's troops had reached the village of Hartwood on the same day; and the latter general asked permission of his chief to cross the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg, to bear to the north-west and occupy Marye's Heights. With a bridge equipage this operation would have been safe and

easy, but the circumstances which had already detained Sumner at Falmouth rendered it very dangerous at a time when Lee was already approaching Fredericksburg, and a copious rain, submerging all the fords, interposed a formidable barrier before the Federal army. Burnside, having massed his entire force along the hills on the right bank, whence he could see the plains into which he was unable to descend, and also the heights yet unoccupied by the enemy, was obliged to wait for the arrival of the equipages upon which he had so imprudently relied. The army of the Potomac was not only unable to take a single step in advance, but even found the greatest difficulty to subsist in its positions. The provisions it had brought along were exhausted, the Aquia Creek Railroad and the landing-piers were not yet reconstructed, and the wagons that had been sent to this point to transport articles of food were very slow in bringing them over. In the mean time, the forty-eight boats were waiting, unknown to the general-in-chief, in the small bay of Belle Plaine for the vehicles and the remainder of the equipages, which still lay embedded in the bogs of the Occoquan.

Lee's entire army, on the contrary, was advancing by forced marches. Thoroughly informed as to what the enemy was doing, owing to the sympathies of the inhabitants of the country, he had been aware of the movement of the Federals along the left bank of the Rappahannock since the 15th, a few hours after Sumner had started. This intelligence had been confirmed on the 17th, and he had at the same time learned of the arrival of several transports at Aquia Creek. This was sufficient to enable him to form an idea of Burnside's project. A few feeble demonstrations against Culpepper could not deceive him, and he at once made his dispositions to be present at the rendezvous proposed by his new adversary before Fredericksburg.

The divisions of McLaws and Ransom, with artillery and a brigade of cavalry, were immediately sent to occupy this important point. On the same day, the 18th of November, Stuart, facing the passage of the Upper Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs, ascertained that the whole Federal army had left its positions and was proceeding toward Falmouth. Being now convinced that this movement was not a feint, Lee ordered the whole of Longstreet's

corps, which had occupied Culpepper since the 3d, to strike their camp, and started for Fredericksburg with them. But for the rise in the river and the delay of the pontons, which paralyzed the Federals, he could not have arrived in time; he had, however, the satisfaction of finding McLaws in quiet possession of the heights commanding the town; and on the morning of the 22d, Burnside, from the summit of the opposite hills, to which he was fettered, had the mortification of seeing the enemy's army quietly settling in the formidable positions which he was not yet able even to dispute.

During Longstreet's march from Culpepper to Fredericksburg, Jackson, who had hitherto remained in the valley of Virginia, ready to throw himself upon the right flank or the rear of the enemy, made a corresponding movement, and crossing the Blue Ridge came to take position at Orange Court-house, so as to cover the Rapidan in case the Federals should return in that direction, and assist Longstreet if they attempted to force the passage of the Lower Rappahannock. Leaving D. H. Hill at Front Royal, he took up his own quarters at Orange Court-house, where he remained until the 26th of November; on that day he was summoned to Fredericksburg by an order from Lee, for it was evident that the Unionists were massing all their forces before that town. He only reached the neighborhood on the 28th or 29th, after marching a distance of sixty kilometres. The bridge equipages of the Federals had arrived at Falmouth on the evening of the 25th. If Burnside had been ready to put his army in motion the instant he found himself in possession of the means for crossing the Rappahannock, even though it had taken the whole of the 26th to throw the bridges across, to distribute a few rations and cartridges to his troops, and mass them near the river, he would have been able to attack on the 27th, on the other side of Fredericksburg, the corps of Longstreet, which was entirely isolated, not having yet had time to throw up any works. He would perhaps have failed, but he had far greater chances of success than three weeks later. He could also have sent his bridge equipage direct from Belle Plaine toward the great angle of the Rappahannock known by the name of Skinner's Neck, and tried to effect a passage at this point either on the 27th or 28th, as the enemy was not able at that period to offer any opposition. It

would, however, be unjust to blame him for having allowed this fleeting opportunity to escape him, for he was not sufficiently well informed to have ascertained the exact position of Jackson on the 25th or 26th, and a fortunate chance could alone have enabled him to take advantage of it. Lee's whole army was, therefore, reunited in front of him; and instead of reaching Fredericksburg before it, he had only succeeded in securing to the adversary he desired to attack the protection of a formidable obstacle. The difficulties of his positions were daily increasing. The weather was frightful; and but for the extraordinary efforts of General Haupt, whose name we have mentioned at a period when he did not yet occupy a military position, to put the Aquia Creek Railroad in running order, the army could not have continued to subsist at Falmouth. In six days he had rebuilt a viaduct, one hundred and twenty metres in length and twenty metres high, over the deep ravine through which Potomac Creek runs. This magnificent work, which was four stories high, containing two millions of feet or forty thousand cubic metres of timber, was remarkably strong; more than twenty trains heavily loaded passed over it daily, and it withstood all the winter freshets.*

In the estimation of those who took a calm view of the matter, a campaign in this section of Virginia was absolutely impossible before the month of April. The enemy might be attacked if he awaited such an attack without stirring, but it would be impossible to follow him even after the most decided victory. Only two alternatives, therefore, presented themselves; either to put the army into winter quarters between Falmouth and Aquia Creek, or to convey it to the James in order to attack Richmond by following this river, which was open at all seasons. But Burnside had been selected to supersede McClellan, and the censure which had been twice bestowed upon the latter had special reference to his inaction during the preceding winter, and the selection of Fortress Monroe as a base of operations in his campaign against Richmond. Burnside could not follow in the same wanderings without disobeying the orders he had received directing him to

* This viaduct had been constructed before, in May, 1862, on the same plan and within the same space of time, when McDowell occupied Fredericksburg, and was destroyed in August during Pope's campaign.

adopt a different course from that pursued by McClellan. He, therefore, considered himself bound to attack Lee wherever he found him. It required a fortnight to prepare his army. He had determined to cross the Rappahannock at Skinner's Neck, as this point, situated at a distance of twenty kilometres below Fal-mouth, afforded great facilities for such an operation, and enabled the Federals to avoid the formidable positions of Marye's Heights, which commanded the suburbs of Fredericksburg.

These preparations, however, had not escaped Lee. The entrance of a few Federal gun-boats into the waters of the Lower Rappahannock had attracted his attention, and he had made such disposition of his army as to avoid being turned in that direction. D. H. Hill's division had arrived in the early part of December from the valley of Virginia, where it had remained until then; it was sent to Port Royal, where it exchanged a few cannon-shots with the Union vessels. The remainder of Jackson's corps, of which it now formed a part, was ranged *en echelon* along a line of considerable length, so as to be able to support the former or to assist Longstreet, as circumstances might require. Ewell's division was at Buckner's Neck, in the vicinity of the Rappahannock; that of A. P. Hill on his left, at Yerby's plantation, near the Massaponax, and Taliaferro in the rear, at Guiney's Station, on the Richmond Railroad. This station had become the principal dépôt and centre of supplies for the army. At last everything was ready to resist Burnside if he should cross the Rappahannock near Fredericksburg. It is true that the heights on the left bank, known by the name of Stafford Heights, commanded its course; but if the crossing of the river could not be seriously disputed with the Federals, such a reception could be prepared for them on the right bank, a little beyond, as would make them pay dear for this first advantage. During the last three weeks the engineer officers attached to Longstreet's corps had time to fortify his positions, which were formidable in themselves without the aid of art.

Marye's Heights, which command Fredericksburg at the southwest, form two tiers of terraces. The highest, which is the most remote from the town, terminates on one side on the borders of the Rappahannock, at a point called Taylor's Hill, about twenty-

five hundred metres above the angle of the river; on the other side it is only separated by the small ravine of Hazel Run from the chain of wooded hills to which we have before alluded, and which is a direct continuation of it. The second terrace projects toward Fredericksburg like a large fortification, for which nature has provided bastions and flanks. This terrace, which presents a front of twenty-five hundred metres, is divided into three almost equal sections by two slight re-enterings. These sections are called, the one at the north-west, Stansbury Hill, the one in the centre, Cemetery Hill; that at the south-east bears more particularly the name of Marye's Hill, which has become celebrated in America. At each extremity of this front the rest of the terrace turns in nearly a right angle, resting upon the second tier of hills, which commands it completely. On the Stansbury Hill side, the front is covered by a broad and deep lateral canal (*canal de dérivation*), impassable without the aid of a bridge, which penetrates into the town of Fredericksburg. At four hundred metres before entering this town, on a line with Cemetery Hill, a large ditch, which carries off the waste water of the canal, detached itself from it, and running in a parallel direction with the Rapahannock finally emptied into Hazel Run. It was an obstacle that could be surmounted, although difficult, and which it was absolutely necessary to pass in order to approach the positions of Cemetery Hill or Marye's Hill. The road from Fredericksburg to Orange Court-house through Chancellorsville, well known since as the Plank Road, passes over the first terrace, following the strip of land which separates these two hills. At two hundred metres to the south, the road from Spottsylvania Court-house, called the Telegraph Road, follows a parallel direction across the plain to the foot of Marye's Hill, then, turning suddenly southward, envelops the whole hill together with the angle of the terrace, and, after traversing the rear part of it, ascends, on the other side of Hazel Run, a high hillock which marks the commencement of the wooded ridge whose undulations reach down to the Massaponax. On the summit of Marye's Hill stands the house of the Marye family, from which the name is derived. Thence a declivity of considerable steepness and entirely open descends to the Telegraph Road. This road, on the side of

Fredericksburg, is supported by a sustaining wall of stone, which also rises above the level of the road as a parapet. Beyond the road the ground sinks gradually as far as the ditch which serves as an outlet to the canal, rising again afterward in the direction of the town; the whole of this space is bare, and only intersected by fences formed of stumps of trees or boards, which afford no shelter to an assailant. A double line of breastworks and redoubts crowned the summit of the two terraces, while at the foot of the second the wall by which the road is bounded had, with the addition of some earth, been converted into a continuous work, behind which the infantry found absolute protection, and from which it could cover with its fire the whole space intervening between its positions and the ditch.

The hillock over which the Telegraph Road passes after crossing Hazel Run, and which at a later period was denominated Lee's Hill, was also covered with several redoubts, which entailed this road and completely flanked the positions of Marye's Hill. This hillock, as well as those extending south-westward in the direction of Deep Run, gradually sinks, until they reach the plain which separates them from the Rappahannock, through a succession of gentle slopes covered here and there with patches of isolated wood. They formed the centre of the Confederate position; and although placed in the rear of the two wings, they were defended by a number of works. The right of this position comprised the group of hills which separate Deep Run from the Massaponax before these two water-courses enter the plain. This range of hills terminates at the north-west on the borders of Deep Run, at a point called Bernard's Cabin, and at the south-east in Prospect Hill, behind which the Massaponax pursues its winding course. Upon the slope of Prospect Hill is situated the handsome residence of Captain Hamilton; a little lower down a road detached from the Telegraph Road traverses the property, and crossing the railway track on a level strikes the old Richmond Road, twelve hundred metres beyond. The latter road, as we have said, follows a direction across the plain, nearly parallel to the Rappahannock, at a distance of one or two kilometres from its banks. The railroad, after successively crossing Hazel Run and Deep Run at some hundred metres above the road, touches

the hills in front of Bernard's Cabin, and skirts along their base for some distance beyond Prospect Hill. The point where it intersects the Mine Road is called Hamilton's Crossing, which was the first station between Fredericksburg and Bowling Green. The hilly country comprised between Bernard's Cabin and Hamilton's Crossing presented a front of three kilometres in extent, and was covered with a dense forest, through which the Confederate soldiers had cut numerous roads; the most important of these was called the military road, which followed a parallel direction with the ridge of the hill, at a short distance in the rear of the breastworks that lined the margin of the wood. The margin follows in the main the ridge of short gentle declivities which reach down to the railroad; but at one point, in the centre of the position, the forest stretches north of the road along the two banks of a small stream. The greatest portion of the railway line follows a cut of no great depth bounded by a thick copse of young trees interspersed with tall dry grasses. From this line to the road, which is enclosed by two deep ditches, the ground gently rises, after which it sinks again down to the Rappahannock. In the vicinity of this river, precisely fronting the centre of the chain of hills we have just described, stands the village of Smithfield, situated at five hundred metres from the margin of the water, six hundred from the road, and sixteen hundred from the railway, the plain at this point having a width of two and a half kilometres. The Massaponax, at a distance of fourteen hundred metres from its confluence with the Rappahannock, is crossed by the old Richmond road, above the bridge over which the road crosses; it is bordered by impassable swamps; between the bridge and Hamilton's Crossing there is an open plateau from two to three kilometres in width, which gradually sinks south and in the direction of the water-course. The Confederates had not erected any work at this point, not deeming it possible to extend their lines so far, and counting on their ability to command its approaches from the summit of Prospect Hill.

Taken as a whole, therefore, these positions offered Lee's army three distinct ranges of hills. That on the left, consisting of Stansbury Hill, Cemetery Hill and Marye's Hill, as well as the second terrace, barred the road to any one that should attempt to

come out of Fredericksburg. The canal, prolonged by a deep ditch, and then the wall adjoining the road, and finally the entrenchments which crowned the crest, gave him a triple line of defences. The middle range was protected by its position in the rear of the two wings, and was also fortified by several works. The one on the right was almost as formidable as the first; for its defenders, being concealed among the woods and able to move about unperceived by their adversaries, were admirably posted for observing the latter at a distance in the plain, and crushing them with the fire of their artillery so soon as they should cross the railway track to climb the acclivities which rose to the margin of the wood. In the wood itself the chances would have been more equal, but the knowledge of the roads which traversed it was a great advantage to its defenders. This long line was entirely occupied by Longstreet's corps; Hood, from the elevation on the right, communicated with A. P. Hill at Yerby; Pickett and Ransom occupied the middle range; McLaws and Anderson were encamped in the rear of Marye's Hill and Cemetery Hill, ready to occupy the redoubts planted on the heights with all their artillery; the first named had a brigade in Fredericksburg; the posts of the Second extended along the line of the Rappahannock as far as Bank's Ford. Two cannon-shots were to announce the crossing of the river by the Federals, and at this alarm signal the whole Confederate army was to be under arms.

This army, whose supplies were easily obtained through the railroad which connected it directly with Richmond, was then in a better condition for fighting than it had been on the borders of the Potomac or the Shenandoah, or even at Culpepper. A large number of soldiers, who had been taken sick or slightly wounded during the summer, had again joined it, and its ranks were likewise swelled up by the draft, so that it now numbered from eighty to ninety thousand men.* This was about twenty thousand men less than the Federals had—a difference largely compensated for by the necessity imposed upon the latter of taking the offensive in a country where all the positions can be easily defended.

* See the state of the situation in the Appendix.

At the beginning of December the rain had been succeeded by cold, and winter had set in with unwonted severity; then the weather became suddenly mild. Every day toward noon the sun dispersed the thick fog which gathered along the water-courses during the night; it thus eventually dried up the muddy roads of Virginia, and seemed to invite the Federals to renew the campaign. Burnside determined to take advantage of this intermission, and on the 8th of December gave all the necessary orders for forcing the passage of the Rappahannock at Skinner's Neck; but, having learned that Jackson was awaiting him behind some entrenchments that had been hastily thrown up, he gave up the project, nor did he think of looking out for a passage above Fredericksburg. In ascending the river, starting from Taylor's Hill, the right bank is precipitous and easy to defend, and soon after is covered with wood, which becomes thicker and thicker as one approaches the almost impenetrable forest of the wilderness, which extends beyond the point of confluence of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. In order to turn Lee's positions effectually, it would have been necessary to cross the river above this point of confluence. But Burnside could not undertake this movement, which sound policy would otherwise have suggested, as it would have been returning indirectly to the plan formed by McClellan when he had proposed to march upon Culpepper; he therefore selected the town of Fredericksburg itself as the point of crossing, although he fully realized the difficulties attending such an enterprise. From the summit of Stafford Heights he could perfectly distinguish the two lines of fortifications erected along the terraces in front of him, and it was easy to calculate the number of guns that would be placed in position, for the purpose of overthrowing his troops, as soon as the latter had deployed along the plain. But this very difficulty was the cause of his resolution. He thought that the enemy, deeming this position impregnable, would weaken it, and that it might be possible to wrest it from him whilst the main body of his forces was occupied in watching the Lower Rappahannock. This was to form a very wrong opinion of such vigilant adversaries as Lee and his lieutenants. But even if he had succeeded in deceiving them for an instant, the troops to whom the guarding of Marye's Heights and Lee's Hill

had been entrusted for the last three weeks would have sufficed to repel any direct attack upon those heights. At a council of war which he held prior to putting his army in motion, and in which his generals agreed in recommending him to concentrate the entire effort of his army upon a single point, a German prisoner, who was questioned on the subject, gave an exact description of the defences accumulated on the Telegraph Road. This information would have caused any general-in-chief to hesitate. He, however, merely replied, "That has always been my favorite point of attack."* Those fatal heights already possessed a strange fascination for him; but none around him participated in his views with the exception of the old Sumner, whose age had by no means cooled his somewhat indiscreet ardor. The whole army had witnessed the earth thrown out of the enemy's entrenchments, and there was not a soldier who, after attentively surveying these positions, had not arrived at the conclusion that his general would find some means of turning them.

The army would certainly have felt well disposed to fight if its chief had at the outset inspired his troops with confidence. McClellan was much regretted by a great many officers and a large majority of the soldiers; but while these regrets gave rise to a feeling of jealousy among the superior officers, and excited a spirit of criticism against his successor, the soldiers asked for nothing better than to follow him if he was capable of leading them to victory. Unfortunately, he was almost a stranger to them. He had neither taken part in the laborious organization of the army, nor participated in the battles which the latter had fought before Richmond; people waited to judge of him by his work. Consequently, when the army, which had been massed in front of Fredericksburg and Smithfield since the day previous, was ordered on the evening of the 10th to take up its line of march in the direction of the Rappahannock, this order was received with a mixture of satisfaction and astonishment. The restless and monotonous life of the cantonments in presence of the enemy was about to cease; but everybody felt that it was

* See Hooker's deposition, *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War*, 1863, vol. i., p. 667.

only ended for the purpose of entering upon a desperate enterprise.

The night was clear and cold, and the artillery rolled lightly along the frozen roads. Franklin, with his grand division, was to throw across three ponton bridges on the left—two a little above the mouth of Deep Run, and the last lower down, opposite Smithfield. Sumner was ordered to cross over by two other bridges in front of Fredericksburg, Hooker to remain on the right bank ready to cross the river in order to support either. The reserve artillery, under the immediate command of General Hunt, took position on the summit of Stafford Heights, so as to protect the operation. The boats, being speedily unloaded, were thrown upon the water, and the process of constructing the bridges commenced. The most profound silence prevailed on both sides of the Rappahannock. In the eyes of the Confederate sentinels, who were watching the northern horizon, the heights on the left bank, which were only visible through the reflection of lights which their adversaries were striving to hide, seemed to wear the pale crown of an aurora borealis. In front of the Federals were deployed in a vast semicircle the bivouac fires of Longstreet's corps, the bright flames of which presented in relief the formidable positions that were to be attacked. Soon, however, the sound of the pontoniers' hammers attracted the attention of the advanced posts of Barksdale's Mississippi brigade, which occupied Fredericksburg; they gave signal of the danger by a few musket-shots, and shortly after, toward five o'clock in the morning, two cannon-shots, fired from one of the batteries of Marye's Hill, aroused the whole Confederate army.

Before daylight a thin fog spread like a curtain between the two belligerents, but it was not dense enough to completely intercept the view from one side of the river to the other, and prevent Barksdale's soldiers from firing upon the Federal pontoniers, who were bringing their boats into position one by one and adjusting the planks of the flooring. The firing presently became so brisk that, despite their coolness, the latter were obliged to suspend their work. Several Union regiments hastened down to the shore to protect them; but being more exposed than the enemy, who lay concealed in the houses and cellars adjoining the river, they sustained

great losses without being able to silence the guns. Day broke and the morning advanced without any progress having been made by the Federals in their work; their operations had been resumed three or four times, but the precision of the enemy's fire had always stopped them. The unfinished bridge was covered with blood; it was time, therefore, to bring matters to a crisis. Intelligence had been brought that on the left Franklin had not met with any serious obstacle; this would have been the time for Burnside to take a new departure, and mass all his troops in that direction, confining himself to some simple demonstrations before Fredericksburg to occupy the enemy. But the hills of Marye's Heights, which the mist screened from view, were the object of all his preoccupation, and the difficulties of the crossing disturbed him without deterring him from his purpose. The town-clock of Fredericksburg, which had also been enveloped in the thickening fog, had just struck eleven. The position of the town was well known; and notwithstanding this fog, Burnside ordered it to be bombarded, in the hope of dislodging the Mississippians, who had hitherto so gallantly held him in check.

When Sumner had arrived at Falmouth three weeks before, he had warned the mayor of Fredericksburg of the danger the population of that town would incur, which population before the war numbered about five thousand souls. That portion of the inhabitants who were in easy circumstances had abandoned the place; but the others had either remained, or returned to their homes after a few days' absence, and were living between two powerful armies, whose first encounter must necessarily take place in their streets, without seeming to care for either. It required Barksdale's brisk, sharp musketry to make them quit their dwellings and seek refuge in the rear of Longstreet's lines. When the bombardment commenced, the town was deserted. The sound of one hundred and fifty cannon, opening fire at once, was repeated in the distance by the echoes of the Rappahannock, and conveyed to the Confederate generals confirmation of the notice given in the morning by the alarm signal.

Toward one o'clock the appearance of flames, seen through the mist, announced that Fredericksburg was on fire; and shortly after, a light breeze sprang up as if by magic, tearing asunder the hu-

mid veil that enveloped the town. The sun burst forth, throwing a vivid light over the lists where the two armies were about to measure strength. Smoking ruins marked here and there the ravages caused by Federal shells; but in general the houses, built of brick, had withstood the effects of the bombardment, whilst Barksdale's sharpshooters, who had not been dislodged, again interrupted the construction of the bridge. On the heights beyond Fredericksburg the divisions of Anderson and McLaws could be seen drawn up in line of battle; their artillery, ready for action, reserved its fire until the enemy's infantry should be compelled to deploy before it at short range.

Franklin had completed the construction of his bridges, but was ordered by the general-in-chief not to cross the river until those in process of construction before Fredericksburg were finished. In order to conquer the resistance which the Federals encountered before that town, Hunt proposed to Burnside to ship some soldiers in the boats that had not yet been fastened together, and send them to the other side of the river to dislodge the enemy's sharpshooters; this is what should have been done at the very first. The Seventh Michigan, the Tenth and Twentieth Massachusetts, one thousand men in all, thus crossed rapidly over, losing but a few men. They were soon reinforced; and the Mississippians, driven into the centre of the town, left behind them sixty prisoners, thirty killed and one hundred wounded. Toward four o'clock the two bridges were at last completed, and Sumner sent Howard's division to occupy Fredericksburg. The Rappahannock was then crossed at all the points; but it was getting dark, and the 11th day of December was drawing to a close. It was the first respite granted to the enemy.

The latter had taken advantage of it. At the sound of the alarm-gun, Lee had hastened to Longstreet's headquarters, although afraid lest this movement might prove to be only a feint; but when the fog cleared away, discovering to him the whole Federal army, and when Hood's outposts had exchanged a few shots on the right bank of the river with Franklin's cavalry, all doubts were at once dispelled. The satisfaction which the commander of the Confederate army experienced at this sight, and which he did not conceal from those around him, was shared by all his

soldiers. In fact, after having carefully fortified a position which was naturally almost impregnable, he beheld his adversary rushing headlong into the circle of fire which had long since been prepared to receive him. There was nothing more to be done but to mass the whole army upon the ground where Burnside was so imprudently going to seek him. The latter even allowed his opponent time to effect this concentration. Jackson was sent for in great haste; but Ewell and D. H. Hill, who occupied positions on the Lower Rappahannock, could not arrive before the 13th, and Taliaferro, who was encamped at Guiney's Station, not before the evening of the 12th. If, therefore, the battle had been fought on that day, Lee would have been deprived of the assistance of two or three of his divisions.

To have brought about this result, it would have been sufficient for Burnside, as soon as apprised of the completion of the bridges on the left, to have ordered Franklin to put his soldiers over these bridges; a large portion of this general's troops would thus have found themselves on the other side of the river on the morning of the 12th, and while they began the fight, the remainder of the army could have crossed the river and gone to their support. Nothing of the kind took place. Held back by Burnside's instructions, Franklin only began crossing on the morning of the 12th, Reynolds' corps taking the lower and Smith's the upper bridge.

The night of the 11th or 12th was extremely cold, and the soldiers, deprived of fire, suffered greatly. In the morning, as on the previous day, they found themselves enveloped in a mist which favored preliminary operations. But these operations should have ended by noon, when the fog usually disappeared; instead of this, the whole day was again wasted in mere preparations; and when the sun made his appearance, Lee was enabled to examine at leisure the whole of the enemy's army deployed before him, saying to himself that the next morning his own troops would also be all assembled on the field of battle.

Burnside does not appear to have attached any importance to this delay, nor to have made any effort to accelerate the crossing in order to engage the battle on the 12th. Toward five o'clock in the evening he proceeded to inspect the positions occupied by

Franklin. If the army of the Potomac had any chance of victory, it was by directing all its efforts on that side against the woods where the Confederate right was posted. Franklin endeavored to convince his chief of this, and asked for instructions, directing him to make a vigorous attack with all his forces on the following morning; he required the whole night to assemble and mass them. Amid the darkness, which was prolonged by the fog, leaving but four or five hours of daylight for the actual fighting, he needed considerable time to put his forty thousand men in motion. Fifty-five thousand might even have been mustered in front of the lower bridges if that portion of Hooker's grand division which was to support Franklin in case of necessity should be added to the command of the latter. The divisions of Birney and Sickles, of Stoneman's corps, were, in fact, encamped on the left bank, fronting Smithfield, ready to pass over the bridge, which Reynolds had crossed on the 12th. But Burnside was unable to come to any decision, and left Franklin, promising to send him his instructions before midnight. The night passed without any being received—a precious time irreparably lost—and it was only toward six o'clock in the morning that the general-in-chief issued orders to his three lieutenants for the decisive day which had already commenced. Franklin received them a little before eight o'clock. It is in the character of these instructions, and not to subsequent explanations, that we must look for the designs of the general-in-chief. Instead of the great movement against the enemy's right recommended by his principal lieutenants, Burnside ordered two partial and simultaneous attacks, each to be made by one or two divisions, upon two points separated by more than six kilometres from each other, in the direction of Hamilton's Crossing and the Telegraph Road. It appears, from the measures he ordered, that the Union general still hoped to take his opponent by surprise, notwithstanding the forty-eight hours of respite he had granted him. He believed, in fact, that one or two divisions would suffice to break the enemy's line on each side, and that, once master of these two points, he could easily carry all the works, erected by Lee with so much skill and care. In informing Franklin of the attack to be made on Marye's Hill on the

right, and in ordering him to place troops within reach of those that were to undertake it, he ordered him to hold all his command in readiness for an eccentric movement toward the old Richmond road. This road follows the course of the Rappahannock as far as the Massaponax; after crossing this stream, it inclines southward in the direction of Bowling Green, thus turning the extreme right of the line of battle of the Confederates. Burnside's plan, therefore, was to capture the keys of the enemy's positions on the left and right with small detachments, so as to put his army on the march in two diverging lines immediately after, Sumner and the greater part of Hooker's grand division following the Telegraph Road, Franklin with the remainder of Hooker's troops that of Bowling Green. The two partial attacks were but the prelude to this operation, which supposed the adversary to be divided and surprised before he had time to collect his forces.* On the morning of the 13th the two entire grand divisions of Sumner and Franklin were on the right bank of the Rappahannock. The former had placed Couch's corps (the Second) in Fredericksburg and the vicinity, fronting the terrace formed by the heights of Marye's Hill and Stansbury Hill; Wilcox's (the Ninth) was on the left of Hazel Run, resting on the banks of Deep Run, along the old Richmond road. Franklin had deployed Smith's corps (the Sixth) on his right, which extended nearly as far as Deep Run and occupied the slight undulation of ground between the road and the banks of the Rappahannock. The extreme left was formed by Reynolds' corps (the First), posted in front of Smithfield. Bayard's cavalry had felt the enemy's pickets the day before. The Confederates were found everywhere in force, and all the reports current through the country represented their positions in the woods as almost impregnable.

Everything, in fact, was ready on the side of the Confederates for the attack which had been expected for the last two days. Jackson's arrival had enabled Longstreet to close his lines on the left. During the afternoon of the 12th, A. P. Hill had relieved Hood in the works erected along the margin of the woods from Hamilton's Crossing to Bernard's Cabin; Hood had taken position on the heights between Deep Run and Hazel Run, in the

* See Note A at the end of this volume.

place of Pickett, who was stationed at the foot of the hills between the second stream and the Telegraph Road. Ransom, who was posted on the Plank Road, considerably in the rear, advanced in order to reinforce McLaws' and Anderson's line, and sent Cooke's brigade to occupy the left of the stone wall, along the Telegraph Road between those two divisions. Taliaferro's division of Jackson's corps formed on the evening of the 12th a second line behind that of A. P. Hill.

D. H. Hill and Ewell had a long distance to march; they travelled the whole night of the 12th or 13th, and arrived at early dawn. Jackson placed the former in third line behind Taliaferro; Ewell took position a little obliquely on the right of the latter, resting his extreme right on the railroad, in front of Hamilton's Crossing, and consequently facing north. Stuart's cavalry extended beyond this point on both sides of the old Richmond road. This general had with him eighteen field-pieces under command of Major Pelham, a young officer who was as skilful as brave. Along the whole line the artillery was so disposed as to command the space which the Federals had to cross before they could engage the infantry. Forty-seven guns covered the most exposed part of the front of Jackson's corps, fourteen of which were on the right, along the slopes of Prospect Hill, twenty-one on the left around Bernard's Cabin, and twelve at two hundred metres on the right of the latter in an advanced position beyond the railroad, whence they could strike in flank any column marching toward the extreme end of the wood above mentioned. Most of Hood's guns occupied the summit of Lee's Hill, from which they enfiladed the Telegraph Road. Two large thirty-pounders, recently brought from the Richmond foundry, had been added to their number on the evening of the 12th, but they both exploded during the next day's battle. The remainder of Longstreet's artillery was distributed among the redoubts which crowned Marye's Hill, Cemetery Hill and Stansbury Hill. The Confederates had nearly two hundred cannon in line.

Franklin opened the battle. As soon as he received Burnside's instructions, he ordered Reynolds to take Meade's division and attack the position indicated, which nearly corresponded with the centre of A. P. Hill. The other two divisions of the same corps,

under Gibbon and Doubleday, formed in column by brigades, were ordered to support Meade by keeping a little in the rear, the former on his right, the latter on his left. He had about five thousand men under his orders, Doubleday as many, Gibbon nearly six thousand, which swelled the number of effective combatants at Reynolds' disposal to sixteen thousand. The fog was so dense that from the Confederate lines one could hear, without being able to distinguish the enemy, the words of command given by the officers. The Federals marched at random, and consequently very slowly; there was nothing to guide them except the vague remembrance of certain objects that had been seen the day before. The plain was intersected by wide and deep ditches, which delayed the progress of the artillery and broke the ranks of the infantry. At last, between nine and ten o'clock, Meade had passed beyond the road, and was preparing for the attack, when the fog suddenly cleared off, enabling the Confederates, who had hitherto only exchanged a few skirmishing shots with the Federals, to see their columns. Stuart's cannon, posted along the road, immediately opened an oblique fire upon Meade, which compelled him to halt. His left brigade was posted *en potence* to sustain the division artillery, which was trying to silence the enemy's guns. At the expiration of half an hour Doubleday came to relieve him, deploying in front of Stuart, while Meade continued his onward march. This demonstration on the part of the Confederate light batteries thus occupied a whole division, which, had it been able to follow that of Meade, might perhaps have secured the success of the attack which the latter was about to make. But the Federals were fighting with a river at their back, and the farther they got from their bridges, the more they feared to be cut off from them in case of a reverse; the necessity of covering their communications, therefore, already absorbed a great portion of their strength.

While Doubleday was facing to the left, Meade was advancing toward the railroad. Not an enemy was to be seen along the skirts of the woods. Jackson was hiding his battalions, and waiting for his adversary to approach within easy range. The Federal artillery, however, covered the copses occupied by A. P. Hill's division with shells, and inflicted considerable losses upon it. Pelham had retired, but Doubleday was not yet ordered to

advance, for it was still feared that the enemy might make an offensive return along the road. In the mean time, Meade had arrived within eight hundred metres of the positions occupied by Walker's artillery near Prospect Hill. At a given signal the latter opened the fire; the twelve guns posted at the left centre of the Confederate line did the same. Meade found himself alone in an entirely open space, where he was exposed to the fire of two powerful batteries, which were on Jackson's flanks, and the projectiles of which crossed each other in his ranks. The very silence which prevailed, in the woods that covered the enemy, proved to the experienced soldiers that the latter was there in force, and was seeking to provoke an attack.

Before making this attack it was necessary to silence his guns and wait for the reinforcements required for holding him in check at other points. Gibbon deployed on the right of Meade, and the left of Smith's corps, consisting of Howe's division, advanced toward the positions of Bernard's Cabin, forming a junction with Gibson. Finally, Franklin, whose grand division was already in line, summoned to his aid the two divisions of Stoneman's corps which had been detached from Hooker's command, and stationed on the left bank for the purpose of supporting him in case of need. Sickles' division remained near the bridges, whilst that of Birney was sent to Meade's relief. About this time, a little before noon, Franklin received an order from Burnside, as vague as the preceding ones, directing him "to advance his line and his right." It was at the moment when, in fact, the whole of his line was advancing, and it was too late to introduce any changes in the dispositions already made.

While the infantry was thus deploying along the Federal left, the three batteries of Birney's division engaged Walker's artillery, posted on Prospect Hill; Gibbon's cannon replied to the Confederate guns planted in front of the railroad, and after one and a half hour's fight they finally succeeded in obtaining a decided advantage. Two of Walker's caissons exploded; and although Jackson had employed all the guns which covered his front, his fire had evidently slackened. Birney approached, and Reynolds gave Meade the signal for attack.

A. P. Hill had posted part of the brigade of Brockenborough

at the extremity of the wood beyond the railroad. His line was formed by three brigades drawn up in the rear of the track, Lane in the centre, a little in advance of the others, Pender on the left, and Archer on the right, separated from each other by considerable intervals. Behind these intervals, along the military road, were Gregg's brigade on the right and Thomas' on the left.

Meade's Pennsylvanians were well-trying troops whom we have already seen fighting gallantly before Richmond, at Beaver Dam and on the bloody battle-field of Glendale. As they advanced through the open plain which separated them from the woods, with a brilliant sun shining upon them, a sharp fire of musketry broke out along the entire skirt of the wood; and the Federal artillery having remained silent for fear of injuring them, the Confederate guns covered the advancing column with grape. Nothing, however, could stop them; the extremity of the wood was reached, and Brockenborough forcibly driven to the other side of the railroad, the battery posted in the vicinity being also obliged to retire in great haste. Meade's dash did not stop there; but quickly crossing the railway track without slackening his pace, he carried the entrenchments defended by Lane's brigade. The first line of the Confederates was pierced. Sinclair's Federal brigade, supported by that of Magilton, dispersed Lane's soldiers, while, on his left, the brigade of the Union general Jackson, having penetrated into the interval of the enemy's line, flanked Archer's left, drove it back in disorder and pushed on as far as the military road, where it encountered Gregg's brigade, which scarcely expected such a vigorous attack. Gregg himself, having mistaken the enemy for Confederate soldiers of the first line, forbade his men to fire; and when a discharge of musketry at short range undeceived him at last, he fell mortally wounded. The most exposed regiment of the line, called Orr's Rifles, was almost annihilated. The remainder of the brigade re-formed with difficulty some distance in the rear. In the mean while, Meade's right, after driving Lane's brigade before it, had become engaged with Thomas' brigade, which made a stand before him. It was a critical moment; it would require one or two fresh divisions to penetrate the gap that Meade opened through the first

Confederate line, and immediately to attack the second, for the Pennsylvania division had completely exhausted its strength. No reinforcements, however, were within reach. Doubleday on the left had long remained watching the Richmond road; Gibbon on the right, after a vigorous attack, allowed himself to be stopped by the last brigade on the left of Hill's line, on the border of the railroad; more to the right, the whole of Smith's corps, numbering about twenty-one thousand men, was deployed in front of the enemy's centre, with which his skirmishers only exchanged occasional shots. In this direction the Federals had not made a serious attack, but it would have required several hours to bring a part of Smith's corps to the relief of the extreme left. Birney's division had not come up on a line with the point occupied by Meade previous to the attack. Franklin had established his headquarters far in the rear; and being desirous to execute the orders he had received literally, he did not dare to engage the greater portion of his forces, holding them in readiness for the movement along the Richmond road mentioned in Burnside's despatch. Therefore, in the absence of a well-specified plan and the want of positive instructions for the concentration of his troops, Franklin found that he had scattered the fifty thousand men placed under his command along a too extended line, whilst Meade's five thousand soldiers, deprived of timely support, were about to lose in an instant all the advantages obtained by their courage.

A portion of Archer's brigade was, in fact, making a bold stand on the extreme Confederate right; the soldiers of Lane, Gregg and Brockenborough rallied at the appeal of their officers, and there were three strong divisions in their rear that had not yet been in action, which were hastening to their relief. Whilst Paxton's brigade of Taliaferro's division was advancing and stopping the Federals in front, Early, who on this occasion commanded Ewell's division, fell upon their left flank with three brigades. It was impossible to withstand any longer such superior forces; the Union general Jackson was killed while vainly endeavoring to stem the tide of the advancing foe, whose forces were four or five times as great as Meade's soldiers. The latter were driven back upon the railroad, and crossed it in disorder. Early, at the head of his division and the *débris*

of A. P. Hill's, crossed in pursuit of them. The Confederates rushed forward with loud yells, throwing themselves upon the artillery, which was covering Meade's retreat; but at this moment Birney's division appeared upon their right flank, and by a well-sustained fire quickly obliged them to seek refuge in the woods, leaving more than five hundred men killed or wounded on the ground. Birney, crossing the railroad in turn, took possession of the thickets that lay south of this line and pushed into the wood, but he could not effect another breach in the position of his adversaries. Meade had suffered too much to be of any assistance. Doubleday was still extending his lines to the left in front of the Confederate guns, which had again been placed in position on Prospect Hill. Although not closely engaged, Gibbon, finding himself exposed without shelter to a terrific fire of artillery and musketry, had experienced severe losses and been himself wounded. The cannon-balls of the enemy were flying in every direction through the vast plain where the Federal reserves were seen in the distance; one of these projectiles, fired by a Whitworth gun across the Massaponax, mortally wounded the cavalry general Bayard while he was quietly seated at the foot of a tree. Full of dash and daring, trained by long campaigns against the Indians, Bayard had brought away a glorious memento of those wars in the shape of an arrow wound, which had left a deep scar upon his cheek; he would certainly have reached the foremost rank among the most brilliant chiefs of the Federal cavalry, and he died regretted by all his comrades. At two o'clock Reynolds was master of the railway line, but he did not feel strong enough to attempt to recapture the woods of which Meade had for a moment been in possession.

While the belligerents were thus fiercely contending for that portion of the forest which adjoined Hamilton's Crossing, the attack of the Federal right wing had been even more unfortunate and far more bloody. It will be remembered that Burnside's plan was to throw upon the Plank Road and Telegraph Road a column of equal strength with that which was to make the attack on the left, and that by this manœuvre he expected to seize all the positions of Marye's Hill, Cemetery Hill and Stansbury Hill. The two attacks were to be nearly simultaneous.

Early in the morning Sumner had made his dispositions for battle without being molested by the enemy, owing to the thick fog which enveloped both the armies. To French's division of Couch's corps was assigned the perilous task of leading the attack; that of Hancock was to follow and support it.

Burnside had reserved to himself the direction of the battle more especially along that part of his front; he had not, however, crossed the Rappahannock, and had taken up his quarters in the handsome residence of Mr. Phillips, which, from the heights on the left bank, overlooked the entire plain and the hills opposite. He had all the reserve artillery about him, which was preparing to support the attack of the infantry with its fire. But the heavy mist which hung over the valley of the Rappahannock, and hid from him the enemy's army, did not disappear until toward eleven o'clock; it was the moment when Meade was cannonading the Confederate batteries of Prospect Hill. The battle, therefore, had not yet seriously commenced on the left. In proportion as the sun dispersed the vapors which clung to the hillsides, the successive lines of entrenchments filled with Confederate soldiers, whose bayonets glistened in the distance, could be seen, clearly defined, from the headquarters of the Union army. The Confederates awaited without moving the attack of their adversaries, but as soon as they saw the town of Fredericksburg filled with Federal troops, who had been massed there after crossing the river, their artillery opened its fire upon this doomed city. The heights of Marye's Hill were immediately encircled with a double crown of white smoke, the bluish tinge of which could not be mistaken for the lingering wreaths of the morning fog, and which revealed the strength of the means of defence accumulated by Lee at this point. This prelude should have made Burnside feel the rashness of his undertaking, but his purpose was irrevocably fixed. He gave the signal of attack to his right, and French's columns, emerging into the plain, soon diverted the attention of the enemy's cannoners from the town.

These columns, emerging by way of the cemetery, were obliged to defile over the two or three bridges that still remained in order to cross the large draining ditch, and to deploy afterward on the other side under the murderous fire of all of McLaws' batteries.

The cannon-balls committed a fearful ravage among those deep and almost immovable masses. They were not, however, staggered, and as soon as the line was formed, Kimball's brigade, followed at a short distance by two other brigades, advanced against the stone wall adjoining the road, behind which were posted the Confederate brigades of Cook and Cobb. For the space of six hundred metres, over which these troops had to pass, every step in the advance was marked by dead bodies; they closed their ranks without stopping. When within two hundred metres of the enemy, they were received by discharges of musketry, every shot of which, aimed at leisure, made sure of a victim.

Hunt's artillery had vainly endeavored to silence the batteries posted on Marye's Hill; the distance was too great. They disdained to reply to him, devoting all their attention to the assailants, and Hunt himself was obliged to intermit his fire for fear of killing more friends than foes. The field-pieces of Couch's corps could not accompany their infantry; they would have been dismounted in an instant. French's soldiers, however, were still pushing forward, but at fifty paces from the wall, the first line, which was reduced to a handful of men, halted and began to skirmish. The two brigades that were following could not pass beyond this fatal point, and after a single discharge they retired, leaving one-third of their comrades on the ground. Hancock immediately took their place. This brilliant officer, who had always inspired his soldiers with the ardor by which he was himself animated, was in command of well-tried troops. The sight of the massacre of their companions, and the formidable positions that rose before them, did not cause them to hesitate for a single instant. Three flags, planted by French's soldiers within eighty or one hundred metres of the enemy's line, floated amid the cannon-shot and musket-balls alone above the dead bodies that surrounded them.

They seemed to call for new combatants, or rather new victims. Meagher's Irish brigade was the first to rush forward. A portion of French's troops, who had felt reluctant to leave the vicinity of this field of carnage, joined it, and the rest of Hancock's division followed close. All the generals were on foot at the head of their soldiers. Howard's division came out of the town for

the purpose of following in the tracks of Hancock should the latter meet with any success. On the left, Wilcox had deployed the Ninth corps in front of Pickett's Confederate division; the divisions of Sturgis and Getty extended from Hazel Run to Deep Run, while that of Burns was on the other side of the latter stream, near Smith's corps. The embankment of an unfinished railroad covered Hancock's left to within a certain distance of the stone wall; his centre as well as his right was utterly unprotected. Nevertheless, his whole line reached and passed beyond the flags planted by French; but when within twenty or twenty-five metres of the wall, it also halted, and all those who had gone beyond were instantly struck down. The Federal line wavered, without, however, falling far back, while, enveloped in smoke, it opened a sharp fire upon the defenders of the stone wall. From time to time a group of soldiers was seen advancing to reach the obstacle; but this movement, always unsuccessful, was soon followed by a speedy retreat, which brought back the small number of those who had escaped death. The Federals, however, maintained themselves; and if they could not gain ground, they suffered themselves to be decimated without abandoning the place. Their losses were enormous, but their adversaries were also beginning to suffer; in vain did they shelter themselves behind the wall, in vain did the artillery, which fired over their heads, throw its shrapnels into the midst of the assailants; their ranks were fast thinning off.

The two brigades, which up to this time had alone defended the stone wall, lost their two commanders at the same moment—General Cobb killed and General Cook seriously wounded. But numerous reinforcements were at hand. Ransom's brigade* had come to the relief of Cook's; Kershaw had been sent by McLaws to succor Cobb's soldiers. These new troops were placed in rear of those they came to support; and owing to a slight inclination in the ground they occupied on the road, they were enabled to open a well-sustained fire of four ranks upon the assailants. The Federals had no hope left. The bravest among them acknowledged that it would be folly to remain any longer

* This brigade, like many others, had preserved the name of its former chief, although the latter commanded the whole division to which it belonged.

before a position which it was impossible to carry. On the left, Sturgis and Getty, each on one side of Hazel Run, kept up a lively fire of musketry with Pickett and the troops posted at the south angle of Marye's Hill; and without being able to approach the latter sufficiently near to menace them seriously, they found themselves exposed to a cross-fire from the batteries of Hood and McLaws, which caused them considerable losses. Out of six thousand men, Hancock's division had lost two thousand, of whom one hundred and fifty-six were officers; among the wounded, those who could drag themselves along formed a long column, extending as far as the temporary hospitals in the town of Fredericksburg. The others lay upon the ground for which the Federals were obstinately contending. It was in vain that Howard advanced on the right in order to support Hancock's efforts; Getty, crossing Hazel Run with two brigades, tried in vain to make a diversion in his favor by attacking the right of the Confederate positions; all these attempts only served to increase the number of victims without shaking the enemy. The moment had arrived for yielding, and the Federals retired behind a small rise of ground situated in front of the draining ditch which in some places afforded them somewhat of a shelter. Howard occupied the right of the line, Hancock and French, with the *débris* of their respective divisions, the centre, Sturgis, with a portion of Getty's troops, the left. There were no Union troops between Hazel Run and Deep Run, except on the very banks of the Rapahannock. It was about half-past one, the precise moment when Jackson had driven Meade out of the Hamilton wood on the left. Burnside's plan for surprising and dividing the Confederate army had, therefore, completely failed. The two independent attacks which constituted the first part of this plan had each been made with more forces than he had directed to be employed, and with great vigor; both of these attacks had only succeeded, at the cost of immense bloodshed, in revealing the strength of the enemy's positions; and without having gained an inch of ground, it was the Federal army instead of Lee's which found itself divided into two fractions, each fighting a separate battle on its own side.

Everything demanded of Burnside to stop, and to give up his

undertaking or to change his plan. But instead of doing this, he clung to his purpose with the persistency of men whom disappointments irritate without enlightening. He ordered Franklin to charge the enemy once more, and this time with the whole of his forces, in order to draw all his attention and facilitate a new attack upon the right. He was not aware that his numerous assaults in that direction had been solely repelled by Longstreet's artillery and four brigades of infantry, whilst at the other extremity of the line Jackson had brought but little more than one-half of his troops into action. He demanded of Franklin to achieve the first success; to accomplish this he should have given this general the support of all the troops who were not participating in the fight elsewhere.

Hooker, one of whose divisions was in Fredericksburg and two on the left wing, had three others in addition on the north side of the river, which might also have been sent in that direction. Burnside ordered him to push them across the river, but it was only for the purpose of leading them to that part of the battle-field which had already been uselessly drenched in blood; one of them was to support Sturgis' division on the left, the other two were to attempt a new attack against the wall which had baffled all the efforts of French and Hancock. Hooker started at once with the divisions of Sykes and Humphreys, of Butterfield's corps, designated for this dangerous expedition. He was justly looked upon as one of the bravest and most enterprising generals of the army. Since the battle of Williamsburg, where he had fought almost along against Longstreet, down to that of Antietam, where he was wounded, he had acquired for himself, through his entire deportment, the nickname of "Fighting Joe," which his soldiers had given him. But when he beheld the positions he was ordered to attack, after questioning French and Hancock as to the means of approaching them, his military instinct clearly demonstrated to him the impossibility of succeeding in such an attempt, and he sent an aide-de-camp to Burnside, asking for a counter-order. The general-in-chief was inflexible. Hooker was so thoroughly convinced that he adopted one of those resolutions which none but men whose courage is above suspicion can take with impunity. Instead of leading his soldiers to a useless butchery, he recrossed

the river in order to see his chief in person and try to dissuade him from so disastrous a project.

Burnside, being detained by some strange fatality on the left bank of the river, had not left the Phillips mansion; he had no opportunity of taking a close survey of the positions he persisted in trying to carry, nor had he witnessed the scenes of carnage of which those positions had been the theatre; he had neither shared the dangers nor acquired the experience of those who had attacked them, and who had been fortunate enough to come back; his duty, therefore, was to listen to them. But the ruling idea which had taken hold of a mind wearied by a too heavy responsibility misled the heart and the reason of this brave soldier. The officers who surrounded him, silent witnesses of a scene which they have often related since, saw with terror the unfortunate Burnside striding up and down the terrace, from whence he could survey the whole battle-field: pointing to the heights, wreathed with smoke, whence the Confederate artillery was battering his troops, he repeated mechanically, "That height must be carried this evening." Hooker failed to obtain any other reply to his representations, and nothing was left for him but to obey.

One hour and a half had thus elapsed. Meanwhile, there had been but little fighting along the Federal left. As we have said, Franklin's line was so much extended that he had not time to collect his forces and attack the enemy with any chance of success. The positions occupied by Hood were as formidable as those of Jackson, and well flanked with artillery. Smith's corps was posted in front of these positions, but at a considerable distance; the greater part of his forces were ranged along a prominent angle of Deep Run, in the vicinity of the Richmond road; Howe's division, on the left, being more advanced than the others, fronted the heights of Bernard's Cabin and the adjoining woods, which were occupied by Hood's right and the left of A. P. Hill. The ground through which it would have been necessary to lead the troops in order to concentrate them was rough and difficult, and their march would certainly have been delayed until night. On the other hand, an attack made by a single division would have experienced the same fate as that of Meade. The Confederates, encouraged by this inaction, determined at last, about three o'clock,

to take the offensive. Law's brigade attacked the left of Howe's division, posted along the railroad, but it was speedily repulsed with loss; one of its regiments, the Fifty-seventh North Carolina, was almost annihilated, having had two hundred and twenty-four men disabled. In front of Hamilton's Crossing, Birney and Sickles had replaced Meade's and Gibbon's divisions, which had been placed in reserve to recover from their losses. The enemy's artillery had also caused much damage to Doubleday. Despite his forces, therefore, Franklin found himself in a position which rendered it impossible for him to make a decisive attack before night; the general-in-chief had not indicated any new plan, but simply ordered him to draw the enemy's attention toward himself as much as possible. In order strictly to carry out the order received, he might undoubtedly have subjected a large number of his soldiers to be killed by a new partial attack; but it would certainly have failed, without influencing in the least what was passing at the other extremity of the line, for the Confederates were sufficiently numerous to show themselves in force everywhere at once. He contented himself by simply continuing the musketry-fire which nearly the whole of his line had kept up for some time with Jackson's troops.

Meanwhile, Hooker, having returned to the field of battle, prepared in his turn to storm the slopes of Marye's Hill, and to this effect he wished to concentrate his whole effort upon a single point. Several batteries were boldly planted within four hundred metres of the stone wall to open a breach through which the Federal column might penetrate. But this wall, supported by the earthworks upon which it rested, was proof against all attacks. Night was approaching, for it was four o'clock, and Burnside's order was positive. The attack must be made. Hooker at last gave the signal. The Federal artillery at once ceased firing. Humphrey's soldiers, disencumbered of everything that could impede their march, formed into columns and sprang suddenly from the shelter they had found behind a small hillock. They rushed forward with such eagerness that they nearly reached the foot of the wall. But the enemy had also acquired new strength. The whole artillery posted on the heights had been strengthened, and Pickett's division had been sent to the relief

of the defenders of Marye's Hill; one of Hood's brigades, led by Jenkins, had gone to take position behind the wall, which was already defended by four other brigades. Humphreys was stopped. His division, like those that preceded it, remained in line exposed to a terrific fire, unable to advance and unwilling to fall back. Sturgis, on the left, had again attacked the extremity of Marye's Hill; but the Confederates were waiting for him at short range, and his troops were received by a furious fire, which also interrupted their march. Twilight had come; incessant flashes of light, which shone without giving a clear view, shadowed forth the lines of the combatants. Hooker, to use his own words, which forcibly expressed his sense of the painful duty imposed upon him, deeming that he had lost "about as many men as he was ordered to sacrifice," then gave the signal for retreat. Soon after, the extreme darkness of a December night came to put an end to the conflict, and spared the Federals still greater sacrifices by rendering all further attempts against Marye's Hill impossible. On the Confederate side, Jackson was for a moment inclined, toward the close of the day, to attack the Federal left with his whole corps in order to drive Franklin back upon his bridges. His orders had already been given to that effect, and he had even put Stuart's cavalry in motion, when, seeing night approaching and fearing to be overtaken by darkness, he countermanded this movement—a wise determination; for if the Federals were afraid of venturing into the woods in search of their adversaries, they would certainly have driven them back so soon as they had shown themselves in the open ground.

This night of December 13th-14th was probably the most painful ever experienced by the army of the Potomac during its whole existence. Its losses amounted to twelve thousand three hundred and fifty-three men, one thousand one hundred and eighty of whom were killed, nine thousand and twenty-eight wounded, and two thousand one hundred and forty-five prisoners. These losses were undoubtedly less than those sustained in the battles fought on the Chickahominy and the Antietam, but the thought of their utter uselessness increased the bitterness. The Federal soldiers had stormed the formidable positions of Marye's Hill with a degree of intrepidity which their very enemies could not

help admiring. They had left sixty-three hundred of their bravest men, either killed or wounded, at the foot of that fatal hill; but there was not a soldier in their ranks who did not feel convinced that so much blood had been shed entirely in vain. The left wing had suffered less, and, besides, it had fought on more equal terms; yet, even in that direction, the officers, who had seen two divisions uselessly sacrificed in isolated attempts, severely censured their general-in-chief; and when their soldiers became acquainted with what had taken place on the right, they fully shared the sad impressions which prevailed in the rest of the army.

Burnside, however, was only thinking of another attack on the heights of Marye's Hill, and had already issued orders for a general assault. He wanted to lead his old corps, the Ninth, in person the next morning, formed into single column by regiments. But the counsels of all his officers prevailed at last; the bravest, and Sumner among them, implored him to relinquish so fatal a purpose. Visiting in their company the silent and fireless bivouacs where his soldiers were waiting for the termination of that long and gloomy night, he was able to convince himself of their sentiments, and to realize how much greater and more disastrous were the moral consequences of the defeat than the material losses which had marked it. Day dawned at last, and found the Federal army immovable in the positions it had taken in the evening.

Lee, who was expecting another attack, did not seek to provoke it. His losses, including those of December 11, amounted only to five thousand two hundred men, five hundred and ninety-five of whom were killed, three thousand nine hundred and sixty-one wounded and six hundred and fifty-three prisoners. It was less than one-half of those sustained by his adversaries, nor would this figure have been reached but for the battle between Hill and Meade; for whilst Jackson on the right counted three thousand three hundred and fifteen men disabled, the defenders of Marye's Hill and the whole ridge commanding Fredericksburg had only lost nine hundred and fifty-two in killed and wounded, while six thousand three hundred of their adversaries had fallen. The Confederate army was not only slightly weakened by its losses, but the easy victory it had achieved had inspired it with still

greater confidence than it possessed before the battle. Fresh troops had everywhere taken the place of those who had been engaged on the 13th; new entrenchments had been erected during the night along the whole line occupied by Jackson and Hood; consequently, when daylight came, Lee was ardently wishing that his opponent would renew the fight. In the battle of the 13th his part as general-in-chief had not been of great importance, for the troops, once placed in line, had only to remain steady in the advantageous positions they occupied. But he too easily believed what he desired, and only made preparations for repelling a new assault. Indeed, he was not aware that his victory had been so complete and decisive as it really was, and all his generals were laboring under the same mistake. He has frequently been blamed for not having taken the offensive on the morning of the 14th to attack the Federal army, shut up as it was between the river and the positions it had been unable to carry. But this censure, in our opinion, is unjust. It does not follow because, with an army of eighty thousand men, he had held the Federals in check in the woods or behind earthworks, that he would necessarily have conquered them if he had come, in his turn, to measure strength with them in an open plain, where their excellent and numerous artillery would have recovered all its advantages. The army of Northern Virginia was the only bulwark of the Confederacy, and the latter was too poor in men to replace it. Lee had no right to sacrifice a portion of it in so hazardous an undertaking, however brilliant might be its results. By maintaining himself in his positions he rendered an offensive campaign against Richmond impossible, thereby fulfilling his true mission. But without hurling his infantry against the Federal battalions, the most experienced of which had rallied and re-formed during the night, he could have done them much harm by the fire of his artillery, which commanded the whole plain, and especially the town of Fredericksburg. Everything was ready for a bombardment; even the cannon-balls had been heated for the purpose. But Lee wanted to save his ammunition for the attack he was still expecting; and the day of the 14th passed away without being disturbed except by the fire of skirmishers, who were in close proximity to each other along the whole line.

On the 15th, Burnside determined to bring back his army to the left bank of the Rappahannock; he asked for a few hours, truce for the purpose of carrying off the wounded, who for two days had been lying helpless on the ground between the combatants, the victims of one of the most horrible consequences of the war, and all his troops recrossed the river during the night. This movement was executed with great precision and success. The Confederates only discovered the disappearance of the foe in front of them on the morning of the 16th. Their skirmishers returned to the deserted and half-ruined town of Fredericksburg, where they only found a few wounded, who could not be removed.

The Federals had only a last duty to perform as the closing scene in this bloody drama. The dead bodies of five or six hundred brave fellows still lay stretched at the foot of the wall which had baffled all their efforts. On the 16th detachments of their comrades came with Lee's permission to give them the rapid burial of soldiers dead on the battle-field. An immense deposit of ice happened to lie at the foot of Marye's Hill; all these sad remains were crowded into it, filling up to the brim the gigantic vault which will ever remain as a mournful memento of that terrible day.

The army of the Potomac had fought gallantly; it had not lost a single cannon, all its attacks being made by masses of infantry; it had experienced neither disorder nor rout. But the defeat was complete, and its effects were felt throughout the entire country as keenly as in the ranks of the army. The little confidence that Burnside had been able to inspire in his soldiers had vanished, and the respect which everybody entertained for the noble character of this unfortunate general could not supply its place. Halleck, his immediate superior, was accused of reserving all his favors for the armies of the West, which he had commanded, and of never addressing the officers and soldiers of the army of the Potomac, except in terms of censure and criticism.* They felt as if forsaken, and a deep feeling of sadness, if not discouragement, soon crept into all the ranks. Political quarrels, which lay dormant while the cannon spoke, became embittered un-

* See Hooker's deposition, *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War*, 1865, vol. i., p. 113.

der this fatal influence. They had been stirred up in all the Northern States by the progress of the abolition sentiment, of which Mr. Lincoln's proclamation emancipating the slaves had been the interpreter, and found an echo in the army, where this sentiment was probably not then entertained by the majority. To these quarrels must be added the weariness and discontent growing out of inaction amid the sufferings entailed by a severe winter. The old soldiers who had made the campaign of the peninsula could not ponder without bitterness over the fact that, after having seen the spires of Richmond six months before, they were further than ever from attaining the object of their efforts. The new comers had learned to know the war in its most tragic aspect, and the enthusiasm which had called them to arms had considerably cooled off. Hence, desertions into the interior, that ulcer of the American armies in the North as well as the South, which had already developed itself in an alarming manner since the arrival of the army at Falmouth, attained frightful proportions after the battle of Fredericksburg. The day when Hooker superseded Burnside in the command, as we shall presently show, he stated that two thousand nine hundred and twenty-two officers and eighty-one thousand nine hundred and sixty-four soldiers were absent from their corps either with or without leave. The army had not been paid for six months; the soldiers who had enlisted in the service of their country under the conviction that their families would be supported by it, as they had been promised, were daily receiving letters from them stating their destitution and the distress which had resulted from their helpless condition. Their friends and relatives, therefore, did all in their power to assist them in escaping. Packages containing citizens' clothes, intended as disguises for deserters, were sent to the army under the name of provisions. As to the generals, they nearly all criticised the plans of campaign attributed to Burnside, some openly, others within the circle of their intimate friends. The general-in-chief, in fact, either not noticing or not wishing to notice what was passing around him, was absorbed in strategic combinations, in which he hoped to find the means of obtaining a signal revenge. The dry season still continued, and soon after his defeat he set himself ardently to work to prepare for a new movement. This time he

intended to cross the Rappahannock ten or twelve kilometres below Fredericksburg, while his cavalry, led by Averill, should proceed up this river as far as Kelly's Ford, cross the Rapidan, and, destroying the railway track in Lee's rear, traverse the whole of Virginia, so as to join the garrison which occupied Suffolk, near the mouth of the James. On the 30th of December the cavalry was already at Kelly's Ford, and all the infantry ready to start, when Burnside's operations were interrupted by a formal order from the President. The latter had been informed of the moral condition of the army of the Potomac and the want of confidence felt in its chief. After the battle of Fredericksburg, both Franklin and Smith had addressed him a memorial to show that it would be useless and dangerous again to attempt the passage of the Rappahannock, and a few days later two other generals, Newton and Cochrane, happening to be in Washington, had represented to him in the darkest colors the dissatisfaction prevailing in the army. We have already seen that Mr. Lincoln was wont to apply to military matters the system of compromises to which he had been accustomed in his political career; so, instead of silencing those who were dissatisfied if he believed them to be in the wrong, or of taking away the command from Burnside if he deemed him incapable of exercising it successfully, he adopted a halfway measure. He limited himself to interfering to prohibit the latter from renewing the campaign without previously consulting him. Burnside, whose loyalty and patriotism were always above suspicion, immediately tendered his resignation to the President. It was not accepted, but Newton and Cochrane were retained in the posts they occupied.

It was in the midst of these painful circumstances that the army of the Potomac witnessed the close of the year 1862, the first of its active existence:—this year, which was marked by so many memorable events—by the siege of Yorktown, the comparatively successful battles of Williamsburg and Fair Oaks, the sanguinary but honorable defeats of Gaines' Mill and Glendale, and the success of Malvern Hill—this year, which had witnessed the disaster of Manassas, the fatal capitulation of Harper's Ferry, the victories of South Mountain and Antietam, and which had closed with the terrible defeat of Fredericksburg. For the Con-

federate army of Northern Virginia, on the contrary, the year 1863 opened under the best auspices. Thanks to the despotic energy of the Richmond government, the absence of all political discussion in the interior of the Confederacy, and, above all, to the superior talent of Lee and his two principal lieutenants, this army had then no equal either in the North or South for discipline and cohesion. It was not entirely free from desertions into the interior, which, as we have before stated, were very considerable. But these desertions, which met with no encouragement among the people, did not prevent its ranks from being better filled than they had been for the last six months.

It did not, however, attempt any aggressive movement, being satisfied with holding the enemy's army in check. Lee merely sent off some parties of cavalry at the latter end of December, which proceeded as far as Fairfax Court-house, but were driven back by Stahel's brigade.

We shall only eneroach, by a few days, upon the year 1863, in order to finish with this chapter the period of Burnside's command. This general had soon discovered the authors of the reports which had determined Mr. Lincoln to put so sudden an end to his movements on December 30th. He did not otherwise deceive himself as to the disposition of all his lieutenants toward him. Before resuming his aggressive plans, about the middle of January, he asked the President either to accept his resignation or to approve of his plan for a new campaign on the other side of the Rappahannock, of which he alone assumed the responsibility. He was authorized to carry out this plan, and he set himself immediately to work. He proposed to cross the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg, while Sigel's corps, which had recently joined him, should guard his communications with Falmouth, and that of Couch draw the attention of the enemy toward the lower part of the river. New roads were cut through the forest in order to facilitate the movements of the army; and, reconnaissances having shown that the point called Banks' Ford, ten kilometres above Fredericksburg, was not occupied in force by the enemy, the grand divisions of Franklin and Hooker bivouacked on the 20th within reach of this point. Banks' Ford is a ford in summer, but at that season of the year it was not passable, and it

was necessary to construct bridges over the swollen waters of the Rappahannock. Burnside carried with him the pontons which played so important a part in the operations of the army since he had taken command of it. The day of January 20th was occupied in making all the necessary preparations for crossing. Fortune seemed at last to be smiling upon McClellan's successor. The secret of his movements had been well kept. The demonstrations which had been made lower down had for a moment routed the enemy, who was not ready to defend the right bank of the river at the point really menaced. The roads were good and the weather magnificent. Officers and soldiers would, at the first success, have forgotten their grievances and mistrust of their chief. It is true that the latter was in a position dangerous for a general, and especially for his army, in which this first success was absolutely indispensable, and when everything had to be risked in order to encompass it. He was not, however, even allowed to run this risk. The elements, which seemed to take a cruel pleasure in favoring him at first and in disappointing him afterward, interfered to deprive him of the last chance he had to obtain his revenge. A fearful storm broke out during the night of the 20th and 21st. The rising sun was to have seen the bridges ready to be thrown across the river, but the rain interfered with the preparations. When daylight appeared, it was still falling in torrents, and the soil of the swampy forests which border the Rappahannock was converted into soft, sticky paste, in which wagons, horses and soldiers sank deeper and deeper at every step. A few guns had, however, been placed in position on the margin of the river, and fifteen pontons were floating on the waters, which were visibly rising; but it required twenty of them to construct a single bridge. The longer the rain fell, the more the road was rendered impassable for the rest of the equipages, and every hour lost gave Lee an additional chance to arrive in time to dispute the passage of the river. During the whole day, in the midst of an incessant rain, men and horses worked without intermission to push forward the vehicles that were conveying the boats. Fruitless efforts! at every step they sank deeper and deeper in the mud. The Confederate sharpshooters, who were watching the vain labors of their adversaries from the other side of the

river, cried out to them, in bitter irony, that they were coming over to assist them in building the bridges. The day of the 21st was thus consumed. On the morning of the 22d the rain was still falling, and the vehicles had ceased to move altogether. The three days' rations which the soldiers had stowed away in their haversacks were nearly exhausted. The enemy was still watching them; and even if the bridges had all been constructed, and Lee had allowed the army quietly to cross to the other side of the river, it could not have subsisted there for two days for want of means to procure supplies at such a distance from its *dépôts*. The game was lost before being played. The only question was how the army might again reach its cantonments without abandoning the greatest portion of its *matériel*. Burnside bowed his head before this decree of adverse fortune, and with a sinking heart he gave the signal for retreat. Fortunately, the overflowing river did not allow the enemy to disturb this painful march. By means of superhuman efforts, all the cannon and vehicles which had not been shattered on the road were brought back along corduroy causeways, constructed with that skill which has always characterized the American soldier. On the 23d of January the army of the Potomac was again settled in its former camps, where it went into winter quarters. The impossibility of undertaking an aggressive campaign at that season of the year had been too strikingly demonstrated to renew the experiment.

Burnside was not responsible for the failure of this last attempt, and could find no fault with any of his lieutenants. But irritated and discouraged by this misfortune, he could no longer bear the criticisms, which he had not heeded until then, and which he finally read in the very silence of his humblest soldiers as well as his most zealous officers. He had determined to put an end to this state of things, and he requested the President to dismiss Generals Hooker, Brooks, Newton and Cochrane from the service of the United States, and to deprive Generals Franklin, Smith, Sturgis and Ferrero and Colonel Taylor of their respective commands. This would be to strike a crushing blow at those whom the army had learned to consider as its bravest and most experienced leaders. By signing such an order Mr. Lincoln would have disorganized the entire army. No serious cause for complaint was alleged

against these officers to justify such punishment, except that they did not possess that confidence in their chief which cannot be enforced. Burnside deceived himself, moreover, by selecting these officers only upon whom to cast his censure, which might equally have been applied to his whole army. The President understood this; and without accepting his resignation of the rank of major-general, which Burnside had tendered him, he relieved him, at his own request, of the command of the army of the Potomac on the 25th of January.

McClellan's successor quitted this army carrying with him the personal regard of all those who had known him, but he only bequeathed to it the remembrance of cruel disasters. He had received this army full of ardor and confidence, and he left it morally and physically weakened. Despite the reverses it had just experienced, it had lost none of its courage or patriotism, and was only waiting for a chief capable of leading it to retrieve its fortunes.

The organization into grand divisions was abolished. Sumner, broken down by age and infirmities, was at his own request relieved of his command. Advantage was taken of this occasion to deprive Franklin of his own, whose seniority of rank and services in the army designated him for the functions of general-in-chief, but who was too faithful to his friend McClellan not to have many enemies at Washington; and Hooker, having thus become the senior general of the army of the Potomac, received the dangerous honor of being made its leader. This third chief had shared all its trials; by his undaunted courage, his sterling military qualities, and perhaps, also, his self-reliance, he had made himself a great reputation among all ranks. His appointment was well received by his old companions in arms.

In the next volume we shall see what new trials were reserved for the army of the Potomac under his command.

BOOK VII.—POLITICS.

CHAPTER I.

THE BLOCKADE.

WE will conclude the narrative of military events for the year 1862 with a sketch of the operations of which the coast of the Confederate States was the theatre during the second half of that year.

In the chapter on Roanoke, contained in the first volume, we gave an account of the operations of the Federals on the coast of North Carolina until after the capture of Fort Macon, on the 26th of April, 1862. Regarding those which took place along the other portions of the coast of the Southern States, the chapter on Pulaski, in the early part of this volume, brought us down to the end of June. We resume the narrative where those two chapters left it, following the division adopted in the report of the Secretary of the Navy, so as to classify the minor incidents that have no connection between them, and ending it, in a uniform manner, at the close of the year 1862. The naval or mixed operations will thus be grouped according as they may have taken place on the northern or southern part of the Atlantic coast, or on the eastern or western part of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, or on the high seas.

We begin at the north of the Atlantic coast, where the Federal blockading squadron was placed under the orders of Commodore Goldsborough. We have already given an account of the operations of this squadron in the rivers and bays of Virginia, when it co-operated with the army of the Potomac. It remains for us to record what it had to do on the coast of North Carolina, in order to preserve and extend Burnside's conquests in the inland

sea which bears the name of Pamlico Sound, south of Roanoke, and Albemarle Sound, north of this island.

Pamlico Sound penetrates into the low lands of North Carolina westward by means of two deep estuaries, which are in their turn cut up into numberless small creeks. At the north, that of Tar River takes, from the village of Washington, the name of Pamlico River; at the south that of Neuse River retains the name of this water-course, forming the anchoring-ground of the small town of Newberne, built on its right bank. The tide is sufficiently strong both in the Tar and Neuse to carry vessels of considerable draught far beyond the mouths of those rivers, thus enabling gun-boats to penetrate into the very interior of the State. The river waters which flow into Albemarle Sound also form a certain number of deep inlets on the northern shore of this interior basin, the most important of which are the North River, eastward, the Chowan River, to the west, and the Pasquotank River, between the two. On the borders of the last-mentioned bay, into which the Great Dismal Swamp discharges its waters, stands the little town called Elizabeth City. The western extremity of Albemarle Sound terminates at the entrance of the important river of Roanoke, which, descending from the Alleghanies, where it takes its rise, runs along the boundary-line of the States of Virginia and North Carolina, and on the borders of which are successively to be met the villages of Weldon, Hamilton, Williamston and Plymouth. Albemarle Sound extends northward, between the mainland and the sand-bank by which it is bounded, almost as far as Cape Henry, in Virginia, at the entrance of Chesapeake Bay, under the name of Currituck Sound; but this arm of the sea does not communicate with the ocean, which can only be reached through Pamlico and the Strait of Croatan. The strip of land bordering on Pamlico Sound, as we have stated elsewhere, presents but four navigable passage-ways for vessels—New Inlet, Hatteras Inlet, where the forts were situated, Ocracoke Inlet, and lastly Old Topsail Inlet. This last inlet, situated near an angle formed by the sand-bank known to sailors as Cape Lookout, only communicates with the inland sea through a kind of narrow lagoon, which stretches southward, as Currituck Sound extends northward. It was nevertheless the inlet

most frequented by trading-vessels before the war. It was protected by Fort Macon, which the Federals had captured in April. At a short distance from this fort, but on the mainland, stood, on the two sides of a small bay, the towns of Beaufort and Moorehead City. A railroad connects the latter with the town of Goldsboro' and with all the railway lines of North Carolina.

This was the junction of railway lines that Burnside was charged to break up after the capture of Newberne—an operation which might have had a great bearing upon the whole system of Confederate defences, but which he was obliged to forego in consequence of the reverse sustained by the Federal troops before Richmond. In fact, Virginia was only connected with the other Southern States by three lines of railway. To the west there was the Richmond, Lynchburg, Knoxville and Chattanooga line, which the Federals menaced every time they advanced either from Nashville or Kentucky toward East Tennessee. The other two lines placed Virginia in communication with the other States bordering the Atlantic, the two Carolinas and Georgia, whence Lee's army derived part of its supplies. These two lines, composed of several branches constructed at different periods, described many zigzags through the country which they traversed. One, in the vicinity of the mountains, had been considerably shortened at the end of 1861 by the completion of the Danville and Greensboro' section, which avoided the circuitous route of Raleigh. The other runs southward, in an almost direct line from Richmond to Wilmington, along Cape Fear River, thence proceeding westward toward South Carolina. This line crosses the Roanoke at Weldon, and the Neuse at Goldsboro'. If Burnside had been able to strike the railroad near one of these two points, he would have caused serious trouble to the Confederates. But when he left the waters of the Neuse for those of James River, with a division composed of his best troops, his successor, far from being able to resume such projects, was afraid lest the enemy might come to dispute the posts of which he was already in possession. In fact, General Foster, the successor above mentioned, had only one brigade with him, and a few gun-boats commanded by Captain Davenport. To avoid seeing his troops surprised and crushed in detail, he massed them at those points

where they were protected by the naval force on the island of Roanoke, at Cape Hatteras and at Moorehead City. Newberne was only occupied by an advanced post. The gun-boats were directed to display the Federal flag in front of the small towns situated on the borders of Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, without compromising it by a permanent establishment. Fortunately for Foster, the Confederates on their part had stripped North Carolina of troops in order to reinforce their main army in front of Richmond. He was not, therefore, molested, and at the expiration of a few weeks reinforcements came from Massachusetts to form a small division under his command, sufficient to prevent any aggressive return on the part of the enemy.

Before proceeding any further, it is proper that we should rapidly enumerate the naval operations which took place in the waters of North Carolina from the month of April to the time when the land-forces were again able to co-operate effectively. During the siege of Fort Macon, three gun-boats were sent into Currituck Sound to obstruct the channel which connects this bay with that of Norfolk. It was feared that the Confederates, who were still in possession of the arsenal of that name, might use this channel for the purpose of transferring into the waters of North Carolina the flotilla which was blockaded by the Monitor. The operation was accomplished without any opposition on the 24th of April, shortly before the evacuation of Norfolk.

During the first fortnight of May, four gun-boats, commanded by Lieutenant Flusser, scoured Albemarle Sound, carrying off the machinery appertaining to the lighthouse of Wade's Point, on the Chowan, which the Confederates had concealed in a farmhouse; and, destroying several provision stores, they subsequently appeared before Elizabeth City, and finally returned to the island of Roanoke.

Flusser, with five or six vessels, being left in special charge of Albemarle Sound, undertook another expedition in the early part of July, at the very time when Burnside was embarking at Newberne. He penetrated into the Roanoke, easily overcame the obstacles which the Confederates had placed in his way, seized one of the enemy's steamers fitted out as a man-of-war, which was not expecting to meet the Federal fleet so high up in the

river, and, after reaching the village of Hamilton, returned to Plymouth, where he landed a few troops. This expedition proved, in the first instance, that the Confederates did not possess any ship of a really formidable character in the Roanoke; secondly, that this river was not sufficiently deep to enable gun-boats to ascend as far as Weldon.

In the beginning of August, Foster, having received the reinforcements he had been expecting, transferred his headquarters from Moorehead City to Newberne, a position better adapted for resuming the offensive. The railroad which connects these two villages was reopened, and an expedition was organized to protect it against inroads on the part of the enemy. West of Old Topsail Inlet, the sand-bank upon which Fort Macon is built hugs the coast more and more, and forms a simple chain of sand-banks, separated by inlets opening in front of each of the small rivers that intersect the coast. The two most important of these water-courses are the Bogue River, at the mouth of which stands the village of Swansboro', and farther west the New River, which must be ascended for a considerable distance before reaching the village of Jacksonboro' or Onslow Court-house. On the 21st of August five or six vessels loaded with troops entered the estuary of the Bogue River; starting from Beaufort, some had steered between the downs and the mainland, while the others had taken the open sea, so as to re-enter by way of Bogue Inlet. Immense salt-pits, an earthwork and some barracks recently occupied were destroyed, and then the expedition returned to Beaufort after having ascertained that the Confederates were not in force in that direction. The abandonment of the James River by the army of the Potomac and Lee's victory at Manassas again emboldened the Confederates in North Carolina. The small regiments which alone had remained in the State received a large addition of volunteers, who, believing the Federal cause lost, were hastening to atone by a tardy demonstration of zeal for the lukewarmness they had hitherto evinced in defence of the slave interests. The fevers which prevailed along the marshy coast of the Carolinas during the hot season had proved a terrible ordeal for Foster's troops, who had not yet had time to become acclimated. Scattered in small garrisons, they were reduced by more than one half, and even the

soldiers who were not in the hospitals felt the enervating influence of the climate, being hardly strong enough to defend the positions entrusted to them.

The Confederates took advantage of this condition of things to make an effort to crush them in detail, and determined to gain possession of the entrance of the two principal rivers which empty into the inland sea by attacking at the same time Plymouth, on the right border of the Roanoke, and Washington, on the left bank of the Tar. With regard to the town of Newberne, which is the key of the Neuse, it was too well defended for them to entertain any hope of surprising it. On the 2d of September the Confederate colonel Garrett approached the little town of Plymouth with about one thousand men, half cavalry and half infantry. As it was already broad daylight, he bivouacked in the forest, not intending to attack the enemy before twilight on the following day, when he was discovered by a Union farmer, who made known his presence to the Federals. The latter numbered about six hundred, but more than one-half of them were laid up with fever in the hospital, so that when the roll was called there were only three hundred able-bodied men present, and one sergeant to command them. Without allowing himself to be disconcerted by the numerical weakness of his troops, Sergeant Green led them against the enemy. Turning the tables, he suddenly fell upon the Confederates, routed them, killed about thirty men, and triumphantly brought back forty prisoners, among whom was Colonel Garrett.

The attack against Washington was more serious. This village was occupied by a field-battery of six pieces, five squadrons of cavalry and four companies of infantry. The gun-boats *Pickett* and *Louisiana* were at anchor in the river fronting the village. The talk of the inhabitants, who were known to be in sympathy with the enemy, had roused the suspicion of the Federals, and on the morning of September 6th the cavalry, with two pieces of cannon, went out on a reconnaissance along the Plymouth road. Three or four hundred Confederate infantry, with about one hundred horse, were at the same time approaching the village from another direction. A thick fog concealed their movements, enabling them to take the Federal garrison com-

pletely by surprise. In a few moments all the streets were invaded, the houses containing Union soldiers were surrounded, and the four guns, together with the small post which guarded them, were captured. But at the sound of the first musket-shots fired in the streets the cavalry returned in full haste from its reconnoitring expedition. The Confederates were checked; the Federals rallied, re-formed and assumed the offensive, supported by the two field-pieces that were still left them. They were also assisted by the powerful artillery of the gun-boats. At the opening of the musketry-fire, it is true, an unexplained accident set fire to the powder-magazine of the *Pickett*, which exploded, killing and wounding about twenty persons. But the *Louisiana*, throwing her heavy shells into the houses where the assailants had taken refuge in their turn, compelled them to beat a speedy retreat. The attempt had failed, but the capture of four guns and the destruction of the *Pickett* sufficiently indemnified the Confederates for the losses they had sustained.

The battle of Antietam had restored confidence to the Federals; the garrisons of all the isolated posts were ordered to be doubly active, so as to occupy the enemy and prevent him from reinforcing Lee's army. In conformity with these instructions, General Dix, who was in command of Fortress Monroe and Norfolk, determined to undertake an expedition west of that place, and asked for the co-operation of Flusser's flotilla for that purpose. The land-troops were to advance from Suffolk by following the Norfolk and Weldon Railroad, and meet at the Franklin bridge, on the Blackwater River, the gun-boats which should have ascended this tributary of the Chowan. The rendezvous was fixed for the 3d of October. The naval force was alone punctual, Dix having relinquished his project at the last moment. The gun-boats, after a navigation rendered more difficult by the narrowness and sinuosities of the Blackwater, found the Confederates at Franklin ready to receive them. One or two regiments of infantry posted along the right bank, under the command of General Pettigrew, opened a terrific fire upon the Federal vessels just as the latter were turning a difficult angle in the river. Scattered at first by a discharge from the Union artillery, the Confederates re-formed in the vicinity of a stockade which had recently been constructed.

They well knew that this obstacle would stop the enemy's vessels, for it could not be removed without much labor, which would have involved great loss of life without any certainty as to its results. Flusser, seeing nothing of the army and dreading to be blockaded, decided to retreat. He was saluted along the whole route by the bullets of sharpshooters hidden in the woods adjoining the river, and finally re-entered the waters of the Chowan after having lost ten men, considering himself fortunate in having been able to extricate his three vessels from a perilous position at that price.

At the end of the same month General Foster determined to assume the offensive in his turn. Besides the advantage of intercepting any reinforcements which might be destined for Lee, he was influenced by another consideration for himself. The unhealthy season had passed, and at that period of the year an active campaign was more advantageous to his troops than an idle camp-life around Newberne. He resolved to scour the country watered by the Tar River with his division, and to come up, if possible, with the forces of the enemy, supposed to consist of three regiments which had attacked Plymouth and Washington. These forces were believed to be massed at Tarboro'; if the Federals should succeed in taking possession of this point, they could easily advance as far as the Richmond and Wilmington Railroad, and destroy the bridge over which this important line crosses the Tar River.

One brigade proceeded by land to Washington, the other two being conveyed there by water; and on the 3d of November the expedition, numbering six thousand men, started for Williamston, on the Roanoke, across the interminable pine-forests which abound in that region. Its march was delayed by the mud, into which both horses and vehicles sank at every step. On the evening of the same day the expedition finally reached a stream, behind which a detachment of about seven hundred Confederates sought to stop it. But the latter were dislodged from their position after a brief skirmish, and on the 4th Foster reached Williams-ton, where Captain Davenport, who had come up the Roanoke with five gun-boats, had preceded him. The Confederates were at this moment preparing for a new attack upon Plymouth. They

had massed their forces higher up on the Roanoke, at a point called Rainbow's Bluff, where was planted a battery constructed so as to command the river, but on the approach of the Federals they retired to Tarboro'. On the 5th, Foster, ascending the Roanoke, found this work abandoned, and reached the village of Hamilton, where several houses were burnt down by undisciplined soldiers. Leaving the gun-boats to guard this point, the Federals started for Tarboro' on the 6th, and encamped in the evening at sixteen kilometres from this village. But the march had been very trying for these soldiers, little inured to the hardships of camp-life; more than one-third of them had been unable to keep up with the column; the weather had become threatening, and the least rainfall would render the roads almost impassable. At last Foster received information, exaggerated, it is true, that considerable forces were assembled at Tarboro' for the purpose of protecting the great railway line. He did not venture to attack them, but retraced his steps on the morning of the 7th. A snow-storm rendered this retreat extremely painful; after two days' sufferings, however, his troops reached Plymouth on the 9th of November, where they again shipped for Newberne. In this expedition Foster gathered a large quantity of provisions, diverted from Plymouth the attack which menaced that post, and gave the Confederates to understand that he was able to move off some distance from the coast; in short, he gave his troops some kind of experience in warfare, but this first essay cost him dear, and he brought back with him a very large number of sick and lame.

Whilst he was preparing to undertake a more serious campaign against the Richmond and Wilmington line of railway, the operations of the naval force were of but little importance. On the 23d of November, Lieutenant Cushing, an enterprising officer, who signalized himself at a later period by one of the most brilliant and remarkable exploits of this war, penetrated into the New River with the steamer *Ellis*, between Wilmington and Fort Macon, and ascended this water-course as far as Jacksonville, where he captured two schooners. But when he came down the river, the Confederates, posted on the shore with two pieces of cannon, received him with a very brisk fire. He had the misfortune to run his ship aground upon the bar, and, after spending the night in

vain efforts to extricate her, was obliged to abandon her. The crew and *matériel* were put on board one of the prizes, which sailed direct for Beaufort with a fair wind, while Cushing remained to the last on board his vessel, exposed to the enemy's shot. He finally set her on fire, and, taking one of the launches, reached Fort Macon safe and sound.

On the same day three Federal steamers, leaving Yorktown, in Virginia, with a few companies of infantry, landed these troops for a few hours in one of the bays of Matthews county, on the Chesapeake coast, where they destroyed three schooners and some important saltworks. In the mean time, Foster had received new reinforcements, which enabled him at last to carry out his plan of campaign. Wessell's brigade, detached from Peck's division, which was stationed between Yorktown and Fort Monroe, had come to join him at Newberne, and on the 11th of December he set off with the four brigades placed under his command. This time the preliminaries were complete, and nothing was likely to stop the march of his troops, as had been the case the preceding month. The object of the expedition was difficult to accomplish. Foster proposed to penetrate into the interior of the country, and to cut, in the vicinity of Goldsboro', the track of that Richmond and Wilmington line of railway which, since the capture of Roanoke eight months before, the Federals had been vainly seeking to destroy.

In this expedition he was deprived of the support of the navy; for the waters of the Neuse were too shallow to be navigated by gun-boats, and the experience acquired on the rivers of North Carolina proved, moreover, that, in these sinuous and enclosed water-courses, ships of war ran the risk of being captured without rendering any service to the land-forces. Foster, therefore, could only rely upon his own troops. The country was little known, presenting at every step, behind deep and swampy streams, positions easy to defend. The column, comprising ten or eleven thousand infantry, one regiment of cavalry and twenty-six field-pieces, proceeded toward Kingston, a pretty little town, near which the Newberne and Goldsboro' Railroad crosses the Neuse. The soldiers had three days' rations in their haversacks, and the army-wagons carried provisions for seven more. In short, the resources

of the country, where the potato, which matures at this season, is found in great abundance, and where every farm-house is well stocked with pork and beef, were to make up for the insufficiency of provisions if the expedition should be prolonged for a longer time.

The task of defending North Carolina had been entrusted by the Confederate government to General Gustavus Smith, a distinguished officer, who, it will be remembered, commanded the Southern army at the battle of Fair Oaks after Johnston had been wounded. He had under his command the few Confederate troops stationed in that State, and the local militia enlisted in the particular service of the authorities of Raleigh. His forces consisted of Pettigrew's brigade, which Foster had encountered the month previous during his march upon Tarboro', and two other brigades, commanded by Generals Robertson and Evans. At the first news of the movement of the Federals, Smith, hastening to Goldsboro', had sent Evans to meet the enemy in order to delay his march as long as possible. On the 12th, Foster's scouts met those of the Confederates, and captured a few prisoners. The next day there was a more marked resistance. Four hundred infantry and three field-pieces were awaiting the Federals behind the deep stream of South-west Creek, the bridge of which had been destroyed; but the Confederates, having no knowledge of the strength of the enemy they had to contend with, allowed themselves to be beguiled by fruitless skirmishing, whilst several regiments turned their position; and being attacked both in front and in flank at the same time, they soon dispersed, leaving one of their guns behind.

On the 14th, whilst his cavalry was pushing some reconnoissances far in a westerly direction, Foster turned toward the north in order to reach the railroad bridge on the Neuse, situated at two or three kilometres south of Kingston. Evans with his brigade, numbering about two thousand men, was awaiting him at this place. He had taken a good position in front of the bridge, across the road and along the edge of a wood which crowned the summit of a steep acclivity; his left rested on the Neuse, and his right on an impassable swamp. Unable to deploy his forces within the narrow space where they were confined, Foster tried to

make up for this disadvantage by the vigor of his attack. While his batteries were shelling the Confederates, Wessells' brigade, composed of well-trained soldiers, advanced first, and went into action; that of Amory followed close, replacing the battalions that had exhausted their ammunition. Twenty minutes later, just as the third brigade, under Stevenson, was about to join them, Wessells and Amory gave the signal to charge. Their whole line rushed forward, and without a moment's pause dislodged Evans from the positions he occupied. The Confederates then only thought to gain the bridge on the Neuse before their assailants. Most of them succeeded in crossing it, but about four or five hundred of their number, having been unable to reach it, fell into the hands of the Federals, and the last to cross set it on fire, but so carelessly that the flames were extinguished before any serious damage had been done. An hour later, Wessells' brigade entered the town of Kingston, where it took possession of nine guns which Evans had abandoned in his precipitate retreat toward Goldsboro'.

Foster, pushing his troops forward as rapidly as possible, tried to overtake the latter, who had halted four kilometres from the town. But before engaging the fight he thought proper to wait for the arrival of his artillery. Evans did not allow him time, but immediately resumed his march. Protected by the darkness, the Confederate general easily escaped from his adversary; and gaining one of the stations of the Newberne Railroad, he placed the whole of his brigade on board several trains of cars, which conveyed it to Goldsboro'.

Foster's march north of the Neuse had not, however, been fruitless, for it had deceived the Confederates regarding the route that the Federal army was about to take. Thinking that the latter would follow Evans, they were waiting for it along the railroad between Kingston and Goldsboro'; in the mean while, Foster, having left a simple rear-guard in Kingston, retraced his steps, crossed the river over the bridge near which he had fought the day previous, and after having thus placed this obstacle between the enemy and himself was rapidly proceeding up the right bank. The Richmond and Wilmington Railroad crossed the Neuse two kilometres south of Goldsboro', over a large wooden

bridge, the flooring of which, of latticed wood-work, is supported by stone piers. Having once reached the right bank, the track runs for some distance in close proximity to the river, and, following a south-easterly direction, crosses several small streams over wooden bridges, in the vicinity of which one meets successively the stations of Everettsville, Dudley and Mount Olive. Several wagon-bridges connect the two banks of the Neuse between Goldsboro' and Kingston; the most important is situated at an almost equal distance from these two points, near the village of Whitehall, another a little above the great railroad bridge, and a third, called Thompson's Bridge, between the first two.

On the 15th, Foster advanced to within six kilometres of Whitehall, sending three squadrons and two field-pieces, under Major Garrard, to occupy that village. Garrard had orders to burn the bridge, so as to prevent the enemy from using it the next day to harass the flank of the column; but the Confederates, being under the impression that he intended to cross it for the purpose of marching upon Goldsboro', set it on fire themselves before his arrival, and Robertson's brigade hastened to dispute the passage of the Neuse with the Federals at this point. Before retiring Garrard made an attempt to destroy an unfinished ship of war which lay moored to the opposite shore by firing cannon-shots into her, but did not succeed, and soon resumed his march to join the rest of the column. On the 16th the Federal vanguard reached at last the great Richmond and Wilmington Railroad line at Mount Olive, burnt several bridges, and destroyed the track for a distance of seven kilometres. A Confederate regiment had passed over this track a few hours before, on its way from Wilmington to Goldsboro'. Other reinforcements, sent from Petersburg, having reached that town at the same time, Smith placed these forces under the command of General Clingman, to whom was entrusted the guarding of the great railway bridge over the Neuse, the destruction of which was evidently the main object of the campaign undertaken by Foster.

The latter encamped, on the evening of the 16th, thirteen kilometres from Goldsboro'. On the 17th he sent a detachment from the left of the main column to destroy the railroad track at Dudley and Everettsville, while Garrard on the right, keeping close

to the river, proceeded to Thompson's Bridge, which he found already in flames. In the mean time, the little Federal army was approaching the great bridge. Lee's brigade, which was in advance, found a portion of Clingman's troops posted on the right bank for the purpose of defending the railroad on that side. It dislodged them from their position after a sharp combat, and took possession of the track. But Clingman, rallying all his forces on the left bank, placed himself in a position so as to enfilade this track, and to command all the approaches to the bridge, to prevent the destruction of which was of the greatest importance to the Confederates. Foster sent nearly the whole of his artillery to Lee's assistance, whilst Wessells' brigade occupied an eminence from which it commanded the course of the river. The signal for the attack was given, and Lee's soldiers bravely followed the railroad track; but the enemy's fire compelled them to seek shelter on the right and left of the road. They thus advanced step by step, sustaining great losses. At last the superiority of the Federal artillery compelled their adversaries to slacken their fire; an iron-clad locomotive carrying one gun, which the latter had pushed to the verge of the river, was pierced by a shell, and exploded; after a struggle of two hours, Lee gained the approaches to the bridge. But every time that his soldiers showed themselves within the open space which still separated them from it, they were received by such a terrific fire that they could not reach the bridge itself. Many men who had volunteered to set fire to it had fallen victims to their devotion. Finally, Lieutenant Graham, as daring as, and more fortunate than, those who had preceded him, succeeded in setting fire to some of the beams amid a shower of balls. The fire spread rapidly, and the Federal guns, supporting the fire of Lee's brigade, which was lying in ambush along the bank, kept off the Confederates, who were vainly trying to extinguish it. In a few moments this great work fell a prey to the flames, and its blazing fragments dropped into the river, leaving nothing standing but the stone piers, which could not be demolished without blowing them up.

The main object of the expedition was accomplished. The Confederates did indeed retain possession of the small wagon-bridge situated a few kilometres above the one which had just

been burnt, but the great railway line was destroyed; the bridges of this line throughout a distance of from twelve to fifteen kilometres no longer existed; the cross-timbers had been made into fires upon which the rails had been heated and twisted out of shape; in short, the passage of the Neuse was interrupted for a considerable length of time. Foster had no interest in marching upon Goldsboro', where Smith could mass considerable forces, nor could he have destroyed the piers of the bridge without taking possession of the left bank, which would have been a difficult attempt, and very uncertain of success. In short, having ventured thus far from his base of operations in a country where he could find no provisions except by scattering his troops, he was in danger of seeing the enemy, whose ranks were rapidly increasing, cross the Neuse behind him and cut off his retreat. He gave the signal for departure without any further delay, and again took up his line of march in the direction of Newberne. Lee's brigade was directed to cover this movement. Meanwhile, Smith had succeeded in massing all his forces upon the point menaced. Evans' brigade, which had been detained for some time at Goldsboro' by obstructions on the road, had arrived at the commencement of the fight; it had been joined by that of Robertson and by Pettigrew, who was recalled from the neighborhood of Tarboro'. As soon as the Confederates became aware of Foster's retreat they recrossed the wagon-bridge which they had preserved, and tried to capture the rear-guard of the Federals. But Lee had posted a battery in thickets, from which it commanded the road; and when Pettigrew's brigade boldly advanced against him, it was stopped and driven back in disorder by a fire which inflicted severe losses upon it. This last engagement ended the conflict. Smith did not deem it prudent to pursue his adversary, who reached Whitehall on the 18th and Newberne on the 21st. The Federals had ninety men killed and four hundred and seventy-eight wounded; the Confederates, seventy-one killed and two hundred and sixty-eight wounded.

In little more than ten days the small Union column had travelled nearly three hundred and twenty kilometres, fought two successful battles, captured ten pieces of cannon and nearly five hundred soldiers from the enemy, carried dismay into a region where it was thought it could not penetrate, and, above all, inter-

rupted one of the principal lines of communication of the Confederate army ; for if the small railroad bridges were restored by the 24th, it required several weeks to reconstruct that of the Neuse. The most important result of this expedition, however, was that it gave Foster's soldiers that confidence in themselves and their chief which they did not possess before. It was a brilliant termination of the campaign of 1862 in North Carolina. It now remains for us to mention the operations that took place at the same period in the other parts of the coast of the Southern States.

We interrupted the recital of these operations on the shores of the Atlantic after the check of the Federals at Secessionville in the middle of June. All attempts against Charleston had been abandoned ; the heat paralyzed the troops, and the fleet confined itself to the maintenance of the blockade, and to the protection of the posts which it was necessary to occupy along the coast. During the whole summer we have but one reconnaissance, of little importance, to mention, which was made from the 12th to the 14th of August, by the small steamer *Treaty*, on the Black River, a water-course which empties into the bay of Georgetown between that of Charleston and the entrance of the Cape Fear River. The *Treaty* proceeded up the Black River for a distance of forty kilometres in the hope of seizing a vessel of the enemy which was lying there ; but having learnt that this vessel was abandoned, she again came down the river after dispersing some of the enemy's troops, who did not even try to defend the batteries entrusted to their care.

Meanwhile, Hunter, who had been recalled after the unfortunate Secessionville expedition, had been superseded by the brave and gallant Mitchell, a former professor of astronomy, now become a general, who had recently distinguished himself in his campaign through Northern Alabama. Having reached the headquarters at Beaufort on the 30th of September, Mitchell at once set himself to work to organize the colony of emancipated negroes that he found in the place, and to prepare his troops for a new campaign. He did not, however, allow them to remain inactive until these preparations were completed. The best part of the Bay of St. John's, into which the river of the same name empties,

and which affords the safest refuge on the western coast of Florida, is commanded by the heights called St. John's Bluff, which the Federals had abandoned at the same time as the village of Jacksonville, a little higher up. The Confederates had established themselves there and erected batteries, which were a source of great annoyance to vessels anchored in the bay. Admiral Dupont determined to dislodge them; and on the very day of his arrival at Beaufort, Mitchell sent a few troops, under General Brannan, to assist the naval force in this operation. It was an easy and complete success. While the Federal gun-boats were bombarding the enemy's batteries, the soldiers quickly landed and took possession of these works, where they found nine guns. Some ships subsequently penetrated into the St. John's river, appeared before Jacksonville, and proceeded for a distance of three hundred and seventy-five kilometres up this large sheet of still water, which not far from the coast forms rather an extended lake than a real river.

Before resuming the siege of Charleston, Mitchell had determined to break up, at least for a time, the railroad which connects that city with Savannah. This line, in fact, enabled the garrisons of the two cities mutually to support each other, and to concentrate on all the points which the Federals might attack. It passed through a fertile country, whence the inhabitants of Charleston derived a portion of their supplies, and formed one of the branches of the great artery running parallel to the coast which Foster was to strike at Goldsboro' a few weeks later, and the preservation of which was essential to the system of Confederate defences. An expeditionary corps was formed of detachments from the two brigades of Brannan and Terry, stationed at Beaufort and Hilton Head, and two regiments taken from the garrison of Fort Pulaski. The total force of this corps numbered forty-five hundred men, about three hundred of whom were cavalry, and two sections of artillery comprising six field-pieces. The fleet furnished a battery of field-howitzers, drawn by hand. The expeditionary corps embarked at Hilton Head on the evening of October 21st, on board of fifteen vessels of light draught. Every preparation had been made to take it by water as near as possible to the point it was intended to strike. Information had been collected, not without

trouble, concerning the country, of which no map gave a correct description. The hours of the tide had been carefully calculated, and a large number of tenders, towed by steamers, were to facilitate and expedite the process of landing. The fleet weighed anchor during the night, under the direction of Captain Stedman. Mitchell, mortally stricken by the fevers which ravage these coasts in the fall of the year, had transferred the command of the expedition to Brannan. But notwithstanding the secrecy which had surrounded it, the Confederates had either learned or surmised its object, and were on their guard.

The Savannah and Charleston Railroad described a circular arc between these two points, the convexity of which was turned to the west. This course is necessitated by the two arms of the sea, which extend the bays of Port Royal and St. Helena far inland, separating the archipelago which bears the latter name from the continent. Deep estuaries and rivers bounded by vast swamps compelled the railroad constructors to look for firm ground far from the coast. Nevertheless, it was found necessary to build large bridges over water-courses, apparently insignificant, but to which the effect of the tide gave at stated periods considerable breadth. The object of the expedition was to destroy these bridges. The two were selected that could be most easily approached—that of the Coosawatchie, near the village of that name, and that of the Pocotaligo, an estuary very shallow at low tide, which also gives its name to a small village situated on its borders. The brigades of Terry and Brannan, under the command of the latter general, were ordered to land at Mackay's Point, on the right bank of the Pocotaligo, and near the point where it empties into the Coosaw River, while Colonel Barton, with two regiments from Fort Pulaski, ascended the Coosawatchie as far as the vicinity of the railway bridge.

The difficulty in navigating the river at night delayed the landing at Mackay's Point beyond the appointed time. It was, however, effected on the morning of the 22d without accident. The vessel which had the cavalry on board was the only one that remained stranded in the offing, and was unable to land her cargo. As soon as his troops had formed, Brannan set out in the direction of the railway bridge, following the road leading to the village

of Pocotaligo, situated at a distance of eighteen kilometres from Mackay's Point. This road runs along the right bank of the water-course, and crosses, over narrow causeways intersected by wooden bridges, the broad swamps, often bounded by thick copses, with which all the small valleys in this region are covered. Each of these causeways formed a defile easy to defend. The Confederates took good care to avail themselves of these excellent positions. Colonel Walker, after feeling the Federals, who were advancing and deploying whenever the nature of the ground allowed them, awaited their approach behind one of these obstacles in front of the Frampton plantation, twelve kilometres from Mackay's Point. Twice did the Union troops cross the wood by which the swamp was bounded on their side; and each time they were received by such terrific volleys of musketry along its edge that they were compelled to fall back, leaving behind them a large number of killed and wounded. The section of regular artillery which accompanied them succeeded at last in taking position at the entrance of the causeway, from which it shelled the thickets occupied by the enemy, who, staggered by its fire, were unable to resist the final charge of Brannan's brigade. The Confederates retired in great haste, abandoning a caisson; but they soon formed again in a new position similar to the first. This was stronger yet, for, after the defile formed by the causeway, the road ran upon a bridge thrown across the Pocotaligo, and crossed over to the left bank of this stream. In order to avoid this crossing and strike the railroad bridge without leaving the right bank, it would have been necessary to pass through a country entirely deprived of any line of communication for a distance of several kilometres. It was two o'clock before the Federals found themselves facing this new obstacle. The reconstruction of the bridges had delayed their march. The means of transportation were wanting, and the artillery was without ammunition, with the exception of the naval howitzers, which could use the projectiles abandoned by the enemy. The Confederates had crossed over to the left bank of the Pocotaligo, destroyed the bridge behind them, and planted several guns of heavy calibre along that bank, which completely commanded all the approaches to the swamp. After repeated attempts to brave the fire of these guns, the Federals became

convinced that they could neither silence them by crossing the river nor leave them behind. Deprived of ammunition, short of provisions, with a large number of their wounded left on the road, they ran the risk, if they waited till night, of being turned by the enemy, who could not fail speedily to receive reinforcements. Brannan therefore about four o'clock gave the order for retreat, which was accomplished without confusion. The column, carrying back all its wounded, joined the fleet which had brought them over at a late hour; and on the 23d the Union troops landed at Hilton Head.

Colonel Barton, on his side, leaving Mackay's Point on the morning of the 22d, where he had received Brannan's instructions, proceeded up the Coosawatchie with four hundred men and four vessels, two gun-boats and two small transports. At three kilometres below the village of Coosawatchie, the tide being low, there was not water enough. He landed his troops on the right bank and proceeded in the direction of the railroad, hoping to be able to reach the great bridge, which he intended to destroy before the enemy had collected sufficient forces to defend it. Whilst his scouts were occupying the track, the whistle of a locomotive announced the approach of a train coming from Charleston. It was a Georgia regiment sent by Beauregard to guard the river crossings. The Federals, who were posted at a short distance, received the Confederates that were crowded in the open cars with a well-sustained fire of musketry. Several of them were wounded. Their leader, Colonel Harrison, was killed at the first discharge; others, astonished by this unexpected attack, jumped out of the cars, most of them being severely injured by the fall; but the train proceeded on its course. It stopped a little farther on to land the troops that were on board; they formed rapidly, so as to protect both village and bridge. Barton did not venture to attack them, but contented himself with tearing up the rails along that portion of the track he occupied, and then returned to the vessels, on board of which he embarked, joining Brannan at Hilton Head the next day. The losses of the Federals in these various engagements amounted to thirty-two killed and one hundred and ninety wounded; the enemy had about one hundred men disabled.

The double expedition had not accomplished the object proposed, for it had not seriously damaged the railroad at any point. It was undertaken without a sufficient number of troops, and, above all, without any of those accessories which are indispensable for a campaign of several days. Mitchell's bold and skilful management had been wanting. The troops returned to find their chief expiring. He died on the 30th of October, and was replaced by General Hunter, who had already preceded him in the command. The latter attempted no operation during the last two months of 1862, but confined himself to the task of preparing for the siege of Charleston, which he proposed to undertake in the spring of 1863.

We shall therefore pass from the Atlantic coast to that of the Gulf of Mexico, where we left the Federals after the conquest of New Orleans in the latter part of April, 1862. The capture of this great city, instead of setting Farragut's fleet free, and enabling it to sail again on the open sea, had drawn it toward a new field of operations. We have already given an account of the battles which the Federal admiral fought on the Mississippi waters during the summer. The task assigned during this time to the few vessels he had left in the Gulf of Mexico was confined to the maintenance of the strictest blockade of the ports which the Confederates still possessed in that sea. About the end of July, Farragut finally returned to New Orleans with a portion of his fleet, after his campaign against Vicksburg, and since then his duties had been divided between guarding the lower course of the Mississippi, watching the ports of Pensacola and Mobile, and the occupation of some important points along the coast of Texas.

He resolved to establish a strict blockade of this coast, which had long been neglected by the Federal fleet. It was a difficult task; for if it possesses but few ports accessible to large vessels, its configuration is excellently adapted for a smuggling coasting-trade. In fact, with the exception of a small interval near the mouth of the river Brazos, it is bounded from the Bay of Galveston at the north to the Mexican frontier, at the south by a long sand-bar similar to that which the Atlantic has raised around North Carolina. This narrow dike is divided by channels into a

certain number of islands; but the arm of the sea which separates it from the mainland is neither deep nor wide, except where it has been hollowed by the water-courses which flow from the interior of Texas. This arm of the sea thus forms a long channel, which is only navigable for vessels of light draught, and which connects all these water-courses. The small trading-vessels of the Confederacy availed themselves of this fact to ply to and fro out of reach of the blockading fleet. At times they would emerge through one pass, at other times through another, and thus reach the neutral territory of Mexico in a few hours. This kind of lagoon bears at first the name of Matagorda Bay, in the vicinity of the village of Indianola, and communicates with the sea by way of the pass of Saluria; then it successively forms the bays of Espiritu Santo, Aransas, Corpus Christi and Salt Lagoon—names which indicate so many corresponding intersections at the mouths of the rivers San Antonio, Mission, Nueces and El Grullo. Beyond the latter river the lagoon takes the name of Laguna Madre; and being no longer fed by the waters of any tributary, it stretches with uniform width as far as the mouth of the Rio Grande, which marks the Mexican frontier. South of the pass of Saluria are only to be found those of Aransas, Corpus Christi, and finally that of Boca Chica, at the extremity of the Laguna Madre.

Lieutenant Kittredge was in command of several small vessels fitted out as men-of-war, nearly all sailing-vessels, and the gun-boat *Sachem*, with which he blockaded the entrance of Corpus Christi. The Confederates, being desirous to fit out a few vessels in their turn without being molested, had sunk some piles among the passes. On the 12th of August, Kittredge succeeded in removing these obstacles; he penetrated into the bay with the small steamer *Corypheus*, and captured one of the enemy's ships, while another was burnt by its own crew. Still another fell into his hands on the 17th. On the 18th he landed about one hundred men, who, being supported by the naval guns, made an attempt to occupy the village of Corpus Christi; but the enemy having appeared in force, these troops re-embarked after having repulsed a feeble attack made by three hundred Confederate horse. Kittredge made no further demonstration against Corpus Christi, and four weeks later he was taken prisoner with the

crew of one of his launches while engaged in a reconnaissance in Laguna Madre.

The principal port of Texas, after Galveston, is that of Sabine City. This little town, situated on the west side of the deep and narrow strait which connects Sabine Lake with the open sea, has a line of railway that places it in communication with Houston and the interior of the State. A battery of four thirty-two pounders had been erected by the Confederates to command the pass. The Federal steamer *Kensington* arrived in sight of this pass on the 23d of September, and the next day her crew got on board of two schooners of light draught for the purpose of forcing an entrance. This operation was successfully accomplished on the 25th; and while the Union vessels were engaged in silencing the four guns of the enemy, a landing-party was disembarked between the battery and Sabine City. It met with no resistance; and the Federals, after taking possession of the works, established themselves in the town. Unfortunately for them, they found the yellow fever there, which made their apparently easy success cost them very dear. The merit of this little expedition was due to Mr. Crocker, a merchant captain, who, like many others, had temporarily passed into the service of the United States with the title of *acting master*. He resolved to finish the work he had so successfully begun, by going in search of and destroying all the vessels engaged as blockade-runners in the bays situated between Sabine Pass and the entrance of the Atchafalaya. While the crews of the schooners were landing on the west side of Lake Sabine and setting fire to a railroad bridge over a stream called Taylor's Bayou, he proceeded on board the *Kensington* to visit the passes through which the waters of Lakes Calcasieu and Mermantau empty into the sea, and captured several vessels, among others a small steamer. Meanwhile, the Confederates promptly repaired the little damage done to the bridge of Taylor's Bayou by the fire; and understanding how important it was for them to retain possession of this bridge, so as to be able at all times to menace Sabine City, they stationed there a garrison of three hundred men. On the 15th of October, Crocker, with a steamer recently captured, on board of which he had placed a twelve-pounder howitzer and a twenty-pounder Parrott gun,

penetrated into the lake and took a position bearing upon the entrance of Taylor's Bayou. The railroad at this place runs close to the shore, and the Federal shells soon fell among the troops who were guarding the bridge; a few successful shots disabled a train of cars which was bringing them reinforcements, and the Union sailors, landing under cover of their guns, entirely destroyed the bridge, the barracks occupied by the post, and two small schooners which they found at the entrance of the stream. On the 17th a detachment of fifty of their party, accompanied by a howitzer, attacked and dispersed a body of cavalry encamped eight kilometres from Sabine City, thus securing to the Federals the undisturbed possession of this important post.

These operations, which were gradually substituting the occupation of the most important points on the coast for the maritime blockade, had all been directed by Farragut, who had stationed himself with his favorite ship, the *Hartford*, under the guns of Fort Pickens, in the Bay of Pensacola. At the same period, he sent Captain Renshaw, with four gun-boats, to take possession of Galveston. This town is situated near the eastern extremity of a large island which closes the entrance of the extensive bay of the same name; in order to reach the wharves which project into the tranquil waters of the bay, the ships doubled the point of the island, passing between this point and Pelican Island. Galveston is connected with the continent by a railroad which crosses an arm of the sea of no great depth, over a bridge twelve hundred metres long. At the bottom of the bay stands the village of San Jacinto, in the vicinity of which the American adventurers who had undertaken to conquer and colonize Texas defeated the Mexican army and captured General Santa Anna. Renshaw appeared on the 4th of October with his flotilla at the entrance of the bay. After waiting in vain for an answer to his summons, he crossed the bar. A fort erected by the Confederates, at the extreme end of Galveston Island, opened fire upon him, but two or three well-directed shells soon silenced its guns. The battery on Pelican Island, from which the Federals had expected to receive numerous projectiles, was found to be only armed with bogus wooden cannon. It was immediately occupied; and Ren-

shaw, bringing his vessel to bear upon the town, allowed the Confederates to evacuate it. The place was delivered up to him on the 9th of October, but the few troops he had at his disposal rendered its possession more dangerous than useful, as we shall presently see.

Meanwhile, he continued the system of occupation prescribed by Farragut and on the 26th of October two of his gun-boats, the *Westfield* and the *Clifton*, took possession of the village of Indianola, in the Bay of Matagorda, without opposition.

Similar bold strokes were attempted along that portion of the coast of the Mexican gulf which extends east of the mouths of the Mississippi. We do not propose to speak of the operations of General Weitzel, nor of the flotilla that accompanied him on the Atchafalaya and the Bayou Tèche; the naval force having only played an accessory role, these operations have been recorded elsewhere. We shall merely mention a small naval expedition, undertaken a month earlier by Major Strong, chief of Butler's staff, against some Confederate detachments which were assembling on the left bank of the Mississippi for the purpose of harassing the Federals in their possession of the districts in the vicinity of New Orleans. It is known that this great city is situated on an irregularly formed peninsula, bounded on the south by the Mississippi, on the east by the sea, and on the north by a succession of bays, straits and lakes, which reach far inland. This chain is composed of the bay of the islands Les Malheureux, Lake Borgne, the Rigolets and Lake Pontchartrain, thus forming a continuous barrier which effectually protected New Orleans. It is extended beyond Lake Pontchartrain by Lake Maurepas, and still further west by the swamps adjoining Amitié River. This river, proceeding from the vicinity of Baton Rouge, discharges its waters into the first of the lakes above mentioned, which, in turn, empties into the second, at the east, through a channel called Manchac pass. The great line of railway which traverses the State of Mississippi throughout its entire length, reaching down to New Orleans from Memphis through Jackson, penetrates into the peninsula by crossing the Manchac pass over an important bridge. It was probable, therefore, that as soon as the railroad had brought the Confederates sufficient forces to enable them to

strike a blow against New Orleans, they would debouch from this direction. The Southern general J. Thompson had stationed himself in the village of Pontchitoula, situated seventy-seven kilometres from the great city, and sixteen beyond the bridge of the Manchac pass. He had three hundred men with him, together with a battery of artillery. Strong conceived the idea of surprising him; he shipped one hundred and fifty men on board the *Ceres* and one hundred on the *New London*, two of the steamers of light draught which had been detailed to guard the waters of Lake Pontchartrain. The first, proceeding up Tangipahoa River, was to land the troops she had on board east of Pontchitoula, while the second was to make its landing on the left bank of the Manchac pass, after having destroyed the railway bridge. It was expected that both would strike J. Thompson's camp at the same time. Strong hoped thus to cut off his retreat and capture him with all his troops. But this plan could not be carried out; the *New London* vainly tried two nights in succession to get over the Manchac bar, and the *Ceres* was found too large to ascend the winding course of the Tangipahoa. Strong was obliged to send the *New London* back, and to enter the Manchac pass with the *Ceres* in broad daylight, the forces of the expedition being thus reduced to the troops on board this ship. A surprise was henceforth impracticable, which rendered it necessary to use the greater speed. Strong landed on the morning of the 15th of June near the bridge of the Manchac pass, which he proceeded to destroy, and at once pushed on with his small band toward Pontchitoula. A tropical sun darted its rays on the heads of the Federal soldiers, and was reflected from the putrid waters of the marshes by which they were surrounded. In order to cross these swamps they had nothing but the railway embankment to walk upon, and for several kilometres they were even obliged to jump from beam to beam over the open work of the bridges which alternate with the causeway. The Confederates were on the lookout for them in front of Pontchitoula with a battery of artillery; but after the first discharge, seeing that the Federals were steadily advancing, they took to flight. Strong destroyed a large number of wagons and army stores, occupied the village, where he found arms and equipments, and returned to his vessel on the same evening. The

next day he re-entered New Orleans, having had but ten men wounded.

The coast of Florida is particularly adapted for the establishment of salt-works, and the Confederate government, assuming the control of this branch of industry, had developed its resources to a great extent. The victualling of the armies, which consumed large quantities of meat from Texas, rendered the production of salt a question of capital importance; hence it is that we find the Union fleet constantly engaged in interfering with the production of this commodity. In a former chapter we gave some account of the occupation of Dépôt Key, on the western coast of Florida. Two Federal vessels, the *Sea-Horse* and the *Somerset*, were at anchor before this place at the beginning of October, when it was ascertained that the Confederate garrison stationed opposite the island on the mainland, for the protection of immense salt-works, had been withdrawn. An expedition was immediately organized with a view to the destruction of these establishments. On the 6th of October about one hundred men were conveyed to the spot in eight launches; they accomplished the task assigned to them after a slight affair with some Confederate skirmishers, in which five or six of their number were wounded. During the autumn the Federal navy also destroyed the salt-works in the Bay of St. Andrews, those of St. Mark, near Cedar Keys, those of Tampa, and lastly those in the vicinity of Appalachicola.

The last town was occupied by the Unionists, but constantly menaced by their adversaries, who starved them in it. The inhabitants themselves only existed by means of contraband trade with the rest of the country, which it had been found expedient to tolerate. The Confederates, becoming bolder from day to day, did not hesitate to fit out vessels, intended to run the blockade, in the river from which the town derived its name. The Federal steamer *Somerset* having reached this anchorage from Dépôt Key, her commander determined at last to oppose the fitting out of these vessels. He proceeded up the river with four launches carrying howitzers, and, after a trifling engagement with the enemy's partisans lying in ambush along the shore, he seized, on the 15th of October, a schooner loaded with cotton which was getting ready to sail.

Throughout this dry recital of war incidents insignificant in themselves, the reader will have seen that the Federals had pursued a plan which was almost entirely carried out by the end of October. This plan consisted, as we have already said, in taking possession of all the points along the coast which commanded the ports, bays and entrances of rivers in which Confederate or neutral vessels engaged in running the blockade might find shelter. This substitution of land occupancy for a maritime blockade presented great advantages, especially at the approach of a season which would render a station on that inhospitable coast very dangerous, for vessels of indifferent quality. This substitution, however, was not without its difficulties and perils. On one hand, the small towns thus occupied found themselves separated from the rest of the continent, whence they had hitherto derived all their resources, and it became necessary to furnish not only the garrisons, but entire populations, with the supplies they needed. On the other hand, the multiplicity of these posts weakened the Federal navy by impairing its activity. Vessels were detained at the points it was necessary to protect; obliged to land a portion of their crews, they had lost their efficacy for sea-combats, without supplying garrisons capable of resisting on land any serious effort on the part of the enemy, and they were surrounded by spies always ready to notify the latter as soon as an opportunity offered for attacking them. The extent of the coast which the naval forces had undertaken to blockade had therefore the same inconveniences for them as the multitude of railways had for the land-armies, which were weakened to protect them.

These inconveniences were soon felt, and drew upon the Federal fleet a serious reverse, not in material results, but in the moral effect it produced. The Federals, indeed, in taking possession of the coast, not only proposed to themselves to complete the blockade of the States in rebellion against the Union, but they also sought to create centres of political resistance against the action of the Confederate government at all the points they occupied, and were especially in hopes of succeeding in their designs on the coast of Texas, where slavery had but recently been introduced. Among the rough settlers who had come into that State from all parts of America, there were many Unionists, whose

number daily increased in consequence of the severity of the Confederate conscription law. Hunted down by merciless adversaries, and not being sufficiently numerous to resist them on the soil of Texas itself, they sought to gain those regions where the Federal flag afforded them a safe refuge. Most of them had for some time proceeded first to the Mexican frontier, and thence had gone to New Orleans by sea. Thus, in the beginning of August, about sixty young men, nearly all settlers of German origin, had united to fly from the tyranny of the government of Texas, and to sustain each other on their march to Mexico. They thought they had taken all necessary precautions to conceal their project from the adventurers of every description who infested those semi-savage regions. But they were betrayed; and on the 9th of August about one hundred of these ruffians, under the lead of one Lilley, surprised their camp on the borders of Nueces River, about sixty-four kilometres from the Rio Grande. The Unionists had taken no precaution to guard against a surprise, and Lilley, falling upon them while asleep, deprived them of every chance of resistance. Some were killed while defending themselves, the wounded were finished with the revolver, and most of the remainder, once captured, were massacred in cold blood amid the most cruel tortures. Such was war in a country where no right was recognized except that of the strongest, and where the whites rivalled in cruelty the aborigines whom they pretended to civilize. This massacre intimidated the most daring and stopped emigration. The occupation of Galveston would have favored such emigration, for it offered a refuge to fugitives easy of access. It might even have been made the point of departure for a hostile movement against the government which had dragged Texas into secession. This government determined to anticipate such danger by recapturing Galveston; and although its design was not realized before the first of the year 1863, it is proper that we should speak of it in this place, for this operation must be considered as the sequel of those we have just related.

Magruder, the able defender of Yorktown, had been appointed to the command of all the forces stationed in Texas during the month of December. As soon as he had arrived he set himself to work to prepare for the projected attack against Galveston. The

troops who had invaded and then abandoned New Mexico during the preceding spring, under General Sibley, were scattered among various posts; they were assembled at Houston, a small town situated not far from the extremity of the Bay of Galveston, on the main line of the Texas Railway. In order to attack the flotilla which protected the anchorage at the entrance of the bay, two vessels that had escaped from the Federals were fitted out as men-of-war; one, the *Bayou City*, was a large steamer, with several cabin-decks, modeled on the plan of the Mississippi boats; the smoke-stack had been cut down, and a protecting wall of cotton-bales, piled up four in height, rose around this frail edifice, reaching to above the upper deck. She carried a thirty pounder, and about a hundred dismounted cavalymen, supplied by Sibley, had been placed on board to fire from behind the improvised parapet. The other, called the *Neptune*, of a smaller capacity, was fortified in the same manner, and carried two howitzers. Two or three small vessels, too light to take any serious part in the conflict, accompanied the expedition.

The Federals, after the occupation of Galveston, had suffered themselves to be lulled into a fatal security. If an honorable death, although useless to his cause, did not protect the memory of Commodore Renshaw, we should feel called upon to comment in severe terms upon his want of vigilance. Deceived by the reception he had met with from the inhabitants of Galveston, and deeming it safe to allow them to obtain provisions from the interior which could not be procured from New Orleans without great difficulty, he had consented, by a kind of tacit agreement, to the preservation of the large bridge connecting Galveston Island with the continent. This sort of truce was doomed to silence the guns of the steamer *Harriet Lane*, which was anchored between the bridge and the town, as well as those of a Confederate battery posted on the mainland, although these guns were levelled against each other at short range. Magruder took advantage of the respite to study the character of the ground, and to establish relations with the inhabitants of Galveston; he quietly collected his forces along the railroad in sight of the town, near the promontory called Virginia Point, where the great bridge joins the mainland.

But the news he received in the latter part of December made him feel the necessity of acting promptly, so as not to lose the favorable opportunity. Indeed, President Lincoln had appointed a provisional governor of Texas, who would naturally establish his quarters in Galveston, as it was the only point in that vast State where he could enforce his authority. Renshaw having declared that he had not men enough to occupy the town, General Banks, who had just superseded Butler in New Orleans, promised to send him two small regiments and a battery of artillery. These troops were expected at Galveston in the last days of December. Magruder determined to anticipate their arrival; the attack was at first fixed for the night of the 30th, then for the 31st, of December. On the 28th some bold partisans, acting under his instructions, destroyed the lighthouse situated at the entrance of the pass, at the point called the Peninsula of Bolivar, which faces the island of Galveston.

In the mean while, a naval division conveying Governor M. Hamilton, with the reinforcements promised by Banks and the necessary provisions, had left New Orleans between the 25th and the 29th of December. Unfortunately, a portion of the ships, with one of the regiments, touched first at Ship Island, and the progress of the others was so slow that only one of them, the *Saxon*, reached Galveston before the 31st of December, with three hundred men of the Forty-first Massachusetts on board. The latter were at once landed; and not wishing to lose the protection of the gun-boats, they encamped upon the very pier of Galveston. It was feared to scatter them about the town, which thus remained unoccupied and without surveillance, while the railroad bridge enabled Magruder to communicate openly with the inhabitants. This intercourse was even too frequent not to compromise the secret of his plan. Renshaw was, in fact, notified on the 31st of the attack that was contemplated. He could easily have prevented it by destroying the great railroad bridge with cannon-shots, and re-embarking the detachment of infantry, which was too much exposed on the land, and bringing the guns of his flotilla to bear upon the town. But he took no notice of this information, deeming the projected attack impossible.

The last day of the year 1862 was brought to a close by one •

of those winter evenings of which our own cold climates can convey no idea, when the heat of the sun is tempered by the fresh sea-air without causing the light it sheds to lose any of its brightness; a slight mist, more resembling those white flakes gathered by the breeze along the cotton-fields, than the thick fogs which render our long twilights so sad and gloomy, hung over the mirror-like waters of Galveston Bay. The stillness of nature seemed to have possessed and stupefied the energies of the Federal chiefs. Just as the sun was about to set, the steamer *Boardman*, with Governor Hamilton on board, entered the passes; the *Westfield*, Renshaw's flagship, had gone to meet him, and was escorting him. These two vessels sailed close to the ruins of the lighthouse destroyed three days before without understanding the silent warning they conveyed. The naval division of Commodore Renshaw, consisted of four gun-boats. The *Harriet Lane* was the only one originally constructed as a man-of-war; she carried three nine-inch columbiads, a thirty-pounder rifle-gun and four twenty-pounder carronades. The other three were merchant-vessels purchased by the government, but their hulls were strong, and their armament as formidable as that of the *Harriet Lane*; these were the *Westfield*, mounting two nine-inch columbiads, four sixty-eight-pounder howitzers and two rifle-guns; the *Clifton*, also carrying two nine-inch columbiads, four forty-two pounder howitzers, and a pivot rifle-gun; and finally the *Owasco*, upon which were placed, besides an enormous eleven-inch columbiad, a thirty-pounder rifle-gun and four twenty-four-pounder howitzers. This enumeration will convey some idea of the calibre and weight of the artillery which the Americans had placed on board vessels never intended to carry such loads. To the list of the Federal flotilla we must add the small gun-boat *Sachem*, which had come into Galveston the day before to repair her machinery, the *Corypheus*, that had her in tow, and the transports *Saxon* and *Boardman*, which, however, could take no part in the combat.

Magruder left Virginia Point at nightfall; he had with him from twelve to fifteen hundred men, and two or three batteries, under command of Colonel Green, of whom we have already had occasion to speak in our narrative of Sibley's campaign in New Mexico. He boldly pushed his way over the bridge which the

Federals had so imprudently spared. The *Harriet Lane* was at too great a distance to perceive the long column of the enemy marching at a rapid pace over this fragile structure, and Magruder, although the moon was shining on his movements, reached the suburbs of the town without having attracted the attention of the Federals. The latter, however, had noticed some time before the two steamers belonging to the enemy, which had appeared in sight of Galveston at the hour fixed for the combined attack—that is to say, about two o'clock in the morning, just as the moon was setting. But the Confederate infantry having been delayed, these vessels retired to the further end of the bay to wait for the signal agreed upon. The Federals attached no importance to this demonstration, and it was only when the lookout on the *Harriet Lane* signalled the fact of an extraordinary agitation in the town that they became aware of their danger. This was the force of the enemy, followed by a large portion of the inhabitants, hastily marching upon the camp of the Forty-first Massachusetts. It was half-past three in the morning. After placing his guns in battery and making every disposition for the attack, Magruder fired with his own hand the first gun, which served as a signal to the fleet. At the same time, a storming-party of five hundred men, under Colonel Cook, endeavored to capture the Union camp, which, as we have said, was situated at the extremity of a long pier on piles. The planks of the platform on the land side had been carried off to construct a kind of barricade at the entrance of the camp. But Cook, who had some knowledge of these preparations, had provided himself with ladders to scale that part of the pier thus left isolated, and he boldly descended into the water, followed by his soldiers, in order to reach the foot of it. It was unfortunately high tide, and the assailants had much trouble in getting up to the pier; and when they reached it at last, their ladders were found to be too short, and they were easily repulsed. They did not, however, consider themselves beaten; they climbed into the houses, occupied the windows, and, commanding the plank wall, poured a plunging fire upon their adversaries, more destructive because the latter could only reply at random. In the mean time, Magruder's can-

non were sweeping the streets, and the utter darkness added to the horror and confusion of the battle.

The Massachusetts soldiers defended themselves from behind their barricade in the hope of speedy relief. The *Harriet Lane*, not having steam up, could not draw near the scene of action, and confined herself to firing in the direction of the bridge; but the *Sachem* and the *Corypheus*, having drawn up close to the pier, threw shells into the streets, which soon compelled Magruder's artillery to beat a retreat. It was near daylight, and the Confederates, exposed to the fire of the whole hostile fleet, were beginning to despair of success, when the booming of cannon announced to them at last the arrival of the auxiliaries they had been impatiently expecting. The two vessels which carried the Confederate flag would have been unable to contend against Renshaw's fleet if the latter had been united and ready for the fight. But several of the Federal vessels were reduced to inactivity for want of steam, and were scattered in waters extremely difficult to navigate. The *Harriet Lane* was the first on the track followed by the assailants, who, having flat-bottomed vessels, could safely navigate among the shallows of the bay. Guided by the light produced by the discharge of their guns, they had directed their course toward that vessel in the midst of the darkness. Meanwhile, Captain Wainwright, who commanded her, had at last succeeded in starting his engines; and on perceiving the two hostile vessels, he steamed direct toward them. The combatants, being anxious to come together, only exchanged a few shots at a distance. Wainwright ran his vessel against the huge sides of the *Bayou City*, struck her obliquely, and carried off her paddle-box, without doing any other damage. The *Neptune* on her part, wishing to assist her mate, rushed against the fore part of the *Harriet Lane*, but was only injured herself by the shock; and the water rushing in in every direction, she was obliged to steam to the shore, near which she soon foundered. It was now the turn of the *Bayou City* to resume the offensive, and by a lucky manoeuvre she struck her adversary full amidships. Her prow was driven with such force under the paddle-box of the Federal gunboat that the latter was almost thrown upon her beam-ends. The timber-work of both vessels becoming entangled, they remained

thus fastened together without being able to use their guns. The advantage was now all on the side of the Confederates, who were more numerous than their adversaries, more practiced in the use of their rifles, and besides were ranged on the quarter-deck of their steamer, so as to command the deck of the *Harriet Lane*; consequently, after a few discharges, they boarded the latter vessel. Wainwright and his second in command were killed, and the crew, stricken with terror, hastened to surrender. Out of one hundred and twenty men only ten were disabled.

Meanwhile, a serious danger was menacing the victors. The two vessels were so fastened together as to be unable to manœuvre, and were thus at the mercy of a new assailant. This assailant was the *Owaseo*, who, perceiving the struggle in which the *Harriet Lane* was engaged, directed her course toward that vessel to assist her. Being obliged to follow a narrow and tortuous channel, she ran aground several times, and the combat was over when she got within range of the two vessels. The eleven-inch shells she had fired on her way failed to reach the enemy; and when she drew near the *Bayou City*, she was received by a well-sustained fire of musketry from the top of that floating fortress. Her commander, seeing that the *Harriet Lane* was captured, and being ignorant of the difficult position in which the victors were placed, deemed it prudent to retire; he fired a last broadside and came to join the *Sachem* and *Corypheus*, which had opened their fire upon Magruder's troops in front of Galveston.

Day had scarcely dawned, and the combat we have been describing had only been discernible through the uncertain glimmer of twilight. It is not astonishing, therefore, that the two largest Federal gun-boats, the *Westfield* and *Clifton*, anchored outside of Pelican Island, had not yet been able to take part in it. At the first signal of danger, Renshaw started with the former to approach Galveston, but he soon ran aground, and the swiftly-receding tide left him no hope of salvation. The transport *Boardman* tried in vain to extricate him, and the *Clifton*, after losing much precious time in similar efforts, left him to go to the assistance of the rest of the fleet. In passing before Galveston Point, this gun-boat was saluted by a field-battery of the enemy, and she poured a broadside into it, which reduced it to silence. Continu-

ing her progress, she soon reached Galveston, and took part in the combat in which the *Sachem*, *Corypheus* and *Owasco* were engaged. But the fear of injuring the prisoner-crew of the *Harriet Lane* prevented her from going to dispute the prize with the *Bayou City*. No effort, however, had yet succeeded in separating those two vessels, although it would only have required a little daring on the part of the Federals to destroy them together. In order to gain sufficient time to extricate them from this perilous situation, Major L. Smith, commanding the Confederate flotilla, tried a flag of truce, and sent an officer, with a prisoner from the *Harriet Lane*, on board the *Clifton*, to demand a capitulation. This clumsy stratagem proved a complete success. Lieutenant Law, commanding the *Clifton*, left his vessel to communicate the demand of the enemy to Renshaw; but instead of waiting for orders, he hoisted a white flag and suspended the battle. During his absence the Confederates succeeded in extricating the *Harriet Lane*; and taking advantage of the silence of the fleet, they surrounded the soldiers of the Forty-first Massachusetts, who up to this time had bravely defended themselves. Magruder, showing them the white flags just hoisted at the mast-heads of the vessels of both parties, and his own guns levelled at point-blank against them, persuaded them to surrender as prisoners, and immediately after planted his guns upon the pier, so as to be able to enfilade the decks of the Federal vessels at the first signal.

Renshaw rejected the shameful conditions which his subordinate had the weakness to submit to him. But it was too late to recover the ground lost. Nothing remained but to save those vessels that had not fallen into the hands of the enemy with their crews. Whilst the *Clifton*, the *Owasco*, the *Sachem* and the *Corypheus* were steaming out of Galveston under Law's direction, Renshaw ordered the crew of the *Westfield* to be transferred to the *Boardman*, for no effort could avail to save that vessel, and nothing was left but to destroy her. The transfer was accomplished amid some confusion. When nearly completed, Renshaw applied the fifteen-minute match himself, the extreme end of which reached down into the powder-magazine, which was left open; near him was a barrel of turpentine, the head of which had been staved in; the yawl fastened to the vessel waited only for

the commodore. At last he was seen descending and taking his place in the boat; but at the same moment a thick black smoke rose above the vessel, followed by a vivid flame more than three metres high; the sailors, crowded upon the deck of the *Boardman*, perceived their comrades still resting on their oars through this sinister light; then everything disappeared amid a thick white cloud with a bluish reflection. A terrible explosion was heard at the same time. It is probable that the turpentine, accidentally spilled, came in contact with the lighted match and took fire, which was almost immediately communicated to the powder-magazine. The shells, thrown into the air, exploded in every direction, and a shower of *débris* and projectiles fell around the blackened carcass of the *Westfield*. When the smoke at length disappeared, the yawl was seen floating keel upward. The fifteen men who were in it had disappeared for ever; no trace of them was ever found. The enemy was approaching. The *Boardman* put off and joined the remainder of the fleet which Lieutenant Law had taken out of Galveston Bay. This officer, dreading an attack from the *Harriet Lane*, even hastened to raise the blockade in order to return to New Orleans, at the risk of allowing the transports, which, in the ignorance of what had taken place, might arrive after his departure, to be captured by the enemy. A fortunate chance alone prevented this new disaster.

The capture of Galveston made a profound impression in the South, and the fear of being again subjected to severe treatment on the part of the Confederate authorities long imposed silence upon those who had hitherto openly sustained the Federal cause.

It will be seen from the facts we have just related that the task of blockading and occupying the coasts of the Southern States and the entrance of their rivers threatened to absorb all the strength of the Federal navy. Consequently, a few words will suffice to enumerate the purely maritime incidents of the year 1862 which have not been mentioned in the preceding pages. We have no battles on the high seas to record, but in return the Federal fleet made a large number of prizes. The renewed rigor of the blockade, by raising the price of cotton in Europe and that of most articles produced by the South, stimulated the contraband trade.

The speculations of blockade-runners had therefore expanded in proportion as a larger number of these vessels fell into the hands of the Federal cruisers. These prizes, sold in the Federal interest, were, in reality, paid for by the South and the consumers of cotton, for the speculators, realizing enough profit on a single successful venture, indemnified themselves for the loss of four or five cargoes. Some of these blockade-runners, thus captured, were converted into men-of-war or transports, and proved of great service to the Federal navy. It is unnecessary to give a list of them, which comprises from twenty to thirty steamers, and we shall merely mention the most important—the *Bermuda*, which was captured on the 27th of April, after she had made several successful trips, and brought a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition to the South.

Most of these vessels belonged to ship-owners in Liverpool, and sailed under the British flag. They constituted a peculiar type of naval architecture, in which safety was sacrificed to speed, and formed a fleet, under the command of daring sailors, who took the British port of Nassau, in the Bahama Islands, as its base of operations. The town of Nassau, situated on a barren rock, had up to this period led an obscure existence. The blockade gave it a vast importance by making it the mart where all merchandise intended for the South was concentrated, and where blockade-runners came to load before venturing on their perilous voyages. The Federal cruisers watched them at the distance from port prescribed by international law, ready to pounce upon them if they were not quick enough to effect their escape. These cruisers would frequently come into Nassau for provisions, and to see the agents whose duty it was to aid them in their surveillance. The town was, therefore, full of Americans belonging to both parties, who elbowed each other at the hotels and watched each other on the wharves; and it often happened that, among these adversaries compelled to live side by side under the neutral British flag, a couple of shipmates of the old Federal navy, separated by the civil war, would meet and exchange recognition by glancing at each other in sadness and in silence.

We have said elsewhere that the funds raised by the loan subscribed to by Englishmen, under the guarantee of the Confederate

government, were devoted by the latter as much to the purchase of arms and ammunition as to the creation of a naval fleet. This fleet was especially intended to make voyages; the Confederate agents, however, proposed to procure from the shipyards of Liverpool such armored vessels as might be able to cope with the ships composing the blockade squadrons of Charleston or Mobile. The Confederates counted upon the connivance of certain agents, on the sympathies of the majority in Parliament, and the indecision of the government in tolerating the violation of British neutrality. In fact, the experience of the *Sumter* had shown that the boats seized by the Confederates at the time of secession would be inadequate to carry on the privateer war, which was to avenge the South for the humiliation of the blockade; this required very strong vessels, with capacity for carrying large quantities of coal, a strong armament, a numerous crew, and capable, in short, of fighting the Federal gun-boats on equal terms, in case of their being brought to a stand as the *Sumter* was at Gibraltar.

As soon as Mr. Davis' representatives had a few millions in hand, they found every desirable facility for carrying on their military preparations. They entered into brisk competition with the Federal agents for the purchase of arms and ammunition—a traffic which was besides perfectly legitimate in itself; for if such articles could, in view of their destination, become contraband of war, which a belligerent has a right to seize on the high seas, the mere fact of their sale does not constitute an act of hostility. Their chief concern, however, was the fitting out of ships of war. The magnificent shipyards of Messrs. Laird at Birkenhead, and the cannon-factory of Mr. Blakeley in London, were open to their orders; the banking-house of Messrs. Fraser and Trenholm assumed the agency of their financial operations; and the task of superintending the construction and armament of the vessels which were to display the Confederate flag was entrusted to Captain Bullock, a naval officer of great intelligence. The execution of this task required much skill and prudence, for the United States minister in London, Mr. Adams, was on his guard. It was hopeless to try to evade his vigilance, and that of the entire American commerce, which, stimulated by danger, was on the watch for him; what was wanted was shrewdness to deceive the

English government, so as to prevent it from listening to the representations that might be made against their interest.

It was of the utmost importance to oppose some new adversary against the richly-laden ships which sailed under the United States flag, for the two privateers which for a short time had menaced them, were both closely blockaded, and had for ever disappeared from the naval scene. The small steamer *Nashville*, which, as we have observed before, was the first to prey upon the commerce of the Northern States, had entered the river Ogeechee, on the coast of Georgia, in July, 1862, to land a cargo of arms, and, before she had time to gain the open sea, the entrance of the river was occupied by Federal cruisers; not daring to measure strength with the latter, she had been vainly waiting since that time for an opportunity to escape from them.

With regard to the *Sumter*, she was at Gibraltar, kept at bay by the Federal gun-boat *Tuscarora*, which, remaining within the Spanish waters of Algeciras, could give her chase as soon as she should venture to come out. It is a well-known rule of international law that, when two hostile vessels meet in the waters of a neutral power, the first to leave the port is to be granted a start of twenty-four hours. The recognition of the Confederates as belligerents gave to their privateers the benefit of this law, but it was naturally not applicable between Algeciras and Gibraltar. The rapid speed and powerful guns of the *Tuscarora* made her a formidable adversary. The *Sumter* had no chance to escape her except by making for the open sea, and taking such measures as to render it unnecessary for her to stop at a neighboring port. But in order to do this she required a larger supply of coal than was authorized by international law, and the vigilance of the American consul did not allow Semmes to evade the law. Finally, in the month of April, despairing of his ability to reach the open sea with that vessel, and expecting, moreover, to soon find another, infinitely superior in every respect, he dismantled the *Sumter*. The latter vessel remained at Gibraltar until she was sold to a merchant, who employed her in running the blockade, and Semmes with his officers proceeded to England, to await orders from his government, and an opportunity to ship on one of the new vessels, the equipment of which was no longer a secret to any one.

In fact, the shipyards of Birkenhead were not the only ones at work for the Confederates. As early as the month of February, Mr. Adams had notified Lord Russell, minister of foreign affairs, that a ship called the *Oreto*, in process of construction at Liverpool, under the name of a ship-owner of Palermo, was, in fact, a war-vessel destined for the use of the Confederates. No notice was taken of this communication; and in the early part of April the *Oreto* had quietly left the Mersey with a large cargo intended for the Southern States. She first touched at Nassau, where she found Captain Maffit, who was to command her, a portion of her crew, together with cannon and ammunition forwarded from England for the purpose of fitting her out as a man-of-war. But as she was about to sail she was seized by the English authorities. The British government, having at last listened to the just representations of Mr. Adams, had this vessel libelled before the courts of Nassau for violation of the foreign enlistment act. The tribunal before which the examination took place was not satisfied with the proofs submitted in the case, and in the month of August ordered the vessel to be released. Scarcely had this decree been rendered amid the plaudits of the population of Nassau, who had dreaded to see the interruption of a traffic so lucrative to them, when the *Oreto* got under way, and proceeded to the desert island of Green Key, where she was to meet the vessel that had her armament on board. This was the most striking demonstration of injustice experienced by the American government. Although the complement of his crew was not made up, Maffit succeeded, by dint of activity, in shipping all his guns. But the yellow fever almost immediately broke out on board; and the terrible scourge having spared but four or five men, the *Oreto* was obliged to put into Cuba, where she met with sympathetic protection from the Spanish authorities. Maffit was thus able to prepare for a new campaign, and on the 30th of August he sailed for the port of Mobile. On the 4th of September he suddenly made his appearance in the midst of the blockading squadron, flying the English military flag and the war pennant. Commodore Preble, who was in command of the squadron at the time, had orders to avoid coming in collision with vessels belonging to foreign powers. Deceived by the sight of the English flag, he

hesitated for a moment. It was only when the *Oreto* was about passing the corvette *Oneida*, on board of which he was, that he discovered his mistake. With a view of repairing it, he tried to run his own ship across the prow of the Confederate, at the risk of having her cut in two. But despite the broadside he fired into the adversary at very close quarters, he did not succeed in stopping her. Without wasting time in replying, the *Oreto*, pursued by three of the enemy's ships, riddled with balls and leaking everywhere, succeeded at last in reaching the shelter of the friendly guns of Fort Morgan, under the protection of which she soon repaired her damages.

The Washington government relieved Preble from command, to punish him for a neglect which, however, was perfectly excusable. But his successor was not more fortunate than he had been. At the end of December the *Oreto*, now called the *Florida*, fully equipped, better armed and furnished with a regular commission, again ran the Mobile blockade, and put out to sea under the orders of Maffit. Her depredations belong to the year 1863, and will find their place further on in our recital.

In the beginning of 1862 there was noticed in the ship-yards of Mr. Laird a beautiful corvette, numbered 290, ordered, it was said, by the Chinese government. This pretext could deceive no one; and Captain Bullock, who had superintended her construction with very particular care, did not hesitate in loudly proclaiming the use his government intended to make of this vessel against American commerce. Mr. Adams again notified the English government of the fact, as he had vainly done in regard to the *Oreto*. But Lord Russell, deceived by the custom-house officers of Liverpool, who, it is said, were the accomplices of Bullock and Mr. Laird, thought that he had ample time before him, and submitted the question concerning the seizure of No. 290 to the legal advisers of the Crown. It is almost useless to add that when the opinion of these advisers, asking for more satisfactory proofs regarding the destination of this vessel, was delivered, she was already far out at sea. On a fine day it was announced that she was to be chartered for a pleasure-party on the Mersey. She had come out of the dock with a large number of invited guests on board, a small crew, and without any of the

appurtenances of war. But, not far from the entrance of the river, a small steamer came alongside, which brought her a full complement of sailors, taking back to Liverpool all the amateurs who had served to disguise her flight. The 290 gained the open sea while the English government was tendering to Mr. Adams the assurances of vain regrets.

A few days later, Semmes, who had found at Nassau an order directing him to take command of this vessel, arrived at Liverpool, and immediately took a special boat for the island of Terceira (one of the Azores). Here was performed the last act in the metamorphosis of the Chinese steamer into a privateer, or rather, as we shall see presently, into a Confederate pirate. An English brig, loaded with cannon, ammunition and arms of every description, was waiting for her there; the Portuguese authorities, either through carelessness or from fear of involving themselves in a quarrel with England, said nothing to Semmes, but allowed him to assemble his three vessels in the bay of Angra. He passed several days there without being molested, and effected the transfer of the *matériel* at his ease; the guns were mounted and the ammunition shipped. The British consul himself came on board the 290, and found no fault with these military preparations, which were only hastened by the fear of seeing one of the enemy's cruisers make her appearance. Finally, after having thus armed his vessel in the neutral waters of Portugal, Semmes moved off to the distance of a marine league, which marks the limit of territorial sovereignty—a silly precaution, after this sovereignty had been flagrantly violated. Nothing remained to be done, in fact, but to perform a useless ceremony; the crew was assembled on deck, and Semmes, appearing in uniform, read aloud the commission appointing him to the command of the *Alabama*; such was now the name of this vessel. He was greeted with three hurrahs, in the midst of which the Confederate flag was run up in place of the English colors. The sailors, who had been engaged at Liverpool, belonged to various nationalities, but most of them were English subjects, and among them could even be counted sailors of the royal reserve who had been taught gunnery on board the practice-ship; the latter were valuable auxiliaries in

the campaign which Semmes had undertaken. Out of ninety sailors there were only ten who refused to follow him, and they were finally reconciled; all the others, allured by promises of high pay and the prospect of an adventurous life, enlisted in the service of the Confederate government.

This government possessed at last a real man-of-war. The *Alabama* was admirably constructed for the part she was about to play in the war. She was a vessel of nine hundred tons, seventy-four metres in length, ten metres in width, and drawing five metres of water; she had an engine of three hundred horse power, with a condenser for supplying fresh water; she was, moreover, an excellent sailer, while her speed under steam averaged ten knots an hour. Her armament consisted of six thirty-two pounders, one of Blakeley's one-hundred-pounder pivot-guns, and one eight-inch howitzer. The complement of her crew was one hundred and twenty men and twenty-four officers. Owing to the reputation she soon acquired, she was able to make up this complement by means of new enlistments, at the very first ports she put into.

Among the Confederate privateers, those that caused most damage to the commerce of the United States were the *Sumter*, the *Florida* and the *Alabama*. In giving an account of the end of the first and the first appearance of the other two, it is proper that we should show the differences existing between them in a legal point of view, arising from their origin and the manner in which they had been fitted out.

The *Sumter* had belonged to the Confederates since the beginning of the war; she had run the blockade of the Mississippi at her own risk and peril, carrying off her guns, her crew and her commission. She, therefore, would have been entitled to claim the treatment of a belligerent in neutral ports, if it had not been proved that in capturing American vessels she did not observe the technical rules of international law. Instead of sending them to a Confederate port to be adjudicated, which was somewhat difficult, it must be acknowledged, she burnt them on the high seas. Thus, from a privateer, she had become a pirate, and Semmes pleaded in vain as an excuse the fact that he respected American vessels with neutral merchandise on board. In thus acting he

was swayed simply by the fear of giving umbrage to English merchants. If the right of war justified him in seizing all the enemy's vessels, and having them adjudicated, with or without their cargo, the nature of this cargo did not authorize him, in any case, to constitute himself a court of adjudication.

Upon this point the *Florida* and *Alabama* followed the example of the *Sumter*, besides being tainted by vicious practices that should have closed the entrance of all neutral ports against them from the beginning. It is true that the *Oreto* or *Florida* did not commit any hostile act against the Federals, before having been placed in commission at Mobile, respecting in this the international rule, which only recognizes as vessels of war or privateers those that started from a belligerent port. But if she twice ran the risk of being captured by observing this rule, on the other hand she gave serious offence to the British flag by falsely hoisting it and using it to disguise her nationality. This act of piracy should at least have excluded her from British waters.

With regard to the *Alabama*, her career, from the beginning, was a perpetual violation of the law of nations. As soon as she had received her armament, this vessel, constructed in England, carrying English guns, with a crew composed almost entirely of Englishmen, started on her cruise without being registered at a Confederate port. Consequently, the Americans did not greatly exaggerate the fact in calling her an English pirate, and had a perfect right to call upon the British government to seize her as soon as she should appear in an English port. No attention was paid to this request. The *Alabama* proceeded to Nassau, where she met with the kindest reception on the part of the authorities. As we have above stated, belligerent steamers, by the regulations of international law, are only allowed a certain quantity of coal, according to the distance the vessel has to run to reach one of the nearest ports; but Semmes was allowed the privilege to ship at Nassau all the fuel he wanted, and, thanks to the supply thus obtained, he was able to make for the open sea at once. During the last three months of the year 1862 he destroyed no less than twenty-eight large merchant vessels. After setting them on fire he preserved their chronometers as trophies, and returned to land

their crews either at the Bermudas or at Nassau, where he was always sure to find aid and protection. He thus spread terror among all American ship-owners; and when the New York merchants sent the large three-masted *George Griswold* to England, loaded with donations for the Lancashire workmen who were suffering from the cotton famine, a ship of war had to escort this vessel on her charitable errand, to protect her against the Liverpool pirate. The marine insurance soon rose so high that the Americans were obliged to denationalize their merchant vessels, and the carrying trade was almost entirely effected under the British flag. The English, therefore, profited by the damage done to the United States by a vessel fitted out in one of their ports, and which it was their duty to have stopped. Consequently, the Americans justly declared that if such an act did not receive the most emphatic condemnation, they should consider themselves justified in fitting out a whole fleet of privateers, whenever England should happen to be at war with the least maritime of her East Indian neighbors, and to prey upon her commerce under the Afghan or Thibetan flag.

The Federal government sought in vain to purge the seas of so dangerous an enemy as the *Alabama*. Obligated to employ nearly all its naval resources in the maintenance of the blockade, and in the mixed expeditions of which mention has already been made, it was not able to send in pursuit of the *Alabama* more than three or four corvettes, whose rate of speed was inferior to hers. It is not very easy to find a vessel on the vast ocean; for with a large cargo of coal on board, she can keep out at sea for a long while, get fresh supplies near some desert island where she expects to meet transports despatched to her from neutral territories, and only appear at a port one day to leave it the next for parts unknown. In fact, Semmes avoided all encounters with Federal vessels; he never seriously interfered with the operations of the Union naval forces on the Confederate coast, and it was only in the month of January, 1863, that he fired the first cannon-shot against an adversary able to reply to him. During the year 1862 he was only once overtaken by one of the enemy's vessels, the *San Jacinto*, which found him at Martinique, but he escaped from her through the connivance of an employé of the port, who sup-

plied him with hydrographical charts, by means of which he was able during a dark night to evade the vigilance of the Federal sailors.*

To bring this chapter to a close we have only to mention a maritime disaster which, although purely accidental, must find its place here; for we cannot allow the *Monitor* to disappear from the naval scene where she had played the most important part, without relating the manner of her loss. The year 1862 had seen her launched upon the sea, witnessed her first encounter with the *Virginia*, her fight at Drury's Bluff, and finally, when the year was about to expire, during the last night of December, it saw her go down in a storm.

The Federal navy was already assembling all its forces for the purpose of laying siege to Charleston. It was decided that the *Monitor* should precede the new turreted vessels which were being constructed on her model, and join Dupont's fleet on the coast of South Carolina. It was hoped that she would be able to force the passes of Fort Sumter. On the 29th of December she left Chesapeake Bay under the direction of Captain Bankhead, proceeding under steam, and towed, at the same time, by another vessel, the *Rhode Island*. As was to be expected at that season of the year, she found in deep water, south of Cape Hatteras, a chop sea, caused by strong southerly winds. It soon became evident that the *Monitor* was not in a condition to stand such a trial. The jerking of the tow-cable shook her violently, and the *Rhode Island* vainly slackened her speed to relieve her. The waves, breaking against the turret, shook it so as to detach the oakum inserted between the chinks of its junction with the deck. Moreover, this iron-plated deck, projecting considerably beyond the hull, formed a kind of balcony, which the sea struck underneath, and finally detached. Without any perceptible leak, the *Monitor* began to fill, the water penetrating at every point. The ordinary pumps being of no avail, it became necessary on the evening of the 30th to start the large centrifugal pump with the aid of the steam-engine; but at half-past ten o'clock, the storm increasing, the water gained decidedly. Captain Bankhead made a signal of distress, and two launches came to take a por-

* *Memoirs of Admiral Semmes*, p. 516.

tion of his people off. In order to avoid a fatal collision between the two vessels, the tow-cable had to be cut, and before the launches returned for a second load the fires of the *Monitor* were extinguished. The vessel, utterly uncontrollable, was tossed about by the waves, and the launches were unable to approach the submerged hull, over which the sea was breaking as upon a rock. Bankhead bethought himself of casting anchor. This manœuvre succeeded in putting the bow of the ship to windward, thus facilitating the work of saving the crew. There were only thirty men left on board. The commander, crossing the deck with them, while the waves were sweeping over its entire length, reached the launches of the *Rhode Island*, but some of his companions were carried off by the sea and drowned; some, being afraid to leave the turret, also perished. Twelve men and four officers were missing at the roll-call, when at midnight the sailors of the *Monitor* who had taken refuge on board the *Rhode Island*, beheld the red light suspended over the turret of their gallant little craft sink into the waters.

The two actors of the famous drama of Hampton Roads had disappeared before the close of the year; the *Virginia* had been set on fire by her own crew; the *Monitor* was the victim of those who sought to convert her into a sea-going vessel.

CHAPTER II.

RECRUITING AND FINANCES.

THE object of this work does not allow us to dwell at any length upon the administrative and political legislation which the great struggle we are narrating rendered necessary. We must, however, comment upon it sufficiently to enable the reader to understand the war itself. It is time for us to do so; for we have avoided all allusion to the subject since the guns of Fort Sumter controlled the action of parties.

We therefore propose in this chapter to show the measures that were adopted by the opposing governments of the North and the South, during the first two years of the war, in order to supply their vast armies with men and *matériel*, and to cause their authority to be respected by their respective peoples—measures relating to enlistments, finances and the liberty of the citizens. The next chapter will conclude this volume, with an account of the relations existing between the belligerents and foreign countries.

The labors of the Federal legislature, even in regard to politics, were made entirely subservient to the civil war and its vicissitudes. This war imposed upon it a task of considerable magnitude, for the Congress at Washington had to resort to every kind of provisional legislation in order to procure the men and money with which the patriotism of the nation was ready to supply the government. This military and financial legislation, therefore, formed the principal subject of their deliberations.

We have already alluded to some of the measures adopted during the early period of the struggle. We shall confine ourselves to a brief recapitulation of them, with an outline of the labors of Congress during the years 1861 and 1862. We have delayed presenting this sketch until now, so as to be able to embrace a sufficient collection of legislative acts, and at the same

time to show how Congress, the faithful interpreter of public opinion, gradually imposed the most onerous taxes upon the American people. We shall not take cognizance in this place of any legislation having reference to the home policy of the country during these two years—special laws, resolutions and proclamations involving the question of slavery—as everything relating to this subject will find its place at the end of the chapter in which we propose to treat of the relations of the belligerents to each other.

In virtue of the Constitution, the House of Representatives is elected for two years; one-third of the Senate is renewed every two years, each senator being, therefore, elected for six years. Congress, composed of these two assemblies, meets in stated session the first Monday in December of each year. It adjourns when it pleases, and may be again convened by the President in extra session, before the legal date of meeting, if he thinks it necessary. The 3d of March of every alternate year, on which day the powers of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate expire, ends the existence of a Congress. The new Congress which succeeds it, although it does not meet generally until December of the same year, immediately inherits its power, the elections having taken place a few months before, and its members may on the morning of the 4th of March in case of necessity take the places just vacated by their predecessors.

As we have already said, the Thirty-sixth Congress, which was in session during the last two years of Mr. Buchanan's administration, had adjourned finally on the 3d of March, 1861. The elections that had taken place in the Northern States, previous to this date, had considerably increased the number of representatives and senators belonging either to the party that had carried Mr. Lincoln into power or to that of War Democrats, who, after having opposed him at the polls, had determined to sustain him against all those who attacked the legality of his authority. Nevertheless, these consolidated parties would have found it difficult to obtain a majority in the two houses, as we shall presently show by figures, if their adversaries had occupied the seats which constitutionally belonged to them.

On the 15th of April, at the news of the fall of Fort Sumter,

Mr. Lincoln had convened an extra session of the Thirty-seventh Congress, to meet on the 4th of July. When it assembled, the representatives and senators of the majority of the insurgent States failed to answer to their names when the roll was called by the clerks of the two houses. Most of the newly-elected representatives, as well as those senators who had previously been appointed by these States, already played a conspicuous part in the South; some abstained from taking part in the labors of Congress, others, after having made their appearance on the floor, soon retired. The States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Florida and Texas were not represented in either house of Congress, either because elections had not taken place, in consequence of the act of secession, or because the representatives considered themselves released from their obligations by that act. Virginia did not send senators to Washington, but the districts which remained faithful to the Union elected eight representatives, the total contingent of that State being thirteen. On the contrary, none of the ten Kentucky members appeared at the Capitol, but her two senators took their seats on the 4th of July, although one of them was Mr. Breckenridge, who a few months later was to enter the military service of the Southern Confederacy. Tennessee was represented by only one of the two senators, and three representatives out of ten, who had been elected by districts where the Unionists were in the majority. It thus happened that the Senate, which, being composed of two members from each of the thirty-four States, should have numbered sixty-eight, was reduced to forty-seven, and the House of Representatives, instead of two hundred and thirty-nine, mustered only one hundred and seventy-six. Out of forty-seven senators thirty-one belonged to the Republican party, eleven to the Democratic opposition, and five, although Democrats, supported the government. The forces were about similarly divided in the other house, where Mr. Lincoln had one hundred and six adherents, forty-two opponents, besides twenty-eight Democrats who voted in favor of the war measures of his government. It will thus be seen that, even with the support of the latter, if the representatives of the Southern States had not abandoned the paths of loyalty, and left their seats to plunge into civil war, the

President would only have had six votes in majority in the House of Representatives and two in the Senate; and if the Democratic party had remained united to control him in the houses, this party would have had the advantage of twenty-seven votes in one house and five in the other. After the marshalling of forces, the government majorities were increased by a measure justified by circumstances. Ten of the absent senators whose connivance with the insurrection had been proved were deprived of their seats by a two-third vote of the Senate, while those of Virginia were replaced by two new members representing the western districts. A similar measure was adopted in the other house against some of its members.

Mr. Lincoln had not waited for the meeting of Congress to form a new provisional army and to increase the effective force of the regular troops and the navy, nor did he overstep the limit of his powers when on the 15th of April he asked the governors of the several States for a contingent of seventy-five thousand men; but the direct call he had made on the 3d of May for forty-two thousand three-years' volunteers, twenty-two thousand regulars and eighteen thousand sailors was an extraordinary act requiring the sanction of the legislative power. It was necessary, besides, to raise the requisite loans to cover the expenses which the equipment of such troops would involve. In short, even these measures proved altogether insufficient, and the President, in his message to the Congress he had just convened, asked for a levy of four hundred thousand troops. At its short session, which lasted from the 4th of July till the 6th of August, this new Congress gave evidence of the patriotic zeal by which it was animated. On the 25th of July it authorized the President to issue a call for five hundred thousand volunteers for three years, which was more than had been asked for; it is true that the battle of Bull Run had been fought during the interval. On the 27th it approved the measures taken by the President on the 3d of May for the increase of the regular army, and authorized eleven new regiments, nine of infantry, one of cavalry and one of artillery; finally, on the 6th of August, before adjourning, it legalized all the other calls which the President had made for mustering volunteers in the land and naval forces.

In order to encourage enlistments and to compensate the soldiers who were invited to rally under the Federal flag, Congress passed a resolution offering each a bounty of one hundred dollars. It, moreover, appropriated the sum of one hundred and sixty-one million dollars for military expenses; and in order to secure the most powerful means of action to the government, it authorized the government during the recess of Congress to increase the amount voted for the support and equipment of the national troops to the enormous figure of five hundred million of dollars. We will mention hereafter, the financial measures adopted during the same session to meet the unexpected requirements of such an appropriation. The War Department was reorganized, and its *personnel* considerably increased.

The ordinary session of Congress was to open on the 2d of December, 1861. During the recess the legislative acts it had passed for the creation of volunteer armies were executed, enabling those armies, as we have shown elsewhere, to acquire the numerical strength, organization and necessary *matériel* for a great war. There were but two measures relating to the formation of new corps, initiated by the President himself before the meeting of Congress. The object of the first, under date of September 17th, was to assemble at Hatteras a regiment of volunteers recruited in North Carolina. It was hoped thereby to enlist under the Federal flag those citizens who had remained loyal to the constitution, notwithstanding the secession of their State. This first effort did not prove very successful, the number of Carolinians who sought refuge on the narrow downs of Hatteras being altogether insignificant. On the 7th of November, Mr. Lincoln likewise authorized the raising of Federal regiments in Missouri. As that State was divided between the two parties, and a large number of militia had already entered the service of the Union, several of these regiments were speedily formed.

In the mean while, the people of the North had eagerly responded to the call made upon them; and when Congress met, the government was able to announce that it had six hundred and eighty-two thousand nine hundred and seventy-one men in its service, six hundred and forty thousand six hundred and thirty-seven of whom were volunteers, twenty thousand three hundred and thirty-four

in the regular army and twenty-two thousand in the navy. In order to avoid too great a multiplicity of regiments, and to secure recruiting for those already in existence, the Secretary of War issued a circular, dated December 3d, informing the governors of States that, unless a special requisition was made by the Washington authorities to that effect, they were no longer authorized to form new regiments on the responsibility of the Federal government, and that all recruits enlisted were to be embodied in regiments already existing. It is useless to add that these mandates could not be applied in regard to the local militia, who were placed under the exclusive authority of the governors, and liable at all times to be summoned by them in case of danger.

At its extra session Congress had adopted a rule to entertain only such pressing questions as had reference to the civil war. Military and financial measures, together with motions relating to slavery and the right of secession, had occupied all their time. This was not the case at its second session, which lasted seven months and a half, from the 2d of December, 1861, to the 17th of July, 1862. Still, these questions continued to occupy the foremost rank in the deliberations of Congress.

The republican element predominated more and more in both houses. This was in consequence of the defection of some members, who, following the example of Breckenridge, had at last thrown off the mask, and the expulsion of others convicted of being in communication with the enemy. Upon all questions involving the maintenance of the Union the *War Democrats* sustained the government, which was only opposed by a few *Peace Democrats*. But whenever the subject of slavery was under consideration, or the daily conduct of the administration provoked discussion, Democrats of both shades united in stern opposition; and this the government had to expect.

The leaders of the Republican party, who blamed the President for showing too much favor to those opponents who supported his general policy, caused him, however, more embarrassment than this opposition. The bargains which he had been obliged to make, and the proposals he had invited during the year 1861, in order to provide for the armament and equipment of the armies he was creating of all kinds of material, were the subject of sharp debates

in both houses. At times the public funds had been expended without discretion; at other times the governing rules of accountability had been violated. In these bargains and proposals some scandalous instances of corruption could be mentioned. Contractors, owing to protection too easily procured, had realized large fortunes at the expense of the nation. But it was difficult at first to place the responsibility of such acts where it belonged, and to distinguish the abuses that were inevitable under such circumstances and to which it was expedient to shut one's eyes, from those that were calculated to bring disgrace upon the administration or some of its agents. Personal influence controlled the action of Congressmen too much to admit of any impartial discussion of these questions. This led occasionally to the adoption of imprudent resolutions. Thus Mr. Cameron, who was Secretary of War up to January 14th, and had then been succeeded by Mr. Stanton, was censured by the House of Representatives on the 30th of April for having, during the early part of his administration, authorized military expenses outside of the department, without requiring the usual vouchers. To this resolution Mr. Lincoln replied by a message, in which he stated that the departments were full of clerks who betrayed the government, that under such circumstances irregular means could alone accomplish the desired object, and emphatically asserted his responsibility for the acts of his agent. The matter was then dropped.

We have already had occasion to speak of the committee appointed by both houses on the 9th of December, 1861, to inquire into the conduct of the war. This committee, composed of senators and representatives, comprised some of the most prominent and radical members of the Republican party, who assumed this delicate mission at the time when the inaction of McClellan and the disaster of Ball's Bluff entirely absorbed the popular mind. We shall meet them again from time to time in the course of our narrative, to the latest period of the war.

The laws passed during the extra session, however, seemed to be sufficient for the formation and support of the Federal armies. The call for five hundred thousand three-years volunteers had given the United States the armies of the Potomac, of the Ohio, of the Tennessee and of Missouri. Enlisted for a period which

seemed very long at that time, they had had ample time for thorough drilling before taking the field; but the terrible battles of the spring of 1862 had speedily thinned off their ranks. It is true that the recruiting-office of every regiment was always open to those who were desirous of enlisting for three years and of joining the regiments already organized, but these means were not sufficient to maintain the army on a war-footing. During the month of June, after the battle of Fair Oaks, the evacuation of Corinth and the campaign in the valley of Virginia, when the Federal armies were decimated by sickness both before Richmond and in the swampy posts of the West, this insufficiency had to be remedied. This remedy could only be found in a new call for troops, and by offering greater inducements to volunteers than before. The governors of eighteen States, conforming to the popular will, united in recommending this measure to the President; they offered him their co-operation in a letter dated June 28, 1862, the day when tidings were received of the commencement of the great struggle sustained by the army of the Potomac before Richmond. On the 1st of July, Mr. Lincoln hastened to reply to these patriotic offers, stating that he should call upon them for three hundred thousand men, and Congress immediately passed a resolution legalizing this call, and enabling the government to fill up the weakened *cadres* of the armies in the field. This resolution became a law on the 17th of July. It authorized the President on one hand to levy new regiments of volunteers, not to exceed one hundred thousand men, for nine months only, and on the other hand, to fill up the vacancies in the old regiments by means of enlistments for twelve months. It was naturally hoped that by thus shortening the term of service men would be stimulated to enlist. This law went much further; it established two important principles, which, although a dead letter at first, found application at a later period. In view of the possible invasion of some of the free States by the Southern armies, this law authorized the President, whenever he should deem proper, to call out the militia of those States, as he had a right to do in such contingency, and to muster it into service for a period not exceeding nine months; and if voluntary enlistments should not suffice, it conferred upon him the power to complete the requisite number

by conscription. The principle of compulsory service, which General McClellan had vainly asked to be enforced from the day he was placed in command at Washington, thus appeared for the first time among legislative enactments.

The law of the 17th of July established another principle equally important as well as new, which, unlike the preceding one, was destined to survive the circumstances which had given rise to its acceptance; this was the admission of colored men into the ranks of the army. It was impossible to refuse the services of volunteers because they had African blood in their veins. But the principle once admitted, there was no reason either for making any distinction between the free or enfranchised men of color, and the fugitive negroes, who came to beg of the national armies the privilege of purchasing their freedom by fighting in their ranks. The question regarding the application of this law was settled by the executive power in a proclamation issued on the 4th of August. Mr. Lincoln ordered a levy of three hundred thousand militia for the service of the Union, for a term not to exceed nine months. The contingent of each State was fixed by the President; and if not furnished before the 15th of August, the deficit was to be filled by conscription. The zeal of the local authorities, the ardor which caused volunteers to flock around the recruiting-offices, and the increase of bounties rendered the application of so novel a measure unnecessary for the present. The same document announced that stringent regulations would be published by the War Department, to secure the benefit of promotion in the new regiments to officers of the old regiments who had distinguished themselves during the war, and to exclude all those who should be deemed unworthy of wearing the epaulette. It was, indeed, necessary to reward those who, for the last year, had gone through the trials of a severe campaign, and not to sacrifice their chances of promotion to intrigues and favoritism, which too frequently influenced the distribution of commissions in the creation of new regiments. The governors of States were evidently impressed with this idea; for a large number of officers of inferior rank, who had signalized themselves on battle-fields, were appointed by them to higher positions in the regiments which were in process of formation.

Congress adjourned on the very day it voted the new call for three hundred thousand men. By this call the Federal armies were supplied with men during the entire fall of 1862, which was marked by so many sanguinary battles, and the third session of the Thirty-seventh Congress, which opened on the 1st of December, 1862, found these new soldiers already trained by the experience they had gone through. This session belongs to a period we have not yet touched upon; its most important work in a military point of view, the conscription law above alluded to, was enacted in the month of July, 1863; consequently, we shall not speak of it until after the great events which caused the American people to accept such a burden.

We shall now proceed to the consideration of another subject, and point out, without entering into long details, the financial measures adopted by Congress during the first two years, in order to meet the enormous expenses of the war; the limits of this work will not allow us to comment upon this interesting subject at length.

At the time of the presidential election of 1860, Mr. Howell Cobb, who subsequently became a general in the Confederate service, had been Mr. Buchanan's Secretary of the Treasury since 1857. He had seriously compromised the credit of the United States during his administration. The government of Washington, since its foundation, had formed the practice of promptly liquidating the debts contracted in times of emergency. Its financial condition in 1857, therefore, was very prosperous. The revenue derived from custom-house duties was abundantly sufficient to defray all its expenses, and reduce the national debt, the amount of which was daily diminishing. But after the expiration of one year, Mr. Cobb was obliged to borrow twenty million dollars at five per cent., and in the month of June, 1860, before the civil war could have been foreseen, he found himself under the necessity of asking the sanction of Congress for a new loan, merely to pay the interest on the first and to meet the national expenses. Although authorized to negotiate another loan for twenty-one millions on the same conditions as the first, he only succeeded in raising a little over seven millions. This issue took place in October. Two months later Mr. Cobb retired from the depart-

ment, leaving its *personnel* disorganized, the public treasury exhausted and the national credit impaired, and thus bequeathed to his successors, against whom he was about to take up arms, all the difficulties he had been able to accumulate in their path. A serious scandal, which brought the *personnel* of Mr. Buchanan's government into great disrepute, occurred about this time, to increase the anxiety of the public in regard to the condition of the public treasury. The contract for military transportation in the West had been given to the house of Russell; Mr. Floyd, during his administration as Secretary of War, had the culpable weakness to endorse drafts of this house without guarantee of any kind, or regular accountability for sums not yet due, which had finally reached the enormous figures of nearly if not quite a million dollars. The irregularity of these drafts being well known, they could not be negotiated; and in order to realize upon them, Russell induced a Mr. Bailey, a relative of the Secretary of War and treasurer of the Indian funds, to become a party to a fraudulent transaction. The funds entrusted to his keeping embraced government bonds, the interest on which was paid by the Indian bureau, as the guardian of the tribes who were the owners of these bonds. Mr. Bailey successively remitted eight hundred and seventy thousand dollars' worth of these bonds to Russell, in exchange for the drafts which he had failed to get cashed elsewhere, and the latter hastened to sell them. This transaction, which commenced in July, 1860, was discovered when the January coupons became due.* Mr. Bailey made his escape after confessing everything; the Secretary of War soon followed; and when they were both indicted before the grand jury as speculators, they were safe on the soil of insurgent States.†

The financial enactments of the Thirty-sixth Congress, at their last session, were of little importance, like all those which marked the latter months of Mr. Buchanan's administration. They were mere palliatives intended to cover the deficit caused by a bad ad-

* The acceptance of the drafts was so well known that their propriety was discussed in the newspapers at the time of the transaction. When, however, the bonds were taken from the department, the January coupons were cut off, so that the disappearance of the bonds themselves might not have been discovered for months but that suspicions were excited by other circumstances.—ED.

† See Note G at the end of this volume.

ministration, by the successive losses of custom-house revenues in the rebel States, and the commercial crisis which had grown out of the political situation. On the 17th of December, Congress ordered the issue of treasury notes to the amount of ten million of dollars, redeemable in one year, the interest on which was not fixed, and which were to be awarded to the lowest bidders. It was only on the 19th of January that the new Secretary, Mr. Dix, succeeded in negotiating half of them, or five millions, at the exorbitant rate of 10.625 per cent. interest. On the 8th of February, 1861, both houses authorized a loan for the nominal amount of twenty-five millions at six per cent., the shares to be put up at auction and made redeemable within ten years, or twenty at the utmost; a portion of them were sold on the 27th of February, at between ninety and ninety-six cents on the dollar. Moreover, on the 2d of March, on the eve of adjournment, they empowered the government, after raising the tariffs of custom-house duties, to negotiate another loan of ten millions of similar bonds, with the privilege, if it was not all taken up, to supply the deficiency by treasury notes, with this restriction, however, that they were not to be put in circulation until the next fiscal year—that is to say, until after the 30th of June, 1861. Another issue of bonds at six per cent., redeemable in twenty years, to the amount of two million eight hundred thousand dollars, was granted for the special expenses of the Territories and of the Indian war of 1856, which had not yet been liquidated.

In forming his cabinet on the 5th of March, Mr. Lincoln entrusted the treasury department to Mr. Salmon P. Chase, a man of clear and vigorous intellect, whose financial acts and theories have been warmly discussed, but who certainly displayed great intelligence and determination of purpose in the midst of unheard-of difficulties. He devoted the first few weeks of his administration to the task of reorganizing his department, and succeeded in recovering the confidence of capitalists and of the public in behalf of his government.

The passage of the new tariff law of March 2d, which went into operation on the 1st of April, had, to a certain extent, relieved the credit of the Federal treasury; the Secretary took

advantage of this to negotiate the loan voted on the 8th of February. On the 2d of April he succeeded in disposing of three millions of the bonds at above ninety-four, but political events, such as the bombardment of Fort Sumter, threw difficulties in the way of this operation, and it was with much trouble that he managed to dispose of five millions more, half of which was taken by the principal banking-houses of the Eastern States.

Meanwhile, the call for volunteers and the breaking out of hostilities were daily increasing the expenditures of the treasury department, rendering it more and more difficult for Mr. Chase to meet them. He could find no purchasers for the fourteen millions of bonds which still remained in his hands out of the twenty-one millions voted for in June, 1860, not being authorized to sell them below par; the loan of March 2d could not be issued before the 1st of July, and he was not allowed by the law of February 8th to dispose of more than nine millions. He disposed of this last scrip on the 25th of May, for the sum of eight million six hundred and thirty-seven thousand dollars, of which six million three hundred and ninety-six thousand dollars were sold, and two million two hundred and forty-one thousand two hundred dollars converted into treasury notes at six per cent., convertible in their turn into scrip at the option of the bearer. The provisions of the law of 1860 having been complied with by an offer of the fourteen millions scrip at par—an award which naturally found no takers—the Secretary, in virtue of this same law, issued on the 30th of May an equal amount of notes at six per cent. interest, which were chiefly used in satisfying his creditors.

The position of the treasury department, therefore, was one of extreme difficulty; it was still further aggravated by the competition it had to encounter on the part of the several States, all of which were obliged to resort to borrowing in order to defray the expenses attending the procurement of volunteers or the equipment of militia, and many of which borrowed as much as two millions at a more reasonable rate of interest than was paid by the Federal government. Consequently, at the end of June, although Congress was about to assemble, Mr. Chase found himself confronted by a debt of five millions, which he could not

allow to remain neglected. The notes at six per cent., which he was not authorized to sell except at par, having suffered a depreciation of two and a half per cent., he could not dispose of them. He appealed to the bankers of the large cities of the Union, and obtained from them the loan of this amount for two months by giving them as collaterals an equivalent quantity of the bonds, which he was unable to place on the market.

When Congress met, on the 4th of July, at the call of the President, there was as great a necessity, as will be seen, for asking the American people to furnish money as to furnish men. All that portion of the nation that had remained loyal to the Federal flag understood at last the magnitude of the sacrifices that were required of them. The two houses of Congress showed themselves to be the faithful interpreters of their wishes, by authorizing the President to raise five hundred thousand volunteers, and to expend five hundred millions of dollars for their support; but it was necessary to give him the means for collecting at least a portion of this enormous sum into the coffers of the State. The sources of revenue, whatever might be the taxes imposed, were altogether inadequate, and could evidently barely suffice to sustain the national credit without contributing to the new wants. It was, therefore, indispensable to resort either to borrowing or to the issue of paper money. During the war the Federal government was to make ample use of these two expedients, but for the first two years it used a great deal of caution; it is only from the year 1863 that we see this government, acting under the pressure of absolute necessity, pursuing a course which would have led a nation less rich and industrious than the United States into bankruptcy.

The Secretary, presenting himself before the new Congress, submitted to that body an estimate of the expenses for the year which had just commenced, amounting to three hundred and eighteen million dollars; he calculated to meet these requirements with the eighty millions he expected to raise by means of the former taxes, or those to be imposed, and by borrowing the sum of two hundred and forty millions. Congress, which was then discussing the resolution calling for five hundred thousand volunteers, raised this amount to two hundred and fifty millions by two enactments of

July 17th and August 5th, 1861. It authorized the Secretary to negotiate a loan, in part or in full, under either of the following forms: 1st, the sale at par of scrip bearing seven per cent. interest, redeemable at par after twenty years; 2d, the issue of treasury notes at 7.30 per cent. interest, redeemable after three years, with the privilege of exchange by the purchaser for government bonds bearing six per cent. interest; 3d, the issue of analogous notes at 3.65 per cent., redeemable after one year and convertible into three year notes at 7.30 per cent.; 4th, the sale of bonds bearing six per cent. to the amount of one hundred millions at 89.32 per cent., payable in Europe and redeemable at par after twenty years; 5th, the issue of notes, payable at sight, to the amount of fifty millions. Finally, the notes at six per cent., which, as we have stated, had been put in circulation, were legalized by the authorization given to the Secretary to raise the amount to twenty millions, besides the loan recently voted. Mr. Chase, being unable to find purchasers for the bonds at seven per cent., was obliged to resort to the treasury notes bearing 7.30 per cent. interest. As he could not rely upon the public to furnish him directly the amount represented by these notes, he again applied to the banks of New York, Boston and Philadelphia to aid him in this difficult operation. They subscribed for a sum of two hundred and fifty millions; the first third of these notes was to be delivered to them on the 19th of August, and the last on the 1st of December, on the condition that the government should not compete with them in re-selling this paper to the public. The difference between the date of the interest-bearing note and that of actual payment of the money into the hands of the Secretary, would secure them a certain profit. The notes payable at sight were easily convertible into coin. By these measures the Secretary could count upon being able to realize nearly two hundred millions to defray current expenses until the next meeting of Congress.

In authorizing the issue of the fifty millions of notes which bore no interest, the law of July 17th made them redeemable at sight; but this last clause was soon to be replaced by the legal tender act, as the inevitable consequence of the crisis through which the United States was passing. Peculiar circumstances had

avored this first issue, rendering it as advantageous to commerce as to the treasury. In fact, since the suppression of the Federal banks, which had formerly been sacrificed to the jealous animosity with which the Democratic party had pursued everything calculated to strengthen the central power, no restraint had been placed upon the issue of private bank-bills. In default of a national fiduciary currency, the country had been flooded by the paper of all the banks and associated institutions, which were constantly putting unlimited quantities of bank-bills in circulation, the real value of which depended entirely upon the degree of confidence inspired by those whose signatures they bore. At the beginning of the war the nominal value of all this paper, both North and South, amounted to over two hundred millions. The evil was all the greater, because the Americans, in availing themselves, without stint, of this powerful and delicate measure, made use of bills of very small denomination, which multiplied its effects. So that the promenader who entered a Broadway store to make a small purchase, would throw a package of bank-bills of all kinds and colors upon the counter; the merchant then would consult the *detector*, containing an account of the market value of such bills, from the denomination of one dollar to one hundred, and calculate the discount on this paper from zero to par before taking it. The issue of treasury notes, which have borne the name of greenbacks since their first issue, in consequence of their color, put out of circulation the most depreciated portion of the paper bearing the signatures of private individuals, and thus rendered a real service to the public.

Before adjourning Congress had to provide the necessary means, not only for paying the interest on the enormous debt which it had authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to contract, but also for meeting a portion of the current expenses and for offering an earnest guarantee to capitalists, who were soon to be called upon to make new advances to the Federal treasury. The day when the new loan should be entirely taken the Secretary would have required the sum of sixteen millions for the necessities of his department alone. We have stated that Mr. Chase had proposed to raise eighty millions by taxation. These propositions were endorsed and authorized by the law of August, 1861. It was

expected that the increase in the rate of duties on imported articles would raise the custom-house revenue from thirty-eight to fifty-seven millions; but this expectation was sadly disappointed, for these excessive duties, instead of increasing the custom-house revenue, reduced it to thirty-two millions.* The law of August 3d added two direct taxes. One, on real estate, was divided equally among all the States, not in proportion to their respective wealth, but according to the rate of representation in the lower house of the national legislature, in conformity with the provisions of the Federal compact; so that, the States in rebellion being nominally contributors to this revenue, as well as those which had remained loyal to the Union, it followed that the total amount of taxation, which was twenty millions, was in reality reduced to less than fifteen millions. The second direct tax, which was to be the means of raising eight millions, and thus complete the amount fixed by the Secretary, levied three per cent. upon all incomes above eight hundred dollars. These last two measures were a serious innovation, for hitherto taxes of this kind had only been levied for the benefit of the States; but they had been contemplated by the Constitution and were justified by necessity.

When the two houses met again on the 2d of December, 1861, the military expenditure had already reached a figure which was the more alarming because it was impossible to entertain any illusion regarding the duration of the war, and to believe that it would be ended in a few weeks. The budgets of the government of the Union are made up at the close of the first half of the fiscal year. On the 30th of June, 1860, the Federal debt only represented a nominal capital of sixty-four million seven hundred and sixty-nine thousand nine hundred and one dollars. A year later (June 30, 1861), when the Thirty-seventh Congress was about to assemble, this debt had only reached the figure of ninety mil-

* Secretary Chase says the receipts fell short of his expectations because of—(1) the diminution (against his advice) in the duties on tea, coffee and sugar; (2) the exemption from the increased duties of the vast quantity of goods already in bond, and on which he had hoped to levy them when he made the estimate of fifty-seven millions; (3) the circumstances of the country having proved more unfavorable to foreign commerce than he had anticipated.—ED.

lion eight hundred and sixty-seven thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight dollars, showing, therefore, a simple increase of twenty-six million ninety-eight thousand one hundred and twenty-five dollars. The loans which had occasioned this increase, added to the regular revenue and some extra resources, had succeeded in balancing the budget of 1860-1861, which exhibited eighty-four million five hundred and seventy-eight thousand eight hundred and thirty-four dollars of expenditures, and eighty-six million eight hundred and thirty-five thousand and nine hundred dollars of receipts of every description. But the expenditures of the succeeding months had already assumed fearful proportions. Mr. Lincoln, in his message of December 3d, informed Congress that these expenditures for the first quarter amounted to ninety-eight million two hundred and thirty-nine thousand seven hundred and thirty-three dollars. The provisions made for repaying the temporary loans, and the redemption of a portion of the treasury bonds, raised the amount of expenditures for the fiscal year to five hundred and forty-three million four hundred and six thousand four hundred and twenty-two dollars. Such an increase, by causing a stringency in the market, rendered the disposal of the bonds already issued more and more difficult, and compromised in advance the success of future loans. In fact, the public had only purchased to the amount of one hundred and ninety millions of the loans issued in virtue of the law of July 17th, which the banks had undertaken to dispose of. When, in the month of November, those houses which had already subscribed for one hundred and fifty millions of the interest-bearing notes were called upon to take up the last third, it was found that they had greatly depreciated; by receiving them at par, they would therefore have sustained a considerable loss. They accepted instead an equal amount of the bonds, bearing six per cent. interest, at the rate of 89.32, fixed by law, although this rate was higher than the market price. Their third payment was reduced by this act from fifty million to forty-five million seven hundred and ninety-five thousand four hundred and seventy-eight dollars. The sums realized by the application of the law of July 17 and August 5, 1861, resolved themselves as follows :

Taken by the banks, notes bearing 7.30 per cent. interest.....	\$100,000,000
“ “ bonds bearing 6 per cent. interest.....	45,795,478
Debts liquidated with treasury notes.....	14,019,034
Borrowed at par upon notes at sixty days, renewed.....	12,877,750
Notes at sight (fifty millions authorized) issued.....	24,550,325
	<hr/> \$197,242,587

There remained to be realized out of all the loans already noted about ninety-one millions; if this difficult operation succeeded, the sum thereby obtained would only suffice to meet current expenses for seven or eight weeks. It was, therefore, indispensable to resort once more to borrowing and the issue of paper money. This time, however, it was found impossible to do this with that moderation which had marked the financial measures of the previous session. A large loan could not fail to bear heavily upon the market; and in order to find subscribers, it was necessary at least to ensure the payment of interest by real and tangible guarantees. The extravagant issue of treasury notes was equally, if not more, expensive in a national point of view, because, as they did not bear interest, their inevitable depreciation would involve a proportionate decrease of all the revenues of the State, and, moreover, it would have been equivalent to a tax affecting all transactions with foreign countries. Certain favorable circumstances, indeed, seemed to conspire to avert a monetary crisis. The increase in the tariff of custom-house duties having suddenly stopped importations, as the receipts of that branch of the revenue showed, the balance of trade had been regulated by the importation of specie to the amount of forty million eight hundred and forty-eight thousand one hundred and eighty dollars; moreover, the mines this year, having furnished nothing for exportation, had thrown thirty-four million three hundred and seventy-nine thousand five hundred and forty-seven dollars into circulation, and the coin which was already afloat on the 1st of January, 1861, represented a sum of fifty-two million two hundred and eighty-two thousand four hundred and twenty-one dollars, the total amount of specie on the 31st of December figuring up to one hundred and twenty-seven million five hundred and ten thousand one hundred and forty-eight dollars;*

* Secretary Chase says there was no way of ascertaining with certainty the amount of specie in circulation, but gives the estimate of the director

at the same date the bills of banking-houses and of private institutions were equivalent to one hundred and forty millions, while those of the Federal treasury only represented thirty millions. But the anticipation of an increase of paper money was sufficient to disturb the market, and to bring about the crisis, which was hastened by the consummation of the agreement entered into between the government and the banks. The latter, in fact, having had to pour into the treasury the equivalent of the one hundred and forty-six millions of bonds and scrip subscribed to by them within the space of three months, found themselves short of coin, and on the 31st of December, 1861, suspended specie payments. In consequence of this, there was such a demand for the redemption of the Federal notes, that in spite of the law, the treasury department was obliged to close its doors against those holding them. The latter then took them to the banks, offering them as collaterals for specie they desired to borrow; but the deposits increased so rapidly, and the banks had already such an excess of government paper on hand, that on the 8th of February they refused to continue this kind of loan. This was another blow struck at the government notes. In order to counteract the effect of this blow and to facilitate the circulation of its own paper, the government became itself a lender, receiving its own notes as collaterals, and exchanging them for certificates of deposit, payable ten days after date, with four per cent. interest if the depositor was a private individual, and five per cent. if a banking-house. So that the creditors, being paid in treasury notes, took them to the banks, which exchanged them for certificates, returning the same notes to the treasury, where they underwent again the same process. These measures, however, were mere palliatives. The chambers of commerce strenuously demanded the full value of the greenbacks; Congress had just empowered the government to issue ten millions more of these treasury notes, to provide for its most immediate wants, which increased the amount in circulation to sixty millions. It was under these circumstances that Congress examined the financial projects prepared by Mr. Chase. The discussion in both houses was long and stormy; at last the act of the Mint—between two hundred and seventy-five and three hundred millions.—ED.

February 25th, called the Currency bill, authorized at the same time the new loan and a further issue of treasury notes.

The amount of the latter was fixed at ninety millions, which, being added to the sixty millions already in circulation, made the sum total of Federal paper one hundred and fifty millions. The law made this paper a legal tender, receivable at par in payment of all debts, whether due to private individuals or to the State. The law, however, made one distinction between the two issues. The sixty millions issued before the 25th of February, the legal value of which was again guaranteed by the supplementary law of March 17th, were alone receivable at gold value in payment of the interest on the debt by the State, and of custom-house duties to the State; hence the name of *gold notes* given to this kind of paper, whilst the notes issued on the 25th of February were denominated *legal tenders*. The price of every article of merchandise went up immediately; yet the premium on gold, which is the most infallible indicator of these variations, only rose, under this first pressure of one hundred and fifty millions, to three or four per cent. The condition of the banks was greatly ameliorated by this measure, which enabled them to extend their circulation and to prepare to sustain the government once more.

The loan fixed at five hundred millions was issued in bonds bearing six per cent. interest, redeemable at par at the end of five years or at the end of twenty, at the option of the government, which took the name of *five-twenties*. They were sold below par, and to the highest bidder; but as it required time to place them, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to negotiate a temporary loan of twenty-five millions; this loan was in the form of certificates of deposit having at least thirty days to run before falling due, and payable at ten days' notice. Their rates of interest varied considerably; it may be said, however, in a general way, that the United States at that period borrowed at the rate of seven and a half per cent. The pressing wants of the treasury obliged Congress on the 17th of March, 1862, to double the amount of this temporary loan, and to quadruple it on the 11th of July. This expedient not having, however, proved sufficient, the houses, March 1st, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to satisfy the creditors of the government by means of *certificates of indebted-*

ness, payable at the end of one year and bearing six per cent. interest. These certificates were convertible into any kind of loan known to the government up to the 3d of March, 1863; the demands thus liquidated necessitated the issue of certificates the interest on which was payable in gold. The amount of these certificates was not limited. But all these temporary measures were not of a character to free Mr. Chase from embarrassment; he did not succeed in disposing of the scrip issued on the last loan, and at the end of May the increase of the debt, in consequence of the currency-bill, resolved itself thus:

Paper money.....	\$117,000,000
Certificates of deposit.....	51,000,000
Certificates of indebtedness.....	47,000,000
Five-twenties, placed.....	5,000,000
	<hr/>
	\$220,000,000

Therefore, out of two hundred and twenty millions, only five belonged to the consolidated debt.

We have seen that, during the last days of the session, Congress had voted a new levy of troops; in order to provide for their immediate support, it passed a law, July 11, 1862, authorizing a new issue of greenbacks to the amount of one hundred and fifty millions, naturally at the depreciated value. The premium on gold, which, after having been reduced to 1.30 per cent. in the month of April, had again risen in anticipation of this measure, continued to increase in direct ratio with the growing difficulties of the Federal treasury. In June, 1862, this premium was as high as twelve per cent.; in July, twenty and twenty-five per cent.* The law of July 11th had authorized the issue of treasury notes of small denominations, between five dollars and one, to the amount of thirty-five millions, and the law of July 17th even allowed notes of smaller denomination than those of one dollar to be put in circulation; in order to facilitate the issue of such paper, all bank notes of this description emanating from private establishments were ordered to be suppressed; but the latter clause having been denounced as unconstitutional, it was never applied.

New taxes had to be imposed in order to pay the interest on

* The *Bankers' Almanac* names somewhat different figures, viz.: in June, maximum $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; in July, maximum 20 $\frac{1}{2}$, minimum 9 per cent.—ED.

this constantly-increasing debt. The measures adopted on the 28th of May for the purpose of collecting funds in those districts where the two armies were contending proved altogether insufficient. On the 6th of June, Congress inaugurated an entire system of excise laws under the name of the *internal revenue act*, long prepared by Mr. Chase, which secured some important sources of revenue to the government, although at the cost of great discomfort to those branches of industry affected by it. These means not yet proving sufficient, the whole custom-house tariff was increased by the law of July 14th, being raised to the utmost limits of fiscal protection.

The enormous rise in the prices of all articles manufactured in Europe was added to the depreciation of paper currency and to the ruin of all branches of industry, caused by the want of manual labor, and from this period may be dated the real sufferings which the war inflicted upon the population of the North. A new and sudden reaction took place in the movements of gold, which, as we have said, had been imported in considerable quantities during the year 1861. Its exports from the port of New York for the month of August amounted to one million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars per week. Moreover, the custom-house duties, which yielded two millions per week, and the interest on the debt, being paid in gold, the importers on one hand, and the government on the other, entered the market as competitors, which caused the premium on gold in October, 1862, to rise thirty-nine per cent.*

Consequently, when Congress again met, in the month of December, the financial situation, as described in the message of the President, presented a very gloomy aspect. The amount of expenditures for the fiscal year closing on the 30th of June, 1862, had reached the sum of \$474,744,778.16, and the unavoidable redemption of certain provisional bonds and scrip carried it up to \$570,841,500.25; the following fiscal year was nearly half through, and it was easy to foresee that the next budget would exceed six hundred millions. The Secretary of War had expended \$394,368,407.36, and the Secretary of the Navy \$42,674,569.69.

* The *Bankers' Almanac* gives the maximum premium in this month as 37 per cent.; Secretary Chase says 37½ per cent.—ED.

The borrowing system, under all its forms, including the issue of treasury notes bearing no interest, had during the year yielded the sum of \$529,692,460.50, while the resources which the country furnished without discounting the future only amounted to \$51,935,729.76, nearly all of which, or \$49,056,397.62, were the product of the custom-houses. The following year the new tariffs, of which we have just spoken, added about twenty millions to this amount, while the internal revenue yielded more than thirty-seven millions. There was something in this situation well calculated to alarm financiers, who anxiously questioned the future, asking themselves how long the American nation would be able to sustain the war without becoming bankrupt. At that period the annual products of the United States were estimated at about two thousand millions, out of which it was calculated that two hundred million were economized. Nearly one-half of this two hundred million was invested annually in stocks, the aggregate amount of which represented a capital of about twenty-five hundred millions. The new taxes, yielding from one hundred to one hundred and twenty millions, already affected to a great extent the private incomes of the country, which were greatly reduced by the stoppage of industrial pursuits and the unproductive consumption by large armies. It was not, therefore, from this source that the treasury could expect to obtain the funds for which it was calling. This capital could only become disposable by being withdrawn from the stocks (*valeurs mobilières*) in which it had been invested. But as the total amount of loans which the government was authorized to negotiate already exceeded seven hundred millions, it would have been necessary, in order to realize the cash immediately, that one-third of the stocks should be sold without depreciation—that is to say, that capitalists could be found in foreign countries disposed to purchase them, and thus bear indirectly the unproductive expenses which the war entailed upon the United States. Such a result was all the more impossible because a new loan seemed to be already impending; the consolidation of debt, therefore, was to be long and troublesome, and in the mean while the creditors of the State could not be paid, except by resorting to forced loans, disguised under the name of treasury certificates or irredeemable treasury notes. In

another volume we shall show how these difficulties increased from day to day, and what sacrifices they entailed upon the American people, without, however, making them give up the great stake for which they were determined to play to the end.

The most important question in internal politics, next to military and financial matters, is that of personal liberty. In the United States, as in England, this liberty, as we have already remarked, finds a guarantee in the *habeas corpus*—a law in pursuance of which every individual arrested by the agents of the executive power must be publicly brought before a judge, who can either confirm his arrest or order his release. This protective law is the true constitution of a free people—of those, at least, among whom, whatever their form of government, the most ardent passions acknowledge the supreme authority of the law, and where all citizens submit without murmuring to the institutions of the country. But when these institutions are themselves in jeopardy, when the laws are trampled under foot by a fraction of citizens who resort to violence, the application of the *habeas corpus* becomes impossible. The English do not hesitate to suspend it in such cases, where, in France, a state of siege is proclaimed, for in all countries the first duty of society is to defend itself against those who attack it.

At the outset of the war the South had accomplices throughout the North, and especially among the border States, who occupied positions under the Federal administration. The government required extraordinary powers to strike some of them, and thus to check the treason which was creeping into every place. The guarantees secured by the Constitution to all citizens could not be invoked in behalf of those who were openly conspiring against it. The Constitution itself had, moreover, provided against such a contingency by an express reservation to the effect that "the *habeas corpus* should not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion."

The right to suspend, therefore, was unquestionable, but by whom should it be exercised? Was it by the President alone, or did he require the concurrence of Congress? The Constitution was silent upon this point. Congress not being in session, Mr. Lincoln resolved to act upon his own responsibility. This bold

but salutary measure was unanimously approved by those who had remained loyal to the Union.

A large number of telegraphic despatches of a most compromising character regarding those Southern partisans who resided in the North had lately been seized. The complicity of the latter with the insurgents, especially in Maryland, was not doubted; but as the courts of this State were entirely controlled by secessionists, they could not be tried by the ordinary process of law. In such States as Kentucky or Missouri, where the two antagonistic parties faced each other with arms in hand, respect for the guarantees of personal liberty would only have led to scandalous violations of justice. The military authority, charged to protect the Constitution and to fight its enemies, was released by the President, after consulting with his legal advisers, from all obligations to respect the habeas corpus. On the 27th of April an order from Mr. Lincoln, countersigned by Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, officially informed General Scott, commander of the army, of this decision and the powers it conferred upon him in those districts occupied by his troops, as well as along the whole line of railway from Philadelphia to Washington.

The military occupation of the great city of Baltimore soon rendered a recourse to extreme measures necessary. The leaders who had temporarily drawn it into the secession movement thought only of revenging themselves for the bold stroke by which Butler had wrested it from them. The military power, which alone enforced respect for the Constitution in that city, could not fulfil its mission except by rendering it impossible for them to conspire any longer. On the 25th of May, 1861, Mr. Merryman, a member of the Maryland legislature, was arrested and shut up in Fort McHenry. An application was made before a judge to have him brought into court on habeas corpus. General Cadwalader, who was in command of the fort, refused to obey the summons of the judge to bring the prisoner before his court. The case was taken before Chief-justice Taney, of the Supreme Court of the United States. The latter, who was entirely devoted to the cause of the South, declared that the action of the Baltimore judge was perfectly legal. Mr. Lincoln instructed his agents to pay no attention to this decision.

One month later, June 27th, General Banks, who was then in command at Baltimore, caused the arrest of four officers of the municipal police, who, although suspended by him, had persisted in issuing orders to their agents encouraging them to resist the authority of the government. They were taken to Fort Lafayette, near New York, and refused the privilege of the habeas corpus. These arrests, as might have been expected, formed the subject of warm discussions throughout the country. After two days' deliberation, the Senate refused, by a strong majority, to pass a vote of censure against the government, which had been proposed. The House of Representatives took no cognizance of the matter. These vigorous proceedings, however, had not discouraged the secessionists of Maryland. The legislature had been elected under their auspices, and they had a majority in both houses. An extra session was convened on the 17th of September in the little town of Frederick, situated in the centre of the slaveholding districts; it was to be inaugurated by an ordinance of secession. The government, having been notified of this design, resolved to frustrate it. General McClellan, acting under instructions, caused nine members of the legislature, with its principal employés, to be arrested on the 16th; the town of Frederick was occupied by the military, and the meeting, which was to have consummated the act of rebellion in that State, did not take place. The prisoners were shut up in the forts of New York and Boston, whose gates could no longer be opened by the mandate of the local courts, and before the close of the year nearly one hundred more arrests were made.

As soon as Congress had met in December, 1861, a vote of censure against the acts of the government was discussed in both houses; but the proposition was rejected in both by a large majority.

These detentions, however, without trial could not last long. Public opinion, which had at first approved of the arrests as a matter of necessity, would not have tolerated that. The President took the initiative in procuring the release of the prisoners, excepting those only who, if at large, would seriously have endangered the public safety. In a proclamation dated February 14, 1862, signed by Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, he declared

that, inasmuch as the character of the insurrection had changed and the struggle was now clearly defined, and as the germs of treason which had threatened to shake the Constitution everywhere had disappeared in the loyal States, all the political prisoners willing to take the oath of allegiance, with such exceptions as he deemed necessary, were thereby ordered to be set free. In order to carry out this measure, he appointed a commission composed of General Dix and Mr. Pierrepont to examine all the prisoners, with power to retain or release them or send them before the ordinary courts. Most of them, after taking the requisite oath, saw the gates of their prison thrown open.

This oath was a grave innovation upon the political usages of the American republic. Was it useful? Was it necessary? Experience has taught us what little value there is in the oath which governments exact from public functionaries, whether elected or otherwise. The Americans have never known this oath, with the exception of military men, with whom it is a noble practice in all countries to swear fidelity to the flag, and with the exception also of the chief magistrate of the republic.* But the oath of allegiance exacted from the political prisoners before they were set at liberty was rather a release on parole, because those prisoners, in virtue of their sympathies, belonged to a faction which was at open war with the government and claimed to be treated as a foreign power. It was natural, therefore, to exact from those who resided at the North, and whose sympathies for this hostile power were known, a pledge not to aid or favor it. Circumstances led the Federal government to extend the practice of exacting pledges, from the free States, where Southern accomplices were not numerous, to those sections of country where the two parties faced each other, and finally to those rebel States they had conquered. If on one hand it was proper on the part of the government to impose this oath upon persons who continued to reside in the territories wrested from the rebellion, and whom it considered as belonging to the Union, on the other hand the inhabitants of those States who believed themselves to be legally separated from it justly claimed, according to their view of the matter, the treatment ac-

* The author is here slightly wrong: an oath of allegiance is exacted from other government officers.—ED.

corded to non-combatants during international wars, and rejected the oath which implied a recognition of the sovereignty of the United States. The result of this system, therefore, was to divide the population of those countries into two classes, the oath-takers and the oath-rejecters. The first class, being exclusively favored at the expense of the second, contained not only many sincere partisans of the Union, but also all the wavering or dissembling characters in the community, all those who desired to speculate on the war, and, above all, an incalculable number of spies belonging to every rank of society.

The oath of allegiance, which was proper and easily applied in those States that had remained loyal to the Constitution, became, therefore, unjust and impolitic when the practice was extended to those which had been reconquered by the force of arms.

However, whilst Messrs. Dix and Pierrepont were restoring to most of the political prisoners their freedom, the places thus becoming empty in the Federal forts soon received new guests, chiefly furnished by Kentucky. Some were arrested for the same causes as their predecessors, others were simply the victims of their resistance to the militia conscription law. Many were deserters, insurrectionists or their accomplices, with whom the Federal authorities had thought proper to deal summarily in order to secure the execution of the law. These imprisonments, justified by the state of civil war, were generally of short duration; they did not the less constitute a violation of the habeas corpus; their legality, therefore, was frequently impugned before the courts of justice. These tribunals, whilst recognizing the power of the President to order such arrests, refused to ratify those made by his subordinates, when they were not provided with a mandate bearing his signature. This law was a barrier interposed against all abuse of power on the part of inferior functionaries; but, on the other hand, as it would have been annulling the right of the President to compel him to sign mandates which had to be sometimes executed at a distance of several hundred leagues from Washington, it became necessary to determine to whom his power was to be delegated, and the limits within which this power was to be exercised. This is precisely what Mr. Lincoln did by an

order published on the 8th of August, 1862. The military police was empowered to arrest all individuals accused of holding intercourse with the enemy, or of aiding the latter in any way whatever, either by opposing enlistments or encouraging refractory persons; at the same time, this military police was reorganized, and its authority was made to extend over the whole territory of the republic. A provost-marshal-general was stationed at Washington, and a certain number of provost-marshals, all subordinates to the general, were placed in charge of this police in every State. The judge-advocate was placed at the head of it, with power to control its action and to take cognizance of all complaints to which the exercise of its functions might give rise. Finally, in a proclamation issued on the 24th of September, the President sanctioned the authority he had thus delegated, by suspending the habeas corpus in all the camps, prisons and establishments submitted to military authority. This legislation, so contrary to American usages, but indispensable to ensure the application of the conscription law, was accepted without opposition.

In fact, when, on the meeting of Congress in December, 1862, the Peace Democrats made another attack upon the government in relation to the habeas corpus, no notice was taken of their denunciations. The vote of censure asked for by the opposition was again refused in both houses by large majorities. They were, moreover, about to pass a law conferring upon the President in explicit terms the power he had thus been exercising for nearly two years with their consent. This law having only gone into operation on the 1st of March, 1863, it belongs to another portion of our history.

We shall conclude this sketch of the political legislation in the North during the first two years of the war by reminding the reader that the right of summary arrest was exercised by the President, not only against individuals, but also against newspapers, if we may so express ourselves. At the outset of Mr. Lincoln's administration some of the journals published in the great Northern cities openly preached rebellion; the respect usually entertained for the liberty of the press, and the small amount of influence which these papers exercised over the public mind, secured them for some time perfect impunity. Finally, on the

10th of August, 1861, five newspapers published in New York were indicted by the grand jury of the circuit court of that city. As it was almost impossible to prosecute them criminally, the government decided to refuse them transportation by mail. This measure, which the most distinguished jurists declared to be perfectly constitutional, was frequently applied afterward, and Congress, after voting down a resolution of censure on this subject, which was introduced on the 1st of December, 1862, sanctioned the measure implicitly in the course of 1863. The government had no need of resorting to this measure in order to silence that portion of the press which was in favor of the South in the districts subject to military authority, such as Baltimore, Washington, St. Louis, and all that region of country which had been reconquered by the force of arms; for this authority, being invested with discretionary power by the state of war, never hesitated to suppress the newspapers, whose editors were frequently imprisoned.

We shall now devote a few pages to a brief examination of the internal policy of the Southern Confederacy, embracing, as above, the military and financial laws and the measures relating to personal liberty. As we have said in the first volume, the representatives of the six States which had given the signal of separation had met at Montgomery in the early part of February, and had established a provisional government, the duration of which was limited to one year. Messrs. Davis and Stephens were elected on the 9th of February as President and Vice President of this government, and the assembly of delegates arrogated to itself full legislative powers, with the title of Provisional Congress. It held four sessions—two at Montgomery, from the 4th of February to the 4th of March, 1861, and from the 6th to the 11th of May; two at Richmond, from the 20th of July to the 2d of September, and from the 18th of November, 1861, to the 18th of February, 1862. During these sessions the number of States represented in this Congress increased from six to thirteen. The first six were Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina. The representatives of Texas were admitted to seats in Congress in 1861, those of Virginia and Arkansas in May, those of Tennessee and North Carolina in June, and finally

those of Kentucky and Missouri in December. The permanent government formed under the new Constitution was organized in February, 1862; Messrs. Davis and Stephens were invested for six years with the powers they already exercised, and their solemn installation took place on the 22d of February, the anniversary of Washington's birth. The new Congress, composed of two houses similar to those of the national legislature at Washington, met for the first time at Richmond, on the very day when the provisional assembly ceased to exist. It held two sessions during the year 1862, from the 18th of February to the 21st of April, and from the 12th of August to the 13th of October.

On the 28th of February, 1861, even before Mr. Buchanan had been succeeded in the presidency of the United States by Mr. Lincoln, the Southern Congress passed a law providing for the organization of the military forces of the new Confederacy. The President was invested with the supreme command of all these forces; the conduct of the war and the custody of the common defences were thus withdrawn from the local authorities and centralized in his hands. These functionaries were ordered to transfer to him all the arms and ammunition that had belonged to the Federal government, and he was authorized to enroll all the volunteers whose services he should deem proper to accept into the service of the Confederacy. The term of enlistment of these volunteers was fixed at twelve months. The militia continued exclusively subject to the authority of the governors of States, but the law of March 6th gave the President power to enroll them likewise in the national service for one year, to the number of one hundred thousand men. The Confederacy, at the time of the battle of Bull Run, had, therefore, about two hundred thousand men under arms. When it was seen that the defeated North, far from giving up the struggle, had called for five hundred thousand volunteers, the Southern leaders felt that, in order to preserve the prestige of victory, it was necessary to impose sacrifices of equal magnitude upon the people of the South. On the 3d of August, Congress authorized the President to raise four hundred thousand volunteers to serve for not less than twelve months and not more than three years, and a few days later, August 21st, another law was passed regulating the

formation of special volunteer corps destined for certain local defences, such as that of the ports and coasts.

The loss of Kentucky, Missouri, half of Tennessee and New Orleans, at the beginning of 1862, called for some powerful effort on the part of the Confederate government to win back the smiles of fortune. The capture of Fort Donelson and the bloody battle of Shiloh, together with the ravages of disease, had singularly reduced the ranks of its armies. The four hundred battalions of infantry of which they were then composed could not muster more than one hundred and sixty or one hundred and eighty thousand men for active service in the field.

It was at this critical juncture that the time of service of the volunteers engaged in April and in May, 1861, for one year expired. The discharge of these soldiers, already comparatively trained, a small number of whom only appeared disposed to re-enlist, would have completely broken up the Confederate armies. The Provisional Congress, which, according to Southern historians, manifested but little energy and less practical good sense, had devised a measure which, instead of obviating this danger, was calculated to produce the most disastrous consequences. It decided that all soldiers enlisted for one year who should sign re-enlistment papers would receive besides the bounty two months' leave of absence. This opportunity to quit a hard service and revisit their homes was eagerly seized by a large number of volunteers. They left the armies *en masse*, and in a few weeks the regiments were all reduced to an insignificant figure. The men who availed themselves of this law re-enlisted, in fact, not in the regiments to which they belonged, but in those that were in process of formation, and as to which it was impossible to foresee when they would take the field; so that the one hundred and forty-eight old regiments which were to be discharged at the end of their one year's term of service were left without the necessary elements for re-formation. The generals complained bitterly of this desertion. There was but one measure that could remedy so great an evil; this was compulsory service. Mr. Davis vigorously called for it in the message he addressed to the permanent Congress, which had just assembled, on the 25th of February, 1862.

This assembly, composed of men who did not deceive themselves regarding the difficulties of their task, unhesitatingly adopted a measure of a most radical character. On the 16th of April it passed a law, which placed at the disposal of the government all the able-bodied population of the Confederacy, and which was called the conscription law, in the broadest application of that term, seeing that it provided not for a draft by lot, but for a levy *en masse*. In thus forestalling their adversaries in the use of this powerful engine, the Confederates secured a great advantage, for they found themselves in possession of numerous and well-organized troops when the North, taught too late by her reverses, was vainly mustering into her service inexperienced soldiers, and there was a time when the superiority acquired at the cost of this opportune sacrifice seemed destined to end the war in their favor.

So severe a law could not fail to challenge sharp opposition. The statesmen who had imposed it upon the people of the South, as a cruel consequence of the venture in which they had embarked their fellow-citizens, were exposed to the most severe attacks. This law clashed, in fact, with all the ideas of liberty and independence conceived under the equitable and peaceful government of the United States. Mr. Brown, governor of Georgia, placed himself at the head of this opposition, and was sustained by the legislature of his State. But the Confederate government finally broke down all opposition; and the struggle being prolonged, the law of April 16th was gradually applied to those who by their age or other causes had at first been exempted from its provisions. As this law was made the basis of all the military legislation of the Confederacy, it is necessary that we should explain its principal clauses. It declared as soldiers all white men above the age of eighteen and under thirty-five years residing within the limits of the Confederacy, with certain exemptions, to be subsequently defined; their time of service was fixed at three years or during the war, if the war should not last so long. This measure, comprising sixteen classes, reached a large portion of the twelve-month volunteers, whom it was important to keep in the field, and whose original term of service was thus forcibly prolonged by two years. Most of them having already accepted the offer

of a leave of absence in consideration of a re-enlistment, an ingenious expedient was devised to render this unfortunate promise null and void. The bounty and leave of absence were ensured in principle to all the drafted volunteers; no distinction was made between them; but as the military necessities evidently did not admit of their being all allowed to receive this leave of absence, it was given to none of them, but all were granted, by way of compensation, a sum of money equivalent to their travelling expenses.

This law permitted the introduction of certain regulations and a method, in the formation and recruiting of regiments, yet unknown in the North. The soldiers of a company were not allowed to re-enlist otherwise than in that company, the transfer from one regiment to another by enrolment being a constant cause of frauds and mistakes. The regiments composed of twelve-month volunteers, which came under the provisions of the new law, were allowed to preserve their organization instead of disbanding, but the officers who held their grades by election were subjected to a new ballot. Companies or regiments which possessed their full complement, after deducting the men who had been drafted, were treated like volunteer corps. All the men comprised in the forced levy who, not having yet contracted any engagement, had not left their places of residence, were detailed to fill up the *cadres* of standing regiments, so as to maintain their normal strength. The government was authorized to send for them either by its own agents or those of the several States, and to enrol them without delay into the regiments that were most reduced. Those whom it did not deem expedient to incorporate at once could be allowed to remain at their homes without pay and subject to a draft. No rule was laid down to govern its choice between the drafted men and the latter class, which constituted a reserve intended to supply the different *dépôts*. They did not, however, remain long in this category; for it was abolished on the 18th of July, 1863, after the great battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, by a proclamation of Mr. Davis, summoning them all to join the ranks of the army without exception. The law of April 16th finally conferred upon the government the requisite authority over the *personnel* of the officers, by causing it to participate largely in the control of their appointments and

promotions. Whilst stipulating that the rank of second lieutenant should be made elective, and the other grades awarded according to seniority, it allowed the President to disregard this rule whenever he thought proper, and to make direct appointments of officers or non-commissioned officers to fill vacancies that might occur, without the intervention of the soldiers or of the governors of States.

The cases of exemption were regulated and often modified by subsequent legislation. We give them as they were definitely settled at a later period, at the beginning of 1864, the law of February of this year being the only one affording any precise information on the subject. Exemption from military service was granted to persons declared by the medical board unfit for such service, to ministers of religion, to the heads of charitable institutions, to the principal editors of newspapers and to those in their employ whose services they represented under oath to be indispensable, to State printers, to one person in every druggist establishment, to physicians over thirty years of age and with seven years' practice, to directors and professors of colleges having more than thirty pupils, and to the necessary *personnel* of hospitals, railroads and post-offices; and lastly, to one person on every farm employing more than fifteen able-bodied slaves, and on which there was no white man already exempt from military services. These farmers had to ransom themselves by payment of one hundred pounds of salt meat. The law of April 16th allowed, moreover, to all drafted men the privilege of providing a substitute in their places, the latter to be himself an exempt, reserving to the government the right of mustering them into service if this substitute failed to appear from any other cause than the casualties of war. This clause was abolished by the law of 1864, which mustered into the service all persons who had already procured substitutes.

A few days later, April 21, 1862, the organization of a partisan corps led to the enactment of another law, empowering the President to bestow special commissions upon their leaders, and to secure them the legal character of belligerents. Finally, the Confederate Congress and the legislatures of the different States passed several laws to facilitate and encourage the levying of volunteer corps composed of men freed from compulsory service;

but the classes from which these recruitments could be made were so restricted that the measures produced but insignificant results.

The law of April 16th, applied to a population of about five million whites, should, according to calculations based upon the last census, have furnished seven hundred and fifty-two thousand three hundred and forty-two drafted men; and adding to it the exempts who had enlisted as volunteers, the forces of the Confederacy ought to have numbered eight hundred thousand men. This figure was never reached, and it is difficult to form an estimate of the real resources which this law placed at the disposal of Mr. Davis; it is to be supposed, however, that it gave him from four to five hundred thousand effective combatants. This law had, therefore, at the most critical moment, in the spring of 1862, filled the *cadres* of the armies of the rebellion, and enabled their generals to undertake the long and sanguinary campaigns we have related. But these campaigns caused gaps in the Confederate ranks which could not be filled except by ordering a new levy in the Southern States. Responding to the wishes expressed by Mr. Davis in his message of August 18th, Congress passed a law on the 27th of September extending the limit of compulsory service in regard to age by ten years. All the whites residing in the South, from thirty-five to forty-five years of age, were, in their turn, subjected to compulsory service, the draft being thus made to comprise twenty-six classes; the term of their service was likewise fixed at three years. Finally, the conscription law was made to include all young men who had completed their seventeenth year since the 16th of April. It was under the operation of these new measures, affecting the whole able-bodied population of the Confederacy, that the armies were reorganized and prepared for the sanguinary campaigns of Murfreesborough and Vicksburg in the West, and of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg in the East. It may be said that these campaigns mark the greatest effort made by the Confederates in defence of the cause which they upheld with so much vigor. The troops enrolled at that period, in fact, formed the principal nucleus of their armies until the close of the war; the laws which were subsequently passed, extending still further

the liability to military service, were measures all the less efficacious because they were more severe, and the legislation of which we shall have to speak in the course of this history had scarcely any other object than to strike at those persons—a class which was daily on the increase—who, either as refractory citizens or deserters, sought to evade the rigors of the law of September 27th.

It now remains for us, in continuation of our inquiry, to speak of the financial measures adopted by the Confederate government for the maintenance of its large armies, and to show how, with considerable resources at its command, although precarious and insufficient, it entered upon a course which soon led to a frightful monetary crisis, the result of which was the greatest bankruptcy of modern times.

At the very outset of its organization the new Confederacy, in order to possess and demonstrate a capacity for action, had to create its finances. The chapter of expenses threatened to be heavy; it was necessary to provide for the support of volunteers who had been called to assist in the common defence, and who were passing from the service of the States to that of the central government. The latter had indeed arrogated to itself the same prerogatives that the Federal power possessed under the Constitution of the United States, of which it pretended to be the legitimate successor; but the custom-houses, which formed almost the only source of revenue of the latter, could not, in consequence of the blockade, contribute any resources of importance to the Confederate exchequer. To impose direct taxes upon the populations of the six seceded States was not to be thought of, for they would probably not have accepted the burden without opposition, and the feeble ties that bound them together might have been broken; at all events, the prospect of these new taxes would in all likelihood have had the effect of stopping the other Southern States, which it was important to bring into the league. Mr. Davis' government was, therefore, compelled to resort to public credit, and he made the first of those appeals in that direction which he subsequently abused to so great a degree.

On the 28th of February, 1861, he was authorized by Congress to issue bonds at eight per cent. to the amount of fifteen million dollars; these bonds were to be negotiated on the most

advantageous terms, in proportion as the opportunity offered, in conformity with the system adopted in the North. They were sold at par, but in small quantities, for on the 1st of January, 1863, the treasury had not been able to dispose of one-tenth of them. Consequently, on the 16th of April, new financial measures were adopted by Congress. The conflict had commenced; the Confederacy had received the addition of several new States, and its expenses had increased as rapidly as its resources. A second loan was authorized for a similar sum of fifteen million dollars in the form of treasury notes, bearing seven and thirty one-hundredths per cent. interest, redeemable at sight in paper, with the privilege of being exchanged for bonds at eight per cent.

The small success which had attended the first issue of bonds, however, did not justify the placing of any reliance upon this second issue as a means for defraying the immediate expenses of the war budget. Recourse was had to a speedier means of relief, which, however, on that very account gradually involved the financial affairs of the Confederacy in great difficulties. It was the same expedient resorted to by all States who have neither real resources nor solid credit to cover their expenses—the manufacture of treasury notes bearing no interest. This time, however, the amount issued was not extravagant, for it was limited to ten millions, while the amount of circulating medium in the Southern States was estimated at no less than eighty millions, counting both specie and private bank-notes. The provision making them a legal tender, however, disguised in the law under a form which did not in any way change its effects in a financial point of view, had from the very outset a tendency to depreciate the value of these notes. The measure was indispensable, for the precious metals were rapidly disappearing, and the Confederate treasury had neither the necessary bullion to sustain the currency of the paper nor the means of obtaining it. The resources upon which the government counted could not be realized until the raising of the blockade should enable it to sell its staple agricultural products, cotton, sugar and tobacco, in Europe. Its notes were made redeemable at sight two years after “a treaty of peace” between the Confederacy and the United States. This was a very

uncertain date and a most precarious promise. It was, however, a precaution which enabled the Confederate government to say after it had fallen that it did not break its engagements, since, in fact, the period for redeeming its paper never arrived. Notwithstanding this reservation, the first issues went off without difficulty, for no one doubted the perfect and speedy success of the Confederacy.

Congress, therefore, did not pause in the course it was pursuing. But in order to consolidate its credit, it sought, in the first place, to turn to immediate account the vast quantities of cotton that were stowed away in the ports and warehouses of the South; it authorized the government to receive subscriptions under the name of *produce-loans* or *call-loans* from planters who had stores of cotton in their possession. These planters engaged to pay at a fixed date a specified sum, to be deducted from the eventual produce of the sale of their cotton, receiving government bonds in exchange. These transactions created a paper which, having a tangible guarantee, was not so liable to depreciation. But the blockade, becoming daily more stringent, soon interposed a fatal obstacle in the way of this operation by rendering impossible the sales upon which the chances of the loan depended. In consequence of numerous objections, the date of payment was deferred, and finally postponed, until after the raising of the blockade. This modification greatly encouraged the lenders, the large proprietors, who were convinced that after peace the government would aid them to effect the sale of cotton upon which their subscription depended, and looked upon this very subscription as a sort of guarantee for the future; and during the single year of 1862 they pledged themselves to the nominal amount of sixty millions, say about thirty millions in specie. But, on the other hand, the guarantees they gave, depending upon the raising of the blockade, were found to be as precarious as that of the notes, and their paper speedily underwent a similar depreciation.

This source of revenue soon proved insufficient, as the war budget was becoming heavier every day. A levy of volunteers, as we have seen, had been ordered, as a response to those which had taken place in the North after the battle of Bull Run; it was likewise expedient to imitate the Federal Congress in a

financial point of view, and provide for the support of those volunteers by an additional issue of treasury notes, the negotiation of a new loan, and by taking the real sources of wealth in the country in order to secure the means for guaranteeing the interest on this loan, so as to be able to dispose of the shares. Such was the triple object of the law proposed to Congress in the course of July, and promulgated on the 19th of August, 1861.

This law authorized the issue of one hundred millions in treasury notes bearing no interest, and redeemable only after the conclusion of peace; they did not vary from those already in circulation, except upon one point, they were redeemable at six months after the close of the war, and not at two years—an advantage which must have looked like cruel irony to those who after the war found themselves in possession of this worthless paper. The smallest denomination was of five dollars. The notes issued in virtue of the law of April 16th were accounted part of these one hundred millions. The paper thus created was receivable in payment of all taxes, with the exception of the duties on the exportation of cotton.

The new loan, like its predecessors, was issued in the form of government bonds bearing eight per cent. interest, redeemable at the end of twenty years at the latest, the government being privileged to dispose of it as it thought proper. The law of August 19th fixed the total amount of bonds to be issued at a par value of one hundred millions; and as thirty millions had previously been voted, this loan added seventy millions to the public debt. But the clause accounting the previous issues part of the one hundred million loan authorized by this law was soon repealed, so as to enable the government to place new bonds in the market to an amount covering this entire sum. In order to facilitate the disposal of these bonds, it was stipulated, on one hand, that they should be convertible at par into new treasury notes, and, on the other hand, that they should be received in payment of debts contracted by the government. The effect of the first of these two clauses, called the *funding clause*, was to withdraw from circulation a certain number of notes; it will be seen presently that the most arbitrary measures were resorted to in order to facilitate the operation. The second was a disguised ex-

pedient to obtain a forced loan by making the Government contractors bondholders in spite of themselves. The object of the third section of this law was to secure the payment of interest on this loan, amounting to forty millions, by a final appeal to the real wealth of the Southern States. This section imposed a tax of one-half per cent. upon all personal and real estate—stocks, slaves, merchandise, cattle, specie and bonds of every description, except those of the Confederacy. Estates worth less than five hundred dollars, and the property of colleges, schools and religious institutions, were alone exempted. The difficulty in determining the correct valuation of property and in collecting this tax in a region of country so extensive, and so little inhabited as the Southern States, greatly diminished the payment of it. During the first two years of the war, however, this section did not encounter the same opposition as at a later period, when it was aggravated by new stipulations, and it yielded a revenue which, if well administered, might have upheld the credit of the Confederacy for a considerable length of time; in fact, as will be seen presently, the revenue secured by this tax was nearly seventeen millions in ten months, or about twenty millions during the year 1862.

Thanks to these resources and the hope of speedy peace, the finances of the South were at first well supported. In September, 1861, the treasury notes were still at par. In his message of November 10th, Mr. Davis, while recommending the levying of new taxes, presented a favorable picture of the pecuniary situation that was hardly overdrawn; at the close of the year, despite the blockade, which had stopped the importation of specie from Europe, the premium on gold was only up to twenty per cent., which was about the same rate as at the North. In his fourth message, addressed to the permanent Congress, immediately after its installation on February 25th, 1862, the President stated that the expenses of the Confederate treasury during that first year only amounted to one hundred and seventy millions, which, compared with those of the Federals, was a small affair. But he omitted to add that, a large portion of the costs of the war having been defrayed by particular States, this figure did not convey an exact idea of the sum which the struggle had in reality already cost the people of the South. The total issue of government

bonds and treasury notes during the said period amounted to 111,378,625 dollars.

Before closing the financial review of this year, we must mention a project which was warmly discussed in the South, and from which some persons anticipated wonderful results. The blockade having interrupted the exportation of cotton, there remained about three million five hundred thousand bales in the territory of the Confederacy. Instead of confining itself to receiving subscriptions depending upon the sale of this commodity, which were becoming more and more uncertain, the government was to purchase the whole supply and use it as a guarantee to negotiate loans in Europe. The Secretary of the Treasury very properly rejected such a proposition, which began by obliging it to purchase what he could only pay for in paper, and, consequently, to increase still further the issue of treasury notes, whilst the credit which the ownership of cotton would have secured him in Europe still depended upon the raising of the blockade. The certainty that on the raising of this blockade the export duties on cotton would fill the coffers of the treasury, should be sufficient to secure subscriptions to his loan on the part of English speculators the following year; and he was satisfied, two years later, by the monopoly of the cotton trade carried on by running the blockade.

The second year of the existence of the Confederacy, which began the 18th of February, 1862, was ushered in under gloomy auspices, which Mr. Davis' optimism sought in vain to disguise. The hope of speedy recognition had vanished, and with it all confidence in the credit of the government. The Confederate armies, defeated in the West, decimated by sickness in the East, threatened everywhere with being abandoned by the twelve-month volunteers, could not be revived again except at the price of great sacrifices. It was at this period that the real depreciation of treasury notes commenced, and increased gradually and without interruption from day to day.

The laws passed in 1861 having authorized the executive power to issue treasury notes to the amount of one hundred millions, and one hundred and thirty millions of loan scrip, and to receive subscriptions for the *produce-loan*, which, according to Mr. Davis,

amounted during that year to nearly fifty millions, he had nominally at his disposal the sum of two hundred and eighty millions. Thus provided, he only proposed during the first eight months of that year some insignificant financial measures to Congress, such as, on the 12th of April, the creation of five millions of government bonds at eight per cent., which were never issued,* and five millions of small notes of the denominations of one and two dollars, on the 17th of the same month. Some of the resources placed at the disposal of the Confederate treasury, however, were not promptly realized, and more difficulty was experienced in Richmond in consolidating the public debt even than at Washington. In order to facilitate this operation, Mr. Memminger, Secretary of the Treasury, followed the example of Mr. Chase, and on the 24th of December, 1861, he was authorized to receive Confederate notes on deposit in exchange for certificates bearing interest. This interest, which at the North was at the rate of four and five per cent., was six per cent. in the South. But despite his efforts, the Secretary only succeeded in disposing of a portion of the loan scrip he had been authorized to issue. On the 1st of August, 1862, the eight per cent. bonds voted for in February, 1861, had alone been subscribed for in full, amounting to 15,000,000 dollars; those of August only realized 22,613,346 dollars out of 100,000,000; the treasury notes at 7.30 per cent. of April, 1861, had realized 22,799,900 dollars, and the certificates of deposit authorized by the law of December 24th, 37,515,200 dollars, making in all 97,928,446 dollars. Consequently, notwithstanding the law which limited the issue to 105,000,000, the treasury had put in circulation legal tender notes to the amount of 187,977,560 dollars.

It was in the midst of these difficulties that, on the 18th of August, Mr. Davis addressed his message to Congress stating the necessity of finding new resources in the credit of the Confederacy. Asserting that the public, represented by the numerous contractors who were creditors of the government, preferred being paid in treasury notes rather than in interest-bearing bonds, he dismissed the project of a new loan, asking instead for authority

* \$3,612,300 of them were issued, according to Treasury Report of Jan. 1, 1864.—ED.

to increase the number of treasury notes. He was severely censured in regard to this matter, and Southern writers have accused him of having thereby contributed to the depreciation of Confederate paper. Nevertheless, as he himself observed, this paper could always be used in the purchase of government bonds; and as the interest on these bonds was also paid in paper, they were liable to experience precisely the same depreciation. In fact, the value of treasury notes redeemable at par after the war, and of government bonds whose interest was payable in paper, was regulated according to the chances, more or less promising, which the Confederacy had of triumphing, and both the bonds and notes had to suffer depreciation in proportion as the favorable termination of the struggle seemed more remote.

The law of October 13, 1862, authorized a new issue of one hundred million treasury notes, redeemable, like the former, at six months after the conclusion of peace, besides five millions of the smaller denominations of one and two dollars. The necessities of the treasury were so urgent that it could not wait for the manufacture of these notes, and was obliged to borrow nearly ten millions from private banks in order to defray the most urgent expenses.

This new issue, not being guaranteed by any pledge, soon detracted from the value of Confederate paper. In the month of September the premium on gold was one hundred per cent.; in December, 1862, it reached as high as two hundred and thirty-five per cent. At this period the Confederate government presented an account of its receipts during the ten and a half months that had elapsed since the 18th of February, the date of its permanent installation. We give below the official summary to show what was the real condition of its finances:

Patent Fund.....	\$13,920*
Custom-house receipts.....	668,566*
Miscellaneous	2,291,812*
Repayments of disbursing officers.....	3,839,263
Interest on moneys borrowed from the government.....	26,583*
Certificates of deposit (law of December, 1861).....	59,742,796
One hundred million loan (law of August 19, 1861).....	41,398,286
Legal tender notes.....	215,554,885
Carry forward, \$323,536,111	

	Brought forward, \$323,536,111
Treasury notes bearing 7.30 per cent. interest (law of	
April 16, 1861).....	113,740,000
War tax.....	16,664,513*
Loan of February 28, 1861.....	1,375,476
Gold received from the Bank of Louisiana.....	2,539,799
	<hr/> \$457,855,899

The items marked by asterisks alone represent the real resources of the Confederacy, amounting, with the several receipts included, to a total of 19,665,394 dollars—say a round sum of twenty millions. It will be perceived that the custom-houses only figure in the account for less than three quarters of a million, which is a proof of the efficacy of the blockade. The fourth item is only the cancelling of credit, the gold provided by the Bank of Louisiana but an extraordinary receipt. The amount obtained by borrowing during those ten months, either in the shape of government bonds or treasury notes bearing interest, or notes without interest, reached the enormous sum of 431,811,443 dollars. If we add to this the debts contracted by the Confederate provisional government prior to the 22d of February, 1862, this sum will be found to figure at 556,105,100 dollars. This amount includes bonds and notes of every description to the extent of 410,485,030.50 dollars, after deducting those which had been cancelled. The notes that bore no interest constituted the real paper money, representing a sum of more than three hundred millions—that is to say, nearly four times the normal circulation before the war. This fact alone suffices to explain their depreciation.

Consequently, at the close of the year 1862 the financial crisis was complete; it had produced its inevitable results—stock-jobbing, fraudulent transactions and illicit speculations, the responsibility of which people who have seen their financial prospects ruined by their own blunders in political economy invariably try to throw upon a few individuals. While the Confederate paper was losing two-thirds of its value, the bank-notes of private corporations attained a premium of ninety per cent. over the government paper. The blockade had raised the price of all manufactured articles which the South could not produce, to an inordinate degree. The loss of Kentucky, which supplied twice as much

meat as all the other slave States together, had greatly increased the cost of living. The contracts for supplying the armies were awarded to government favorites, who, according to the testimony of Confederate writers, made them the object of reckless speculation. Their rapidly-acquired fortunes, an insult to the prevailing distress, carried trouble and discouragement everywhere. In short, all the measures devised by Congress were powerless against the general laws of supply and demand. The enactments, prohibiting all commercial intercourse with the North, had no effect; it was carried on even in spite of the war. The first pretext had been the purchase of medicines which the armies needed. This intercourse, thanks to the interested protection of high functionaries, soon extended, and the notes of the Federal government finally got into circulation, attaining a premium over the Confederate paper, which in 1863 was as high as four hundred per cent. Finally, the laws directing the destruction of cotton, in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, were no longer executed except by the agents of the executive power. The bales containing this precious commodity were no longer seen blazing in every direction at the approach of the Federal armies. Planters, instead of applying the torch themselves to perform the work of destruction, carefully concealed their cotton whenever the fortune of war proved adverse to the Confederate soldiers, and hastened to sell it to the speculators who followed in the track of the enemy.

Before closing this sketch we will prolong our inquiry to the first quarter of the year 1863—an epoch which marks the complete breaking up of the financial system of the South. In fact, the figures presented in the budgets of the last two years of the war lose all significance, in consequence of the utter depreciation of the Confederate paper—a crisis far surpassing that which in our own country is connected with the remembrance of the *assignats*.

In his message of January 12, 1863, Mr. Davis was at last compelled to recognize the gravity of the situation. He recommended to Congress the adoption of decided measures in order, on the one hand, to diminish the number of treasury notes by obliging the public to convert those that had been issued, Decem-

ber 1, 1861, into government bonds, and, on the other hand, to secure the payment of these bonds by sufficient taxation. As will be seen presently, this conversion of paper money into bonds was imposed upon the public by a regular certificate of bankruptcy; but the law which caused the treasury notes that had not been exchanged before a certain date to lose successively first one-third, and then two-thirds, of their value, belongs to the year 1864.

Before Congress would have been able to devise new taxes, it became necessary to resort once more to loans and the issue of treasury notes. On the 20th of February, 1863, the government was authorized to negotiate one hundred millions in government bonds at eight per cent. and a similar amount at seven per cent. The placing of this new issue of two hundred millions of bonds being too slow to meet the requirements of the treasury, Congress on the 23d of March voted another issue of treasury notes, the legal amount of which we do not remember, although, in fact, it must have been unlimited; for eight months later, January 1, 1864, it was as high as \$391,829,702.50, and three months later still it was \$511,182,566.50, of nominal value, this amount actually comprising only the notes put in circulation in virtue of the law of March 23, 1863. So that, from the date of this law, the premium on gold was four hundred per cent., and in the month of September of the same year nine hundred per cent., which was equivalent to absolute worthlessness. On the 19th of December, 1862, Congress voted a tax called agricultural, which in reality was an income tax of the most frightful character, showing how great was already the distress of the treasury. This new law provided that on the 1st of January, 1863, an estimate should be made of all the productions of the soil during the year that had just elapsed—grain, vegetables, sugar, tobacco, cotton, turpentine, colts, calves, lambs, all direct or indirect agricultural products, and generally the income of each person during the same period of time, Confederate funds alone excepted. The State appropriated to itself one-fifth of all these products and revenues. This tax, which seems to have been inspired by a recollection of the tithe and the enumerations of the Bible, had scarcely gone into operation when it was pronounced to be insufficient, and

on the 24th of April, 1863, Congress ordered the levy of an aggregation of taxes under a single head, which, had the law been strictly enforced, would have formed the most crushing fiscal system of which history makes mention. It was hoped thereby to obtain the means to pay the interest on the debt. But this system, which was the source of innumerable vexations, could not be seriously applied; and if the debt was never nominally in jeopardy, it is because the unlimited issue of paper money always made it feasible to pay the interest with this worthless currency.

The law of April 24th established—1st, an internal revenue tax of eight per cent. upon all agricultural products wherever found, excepting only the quantity required for the support of each family; 2d, a tax of one per cent. on all bank deposits, etc.; 3d, a license tax on all banks, hotels, and nearly all kinds of trade, from thirty to five hundred dollars; 4th, a deduction of one per cent. on all salaries paid by the State; 5th, a graduated tax upon incomes, the rates being five per cent. upon incomes of from five hundred to fifteen hundred dollars, and rising proportionally, with certain exemptions, to fifteen per cent. upon those exceeding ten thousand dollars; 6th, a deduction of one-tenth on all dividends paid by stock companies; 7th, the same tax upon all profits realized on wholesale purchases of all articles necessary to life; 8th, a similar tax, but in kind, with reservation for individual wants, on all agricultural products, vegetables or animals. This law, therefore, embraced tithes, licenses, taxes on the products of the soil, in whatever hands, the deduction on salaries, taxes or emoluments, and a *pro-rata* tax on incomes. Never, we believe, has a single law combined such an oppressive system in a few clauses.

We shall only mention in conclusion the small loan negotiated in Europe by the Confederate agents, which served to fit out the privateers, whose operations we shall yet have frequent occasions to relate. This loan, the interest on which was payable in gold, deducted either from the profit of the sales of cotton brought by the blockade-runners, or from the capital advanced by subscribers, had in reality no other guarantee than the problematic recognition of the Confederacy, and its value in the market followed the military fortunes of the Southern States.

We shall not enter into the same details regarding the expenses

of the Confederate government, which consisted almost exclusively of the costs of the war, and may be easily calculated according to the total amount of receipts. But in comparing them with those of the North we must take into account the constant variation of the monetary standard, which, by its continual depreciations, swelled in appearance all the figures contained in the Confederate budgets. We shall merely endeavor to convey an idea of these variations, by quoting a single estimate of the expenses incurred during the year 1863, about which the documentary evidence is particularly exact.

The premium on gold during that period averaging four hundred per cent., the real value of the expenses incurred must be diminished by four-fifths. We, therefore, insert below, in two separate columns, the nominal and real values, deducting the redeemed notes from the budget:

	Nominal Value.	Approximate Real Value.
Expenses of the War Department.....	\$377,988,244	\$75,597,650
“ “ Navy Department.....	38,437,661	7,687,530
“ “ Civil and Contingent....	11,629,278	2,325,850
“ “ Custom-houses.....	56,636	11,330
“ “ Public Debt.....	32,212,290	6,442,460
	<hr/> \$460,324,109	<hr/> \$92,064,820

To follow the same plan we have pursued above, we should close this sketch of the internal policy and condition of the Confederacy with a few remarks upon the laws which struck at the personal liberty of citizens. We have already seen how little this liberty was respected from the early stages of secession, when it seemed to interfere with the pretended unity of the secession movement; the guarantees laid down in the new Constitution were never of any effect against the authority of the government, which alleged the supreme necessities of war; and if Congress waited until 1864 to suspend the habeas corpus, which was under its exclusive protection, its vote only served to legalize practices which had been adopted and followed long before. The Richmond government cannot certainly be blamed for having sought to ensure the safety of its armies in the field by summary arrests. But it did not stop here; and wherever its policy encountered

any opposition, it broke it down by the application of measures the rigor of which was in strange contrast with the theories of local independence which the government itself advanced in order to justify the insurrection. Thus, for instance, East Tennessee, having shown her loyalty to the old Constitution by nominating Union representatives at all the elections, and by not furnishing a single volunteer for the Confederate armies, was treated by Mr. Davis and the governor of the State as a rebellious and conquered country.

The Unionists had two prominent leaders in that region. One, Andrew Johnson, a man of the middle class, through his eloquence had attained to senatorial dignity at Washington. He had continued in that position after the secession of his own State; and when the Federal armies entered Nashville, he was appointed military governor of Tennessee, with the rank of brigadier-general—a necessary title to qualify him for the performance of those functions. It is known that the death of Mr. Lincoln called him to the presidential chair in 1865. The other was a Protestant minister, known as Parson Brownlow. Preaching either in a church, or in the open air mounted upon the stump of a tree, and with as fiery a zeal as Johnson displayed in discoursing upon politics, as passionate and intolerant as his adversaries, endowed with indefatigable energy and peculiar strength, which, it is said, he did not hesitate to bring to the support of his logic when his arguments failed to accomplish his object,—he had all the requisites for exercising a powerful influence over the rough mountaineers of the Alleghanies. He was persecuted, imprisoned and driven away.

East Tennessee was occupied by the military, and all the youth of the country carried away by force to fill up the ranks of the Confederate army. Such a violent measure could not fail to create a great deal of dissatisfaction. All refractory persons were mercilessly persecuted, and those who gave them shelter severely punished. They were treated as rebels. The oath of allegiance was imposed by the military authorities upon all the population of that region. This oath was already a subject of discussion when the Federals exacted it in support of a Constitution which had long been established and by universal consent, but this time

it was enforced by those even who had torn the Constitution to pieces in the name of local sovereignty. Indeed, Mr. Davis' government was no longer afraid to contradict its own theories. It caused all the principal inhabitants of East Tennessee suspected of sympathizing with the North to be arrested and conveyed to Tuscaloosa, in Alabama, as prisoners of war. All persons taken with arms in hand, or in whose houses arms were found concealed, experienced the same fate. The refractory portion of the community, feeling exasperated, organized into bands at the end of 1861, and began a counter-revolution in the hope of being able to join the Unionists of Kentucky. Unable to fight in the usual way, they undertook to thwart the operations of the Confederates by destroying the bridges of the important railroad line which traverses that region. They were hunted down like malefactors. The Secretary of War ordered all persons concerned in the destruction of railways to be summarily tried and hanged; he especially recommended, with a view of intimidating their comrades, that their bodies should remain suspended near the bridges they had burnt. These orders were most rigorously executed. They did not succeed, however, in entirely putting down the resistance, which was continued during the remainder of the war.

[The monetary amounts throughout the foregoing chapter have been changed from the francs in which they were expressed in the French edition to dollars, and the figures verified by the authorities as far as was practicable. A few slight errors in terms and figures have been corrected without the formality of a note. The kind assistance in this chapter of Professor R. E. Thompson, of the University of Pennsylvania, is acknowledged with thanks.—ED.]

CHAPTER III.

EMANCIPATION.

IN the preceding chapter we have shown the internal measures adopted by each of the belligerents to sustain the conflict—recruiting, both voluntary and enforced, loans, issues of treasury notes, taxation and restrictions upon personal liberty; we now propose to speak of their external policy. We shall begin with their intercourse with neutrals—a subject we discussed in the first volume down to the peaceful settlement of the *Trent* affair in the early part of 1862. We shall then proceed to treat of the relations that the war itself established between the combatants, of the policy pursued by the Federal government toward the hostile populations of the South, and, above all, of the progress made on the question of slavery during the eighteen months in which the fierce struggle had been raging.

We have shown in the first volume how slavery was the sole cause of the war. It will now be seen how that great word *abolition*, at first spurned in the North, came by degrees to form a part of her programme, and found its true formula in the famous proclamation with which President Lincoln inaugurated the year 1863. In one word, the subject of this chapter may be summed up thus: foreign relations; then exchanges of prisoners, reprisals and requisitions; finally, confiscations, emancipation by indemnity and immediate enfranchisement.

During the first year of the war the foreign powers had, on the one hand, recognized the character of belligerents claimed by the Confederates, and, on the other hand, the blockade of Southern ports established by the Federals. Each of the two parties had energetically protested against the one of these two measures which seemed to favor the other; but the *Trent* affair, by placing before both worlds the prospect of immediate war, had made

Europe extremely cautious in her intercourse with the two antagonistic sections of the American people. Mr. Davis's commissioners, on landing in England, soon perceived that if their imprisonment had come near arming England against the United States, their personal solicitations near European courts would prove useless, and that their liberation was a great misfortune to their cause. Their diplomatic character was never recognized, and they soon occupied themselves exclusively in furnishing resources and material support to their government, by encouraging blockade-runners and negotiating in London, during the first months of 1862, the loan which enabled them to fit out the privateers of which we have spoken in a former chapter.

All the diplomatic questions discussed between the two belligerents and England during this year had their origin in the fitting out of those privateers which the British government was accused of having favored. We have already mentioned the trouble they caused to American commerce. We shall only allude to their names in this place in connection with the incidents of which they were the occasion. The refusal of the English authorities at Gibraltar to allow the *Sumter* to supply herself with the coal she needed to resume her cruise at the end of 1861, had decided Captain Semmes to convert that vessel into a blockade-runner in order to find another ship for himself. This refusal gave rise to sundry fruitless remonstrances addressed by Mr. Mason to the cabinet of St. James. We have related the career of the *Oreto* or *Florida*, which was the first successor of the *Sumter*—her departure from England despite the notification of Mr. Adams, her seizure and release at Nassau; then the first appearance of the *Alabama*, her equipment in the ship-yards of Birkenhead, her armament at Terceira, and the vain protest of the United States legation against these hostile acts. Although American commerce suffered severely by this violation of international law, the Americans could not make it a pretext for declaring war against their maritime rivals, at a juncture when they had so great an interest in concentrating all their forces for the purpose of crushing the Confederates, but the Washington cabinet determined at last to emphasize its protest by formally declaring that it would hold the English government respon-

sible for the consequences of that privateer's escape. England did not understand this reserve, which was dictated by prudence, or perhaps she believed that America would never be in a condition to enforce her demands, of which she then only laid down the principle. She paid dear for this mistake; the world knows how, at the close of the war, the government of the United States sustained the action of its minister, by taking up the question of damages caused by the *Alabama*; how the Senate rejected the first treaty as being too favorable to England, and how, after having paralyzed English policy for several years by threats of war, America imposed the alternative of arbitration upon the British cabinet, which terminated at Geneva by an award against England.

Meanwhile, the Confederate agents, encouraged by the success they had met with in fitting out the *Alabama*, and finding themselves, through the instrumentality of the loan, in possession of large sums of money, undertook to procure the construction of two vessels at Messrs. Lairds' ship-yard of a still more formidable character, being two iron-clads with revolving turrets; these powerful machines of war were to be completed in the year 1863, but the English government, which until then had sinned chiefly through negligence, stimulated by new representations on the part of Mr. Adams, and appreciating at last the obligations imposed upon it as a neutral, determined to prevent their equipment. It will be seen, when our narrative shall have brought us down to 1863, what means it had to employ in order to accomplish this object.

We have no occasion to speak in this place of the intercourse of the belligerents with other European powers, as it presents no phase of special interest. The vessels of war ordered of M. Armand of Bordeaux by the Confederates were not finished until 1863, and the sympathies of the French government for the cause of the South were rendered powerless by the determination of England not to recognize the Confederates as a new power so long as their political existence was in question.

We will, therefore, proceed without any further delay to consider the mutual relations of the belligerents.

Whatever may have been the cause of quarrel which had armed

the two combatants against each other, the usages of war, since these combatants belonged to civilized races, compelled them to be governed by certain laws, fixing the treatment to be accorded to prisoners, to the populations of the country which was the theatre of war, and to private property. Despite their animosity, the Americans of both North and South, so far as regards the manner in which they managed many of these questions, gave examples deserving to be pondered and imitated by European nations.

This part of our inquiry will embrace exchanges, requisitions, reprisals and the confiscation laws.

We have already stated that the Federals, in treating their first military prisoners as enemies and not as culprits, had virtually recognized the belligerent rights of their adversaries from the outset of the struggle. The Confederates, on their part, having in their hands prisoners who had been surrendered by their generals even before the declaration of war, were the first to inaugurate the system of release on parole. The regular troops whose misfortunes in Texas we have mentioned were permitted to return to the North on condition of a personal pledge on the part of every officer and soldier not to bear arms against the Confederates before having been exchanged. The battle of Bull Run and the capitulation of Lexington, in the summer of 1861, having increased the number of Federal prisoners, the government of Washington, without formally entering into the question of exchanges, gladly accepted *de facto* the principle of release on parole. It had already endorsed the stipulations entered into in Texas; it sanctioned the conditions imposed by Price upon the garrison of Lexington by retaining Mulligan's soldiers in camp, where they waited to be exchanged. This humane system, however, soon gave rise to serious abuses. As has been shown in the first volume, Price had kept as prisoners of war all the officers he had found in Lexington, and had only released the soldiers on parole, because he could neither keep them in the place nor take them along with him. If they had refused to take the pledge, he would have been obliged to let them go unconditionally free. The commanders of regiments, detachments or bands on both sides soon arrogated to themselves the right of exacting this pledge, not only from able-bodied prisoners who fell into their

hands, but even from the wounded and the sick whom they could not remove. Sometimes a dozen mounted men might be seen to fall suddenly upon a dépôt, to enter a hospital and compel hundreds of invalids to sign the parole. On the other hand, the certainty of being released as soon as captured, the thought of escaping from danger by surrendering to the enemy, and by means of a simple signature of being sent to some distant camp far from the theatre of war, enervated many soldiers whose courage would otherwise have been stimulated by the prospect of a long and cruel captivity. In the beginning of 1862 the capture of Fort Donelson effected a change in the proportion of prisoners in favor of the North. The fourteen thousand men included in the capitulation were retained by the Federals, who, having abundant means of transportation, desired to send them to the Western States, where their presence might afford evidence that Grant's victory had not been exaggerated. The government of Washington was, moreover, anxious to avail itself of the advantage it then possessed to regulate the conditions of exchanges in a precise manner, so as to obtain the release of all the officers held captives in the South. The Confederates did indeed have a certain number of Federals as hostages at Richmond, many of them of high rank, who were held responsible for the treatment accorded in the North both to pirates and partisans, and sometimes even to conspirators or assassins who under some plea or other claimed to be considered as political prisoners. They refused to dispossess themselves of these hostages by exchanging them for the Donelson prisoners, and shut them up in an old tobacco warehouse, which subsequently became notorious under the name of Libby Prison, where these officers were most cruelly treated. These unnecessary rigors were only a prelude to the atrocities which at a later period disgraced the Confederates when the latter became exasperated by the abolition of slavery.

The system of exchanges and of release on parole having thus been suspended, McClellan's campaign in Virginia greatly increased the number of prisoners on both sides, and this vast number of unserviceable men became a source of great embarrassment to the two governments. On the other hand, the care of the wounded and the various incidents of the war had rendered the

intercourse between the commanders of the two armies under flags of truce very frequent. In these interviews the question of the exchange of prisoners was always made the subject of discussion. Finally, after the great conflicts of which the borders of the Chickahominy were the theatre, the Federal government determined to discard all the scruples which had hitherto prevented it from treating officially with the Confederates, and agreed to appoint a commissioner empowered to conclude a convention or *cartel* of exchange with any representative of the enemy's army designated for that purpose. The Federal general Dix and the Confederate D. H. Hill met at Haxall's Landing, at the headquarters of the army of the Potomac, and signed the cartel of July 22d, which was approved in Washington as well as in Richmond.

This convention, which was prompted by the strongest feelings of humanity, mitigated for some time the horrors of war; but it was unfortunately of short duration, and could not withstand the violence of passion, which was increasing as the struggle continued. We will indicate in a few words the object aimed at by this convention, and the principles it embodied. A list of equivalent grades was first drawn up, representing the value of each grade in the exchanges, from the non-commissioned officer, counting for two privates, to the general, who was estimated as equal to forty-six. Federal or Confederate army ranks being alone recognized, to the exclusion of the local militia, it was agreed that the exchanges should only apply to military men, in order to avoid mixing up political questions with this operation, and to prevent belligerents from appropriating to themselves the money of combatants left on the field of battle in the hands of the enemy; the militia and civic persons could, however, be exchanged for each other. All prisoners taken on either side were to be released on parole within ten days after their capture, and taken to the points specified by the convention for their exchange, at the expense of the power detaining them. These prisoners, having thus been mutually surrendered, were considered as exchanged—that is to say, free from all obligations—excepting those who were found to be in excess of the number possessed by the other party. Each of the two belligerents, in surrendering a certain number of un-

pledged captives, was authorized to release from their promise an equal number of its own soldiers who had been set free on parole. It was stipulated that both parties should keep a double register of the prisoners that each surrendered to the other, as well as of those who were released from their parole, with the understanding that the adversary was always to be furnished with a list of the latter by the party thus receiving back combatants into the ranks of its armies. This double register was a necessary safeguard to prove the violations of parole, if any took place, and to establish by exact figures which of the two parties had a surplus over the other. They mutually pledged each other to continue the system of immediate releases on parole and regular exchanges, according to the table of equivalents, whatever might be the result of the comparison of the two registers, by detaining no soldier belonging to the enemy beyond the time absolutely necessary for his return. It was expressly stipulated that the obligation imposed by the parole should inhibit all manner of military service in the interior, no matter under what denomination, and that the prisoners surrendered on those conditions should not be released from this obligation, until the day when their equivalent was actually delivered into the hands of the enemy, according to the forms agreed upon. Additional articles provided that in the armies the commanders-in-chief should alone have the right of treating directly between themselves relative to exchanges and the release of prisoners on parole. Outside of their sphere, the task of regulating these questions was left to two commissioners or special agents, representing the two belligerents, and the delivery of the men on each side was to take place exclusively at one of the following places, the Aikin farm, on the James River, in Virginia, and the city of Vicksburg, on the Mississippi. It was agreed upon that the exchange should not be interrupted, even if the interpretation of the cartel should give rise to discussions.

The two generals who placed their names at the bottom of the only formal convention concluded between the North and the South in the course of this war relied, as we see, upon their mutual good faith to secure to every prisoner the benefit of an immediate release, and to exchange the sufferings of a long captivity for a ten days' trip, balancing the amount of debit and credit be-

tween the two parties. But at the same time, they restricted the use of paroles, recognizing only those which had been given in due form, and binding the victor not to release his prisoners, until the fact of their *bona fide* capture had been verified by some days' detention. They thus put an end to the abuses we have noticed above. Although their work was to be abruptly brought to a close before the end of the conflict, by the refusal of the South to treat colored soldiers as prisoners of war, it will stand as a useful example to follow, for those who may seek to mitigate the sufferings of future wars.

The cartel of the 22d of July had scarcely been signed when the difficulties contemplated in one of its last clauses began to develop themselves. But these difficulties, arising from the treatment of citizens and partisans more or less regularly enrolled in the service of the Confederacy, occurred, as we have before observed, prior to the conferences held between the two negotiators at Haxall's Landing.

The use of requisitions for supplies in kind is a necessity justified by the custom of war. All armies in the field are obliged to resort to them in order to secure provisions and means of transportation, in a friendly as well as in a hostile country, and the inhabitants who are affected have no right to complain when they receive vouchers signed by officers regularly authorized to issue them in exchange for the articles required. The proffer of these vouchers constitutes the distinction between regular requisitions and plunder. The American armies never exacted war contributions of the towns they occupied; they very seldom plundered; and as they derived nearly all their resources from their *dépôts* situated in the interior, they only resorted to requisitions with extreme moderation. It has even been made a matter of reproach against General McClellan that he carried to excess his protection of private property in the country occupied by his troops. During all his campaigns he watched with particular care over the safety of farms, cattle and lands under cultivation, which lay among his camps or along the roads followed by his soldiers; and the author remembers even to have seen, at the very height of the battle of Frazier's Farm, a sentinel stationed at the foot of a cherry tree loaded with fruit, which the Federal soldiers, thirsty after a long

march, were preparing to demolish. But in Missouri, where the war assumed quite a different character, requisitions on both sides were merely organized depredations. When General Pope, who had begun the war in that State, was summoned to Virginia, he sought to introduce some of the practices he had followed among the combative communities west of the Mississippi. In this, however, he only followed the example of General Milroy, who, since he had exercised a command independent of General McClellan in the valley of Virginia, had sought to repair his errors, and compensate for his reverses, by resorting to every kind of arrogance and violence against the farmers of that rich country. This abuse of the right of requisition having given rise to numerous complaints, the Secretary of War issued an order, dated July 22, 1862, the very day of the signing of the cartel of exchanges, regulating its application. This order directed that in the nine States then considered in rebellion the military authorities should proceed to seize all that was necessary to supply the wants of the war, out of private property, prohibiting at the same time any destruction of property not justified by those wants. It authorized, likewise, the employment of negroes, found upon plantations, for all the work required by the army or navy, by means of proper compensation. It finally directed that all requisitions for slaves or articles of any kind should be made in writing, so as to entitle the owners of such property to indemnity. Nothing could be more equitable, but the seizure of slaves and their employment in labors, for which they themselves received the wages, was looked upon by Southern planters as the first step toward emancipation, and the order of the Federal Secretary was made the subject of a violent protest on the part of Mr. Davis.

The treatment of citizens and partisans who were fighting on their own account gave rise to difficulties of a much more serious character. In a civil war, where certain States found themselves divided between the adherents of the two causes, it was not an easy matter to draw a distinct line separating the assassin from the insurgent and the latter from the belligerent, the conspirator from the citizen armed in defence of his own opinions, and the latter from the regular soldier. In the Northern States any man who should have fired upon a Federal uniform or raised the

standard of secession could only have been treated as an ordinary criminal. More to the south, in Missouri and Kentucky, he would shelter himself behind the name of partisan or militiaman. Farther yet, in Tennessee or in Virginia, he was a regularly recognized enemy. The Federals always treated those who fell into their hands on the field of battle, having a commission from the hostile government, as prisoners of war. Thus, for instance, after the capitulation of Donelson, General Buckner, who had organized the secession troops in Kentucky, having been claimed by the Union authorities of that State for the purpose of being tried on a criminal charge, Mr. Lincoln set aside the demand, and took the first opportunity to exchange him. The Washington government had the same consideration for the partisans who fought openly in uniform and respected the rules of war. But the safety of its own soldiers, and that of the inhabitants who sought the protection of the Federal flag, did not permit crimes committed against all the usages of civilized nations to go unpunished. Lawless men in Missouri took advantage of the state of war to indulge in acts of violence of every description. Some of them were made to suffer capital punishment, justly due to their excesses. The Confederate government protested, assuming to throw the shield of its protection over these wretches. Wherever the Federal armies passed, a certain number of the inhabitants, after professing to be peaceful citizens, would go into ambush in the woods to assassinate stragglers, and even the wounded. Those who were thus taken with arms in hand and without uniform were all shot. This was only justice; and they must have known to what they exposed themselves by playing such a double game. But the Unionists, exasperated by these assassinations, sometimes exceeded all bounds, seeking, as we have too often seen in European wars, to make the inoffensive population responsible for the acts of partisans who were found in their neighborhood. This odious system was especially applied by General Von Steinwehr in Virginia, who made it a practice to seize hostages in every village near which his troops had met with any partisans, threatening to shoot them if the Confederates continued that kind of warfare against him. His chief, General Pope, having committed the grave error of sanctioning such proceedings, the

Richmond government was greatly enraged, and on the 1st of August, 1862, General Lee was instructed to inform his adversaries that if Pope, Von Steinwehr and the officers who followed their directions were captured, they should be detained in view of possible reprisals. Von Steinwehr's orders were neither revoked nor again enforced, the hostages who had been seized by the Federals were promptly released, and the regular exchange of prisoners suffered no delay.

We have stated that private property was generally respected by the armies of both parties. If this was the case on the part of the military, and if the latter did not often abuse the prerogatives of war in this respect, it was far otherwise with the political authorities of the two belligerents. The Congress at Washington, as well as that of Richmond, enacted laws which seriously affected such property. The Federal Congress pleaded, it is true, that the first of these monstrous confiscation laws which disgraced its legislation afforded the only means at that time for aiming an indirect blow at slavery, by striking, through their human property, the enemies of the Constitution, who had taken up arms to protect and extend the servile institution. But it did wrong in not limiting confiscation to this odious description of property, and in violating, to reach that institution, rights which should be considered most sacred by all legislators. We propose now to say a few words concerning these laws, reserving to ourselves the privilege of returning to the subject when we shall have occasion to speak of emancipation and the measures which prepared the way for it in a constitutional point of view.

The first of these laws was passed by the Republican majority in Congress on the 6th of August, 1861. It limited itself to the stipulation that everything employed in aiding and supporting the rebellion in any way whatever should be considered a legitimate object of seizure, and be confiscated by the government of the United States. This clause, which was sufficiently vague to give rise to dangerous interpretations, was evidently applicable to slaves subjected by their masters to services or labors useful to the Confederate armies. In the course of the debate the abolitionists managed to introduce an amendment which defined the meaning of the law, declaring that all slaves thus employed

should by that fact be freed from the authority of their masters, and that the latter should have no further right to reclaim them.

The Confederate Congress decided to reply to the confiscation projects submitted to its rival at Washington, by a law called the sequestration act, and by a strange coincidence it was also passed on the 6th of August. The provisions of this law seemed to have no other object than to indemnify at the expense of Northern proprietors such citizens of the Confederate States as should be made to suffer by the measure we have just described. In reality it also organized a system of confiscation, to be enforced by the most despotic process. It provided that all property, personal or real, belonging to the enemies of the Confederacy should be seized and sold under the direction of the Confederate authorities, the latter to use the proceeds to indemnify citizens of the South for all the damages caused by the Federals. This term *enemies* comprised all the inhabitants of the free States, the slave States that had remained loyal to the Union being considered by the Southern rebels as constituting part, legally, if not *de facto*, of the power which they sought to establish. This law, then, directed the seizure and sale of all property, under whatever form, belonging to citizens of the hostile nation, or even to strangers simply residing on its territory. It would be difficult to imagine a more general confiscation. The law was aggravated by the means resorted to for the purpose of enforcing its execution. All transfer of property from an enemy to a citizen of the Confederacy after the 21st of May, 1861, was declared null, and the object of transfer confiscated. In order to find out everywhere what personal and real estate was subject to confiscation, an extraordinary mode of proceeding was devised, which, despite the danger there was in disputing any orders emanating from Richmond, gave rise to strong opposition, and which, even in the courts of Charleston, was justly designated as a new inquisition. In fact, all the lawyers, the attorneys, the bank-directors, all the agents of corporations or of mercantile houses, exchange brokers, executors or administrators, and generally all persons supposed even by their occupation to have knowledge of the affairs of other people, were obliged to reveal under oath all property attached by the

law, or the names of all persons who, having knowledge of such property, had neglected to reveal the fact. Severe penalties were pronounced against all false declarations. This terrible law was rigorously applied, especially against all native citizens of Southern States who had remained in the North and were serving the Federal cause. On the 30th of September, 1863, the Confederate treasury had realized by the sale of property thus confiscated the sum of \$1,862,650. So violent a measure was well calculated to drive the North to adopt a system of reprisals, and the law of August 6, 1861, was soon declared to be insufficient.

It was replaced by the more severe enactments of July 17, 1862. This new law was not intended, like the previous one, simply to exact some kind of indemnity for the costs of the war from the abettors of the rebellion; for these costs had assumed proportions which would have rendered such a pretext futile. It possessed all the features of a penal law, and began by proclaiming the penalty of death against those who should be guilty of treason; but it was evident that this penalty could not be applied to those who were engaged in a war, the combatants in which were treated like ordinary prisoners of war, and the very coincidence between the date of this law and that on which the convention for the exchanges was concluded forbade such an interpretation. As a simple menace against the principal political personages of the Confederacy, or their accomplices in the North, this clause, fortunately, remained a dead letter. It was the same with the lesser penalties, such as imprisonment for ten years and fines of ten thousand dollars, pronounced against those who had become associated with the rebellion. The refusal to put Mr. Davis himself upon trial at the close of the war—a refusal which was highly creditable to the Federal government—showed at the same time all that is false and worthless in those exceptional laws prompted by the passion of the moment. The forfeiture of political rights pronounced against the same persons was, on the contrary, perfectly legitimate, for it was natural that those who had taken up arms against the Constitution should be excluded from all participation in the affairs of the government; this penalty, therefore, was applied by the North after the victory; the law which decreed this penalty, however, carried its own cor-

rective with it, by conferring upon the President unlimited power in the matter of amnesty—a power of which he was to make ample use to secure the pacification of the South.

The second object of the law of July 17th was the confiscation of the property of all those who had participated in the rebellion. It was an aggravation of the preceding measures, striking at all the officers of the Southern army, all employés or functionaries of the Confederacy, all those in the insurgent States who had received their appointments after the secession of those States, and, finally, all the inhabitants of the loyal States who had in any way aided the enemy. This penalty was unrighteous in principle, and the power to grant amnesty, reserved to the President, only rendered its application the more arbitrary in this case. Fortunately for the honor of the United States, their Constitution contains an article prohibiting the alienation of property from the heirs of a criminal, and in the most trying times the Americans have never hesitated respectfully to comply with the requirements of that Constitution. Consequently, on the very day that this new confiscation law was passed, its authors, at the suggestion of Mr. Lincoln, destroyed to a certain extent its effects, by declaring that the confiscation was not to extend beyond the term of life of those who had incurred its penalty. Notwithstanding this reservation, the law was not the less unjust, for it was susceptible of being so interpreted as to give rise to the most tyrannical acts. This actually happened, and the law seemed all the more harsh because it was but seldom and unequally applied. Among the few examples that might be cited, there is one which deserves particular condemnation; this was the permanent confiscation of the Arlington estate, near Washington, belonging to the family of General Lee, who, in view of his noble conduct at the close of the war, deserved at least to have been allowed to end his days there after the struggle. Among all the Union generals who exercised dictatorial authority in the reconquered countries, Butler was the only one who, during his command at New Orleans, pushed the application of this law to the extremest limits. He took advantage of it to organize an odious system, which might be called speculative socialism, in that portion of Louisiana subject to his control. A large number of planters

had abandoned the Lafourche district, and the adjoining lands situated on the right bank of the Mississippi, leaving their slaves on their plantations. It was necessary to find work for the latter, and to this effect to supply the absence of the masters. This could easily have been done without violence, and without striking at the very principle involved in the right of property in a vast, opulent country. But General Butler was surrounded by men who only looked upon the war as affording the means for enriching themselves. By an order of November 9, 1862, the whole district was placed under the ban of confiscation. At the same time, he appointed a military commission with power to determine, without right of appeal, the merit of all claims to which this measure might give rise, to administer the plantations thus seized, to sell the land or the produce, to fix the wages of negroes, to purchase, to store away and to resell to the resident proprietors what might be deemed necessary for their own consumption or for sowing purposes; the commission, in short, was authorized to grant permission, to such planters as should give sufficient pledges of their loyalty to the Union, to work their own estates by giving them to hope that by such means alone they might merit a revocation of the confiscation. We have only been able to present a brief analysis of this decree, but we have said enough to show what was its object and the consequences likely to follow. It suppressed all rights of property, placing it entirely in the hands of the administration, or rather of a few individuals without control and without honesty, and making the State the only farmer, the only merchant, the only regulator of the market, and sole arbiter of all transactions, and purveyor to each individual on the very land which he held from his parents or by his own exertions. The labor of the negroes was well enough regulated, or at least the confusion engendered by the war in this kind of labor was diminished; but the consequences of a measure so fatal in its principle were not slow in being felt. Scandalous fortunes were realized under this administration, and three weeks later Mr. Lincoln was obliged to recall General Butler in order to put an end to so many abuses. The administration of his successor, General Banks, was more equitable, but he lacked either the power or the ability to repair all the evil done

by his predecessor—evil the effects of which Louisiana still feels to this day, after the lapse of twelve years.

We have concluded that portion of our inquiry, so far as it concerns the epoch under consideration, which has reference to the relations of the belligerents between themselves, except as to a single point, which is, indeed, the most important of all, the enfranchisement of the slaves. The law of July 17th marks a new advance in the legislation of the United States which was to lead to the total abolition of slavery. Before entering upon the subject we must point out the aggregate legislative measures adopted since the beginning of the war in regard to the same matter. It will thus be seen how the Federal government, after having earnestly endeavored to keep clear of this question, was gradually led to a radical solution of it, and turned emancipation into a powerful weapon against its enemies.

In the early chapters of this history we have shown the true cause of the war, which was slavery, the concessions through which the North vainly tried to prevent a rupture of the Union, and the limits which it could not overstep without entirely surrendering the public to the servile institution. We left off at the night of the 2d-3d of March, 1861, when Congress, on the eve of adjournment, rejected the Crittenden compromise, which would have introduced slavery into a large portion of the territories where free labor had hitherto prevailed.

The war put an end to all these vain efforts. But in taking up arms to bring back the Southern States into the bosom of the Union, the Federal government openly proclaimed its intention to respect their constitutional rights. If its triumph had been immediate and thorough, slavery would no doubt have lasted a little while longer. Consequently, the really sagacious politicians among the representatives of the border States saw that the maintenance of the Union could alone prevent the sudden and summary abolition of the servile institution. It was evident to all those who were not blinded by passion or interest that the struggle, if prolonged, would compel the North to display the abolition flag. The very declarations of the Confederate leaders were calculated to bring about such a result, and their withdrawal from the Federal legislative halls, by ensuring a strong majority

to the Republican party, 'afforded the latter an opportunity to secure at last the ascendancy of its political principles. In short, the mere fact of the war being waged on the soil of the Southern States gave rise daily to new difficulties relative to the treatment of slaves, thus bringing the question of emancipation before the public in all its aspects, so as to demonstrate that no human skill could evade the issue.

Before the severance of the Union the fate of the fugitive slaves had been the stumbling-block between the States devoted to free labor and those where slavery prevailed. The former had never pretended to seek out the negro on his master's plantation to tell him, "Thou art free." The latter had not only accepted, but approved, of the suppression of the African slave-trade, because its prohibition favored the internal traffic in slaves; so that this suppression was endorsed by the Montgomery Constitution in order to draw the border States, which exported slaves, into the Confederacy. But the people of the North never could see the owner of human flesh come to seize his property by force on the free soil of their own States without horror; and, on the other hand, Southern planters always considered the exercise of this right as a necessary guarantee to the maintenance of slavery at home. They succeeded in obtaining a recognition of their demands in the Federal statutes, while the fear of seeing the Union in jeopardy had induced the North since 1793 to endorse the principles of this sad legislation. When this first enactment ceased to be considered sufficient, it was followed by the aggravated law of 1850, more especially known by the name of the *Fugitive Slave law*. The Southern planters, who dreaded the excitement which the publicity of any runaway case might cause among their slaves, often complained that the new law was not applied with sufficient severity. Their complaints were not well founded, and the statistics bear evidence of the efficacy of this new law. The annual number of runaway slaves, which in 1850 amounted to one thousand and eleven, was reduced to eight hundred and three in 1860, notwithstanding the increase of the servile population, and the proportion of fugitives was thus reduced from one out of three thousand to one out of five thousand. "These escapes," dryly says the report of Mr. Buchanan's government, "cannot cause a

more sensible depreciation in the total capital represented by the slave population than is experienced by public stocks in consequence of the daily fluctuations of the New York market." Some of the States having refused to comply with the requirements of the Fugitive Slave law, it was enforced by a decree of the supreme court known as the Dred Scott case.

It will be seen that this law was not abrogated, notwithstanding many efforts to that effect, until the second period of the war. It was long preserved as a pledge to the border States that slavery should not be abruptly abolished in their territory. But if no direct blow was aimed at the principle itself, from the outset of the war its application immediately gave rise to serious difficulties. Were the military themselves to interfere for the purpose of restoring slaves to their owners? And in that case was a distinction to be made, first between loyal and rebel owners, then between fugitives, according as they had or had not been engaged in acts of hostility against the Federal armies? This problem, as we shall find, received various solutions in proportion as Congress entered more and more earnestly on the path of abolition.

We have already had something to say about General Butler's device, when he was in command at Fortress Monroe, to reconcile the respect due to the Constitution with the idea of equity, which was opposed to the restoration of a slave flying from a master who was in rebellion against this Constitution. On the 22d of May, 1861, he learned that three negroes had taken refuge in his camps, stating that their owner, Mr. Mallory, a colonel in the enemy's army, wanted to send them to work on some fortifications on the coast. Butler kept them, declaring that he considered them as contraband of war. A flag of truce came to claim them; it was sent back. The rumor of this incident, which spread with astonishing rapidity among the servile population of the neighborhood, soon brought a large number of fugitives on the narrow peninsula lying under the bastions of Fortress Monroe. Whole families were seen to arrive. The adults, whether men or women, could be treated as contrabands, but it was not so with the children; and yet who would have thought of surrendering them and keeping their parents? In reply to requests from Butler for instructions, the Secretary of War decided, in a despatch

dated May 30th, that so long as a State continued in insurrection all fugitives seeking an asylum with the army should be received and protected without any reference to the question of their freedom. Whilst refusing to restore them for the time being, an exact account was to be kept of their cost and earnings, in order to settle that account with their masters in the event of their being restored at a later day.

The question thus stated could not fail to provoke warm discussions on the part of the press and at political meetings in the North. Congress took up the subject soon after the beginning of its session, and on the 9th of July the House of Representatives passed a resolution declaring that in its opinion it was not the duty of soldiers to capture and restore fugitive slaves.

Meanwhile, the number of these fugitives was daily on the increase; they assembled in the towns in the vicinity of the armies, especially in Washington, and crowded the Federal camps. Most of them were so profoundly ignorant that they could only serve the cause of their protectors by manual labor; some, however, were found possessing sufficient intelligence to furnish the Northern generals with valuable information regarding their adversaries. But there were others also who were caught acting, more or less voluntarily, as spies in the interest of the Confederates, and the Union officers justly complained of the obstacles which the concourse of fugitives interposed against the maintenance of order and discipline in the camps. On the 17th of July, General Mansfield, in command at Washington, issued an order forbidding all access to these camps on the part of fugitives, and directing corps commanders not to allow them to accompany the troops under any pretext whatever. Mansfield, an old man as brave as he was strict, like the majority of old army officers, was strongly opposed to the abolition party. The formal execution of this order gave rise to complaints which were all the more pointed because the order was directly at variance with the instructions of the Secretary of War to General Butler. It required the decision of some superior authority definitely to regulate the manner in which fugitive slaves were to be treated by the military, the resolution of the lower house simply implying a wish which had not the force of a law. Congress proceeded at

once to the consideration of this question by passing the confiscation law, which, as we have said, was promulgated on the 6th of August. This law, in assimilating fugitives to contraband of war, declared that no demand for the restoration of slaves who had been in any way employed to the detriment of the Federal armies should be admitted. In this case the fugitive slave law was formally suspended. Congress went farther than either General Butler or the Secretary of War had ventured to go; for so far from making any reservation in behalf of the ultimate rights of the proprietor, it annulled them. The law did not explicitly emancipate the fugitives; it even adhered to the hypocritical circumlocutions which Southern men had introduced into national legislation, and only designated them as persons subject to forced labor, but in declaring that they no longer belonged to their masters it virtually set them free. This measure, although cautiously worded, since it only referred to slaves used in resisting the national authority, was susceptible of being interpreted as implying the enfranchisement of all fugitives coming from the insurgent States and encouraging the flight of many more.

The day after the enactment of this law the Secretary of War hastened to take measures for securing its execution by addressing a letter to General Butler, intended to serve as a rule of conduct to all the commanders of the Federal armies. The object of the war being simply the restoration of the Union, the military, wherever the authority of the Constitution had not been disputed, were to allow the local courts to follow their own course without interfering in any manner. In those States where the Federal government was not recognized, the latter did not deem it expedient to apply the local laws themselves, when such an application might place arms in the hands of its enemies. It was necessary to discriminate between the slaves found at home with their masters and those who came to seek refuge in the Federal armies, and in regard to the latter class of refugees to distinguish those whose owners had not participated in the war from those who had been or might be employed in hostile works. No encouragement was to be given to slaves found at home with their masters to run away. The others were protected by the law

against all claims on the part of their owners. But by what proof, by what kind of inquiry, could this distinction between refugees be made? and if such were possible, how could the army be made to practice it? If two slaves came together to seek the protection of its flag, how could it receive one and surrender the other? It was decided that all fugitives should be protected alike, and that, being registered as laborers on a special roll, they should wait until the end of the war for their owners to come and claim them if they had still the right to do so.

The generals had nothing to do but to conscientiously obey these instructions; they all did so, whatever may have been their political opinions, with the exception of Fremont. In the first volume we spoke of the proclamation of August 31st, in which, disregarding the authority of his chiefs and his duty as a soldier, he decreed among other measures the immediate enfranchisement of all slaves belonging to citizens of Missouri who had shown themselves hostile to the Federal troops. Fremont having refused to modify his proclamation in what related to the treatment of slaves so as to render it conformable to the provisions of the law of August 6th, as requested by Mr. Lincoln, the President, in an order dated September 11th, declared it null.

A month later the government had another opportunity to make known its views upon the same question, and readily availed itself of it to take a new step in the policy it had adopted. The naval expedition to Port Royal, under Commodore Dupont, was getting ready; in landing at the Sea Islands in the midst of an almost exclusively black population, it was to be expected that the slaves, abandoned by their masters, would fall to the care of the Federal authorities. In this anticipation the Secretary of War, on the 19th of October, forwarded special instructions to General Sherman, who was to command the land-forces. After recapitulating the instructions he had given to General Butler, and the principles which had prompted them, he added, as a new matter, that if it should be deemed necessary the refugees might be organized into squads and companies. Although he took care to add that such a measure did not imply the general arming of fugitives, it was evidently intended to open the way for such an event. From the moment that slaves who had fled from owners

in arms against the Union were not to be surrendered to their masters, these slaves would have to be successively cared for, set to work and enrolled. But for the present hardly more was thought of than to feed them and give them something to do. Accustomed to spend their time without any forethought, liberty being to them a synonymous term for idleness, they required the controlling guardianship of the Federal authority. The largest number of refugees was to be found at Fortress Monroe, and General Wool, who commanded this place, was obliged, in the month of November, to publish a series of orders regulating their work and wages, whether in the service of the State or of officers, fixing the price of their clothing, and establishing a fund in their favor, formed by keeping back a portion of their wages. In Missouri, however, General Halleck seemed to make it a point to act in every respect in a manner contrary to his predecessor. The latter had received the slaves and sought to enfranchise them on his own personal authority. Halleck forbade the fugitives to approach his camps under the pretext that they gave information to the enemy, and ordered his troops to drive them off, but this order was never strictly executed, for the soldiers, more logical than their chiefs, were gradually becoming swayed by the abolition sentiment, in proportion as they saw their foes mixing up the cause of slavery with that of the Confederacy. The government, faithfully following the line of policy it had traced out for itself, exacted certain explanations from the commander of the armies of the West, which amounted to a positive disavowal of the orders he had just issued.

Meanwhile, Congress again met on the 1st of December. The Republican majority had received some additional strength since the last session, and could not fail to consider again, although indirectly, the great problem of slavery. The Secretary of War, in his report to Congress, had intended to recommend the emancipation of all the slaves whose masters had been connected with the rebellion, but Mr. Lincoln, more prudent and sagacious than his Secretary, thought that the time for resorting to such a measure had not yet arrived, and only allowed him to allude to the treatment of fugitive slaves. On the 4th of December a discussion arose in the Senate, provoked by the abuses to which the

concourse of these fugitives in Washington had given rise. This city was governed by slave laws, and the local authorities, although mostly appointed by Mr. Lincoln's government, were devoted to the maintenance of the servile institution. Conformably to these laws, every man of color was liable to be seized, imprisoned and given up to any pretended owner who came forward to claim him, if he could not prove his identity as a free man on the evidence of a white citizen. The police of the capital had found a source of shameful profit in the application of these laws. Fugitives seeking the protection of the Federal flag were arrested; and as these unfortunate creatures could find no one to testify in their favor, they were handed over to accomplices, who sold them immediately, dividing the proceeds of such sale with the police. While waiting for this sad fate, the colored men, thus arrested at random, were subjected to the worst kind of treatment. The Senate passed a resolution ordering them to be set at liberty *en masse*. The government hastened to obey this mandate; and, on the very day the resolution was passed, Mr. Seward ordered General McClellan to extend the protection of the military power to all fugitives, notifying the civil authorities that they should no longer be allowed to arrest them.

The discussions provoked by the interference of the military in the treatment of fugitives brought up the whole question of the fugitive slave law, the application of which was so obnoxious to the people of the North. But this law could not be directly attacked without seriously compromising the loyalty of the border States, which, although slave States, had not broken the Federal compact, and whose hostility would have been fatal to the cause of the Union. Consequently, after some fruitless debates upon propositions which were too radical to be adopted at that time, the House of Representatives and the Senate merely instructed, on the 20th and 26th of December, their respective judiciary committees to prepare modifications of the law so as to require the owner of the fugitive slave to produce evidence of his loyalty to the Federal government prior to its being applied. The Senate passed, moreover, a resolution ratifying the decisions of the government, and declaring that it was not the province of the

military to interfere in restoring slaves to their masters. The law upon this point was definitely settled.

Thus ended the year 1861. The force of circumstances had brought up the question of slavery in an indirect form; the following year was to witness its solution. We shall briefly show how, in proportion as the war added fuel to the passions of men, this solution, from which the wisest statesmen still shrank, soon came to absorb the attention of all, appearing to them at last as a necessity.

The victory of Port Royal had delivered a portion of the rich plantations with which the coast of South Carolina is covered into the hands of the Federal authority. Just as the Secretary of War had predicted, this territorial occupation presented the question of the treatment of negroes in a new light. Indeed, if a few slaves left the estates to which they were attached, to find refuge near the Federal fleet, a much larger number were abandoned by their masters on the approach of that fleet, and the Union officers found them quietly settled in their old cabins, near the deserted residence of the proprietor or his agent. The district occupied by the Federals consists of a succession of islands, large and small, adapted to the cultivation of the finest qualities of cotton, whose inhabitants, at least four-fifths of them, were of African descent. The situation of these islands protected them against any offensive return on the part of the enemy, and the Federals thus found themselves at the beginning of the year obliged to regulate, if not to govern, a population of more than eight thousand negroes, scattered over two hundred plantations. They had, moreover, to take care of about three or four thousand fugitives, whose number was daily increasing. They had hoped to derive considerable advantage from the occupation of the Sea Islands in a commercial point of view, and to obtain a sufficient quantity of the cotton which had given them their celebrity, to relieve the distress caused by the scarcity of that article in the markets of America and of Europe. This hope was not to be realized; the trouble caused by the war was too deeply rooted to admit of such a fortunate result. But the efforts made in this district to prepare the slaves for the condition of free laborers were none the less important, and the success was as great as could

have been expected under the circumstances. Agents were despatched by the Secretary of the Treasury to take charge of this new business, and to administer the plantations abandoned by their owners, on which the slaves lingered without control and without means. The rights of the owners were held in reservation, and none of the abuses we have noticed in connection with the administration of General Butler in Louisiana were committed in this district. A large number of well-disposed persons, Protestant clergymen, schoolmasters, and women, volunteered to assist these agents; about one hundred of them offered their services during the first three months of 1862; and although not a few visionaries and fanatics were found among them, their efforts, under the wise direction of Mr. Pierce, the government commissioner, were of great service to the colored people, whom the chances of war had made the wards of the Federal authorities. This population was deeply attached to the land of their birth; the proprietors, therefore, to make them mistrustful of the Unionists, had incessantly represented to them that it was the intention of the latter to transport the slaves to Cuba in order to accomplish their abolition projects. When these proprietors took to flight, the negroes refused to follow them, and remained on the plantations, desisting from all work, without, however, committing any excesses. In many cases the overseers were also slaves, and remained with them. All applications for reorganizing the work on the plantations were addressed to the latter, for most of them, although deprived of their power, had retained their moral authority, over the simple-minded laborers. The first thing to be done was to prevent starvation. In fact, the culture of the Sea Islands was so managed as to produce the quantity of corn, potatoes and pork strictly necessary for the support of laborers, to whom provisions were distributed weekly at the storehouses of the plantation. Nearly all these storehouses had been put under requisition to supply the wants of the fleet and army; the animals had all been carried off or purchased. It soon became necessary to resort to the quartermaster in order to provide for the daily wants of the negroes. The rates of wages and the price of manual labor were things unknown in that promised land of slavery. In order to cover the expenses of the government, a certain price had to be fixed

upon for the daily work of laborers, so as to deduct from these wages the advances made by the State in provisions, clothing, etc. Being thus paid for their labor, they were therefore free. But this idea of liberty was not fully understood except by the more intelligent class of overseers and artisans. The others, in their sad condition, only seemed to dread that they or their families should be sold. With the exile and the heartrendings that would follow as the most cruel consequence, owing to their inexperience and that instinct of caution which is the weapon of the weak, they seemed at first to look upon the Federals only in the light of new masters, whom they only begged to spare them from harsh treatment. When, however, they found that these new masters were strong enough to protect them against the old ones, a taste for freedom soon developed itself. They became assiduous frequenters of schools, where they were taught that alphabet the knowledge of which was formerly the privilege solely of the free man. The very character of the Christian religion is incompatible with slavery; it killed it in ancient times, and will kill it whenever this religion is alike professed by the master and the slave. Consequently, in order to render it inoffensive, it had been debased and deformed in the very little instruction which the enslaved race was permitted to receive. When religion, freed at last from those shameful shackles, came to the slave of yesterday, and told him that his labor belonged to him, that his wife and children were not the property of others, and that there were no duties without rights, however debased he may have been by his former life, he soon began to understand this language, and we shall presently find him on the field of battle rivalling his liberators in courage and devotion.

But before the time had arrived when the Federal armies found useful auxiliaries in the freedmen, the latter were the cause of frequent embarrassments to them. The agents of the government sent into South Carolina were but little acquainted with the country, and still less with the inhabitants of this section of the country, so impenetrable had been until then the barrier erected by slavery, and in perusing the curious reports one would suppose that they were speaking of some region of country yet unexplored by travellers. They naturally desired to extend the

sphere of their operations, and were incessantly soliciting for some new plantation the protection of the army, the troops of which they would eventually have succeeded in rendering completely inactive. On the other hand, both soldiers and officers frequently caused a great deal of disturbance among the agricultural population, and they were finally forbidden to approach the plantations. But this measure soon ceased to be of any great avail, and in the month of June it was deemed expedient to withdraw the supreme control of the freedmen from the Treasury Department, and give it to the War Department, in order to avoid conflicts which might have weakened the military authority.

In proportion as the question of the treatment of slaves in the States hostile to the Union became more difficult and absorbing, the judicious and moderate men of the North entered more seriously into the consideration of the means for directly solving the problem of slavery in the border States. It was, in fact, the loyalty shown by some of these States to the Union, which kept the great mass of the Republican party from resorting to the immediate and complete abolition of slavery, as a powerful instrument of war. But, on the one hand, it was evident that the protection granted to fugitives by the army, that confiscation and the constantly increasing enfranchisements of slaves, and the introduction of free labor on the plantations of the Sea Islands, constituted too serious a blow against the servile institution not to have a rebounding effect upon Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, despite all the provisions of the law which still protected it, and it was no longer to be seriously believed in the month of March, 1862, that, the Union once restored, slavery would be retained as in the past. On the other hand, the secession leaders justly thought that by the maintenance of slavery on the soil of the border States it would only require a few military successes to rally those States to the support of their cause; it was evident that if the South could constitute herself an independent power, all the countries where the servile institution existed would be obliged, out of regard for their own interests, to join her. It was important, therefore, to deprive the Confederacy for ever of all hope of dominating in the centre of the continent, by sundering the ties which might have bound to it the States occupying that

region of country. From that moment it became the duty of loyalty as well as policy to anticipate the crisis with which those States were threatened, by offering them a peaceful and legal solution of the question of slavery through purchase and gradual emancipation. This is what Mr. Lincoln did in his message to Congress of March 6th. He proposed not to interfere with the legislation of States to force emancipation upon them, but to declare that the Federal government would be ready to assist those States financially if they would take the initiative. This proposition was the subject of a resolution passed by the House of Representatives on the 11th of March. But the opposition of the local governments, and of the representatives of the States concerned, rendered fruitless for a time such prudent and considerate overtures of the central power, and Mr. Lincoln, despite all his efforts, was unable to persuade them to co-operate in carrying out his plan.

However, as the formal orders of the government regarding the treatment of slaves who sought refuge near the armies were not always executed, Congress determined to give them a legal sanction; and on the 25th of February and the 13th of March both the Senate and the House of Representatives introduced a new article in the military code, prohibiting officers, at the risk of dismissal, from interfering to restore fugitive slaves to their masters. Notwithstanding the powers with which the government was thus armed, great difficulty was experienced in applying this law in those regiments whose commanders openly professed their sympathies in favor of slavery. We shall have many instances to record of open violations of this law, and at the very gates of Washington; less than a fortnight after Congress had passed the law, slave-owners from Maryland were seen to visit a Federal camp, provided with an order from General Hooker, to take away some slaves whom they suspected to have taken refuge in it. It is true that their presence caused a terrible commotion among the soldiers, and that General Sickles' conduct in driving them away, despite the order of his chief, was approved. In order to secure the execution of the will of Congress, however, even in the city of Washington it required a special order from General Doubleday, commanding the place, on the 6th of April, which reca-

pitulated the several clauses of the law, and forbade officers from admitting to their camps the employés of the civil police engaged in the search of slaves, without a permit signed by himself.

Being obliged to respect the legislative independence of the border States, Congress had been unable, notwithstanding its offers of assistance, to make them adopt the system of gradual emancipation, but it determined to set them the example, by applying this system to the District of Columbia, placed by the Constitution under its immediate jurisdiction. Congress had been invested with absolute authority over this territory by the Constitution to secure its dignity, so that it might not be surrounded by institutions and laws at variance with its policy. It could not, therefore, allow slavery to exist there; on the 16th of April it voted its immediate and general abolition, placing, at the same time, one million of dollars to the credit of a special commission, empowered to grant an indemnity to slave-owners who had not made common cause with the enemy, at the rate of not more than three hundred dollars for each slave. This was the first measure adopted endorsing the abolition principle in a practical and formal manner. In granting compensation to the material interests affected by this measure, the Federal government gave proof of its moderation and sense of equity. It sought to avail itself of this opportunity to try an experiment that Mr. Lincoln had already recommended, and from which he wrongly anticipated great results; the sum of one hundred thousand dollars was appropriated for the purpose of encouraging the emigration of freedmen. Timid men, who, lacking the courage to cut away a difficulty, desired to smother it, had imagined that, abolition being once proclaimed, it would be easy to get rid of the negro race by transplanting it into another country. This was showing great ignorance of the character of that race and the circumstances surrounding it. Its rapid development in the Southern States, despite its condition of servitude, shows that that portion of the new continent, from its climate and entire nature, is particularly favorable to the race. It had been transplanted there by force, but it had taken root and could not be eradicated. African blood, more or less mixed, will ever circulate in the veins of a large portion of the inhabitants

of those countries, whatever their name or social position. It was, moreover, a great mistake to suppose that the freedmen would become parties to this project of emigration, for there is no race on earth more attached to the land of their birth, and it would have required the use of violent means to compel them to expatriate themselves. Some poor wretches, allured by dazzling promises, allowed themselves to be beguiled by speculators who had undertaken to carry out the emigration plan by contract. Being conveyed to a small desert island on the coast of Hayti, called *L'Isle des Vaches*, they suffered cruelly; the contractors were the only gainers by the transaction, and this unfortunate experiment put an end for ever to the plans of emigration and colonization.

The intervention of Congress, however, did not suffice to remove the embarrassments caused to Mr. Lincoln by the conduct of some of his generals, who were always ready to compromise him in some way or other upon the question of slavery. General Hunter, although selected at first to supersede General Fremont in the West, shared the abolition sentiments of his predecessor. Being called to the command of Port Royal, which Sherman had left in the month of April, one of his first acts was to issue a proclamation far exceeding in extravagance that which had drawn Mr. Lincoln's censure upon Fremont. On the 9th of May, without even consulting or notifying the President, he simply announced that slavery was abolished in the three States of Georgia, Florida and South Carolina. The abolition party loudly applauded this proclamation, but it created much uneasiness in the border States; and the Confederate leaders took advantage of this discontent to make an effort to bring them over to their cause. Whatever may have been his opinion in the main, the President could not tolerate such a usurpation of power on the part of a subordinate. Without waiting for explanations, he publicly disavowed the act on the 19th of May, and declared that he could never leave the solution of such questions to an army commander, and that Hunter's proclamation was incompatible with the propositions of purchase he had submitted to the representatives of the nation.

The latter, continuing the work they had commenced by abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, applied their political

principles wherever they did not clash with the provisions of the Constitution. On the 21st of May a law was passed proclaiming the equality of all citizens in that district, without distinction of color, and declaring that they should all be subject to the same laws, the same regulations and the same penalties, and finally opening the school doors to children of African descent. A few days later, Congress officially recognized the republics of Hayti and Liberia, by voting, on the 3d of June, the necessary appropriations for establishing diplomatic relations with them; the statesmen of the South had always opposed this recognition to avoid being obliged to receive negro envoys at Washington. In the course of the same month Congress gave proof of the determination and spirit which animated it, by a decision which was otherwise also of great importance. We have seen that the struggle between slavery and free labor had its principal theatre in the newly-settled Territories, which were under the direct control of the central authority. The introduction of slavery into or its exclusion from these Territories had been the occasion of all the great parliamentary conflicts between the partisans of the two systems; it was always the same question under the different names of Mason and Dixon's line, squatter sovereignty, and, still more recently, the Crittenden compromise. Shortly after the breaking out of hostilities, Congress, not being yet willing to decide it, had constituted the three new Territories of Colorado, Nevada and Dakotah, without explicitly prohibiting slavery in them. But in 1862 the time for concessions had passed, and on the 24th of March the House of Representatives discussed a resolution declaring that the servile institution should henceforth be excluded from the Federal Territories. Such a law was perfectly constitutional, the South having recognized the right of the central power to determine the legislation of the new Territories on the subject of slavery, at a time when she was in hopes of being herself benefited by such recognition. It was not the less the occasion of tempestuous debates, for it raised an impassable barrier around the slave States, and closed the door against every new compromise. This law was finally passed, and the President approved it on the 19th of June. Finally, on the 9th of July, the equality of the blacks with the whites in the District of Columbia was par-

tially established by the admission of the former to testify before the courts on the same conditions as the latter.

Pending the discussion of these laws, public attention was again directed to the treatment of fugitive slaves by some new incidents. The troops under Butler, who occupied the counties adjoining New Orleans, were everywhere surrounded by these fugitives, whose number was much larger in that locality than in any other part of the South, in consequence, no doubt, of the extreme hardships of servile labor in that region. General Williams, who was stationed at Baton Rouge with his brigade, wishing, perhaps, to put an end to some abuses injurious to discipline, or thinking that he would thereby conciliate the good-will of the powerful proprietors in the neighborhood, published an order absolutely prohibiting such fugitives all access to his camps. This order was in open violation of the law of Congress, and Colonel Paine, of the Fourth Wisconsin, refused to execute it. His command was taken from him. Respect for the military authority required it, but equity also demanded that he should not be allowed to suffer for having obeyed the laws of his country, and he was speedily replaced at the head of the regiment.

We have said that in South Carolina the agents of the Treasury Department in charge of the negroes, having been unable to agree with the military authorities, had been recalled. These several agents had been replaced by a superior officer of the staff, General Saxton, who was himself placed under the orders of General Hunter with the rank of a military commander. By this action the government at Washington sustained Hunter in his conflict with the agents of the Treasury Department—a conflict originating in very serious causes, for it affected the question of slavery in its most vital points. We have seen that Mr. Cameron had authorized General Sherman to organize the negroes into squads and companies. The latter had at first only been employed in manual labor, such as the construction of forts, roads and wharves; but Hunter, on taking Sherman's place, saw that he could give a much wider interpretation to the Secretary's instructions. He substituted muskets for the pick-axes used by the detachments of negro laborers organized by his predecessor; and instead of making them dig the earth, he had them taught military exercises.

Nor did he stop here; but wishing to increase the number of these new soldiers, he gathered all the adult negroes residing on the adjoining islands at Hilton Head on the 12th of May, in order to induce them to enter the military service. Such a proposition looked very much like an order to men accustomed from infancy to absolute submission, and many of them left the plantations with regret, believing that they were about to be conveyed to some distant country. The civil agents complained bitterly of the trouble this measure had created among the people entrusted to their charge, and thence sprung the quarrel which Mr. Lincoln cut short by deciding in favor of Hunter. The protection granted to fugitive slaves was the first logical consequence of the war; their enrolment in the Federal armies was the second. As untimely and impolitic as was the proclamation by which Hunter had taken upon himself to free the slaves outside of his jurisdiction, the creation of the first negro regiment was an act skilfully conceived. It was essentially a military act; it raised and ennobled the freedman by entrusting him with arms; its legality was unquestionable from the moment that the President approved of it, for there was no law to prevent him from enlisting colored volunteers. In short, it showed to the Confederates that the Washington government was determined not to allow itself to be any longer paralyzed by the vain hope of reconciliation. The exasperation evinced by the latter proved that the blow had struck home. The partisans of slavery in the North were also naturally excited; and a member from Kentucky succeeded in getting the House of Representatives to adopt a resolution asking explanations of the government relative to the arming of negroes at Hilton Head. The Secretary of War merely stated in reply that he had issued no orders on the subject, and refused to submit his correspondence with General Hunter to the House; three weeks later, however, he communicated to it a despatch, written by the latter, in reply to a resolution of which he had been the subject. Feeling that he was now supported by the approval of the government and the sound good sense of the nation, Hunter openly avowed the measure for which he had been blamed. He pointed out, not without a show of reason, all its advantages, but treated the official communication of the House with an irony which

could only have been tolerated in a country where politicians are accustomed to treat the violent language of their opponents with contempt. He continued quietly to organize battalions of negroes, without concerning himself about the opinions of the representatives. These new troops relieved his soldiers by sharing their labors and service; but notwithstanding the success of this first experiment, considerable time elapsed before the Federal government concluded to follow Hunter in this direction.

We shall quote, without pausing to comment upon it, the vote of Congress on the 7th of July, ratifying the convention on the right of search for the suppression of the slave trade on the coast of Africa, which had been concluded on the 7th of April between the government of Washington and Lord Lyons, the English minister. Southern statesmen, although protectionists in matters concerning slavery, had declined, when they controlled American policy, to take part in an international convention the avowed object of which was to strike at the servile institution.

After the laws we have enumerated had been passed, Mr. Lincoln, feeling that the slave question could not be eluded much longer, determined to make a final appeal to the representatives of the border States in favor of gradual emancipation. On the 12th of July he held a long conference with them, in which he explained his favorite scheme of emigration. Although this chimerical plan was no doubt only put forward with the view of rendering emancipation itself more acceptable, he only succeeded in convincing a small number of his interlocutors. He nevertheless persisted in his determination; and on the following day he sent a message to Congress recommending the passage of a law proffering financial aid to every State that should proclaim the abolition of slavery. The capital represented by the slave population, according to the census of 1860, was to be integrally reimbursed to the government of each State in government bonds bearing six per cent. interest. This proposition, which was general in its character, was addressed to all the slave States, even those forming the Southern Confederacy. If applied only to the States of Kentucky, Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, Missouri and Tennessee, it would have involved an expense of nearly one thou-

sand eight hundred millions, which expense, if all the other States had been included, would have been increased to more than five thousand millions.

No notice was taken of Mr. Lincoln's message for some time ; Congress was then occupied with the question of enfranchisement from another point of view ; it was discussing the second confiscation law, which was passed by the House of Representatives on the 15th of July, by the Senate on the 16th, and promulgated by the President on the 17th. We have already alluded to some of the clauses of this law ; its wording alone, differing essentially from that of the law of August 6, 1861, is sufficient to show the progress of abolition ideas under the influence of one year of war. For the first time slaves are designated without any circumlocution ; they are only called slaves to say that they are free. It is no longer as contraband of war that the legislator refuses to send them back to servitude ; the law grants freedom to all whose masters have in any way been connected with the rebellion. This enfranchisement is as yet only a penal measure adopted against a certain class of slave-owners ; for under the Constitution the principle itself of slavery cannot be attacked without passing through all the forms prescribed for the amendment of the Federal compact, and it protects the servile institution in the border States which have remained faithful to that compact. But this measure is so general in its application that it may be considered as the adoption by the North of the abolition policy. Henceforth the proprietors of slaves who have fled at the approach of the Federal armies will be considered by that fact alone as hostile, and the slaves they have left behind them are to be free. The fugitive slave law will no longer be applied in the free States, unless the person who claims a slave can give evidence of his loyalty to the Union, and the military are again forbidden to take cognizance of such demands. The admission of enfranchised negroes in the army was formally sanctioned, and the President was authorized to enrol them on the only condition of their being treated in every respect like white soldiers. Finally, the Utopian scheme of emigration received some encouragement, not of a very compromising character, however, by the insertion of a clause which allowed the President to take all necessary measures for

conveying the freedmen "to some tropical country," as the law expressed it.

If the arming of a few negroes at Hilton Head had already caused such an intense commotion in the South, one may imagine the effect produced by the law which officially sanctioned their admission into the Federal ranks. The proud planters revolted at the idea of having to fight their former slaves on equal terms and to treat them like regular enemies. It was precisely at this period that the two belligerents signed the cartel of exchanges which was to be subsequently suspended in consequence of this very question concerning the treatment of negro soldiers; but as the Confederate prisons did not as yet contain any of these soldiers, the Richmond authorities, who were greatly interested in the conclusion of this agreement, smothered their wrath.

A strong prejudice still prevailed, even in the North, against men of color—a prejudice which had alone inspired and encouraged the projects of emigration brought forward at the time as a natural consequence of emancipation. It was not thought that these men could ever make good soldiers. Many men would have objected to serve by their side, and several generals were opposed to their being enrolled. Thus, Butler, remembering his former affinity with the slavery party, deprived one of his lieutenants, General Phelps, of his command, because the latter had organized five companies of negroes without having received special orders from the President to that effect. It was, therefore, important that the least possible latitude should be allowed to the interpretation of the new law, called the confiscation law. In communicating the text of this law to several commanders, the Secretary of War, under date of July 22d, gave them precise instructions regarding the obligations imposed upon them by this law, and the manner of fulfilling them. General McClellan hastened on the 9th of August to communicate these instructions to his army by an order which we regret not being able to produce in full, as it sums up the whole question in a clear and dignified manner. It ended with an assurance to fugitive negroes employed by the government in any capacity that they should never be sent back to slavery. Only one point remained now unsettled—

whether at the close of the war their former masters would be entitled to indemnity or not.

Congress had adjourned on the 17th of July, the very day of the passage of the confiscation law, which it left as a *résumé* of its policy during that long and important session. The truce concluded between the Republicans and War Democrats for the common defence of the Constitution did not prevent the question of slavery from being brought to the surface in every form; it was warmly discussed by the press, at all public meetings and in all the State legislatures. Mr. Lincoln was accused by some of compromising the cause of free labor in the vain hope of conciliating the slavery party; according to others, on the contrary, he was sacrificing the Constitution to gratify the opponents of slavery. Despite his cautious language, the President did not conceal on which side lay his convictions; but he did not allow himself to be carried away by his abolition sentiments, and thought only of his special mission, which was to support the Constitution and restore the Union. He did not think he had a right to compromise that restoration either by premature abolition or by an excess of deference to the servile institution. Like a skilful pilot with his hand at the helm, he watched the direction of the strong wind which impelled the vessel entrusted to his care onward, ready to alter his course as soon as that wind should shift to some other point.

The day came when he resolved upon the course to pursue, courageously took upon himself the responsibility of the act, and executed it with determination. We think that he chose the opportune moment; it was the day following the victory of Antietam, and this great decision was like a response to the invasion of the States that had remained loyal to the Union by the Confederate army. Had he taken this step sooner, he would have failed in his duties to the Constitution; if he had delayed longer, he would have exposed himself to the charge of having neglected a powerful means of bringing the war to a close. On the 22d of September, America learned that the President had proclaimed the complete abolition of slavery in all the States in rebellion against the Union. He had only confided this final determination to Mr. Seward, the true statesman of his cabinet, and when the journals

of Washington published the proclamation signed by the one and countersigned by the other, the newspaper controversy which had just been revived after the great excitement caused by the invasion of Maryland was for a moment suspended, just as the murmurs of a crowd are hushed when a clap of thunder suddenly bursts over their heads.

Declaring that the object of the war, as in the past, was the re-establishment of the Constitution, that the offers of compensation he had submitted to Congress in favor of the States who should abolish slavery would be maintained and renewed, recapitulating the provisions of the law of March 13th, which prohibited the military from interfering in the search for fugitive negroes, and that of July 17th, proclaiming the enfranchisement of all slaves whose masters were in rebellion against the Constitution,—Mr. Lincoln announced that the Federal government should regard the servile institution as abolished in all the States, Territories or counties which should not have come back into the Union by the 1st of January, 1863.

A shout of joy from the abolition party hailed this plain and categorical declaration; nothing more was wanted to exasperate the Democratic party, especially in the border States. Many persons both wise and enlightened felt aggrieved at this proclamation, calculated to produce discord; they could not understand that its object was to maintain, as the President was bound to do, the constitutional rights of the States loyal to the Union, and that it merely endorsed the fact, which was daily becoming more palpable, that the Federal government could no longer protect slavery in those States which for the last eighteen months had been in open rebellion against its authority. The masses throughout the country, although more and more hostile to slavery in principle, received the proclamation with a certain degree of astonishment, and Mr. Lincoln, without having anything to regret, was obliged to acknowledge that in this instance he had forestalled public opinion.

The Democratic party felt this, and determined to take advantage of it. This party numbered many sincere patriots, who had sacrificed all their political alliances to sustain the legal authority of the President elected by their opponents, but who,

nevertheless, firmly believed in the necessity of maintaining and protecting slavery. They continued to support the Federal government in the struggle it had undertaken against the South, but resolved to thwart its policy by trying to regain a majority in Congress, which was to be partially renewed before its next meeting. Their plan of action was perfectly defined in the order issued by General McClellan on the 7th of October, which we have quoted elsewhere, wherein, after reminding his soldiers of their duty to obey without questioning the orders of the President, who was their government superior, he added that it was in their power to rectify the errors of the government by their ballots at the next election.

These elections proved, in fact, favorable to Democratic candidates, and of one hundred and twenty-four representatives elected in the early part of November, sixty-seven belonged to this party; the government thus lost fifty-one votes, and instead of a majority of forty-one, it found itself in a minority of ten. This result, without changing its policy, compelled it to be more conciliatory toward the party which had just achieved such a success than it had been in the past.

Congress assembled on the 1st of December. The subject of emancipation occupied an important space in the President's message. He treated the question in a simple and dignified manner, with a moderation and logical force which showed that his strong and upright mind was gathering strength amid the extraordinary difficulties of the situation. After clearly demonstrating that the division of the republic into several nationalities was a thing impossible, that the same Constitution must govern all its parts and represent their common interest as in the past, he asserted that unless the supremacy of slavery was recognized, it was necessary to fix a term for the existence of that institution. It was the cause of the war; by condemning it in a definite manner, this fatal struggle would be speedily ended, and no sacrifice should be considered too great to secure that object. No change was to be introduced in the measures adopted to put down slavery in the States which persisted in their rebellion against the national authority. The confiscation laws should continue to be enforced. The proclamation of September 22d, which was to go into opera-

tion on the 1st of January, 1863, was communicated to Congress simply by way of information, and not submitted to its sanction, the President having acted in the plenitude of the powers which had been conferred upon him. But Congress in its turn had to decide graver questions yet. The moment had arrived for grappling with the very principle of slavery and solving the question by a modification of the Federal compact. Resuming his project of emancipating the slaves by compensating the owners who had remained loyal to the Federal laws, Mr. Lincoln proposed a constitutional amendment to Congress guaranteeing an indemnity to all the States who should proclaim the emancipation of slaves, either immediate or gradual, provided it should be accomplished before the close of the present century. All the slaves emancipated by the chances of war should be declared definitely free, but those owners who had taken no part in the rebellion should be entitled to compensation. Finally, while acknowledging the want of success that had attended the emigration plans, and condemning the prejudices against the colored race which had generally inspired them, he asked Congress to encourage them if they were deemed practicable.

This was the sum total of the propositions contained in the proclamation of September 22d characterizing the policy to be followed by the government in the future. In those States which, being at war against the Constitution, could no longer invoke its protection in behalf of their particular laws, he disposed of the question in a radical way by no longer recognizing the servile institution. Where this institution had still a legal existence, he proposed to abolish it gradually by observing all the prescribed forms—that is to say, by a two-thirds vote of each House of Congress and the sanction of the State legislatures in three-fourths of the States. In order to accomplish this object, he recommended the adoption of a compromise, which, not being entirely satisfactory either to the partisans of absolute and immediate abolition or those who favored the pure and simple maintenance of slavery, might serve as a common ground for all the supporters of the Union to rally upon.

The problem of slavery was at last placed before the nation by its first magistrate in a truly statesmanlike manner, without pas-

sion and without illusion. But however wise this proposition may have been, it was to meet with too much opposition from both parties to admit of its being adopted as a whole. Those who should have been most eager to accept it, if they had understood their own interests, were the first to reject it. They thus allowed the opportunity to pass of facilitating the transition from slave to free labor; and when, two years later, the constitutional amendment was passed as the consequence of Northern victories, it determined the final abolition of slavery under a much more radical form.

The President's proposition required to be maturely considered by both houses. Before confronting such an ordeal, it was necessary that it should be discussed by the press and thoroughly sustained by public opinion. Whilst this great debate was pending, both parties, whose forces were now more equally balanced in Congress, began contending about the text of the proclamation of September 22d. The Democrats attacked it as unconstitutional in the House of Representatives, where their strength was greater than in the Senate. But the government came off victorious, having obtained on the 15th of December a majority of seventeen votes upon this question. Nothing was left for the President to do but to enforce the measures he had announced on the 22d of September. On the 1st of January, 1863, he affixed his signature to another and final proclamation, declaring slavery abolished in the States then at war against the Constitution. The list of these States comprised Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, the two Carolinas, and, finally, Louisiana and Virginia, with the exception of those districts which were under the Federal authority. The proclamation naturally did not extend to the States of Maryland and Delaware, which had never participated in the rebellion; nor to Kentucky or Missouri, which, although rent by civil war, had not voted for secession; nor even to Tennessee, which within the last year had legally returned to the fold of the Union.

This proclamation, sufficient to render the name of its author illustrious, marked the beginning of a year which was to witness still more sanguinary scenes than the year 1862. It also inaugurated a new epoch, and the conflict, freed from the remem-

brance of past concessions, assumed henceforth its real character. It could only be ended by the entire abolition of slavery upon the soil of the reconstituted republic, or by the triumph of this institution over the largest portion of the American continent under the protection of the Confederacy, aggrandized and all-powerful. At the period where we left off the recital of military events after the terrible defeat of the Federals at Fredericksburg, their serious disaster before Vicksburg and their fruitless victory of Murfreesborough, the most sanguine optimists of the North were beginning to doubt the success of their cause.

APPENDIX TO VOL. II.

NOTES.

NOTE A, PAGE 71.

SINCE the foregoing pages were printed we have received additional information which compels us to correct a statement relative to General Keyes. He did not arrive on the field of battle at Fair Oaks with Peck's brigade, as we had believed. He was on the ground almost from the commencement of the battle, and some time before the moment when he directed this brigade what position it should take.

NOTE B, PAGE 148.

Reports of the Federal and Confederate armies, to explain the first book.

I.—REPORT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

ON THE 1ST OF APRIL, 1862.

N. B. The troops marked thus (*) did not form part of those which landed at Fortress Monroe.

Those marked thus (†) joined McClellan after he had landed.

The brigades where dots (.....) are substituted for the name of the commander were without regular commanders, and under the orders of the senior colonel.

Commander-in-chief, MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

Chief of Staff, Brigadier-general Marcy.

Adjutant-general, Brigadier-general S. Williams.

Chief of Cavalry, Brigadier-general Stoneman.

Inspector-general, Colonel Sackett.

Chief of Engineers, Brigadier-general Barnard.

Chief of Topographical Engineers, Brigadier-general Humphreys.

Surgeon-in-chief, Doctor Tripler.

Quartermaster-general, Brigadier-general Van Vliet.
Chief Commissary of Subsistence, Colonel Clarke.
Chief of Ordnance, Colonel Kingsbury.
Provost Marshal-general, Brigadier-general Andrew Porter.
Judge Advocate, Colonel Gantt.
Chief of the Signal Corps, Major Myer.
Chief of Telegraphy, Major Eckert.
Division of Reserve Cavalry, Brigadier-general P. St. George Cooke.
 1st *Brigade*, Brigadier-general Emory.
 2d " Brigadier-general Blake.
Artillery Reserve, Colonel Hunt.
 14 Regular batteries, 80 guns.
 4 Volunteer batteries, 20 guns.
Brigade of Engineers, Brigadier-general Woodbury.
 2 Volunteer regiments.
 3 Companies of regulars.
Siege park batteries, Colonel Tyler.
 1 Regiment.
Infantry Reserve, Brigadier-general Sykes.
 8 Battalions of regulars, 1 regiment.

1st CORPS, * Major-general McDowell.

Brigade of cavalry, 4 regiments.
 Sharpshooters, 1 regiment.
 † 1st *Division*, Brigadier-general Franklin.
 Artillery, 1 Regular battery, 6 guns.
 " 3 Volunteer batteries, 16 guns.
 1st *Brigade*, Brigadier-general Kearny, 4 regiments.
 2d " Brigadier-general Slocum, 4 regiments.
 3d " Brigadier-general Newton, 4 regiments.
 † 2d *Division*, Brigadier-general McCall.
 * (Pennsylvania Reserves.)
 Artillery. 1 Regular battery, 6 guns.
 " 3 Volunteer batteries, 16 guns.
 1st *Brigade*, Brigadier-general Reynolds, 4 regiments.
 2d " Brigadier-general Meade, 4 regiments.
 3d " Brigadier-general Ord, 4 regiments.
 1 Independent regiment.
 3d *Division*, Brigadier-general King.
 Artillery. 1 Regular battery, 6 guns.
 " 3 Volunteer batteries, 18 guns.

1st Brigade,, 4 regiments.

2d " Brigadier-general Patrick, 4 regiments.

3d " Brigadier-general Augur, 4 regiments.

2d CORPS, Brigadier-general Sumner.

Cavalry. Colonel Farnsworth, 1 regiment.

1st *Division*, Brigadier-general Richardson.

Artillery. 1 Regular battery, 6 guns.

" 3 Volunteer batteries, 18 guns.

1st Brigade, Brigadier-general Howard, 4 regiments.

2d " Brigadier-general Meagher, 3 regiments.

3d " Brigadier-general French, 4 regiments.

2d *Division*, Brigadier-general Sedgwick.

Artillery. 1 Regular battery, 6 guns.

" 3 Volunteer batteries, 18 guns.

1st Brigade, Brigadier-general Gorman, 4 regiments.

2d " Brigadier-general Burns, 4 regiments.

3d " Brigadier-general Dana, 4 regiments.

3d *Division*, Brigadier-general Blenker.

Artillery. 3 Volunteer batteries, 18 guns.

1st Brigade, Brigadier-general Stahel, 4 regiments.

2d " Brigadier-general Von Steinwehr, 4 regiments.

3d " Colonel Schimmelpfennig, 4 regiments.

3d CORPS, Brigadier-general Heintzelman.

Cavalry. Colonel Averill, 1 regiment.

1st *Division*, Brigadier-general F. Porter.

Artillery. 1 Regular battery, 6 guns.

" 3 Volunteer batteries, 18 guns.

1st Brigade, Brigadier-general Martindale, 5 regiments.

2d " Brigadier-general Morrell, 4 regiments.

3d " Brigadier-general Butterfield, 5 regiments.

Independent sharpshooters, 1 regiment.

2d *Division*, Brigadier-general Hooker.

Artillery. 1 Regular battery, 6 guns.

" 3 Volunteer batteries, 16 guns.

1st Brigade (*Excelsior*), Brigadier-general Sickles, 5 regiments.

2d " Brigadier-general Naglee, 4 regiments.

3d " Colonel Starr, 4 regiments.

3d *Division*, Brigadier-general Hamilton.

Artillery. 1 Regular battery, 6 guns.

Artillery. 2 Volunteer batteries, 12 guns.

1st Brigade, Brigadier-general Jameson, 4 regiments.

2d " Brigadier-general Birney, 4 regiments.

3d " Brigadier-general Berry, 4 regiments.

4th CORPS, Brigadier-general Keyes.

1st *Division*, Brigadier-general Couch.

Artillery. 4 Regular batteries, 18 guns.

1st Brigade, Brigadier-general Graham, 5 regiments.

2d " Brigadier-general Peck, 5 regiments.

3d ", 4 regiments.

2d *Division*, Brigadier-general W. F. Smith.

Artillery. 1 Regular battery, 6 guns.

" 3 Volunteer batteries, 16 guns.

1st Brigade, Brigadier-general Hancock, 4 regiments.

2d " Brigadier-general Brooks, 5 regiments.

3d " Brigadier-general Davidson, 4 regiments.

3d *Division*, Brigadier-general Casey.

Artillery. 4 Volunteer batteries, 22 guns.

1st Brigade, Brigadier-general Keim, 4 regiments.

2d " Brigadier-general Palmer, 5 regiments.

3d ", 5 regiments.

* 5th CORPS, Major-general Banks.

Cavalry division, 8 regiments.

1 Regiment of Independent infantry.

1st *Division*, Brigadier-general Williams.

Artillery. 1 Regular battery, 6 guns.

" 6 Volunteer batteries, 32 guns.

1st Brigade, Brigadier-general Abercrombie, 4 regiments.

2d ", 4 regiments.

3d ", 6 regiments.

2d *Division*, Brigadier-general Shields.

Artillery. 1 Regular battery, 6 guns.

" 4 Volunteer batteries, 21 guns.

1st Brigade,, 6 regiments.

2d ", 5 regiments.

3d ", 6 regiments.

* Garrison of Washington, Brigadier-general Wadsworth.

Infantry, 23 regiments.

Artillery in position, 7 regiments.

Cavalry, 2 regiments.

Dépôt of cavalry, 4 regiments.

* Garrison of Baltimore, Major-general Dix.

Infantry, 13 regiments.

Cavalry, 2 regiments.

Artillery, 1 Regular battery.

“ 4 Regular batteries.

“ Provost-guard.

Regular cavalry, 1 regiment.

Regular infantry, 2 battalions.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

Cavalry, 3 squadrons.

Infantry, 1 company.

II.—REPORT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC ON THE 27TH OF JUNE, 1862.

2d CORPS, Sumner; 17,581 men strong.

1st *Division*, Richardson. 1st Brigade, Caldwell; 2d Brigade, Meagher; 3d Brigade, French.

2d *Division*, Sedgwick. 1st Brigade, Gorman; 2d Brigade, Burns; 3d Brigade, Abercrombie.

3d CORPS, Heintzelman; 18,810 men strong.

1st *Division*, Hooker. 1st Brigade, Sickles; 2d Brigade, Grover; 3d Brigade, Starr.

2d *Division*, Kearny. 1st Brigade,; 2d Brigade, Birney; 3d Brigade, Berry.

4th CORPS, Keyes, 14,610 men strong.

1st *Division*, Couch. 1st Brigade, Graham; 2d Brigade,; 3d Brigade, Howe.

2d *Division*, Peck. 1st Brigade, Keim; 2d Brigade, Palmer; 3d Brigade, Naglee.

5th CORPS, Franklin; 19,405 men strong.

1st *Division*, Slocum. 1st Brigade, Newton; 2d Brigade, Taylor; 3d Brigade, Bartlett.

2d *Division*, Smith. 1st Brigade, Hancock; 2d Brigade, Brooks; 3d Brigade, Davidson.

6th CORPS, F. Porter; 19,960 men strong.

1st *Division*, Morrell. 1st Brigade, Martindale; 2d Brigade, Griffin; 3d Brigade, Butterfield.

2d *Division*, Sykes. 1st Brigade (regular), Major Russell; 2d Brigade, Warren.

Independent *Division*, McCall; 9514 men.

(Pennsylvania Reserves.)

1st Brigade, Reynolds; 2d Brigade, Meade; 3d Brigade, Seymour.

III. REPORT OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY AT WILLIAMSBURG AND FAIR OAKS.

We are not in possession of official documents to prepare full statements of the reports prior to the 26th of June, 1862, and can only give the following outline.

On the 4th of May the army under Johnston at Yorktown, numbering about 55,000 men, was divided into four divisions:

1st, Magruder; 4 brigades, under D. R. Jones.

2d, G. Smith; 8 brigades, under Wilcox, A. P. Hill, Pickett, Colston, Hampton, Hood, Hatton and Whiting.

3d, D. H. Hill; 4 brigades, under Early, Rhodes, Garland and Rains.

4th, Longstreet; 4 or 5 brigades, under McLaws, Kershaw, Semmes and R. H. Anderson.

On the 30th of May the army under Johnston at Richmond, about 70,000 strong, was divided into six divisions:

1st, Magruder; 6 brigades.

2d, Smith; 7 brigades, under Wilcox and Colston, Hampton, Hood, Hatton and Whiting.

3d, D. H. Hill; 4 brigades, under Early, Rhodes, Garland and Rains.

4th, Longstreet; 4 brigades, under McLaws, Kershaw, Semmes and R. H. Anderson.

5th, A. P. Hill; 2 or 3 brigades, under G. B. Anderson and Branch.

6th, Huger; 3 brigades, under Pryor, Mahone and Pickett.

Holmes' division, comprising the three brigades under Ripley, Lawton and Drayton, numbering 15,000 men, rejoined the army on the 2d of June.

From the month of June, General Lee's reports enable us to give the most exact particulars.

IV. REPORT OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
ON THE 26TH OF JUNE, 1862.

Commander-in-chief, R. E. LEE.

1st CORPS, Longstreet.

1st *Division*, Longstreet. 1st Brigade, Kemper; 2d Brigade, R. H. Anderson; 3d Brigade, Pickett; 4th Brigade, Wilcox; 5th Brigade, Pryor.

2d *Division*, A. P. Hill. 1st Brigade, J. R. Anderson; 2d Brigade, M. Gregg; 3d Brigade, Archer; 4th Brigade, Field; 5th Brigade, Branch; 6th Brigade, Pender.

2d CORPS, Jackson.

1st *Division*, Jackson. 1st Brigade (Stonewall), Winder; 2d Brigade, Cunningham; 3d Brigade, Fulkerstone; 4th Brigade, Lawton.

2d *Division*, Ewell. 1st Brigade, Elzey (afterward Early); 2d Brigade, Trimble; 3d Brigade, Seymour.

3d *Division*, Whiting. 1st Brigade, Hood; 2d Brigade, Laws.

4th *Division*, D. H. Hill. 1st Brigade, Rhodes; 2d Brigade, Colquitt; 3d Brigade, Garland; 4th Brigade, G. B. Anderson; 5th Brigade, Ripley.

3d CORPS, Magruder.

1st *Division*, Magruder. 1st Brigade, Howell Cobb; 2d Brigade, Griffith.

2d *Division*, D. R. Jones. 1st Brigade, Toombs; 2d Brigade, G. T. Anderson.

3d *Division*, McLaws. 1st Brigade, Kershaw; 2d Brigade, Semmes.

Huger's *Division*. 1st Brigade, Armistead; 2d Brigade, Ransom; 3d Brigade, Mahone; 4th Brigade, Wright.

Holmes's *Division*. 1st Brigade, Wise; 2d Brigade, Daniel; 3d Brigade, Walker.

Cavalry *Division*, Stuart; 9 regiments.

Reserve Artillery, Pendleton.

The exact strength of this army has never been officially stated, but it is easy to form a calculation. It comprised thirty-seven active brigades, averaging five regiments each. Allowing only four hundred and fifty men to every regiment—that is to say, less than one half of the normal force—we get at the figure of two thousand two hundred and fifty men as the strength of each brigade, making the total number of Confederate infantry eighty-three thousand two hundred and fifty men. The nine regiments of Stuart's cavalry could not count

less than four thousand five hundred sabres, nor Pendleton's reserve less than one thousand five hundred artillerists, while the various staffs, escorts and detachments mustered between four and five thousand, making a total of about ninety-four thousand men. We also obtain this figure through another calculation. In the month of July, a few days after the battles of Gaines' Mill, Glendale and Malvern, the army reports exhibited a total of sixty-nine thousand five hundred and fifty-four men present in the field. By adding the twenty thousand lost in killed, wounded and prisoners in those battles to the first figure, and five thousand crippled or sick incapacitated for active service after a week of forced marches, we still find the figure of ninety-four thousand men as the actual effective force of the Confederate army on the 26th of June.

According to detailed accounts, the following are the losses of this army by divisions from the 26th of June to the 1st of July :

Longstreet, 4429 ; A. P. Hill, 3870 ; Ewell, 987 ; Whiting, 1081 ; D. H. Hill, 3955 ; Magruder, about 1000 ; Jones, 832 ; McLaws, 300 ; Huger, 1612 ; Artillery, 44. Total, 18,961, of which number the prisoners amounted to scarcely 900. The losses of Stuart's and Jackson's divisions are not given in this estimate. As the latter had been very much engaged, the aggregate amount of these losses may be estimated at 20,000 men.

NOTE C, PAGE 251.

Reports of the Federal and Confederate Armies, to explain the third book.

I. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ARMIES IN VIRGINIA

ON THE 15TH OF AUGUST, 1862.

Army of the Potomac—MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN.

2d CORPS, Sumner.

1st *Division*, Richardson. 1st Brigade, Caldwell ; 2d Brigade, Meagher ; 3d Brigade, French.

2d *Division*, Sedgwick. 1st Brigade, ; 2d Brigade, Burns ; 3d Brigade, Abercrombie.

3d CORPS, Heintzelman.

1st *Division*, Hooker. 1st Brigade, Sickles ; 2d Brigade, Grover ; 3d Brigade, Carr.

2d *Division*, Kearny. 1st Brigade, Robertson ; 2d Brigade, Birney ; 3d Brigade, Berry.

4th CORPS, Keyes.

1st *Division*, Couch. 1st Brigade,; 2d Brigade,; 3d Brigade, Howe.

2d *Division*, Peck. 1st Brigade,; 2d Brigade, Palmer; 3d Brigade, Naglee.

5th CORPS, Franklin.

1st *Division*, Slocum. 1st Brigade, Newton; 2d Brigade, Taylor; 3d Brigade, Bartlett.

2d *Division*, Smith. 1st Brigade, Hancock; 2d Brigade, Brooks; 3d Brigade, Davidson.

6th CORPS, F. Porter.

1st *Division*, Morrell. 1st Brigade, Martindale; 2d Brigade, Butterfield; 3d Brigade, Griffin.

2d *Division*, Sykes. 1st Brigade, Warren; 2d Brigade (regular), Buchanan.

Independent *Division*, Reynolds.

(Pennsylvania Reserves.)

1st Brigade,; 2d Brigade, Meade; 3d Brigade, Seymour.

Cavalry *Division*, Stoneman. 1st Brigade, Averill; 2d Brigade, Pleasonton.

*Army of Virginia,** MAJOR-GENERAL POPE.

1st CORPS, Sigel (formerly the army of the mountain).

1st *Division*, Schenck. 1st Brigade, McLean; 2d Brigade, Stahel.

2d *Division*, Von Steinwehr. 1st Brigade, Bohlen.

* The following is the official estimate of Pope's forces on the 31st of July; but in giving it the general-in-chief remarks that the figures are exaggerated, especially as regards Banks' corps, which did not in fact number more than 8000 combatants:

	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Total.
1st corps..	10,550	943	1730	13,228
2d corps.....	13,343	1224	4104	18,671
3d corps.....	17,604	971	2904	21,479
Total.....	41,497	3143	8738	53,378

To be deducted, a brigade of infantry at Winchester.....	2500	} 6,500
“ “ one regiment and a battery at Front Royal	1000	
“ “ cavalry out of service.....	3000	

Total..... 46,878

The three corps composing this army before the arrival of the Ninth are here distinguished by the particular number assigned to them by General Pope. As soon as they were mustered back into the army of the Potomac they resumed their former enumeration. McDowell's corps became once more the First, Banks' the Fifth and Sigel's the Eleventh.

3d *Division*, Schurz. 1st Brigade, Krysanowsky ; 2d Brigade, Schimmelpfennig ; Milroy's Brigade.

2d CORPS, Banks.

1st *Division*, Williams. 1st Brigade, Crawford ; 2d Brigade, Gordon ; 3d Brigade, Gorman.

2d *Division*, Augur. 1st Brigade, Prince ; 2d Brigade, Geary ; 3d Brigade, Green.

3d CORPS, McDowell.

1st *Division*, Ricketts. 1st Brigade, Tower ; 2d Brigade, Hartsuff ; 3d Brigade, Carroll ; 4th Brigade, Duryea.

2d *Division*, King. 1st Brigade, Patrick ; 2d Brigade, Doubleday ; 3d Brigade, Gibbon ; 4th Brigade, Hatch.

3d *Division*, Sturgis. 1st Brigade, Piatt ; 2d Brigade,

9th INDEPENDENT CORPS, Burnside.

1st *Division*, Reno. 1st Brigade, ; 2d Brigade,

2d *Division*, Stevens. 1st Brigade, ; 2d Brigade,

3d *Division*, Parke. 1st Brigade, ; 2d Brigade,

Cavalry *Division*, Cox. 1st Brigade, Bayard ; 2d Brigade, Buford.

II. REPORT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC * ON THE 15TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1862.

Commander-in-chief, MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN.

RIGHT WING, Burnside.

1st CORPS, Hooker ; 14,850 men strong.

1st *Division*, Meade. 1st Brigade, Seymour ; 2d Brigade, Gallagher ; 3d Brigade, Magilton.

2d *Division*, Ricketts. 1st Brigade, Hartsuff ; 2d Brigade, Christian ; 3d Brigade, Duryea.

3d *Division*, Doubleday. 1st Brigade, Patrick ; 2d Brigade, Gibbon ; 3d Brigade, Phelps.

9th CORPS, Reno (afterward Cox) ; 13,819 men strong.

1st *Division*, Cox. 1st Brigade, Crook ; 2d Brigade, Brooks ; 3d Brigade, Scammon.

2d *Division*, Wilcox. 1st Brigade, ; 2d Brigade,

3d *Division*, Sturgis. 1st Brigade, Ferrero ; 2d Brigade,

* The garrison at Washington is not comprised in this exhibit.

4th *Division*, Rodman. 1st Brigade, Harland; 2d Brigade, Fairchild.

CENTRE, Sumner.

2d CORPS, Sumner; 18,813 men strong.

1st *Division*, Richardson. 1st Brigade, Caldwell; 2d Brigade, Meagher.

2d *Division*, Sedgwick. 1st Brigade, Gorman; 2d Brigade, Dana; 3d Brigade, Howard.

3d *Division*, French. 1st Brigade, Max Weber; 2d Brigade, Kimball; 3d Brigade, Dwight Morris.

2d CORPS, Mansfield; 10,126 men strong.

1st *Division*, Williams. 1st Brigade, Crawford; 2d Brigade, Gordon.

3d *Division*, Green. 1st Brigade, Goodwich; 2d Brigade,

LEFT WING, Franklin.

6th CORPS, Franklin; 12,300 men strong.

1st *Division*, Slocum. 1st Brigade, Newton; 2d Brigade, Torbert; 3d Brigade, Bartlett.

2d *Division*, Smith. 1st Brigade, Hancock; 2d Brigade, Brooks; 3d Brigade, Irwin.

Independent *Division*, Couch. 1st Brigade,; 2d Brigade,

7th INDEPENDENT CORPS, Porter; 12,030 men strong.

1st *Division*, Morrell. 1st Brigade, Martindale; 2d Brigade, Griffin; 3d Brigade, Butterfield.

2d *Division*, Sykes. 1st Brigade (regular), Captain Dyer; 2d Brigade, Warren.

Humphrey's *Division* (joined the army September 18th). 1st Brigade,; 2d Brigade,

Cavalry *Division*, Pleasonton; 4320 men. 1st Brigade, 2d Brigade,

III. REPORT OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

ON THE 15TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1862.

Commander-in-chief, R. E. LEE.

Longstreet's command.

1st *Division*, Pickett. 1st Brigade, Kemper, 4 regiments; 2d Brigade (formerly Pickett's), 5 regiments.

2d *Division*, Walker. 1st Brigade, Ransom, 4 regiments, 1 battery; 2d Brigade (formerly Walker), 4 regiments, 1 battery.

3d *Division*, Hood. 1st Brigade, Anderson, 5 regiments; 2d Brigade, Law, 4 regiments; 3d Brigade, Wofford, 4 regiments of infantry, 1 of cavalry, 3 batteries; 4th Brigade, Toombs, 4 regiments; 5th Brigade, Jenkins, 4 regiments; 6th Brigade, Evans, 5 regiments, 1 battery.

4th *Division*, McLaws. 1st Brigade, Drayton, 3 regiments; 2d Brigade, Barksdale, 4 regiments; 3d Brigade, Kershaw, 4 regiments, 1 battery; 4th Brigade, Semmes, 4 regiments; 5th Brigade, Cobb, 5 regiments.

5th *Division*, Anderson. 1st Brigade, Wright, 4 regiments; 2d Brigade, Armistead, 4 regiments; 3d Brigade, Wilcox, 5 regiments; 4th Brigade, Pryor, 4 regiments; 5th Brigade, Featherstone, 4 regiments; 6th Brigade, Mahone, 4 regiments.

Jackson's command.

1st *Division*, Starke. 1st Brigade, Winder (afterward Grigsby), 3 regiments, 2 batteries; 2d Brigade, Taliaferro (afterward Warren), 4 regiments; 3d Brigade, Stafford, 5 regiments, 1 battery; 4th Brigade, Jones (afterward Johnston), 4 regiments.

2d *Division*, Ewell. 1st Brigade, Lawton, 4 regiments; 2d Brigade, Early, 6 regiments; 3d Brigade, Hay, 4 regiments; 4th Brigade, Trimble, 2 regiments.

3d *Division*, A. P. Hill. 1st Brigade, Branch, 4 regiments; 2d Brigade, Gregg, 3 regiments; 3d Brigade, Field, 3 regiments; 4th Brigade, Pender, 3 regiments; 5th Brigade, Archer, 3 regiments, 1 battery.

Independent *Division*, D. H. Hill. 1st Brigade, Rhodes, 4 regiments; 2d Brigade, McRae, 4 regiments; 3d Brigade, Ripley, 4 regiments; 4th Brigade, Anderson, 4 regiments; 5th Brigade, Colquitt, 4 regiments.

Division of cavalry, Stuart. 1st Brigade, Hampton, 3 regiments; 2d Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee, 3 regiments; 3d Brigade, Jones, 3 regiments. Reserve artillery, Pendleton, 88 pieces.

NOTE D, PAGE 293.

It is impossible for us to enter into the details of the discussions to which General Porter's conduct on the 29th of August, 1862, gave

rise; but the impartiality which it is our earnest desire to preserve in commenting upon the events of that day, compels us to say a few words on the subject of the accusations directed against that officer. We shall pass over in silence the charges of incapacity, cowardice and treason. These are belied by Porter's whole career, who, both as a soldier and a chieftain, had been tried on more than one battle-field, and whose devotion to the cause he served cannot be called into question. We shall only speak of those which rest upon facts or definite specifications. After his defeat, General Pope censured his lieutenant for not having prevented the junction of Jackson and Longstreet, by placing himself between them on the Gainesville and Groveton road. He asserted that this manœuvre was practicable, and that it would have assured the defeat of the Confederates. It was in consequence of this accusation that Porter was tried and condemned. At a later period, when the facts became more fully known, and the official reports of the Confederate generals were given to the public, it was shown that the junction of the two Confederate corps was effected long before Porter could have reached the point which had been indicated to him. From that moment the principal charges brought against him by the publication of General Pope have been modified and restricted. Pope has blamed him for not having left the Gainesville road, which had been designated to him in his first instructions, to move to the right in the direction of Groveton, and attack the extremity of Longstreet's line; and the junction of the latter with Jackson, conceded to have been accomplished at the outset of the battle, is no longer in question.

Thus far the censure is well founded, although it must be acknowledged that, in order to execute such a movement, Porter would have been obliged to change the direction he had been ordered to follow in his formal instructions. It is evident that Porter, when he found himself unable to follow this direction, instead of remaining inactive, should have endeavored to find the enemy, and, notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, should not have waited for new instructions to take part in the battle, the sound of which reached him on his right. But this kind of censure might have been applied with equal force to many of the generals of both parties during the war, without subjecting them to any other penalty beyond the blame of their chiefs; and the contradictory orders that Pope's lieutenants had been receiving for some days may, to a certain extent, plead in excuse of Porter's fatal hesitation. General Pope has weakened the effect of this second charge by his immoderate course, and by presenting the facts in a

light which does not bear investigation. On the one hand, he asserts that he ordered Porter to attack the enemy's right, and assumes that he wilfully disobeyed him in not fulfilling his instructions. Now, this order, as we have already stated, was only despatched at half-past four o'clock, and Porter declared that he did not receive it until the moment when night rendered its execution impossible. The movements of the several corps had been so frequently countermanded, that the officers of the general staff were unable to ascertain the exact position of each, so that the delay in the transmission of that order is not to be wondered at. On the other hand, Pope, in his anxiety to prove that Porter's inaction had permitted the enemy to concentrate all his forces upon that portion of his line which was defended by Jackson, quotes the official report of the latter. But he has made a mistake in the dates, as we have ascertained by examining a collection of Confederate reports on the campaigns of Virginia, published in Richmond in 1864 (vol. ii., p. 96); the quotation he produces has reference to the 30th of August, and not the 29th. This explanation will suffice to show how important it is to be circumspect in examining the various documents that have been published on both sides if one wishes to arrive at the exact truth.

NOTE E, PAGE 367.

The part played by Burnside at the battle of Antietam has been the subject of a long and heated discussion in the North. General McClellan in his excellent report has severely, but without bitterness, criticised the insufficiency of his lieutenant's attack upon the right wing of the Confederates in the early part of the day. He particularly censures him for having kept his army corps inactive, which might have been employed elsewhere if the passage of the river had been found impracticable. Mr. Swinton goes still farther, and accuses Burnside of having through his inaction prevented McClellan from driving the enemy's army into the Potomac. The biographer of Burnside, Mr. Woodbury, has replied to these accusations with great warmth, blaming McClellan, on the other hand, for not having ordered Porter to make the same effort that he had exacted from the Ninth corps. He seeks to justify Burnside for not having crossed the Antietam before two o'clock by showing the heavy losses experienced by his corps. This explanation is not satisfactory for two reasons; in the first place, because the greater part of these losses were sustained after

the passage, in the battle fought on the other side of the river with A. P. Hill's troops—a battle which would not have taken place if the passage had been effected a few hours sooner—and also because the successive attacks, made with insufficient forces, cost a larger sacrifice of life than would have been incurred in a single general attack made at the outset. It will presently be seen that Burnside, having become general-in-chief, did not have the same scruples in hurling his divisions against the formidable position of Marye's Hill. Finally, Mr. Woodbury states that Lee would not have committed the fault of stripping his right in the presence of the whole of the Ninth corps. This assertion is contradicted by the report of the Confederate general himself, who says that he had left the defence of the approaches to the bridge of the Rohrersville road to Toombs' brigade alone.

NOTE F, PAGE 582.

Several writers who have sought to throw the responsibility of the defeat upon Franklin have stated that he was ordered to make a general attack upon the enemy's right, and that the attack on Marye's Hill was not to take place until after the success of this decisive movement. An examination of the documents written at the very time of the action completely disproves this assertion. We give below the entire text of Burnside's order to Franklin. The reader will judge for himself:

“General Hardie will carry this despatch to you, and remain with you during the day. The general commanding directs that *you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement* down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from General Sumner's command up the Plank road to its intersection of the Telegraph road, where they will divide with a view to seizing the heights on both these roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He makes these moves by columns distant from each other with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the

fog. Two of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear at the bridges, and will remain as supports. Copies of instructions to Generals Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an orderly very soon. You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts. The watch-word, which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be 'Scott.'"

Signed,

"J. G. PARKE, *Chief of Staff.*"

The despatches hourly sent by General Hardie, who was with Franklin, to Burnside's headquarters, show, moreover, that the latter, being informed of the dispositions made by the commander of the left wing, had no fault to find, and that he gave the signal of attack to Sumner at a moment when he was well aware that this wing was not yet seriously engaged.

This plan differed entirely from that which had been discussed for the last two days. In consequence of this change and the new attack to be made upon Marye's Hill, Franklin had no alternative but to strictly obey the text of the instructions he had received. His corps commanders were of the same opinion. Burnside, not having yet been tried as their commander-in-chief, had no right to expect more from his lieutenants than the literal execution of his orders; and when these orders were vague or contradictory, those who received them could not supply the deficiency by that initiative action which a subordinate will often venture upon, when sure that he has divined the intention of his chief, and that such conduct will meet with approval. Hence the uncertainty and timidity which naturally characterized the movements of the Federal army, and caused it to lose half its valor, without detracting from the bravery of the soldiers or the capacity of the generals.

NOTE G, PAGE 664.

The statement of these facts is taken from a report (Thirty-sixth Congress, Second Session, Report No. 78) laid before the House of Representatives on the 12th of February, 1861, by a special committee appointed to inquire into the robbery of Indian bonds. All our allegations are based upon the authority of this official document. But while we feel obliged, out of regard for truth, to show the amount of responsibility resting upon Mr. Floyd in these culpable transactions, we eagerly seize this opportunity to modify an opinion, too se-

vere, perhaps, which we have expressed in the first volume. We accused him of having stripped the Northern arsenals for the benefit of those of the South during his administration of the War Department; this was an exaggerated assertion. The following are the facts as they appear from a report made by Mr. Stanton in the name of the committee on military affairs (Thirty-sixth Congress, Second Session, Report No. 91). The number of muskets which Mr. Floyd caused to be transferred from the Northern to the Southern arsenals in 1860 amounted to one hundred and fifteen thousand. These arms, known to be fit for service, may be thus classified: sixty-five thousand percussion muskets, forty thousand altered muskets, ten thousand rifles; these were about one-fifth of all the arms collected in the different arsenals of the North and South. The order of transfer having been issued in the spring of 1860, we may allow that Mr. Floyd had no intention of securing arms for the Southern insurrection, and that an untoward coincidence alone brought about that result. Unfortunately, there is another order of the same character on file, which, although never executed, constitutes, from its date, a still more serious charge against him, and which, taken in connection with the first, greatly aggravates it. This is an order issued December 20, 1860, in which Mr. Floyd directed forty columbiads and four thirty-two-pounders to be sent to the fort on Ship Island, and seventy-one columbiads with seven thirty-two-pounders to Galveston. These one hundred and twenty-two guns of heavy calibre were intended for forts which at that period were yet unfinished, whose armament, therefore, was not justified by any existing circumstances. The order was issued when the secession of several States was already an accomplished fact, and the Secretary of War selected the very moment for its signature when the respected chief of the Ordnance Bureau, Colonel Craig, was absent. If this order, which would have put the Confederates in possession of valuable resources, was not executed, it is because the Secretary had no time to see it fulfilled, and because his successor, Mr. Holt, hastened to revoke it.

We persist, therefore, in thinking that Mr. Floyd failed in the performance of his duty by taking advantage of his official position to favor the arming of the States which were on the eve of insurrection against the government of which he formed a part; but while deeming him guilty on this point, we willingly acknowledge that the harm which he thus inflicted on the Federal army was of less magnitude than we had imagined when we published the first part of this history.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II. OF BOOK I., VOLUME II.

BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS.

THIS volume was already printed when we received some manuscript notes on the battle of Fair Oaks, which General Joseph E. Johnston had the kindness to send us from his retirement in Georgia. Honored by this mark of confidence on the part of the former adversary of the army of the Potomac, we have with the greatest care compared these notes with the numerous official documents from which we have derived the matter of our narrative. We have found in them some details which we regret not having known in time, but nothing to lead us to modify the statements contained in that narrative. In fact, we feel bound to adhere to our own opinion in regard to certain points, not very numerous, however, concerning which we cannot accept General Johnston's assertions. It is therefore out of deference to him that we propose to state in few words the question of fact about which we do not agree. According to General Johnston, the attack of Longstreet or of the Confederate right against Seven Pines was almost immediately followed by that of G. W. Smith on the left, directed against Fair Oaks by the general-in-chief himself, and this attack fell at once upon Couch, who had remained inactive up to that time at Fair Oaks, and upon Sumner, who had already come up to Couch's assistance. If such had been the case, the only fault found with the Confederates, that of a want of unanimity in their attacks, would be without foundation. But we believe that the Southern general, in condensing the incidents of that day into so short a space, has committed two errors in regard to time which completely change the aspect of the battle.

1st. According to his statement, the attack of Longstreet against Casey only preceded that of Smith by one hour or one hour and a half; and the second attack having taken place at half-past four o'clock, the first must have been made at three or half-past three. The most conclusive evidence goes to prove that it commenced before one o'clock. The following is the precise time fixed by the generals of army corps, divisions and brigades who commanded the Federals on this side, in their reports or depositions before the committee on the conduct of the war relative to this matter: Keyes, half-past twelve; Casey, forty minutes after twelve; Naglee, about one o'clock.

2d. Couch's division was engaged before the attack of G. W. Smith, his advance having taken position in front of Seven Pines since two o'clock for the purpose of supporting Casey (Keyes' report). Two of his brigades, Peck's and Devens', had been brought into line since half-past three o'clock (Naglee's report). It was whilst the latter were engaged on the Nine Mile road that, about half-past four o'clock, Johnston, at the head of G. W. Smith's troops, swept down upon Abercrombie's brigade, the third of Couch's division, at Fair Oaks, which rendered it necessary for the Federals to make a change of front (Keyes' report). Shortly after, at five or a quarter-past five o'clock, this attack broke the line which had thus been formed. Couch, four regiments and one battery, was driven back (McClellan's report) north of the railway, where he was soon joined by Sumner (Sumner's deposition before the committee on the conduct of the war).^{*} At the same time the remainder of Keyes' corps lost possession of Seven Pines (Naglee's report). According to the deposition above quoted, Sumner only effected a junction with Couch after the latter had become separated from the greatest portion of his division, and the sworn statement of several eye-witnesses enables us to fix the hour of six o'clock as the time when Smith, the conqueror of the right wing of that division, met Sumner in the clearing of Allen's farm.

These data, which we have only adopted after a careful examination, show, first, that the battle, which was begun by Longstreet before one o'clock, had continued for more than three hours before Johnston ordered Smith to take part in it; second, that the latter at half-past four o'clock only found a portion of Couch's division at Fair Oaks, the remainder having been engaged for the last hour or two in contending with Longstreet, and that he did not meet Sumner's heads of column until an hour and a half after this attack. We may conclude, therefore, that if the offensive movement of Smith had not been delayed during those three hours, the positions of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, which fell almost immediately after this movement, would have been captured at three instead of five o'clock, and that Sumner not having yet crossed the Chickahominy at that moment, Smith, instead of being obliged to give him battle, would have completed the defeat of Keyes' and Heintzelman's two corps. We shall not venture further with hypotheses, our object being simply to specify the points of fact concerning which we are at variance with the illustrious general who was wounded at Fair Oaks.

MAY, 1875.

^{*} *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War*, vol. i., p. 362.

Reports of the Federal and Confederate armies, to explain the second half of Volume II.

I. BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE, BOOK I., CHAPTER I.

FEDERAL ARMY.

Commander-in-chief, MAJOR-GENERAL D. C. BUELL.

Second in Command, Major-general Thomas.

1st CORPS (left wing), Brigadier-general A. M. McCook.

1st *Division* (Sill, commander *ad interim*). Brigade, Sill; brigade,

Division, Rousseau. 9th Brigade, Harris; 17th Brigade, Lytle; 18th Brigade, Starkweather.

10th *Division*, Jackson. 33d Brigade, Terrill*; 34th Brigade, Webster.

2d CORPS (right wing), Brigadier-general Crittenden.

Division, Wood. Brigade, Wagner; brigade,

Division, W. S. Smith. Brigade,; brigade,

Division, Brigade,; brigade,

3d CORPS (centre), Brigadier-general Gilbert.

1st *Division*, Schœpff. Brigade, Steadman; brigade,

9th *Division*, Mitchell. 30th Brigade, Gooding; 31st Brigade, Carlin; 32d Brigade, Caldwell.

11th *Division*, P. Sheridan. 36th Brigade, D. McCook; brigade, Laibolt; brigade, Griesel.

Cavalry, Stanley's brigade.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Commander-in-chief, GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG.

Army of East Tennessee, Major-general Kirby Smith.

Division, Churchill.

Division, Humphrey Marshall.

Division, Heath.

Army of the Mississippi, Lieutenant-general Leonidas Polk.

1st CORPS, Major-general Hardee.

1st *Division*, Patton Anderson. Powell's brigade, Adams' brigade, Jones' brigade, Brown's brigade.

* Killed in battle.

2d *Division*, Buckner. Liddell's brigade, Cleburne's brigade, Johnson's brigade, Wood's brigade.

3d CORPS (without commander, the corps being divided).

1st *Division*, Cheatham. Smith's brigade, Donelson's brigade, Stuart's brigade, Maney's brigade.

2d *Division*, Withers.

II. BATTLE OF CORINTH.

FEDERAL ARMY.

Department of West Tennessee, Major-general Grant.

Division, Sherman. Brigade,; brigade,

Division, Hurlbut. Veatch's brigade, Lauman's brigade.

Division, Ord. Brigade,; brigade,

Division, McPherson. Brigade,; brigade,

2d *Army of the Mississippi*, Major-general Rosecrans.

2d *Division*, Stanley. Mower's brigade, Murphy's brigade, Fuller's brigade.

3d *Division*, Hamilton. 1st Brigade, Sanborn; 11th Brigade, Sullivan; Buford's brigade.

Division, Mackean. Crooker's Brigade, McArthur's Brigade.

Division, Davis. Hackelman's brigade, Oliver's brigade, Oglesby's brigade.

Cavalry, brigade,

Artillery, 16 batteries, 50 guns.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Army of the Mississippi, Major-general Van Dorn.

Division, Lovell. Villepique's brigade, Rust's brigade, Bowen's brigade.

Division, Breckenridge. Brigade,; brigade,; cavalry, Jackson's brigade.

Army of Trans-Mississippi, Major-general Sterling Price.

Division, Maury. Moore's brigade, Phifer's brigade, Cabell's brigade.

Division, Hebert. Gates' brigade, Colbert's brigade, Green's brigade, Martin's brigade.

Cavalry, Armstrong's brigade.

Artillery, 10 batteries, 44 guns.

BATTLE OF MURFREESBOROUGH.

FEDERAL ARMY.

Commander-in-chief, MAJOR-GENERAL ROSECRANS.

LEFT WING, Major-general Crittenden.

1st *Division*, Wood (6th*). Haxall's brigade, Harker's brigade, Wagner's brigade.

2d *Division*, Palmer (4th). Craft's brigade, Hazen's brigade (19), Grose's brigade (10).

3d *Division*, Van Cleve. Fyffe's brigade, Gibson's brigade.

CENTRE, Major-general Thomas.

Division, Negley (8). Stanley's brigade, Miller's brigade (7).

Division, Rousseau. Regular brigade, Shepherd; Beatty's brigade (17), Scribner's brigade (9).

Division, Fry. Hoskiss' brigade, Boyle's brigade, Walker's brigade, Starkweather's brigade.

Division, Dumont. Reynolds's brigade; brigade,

RIGHT WING, Major-general M. McCook.

Division, Jefferson C. Davis. Post's brigade, Carlin's brigade, Woodruff's brigade (32).

Division, Johnson. Willich's brigade, Kirk's brigade, Baldwin's brigade.

Division, Sheridan. Sill's brigade, Roberts' brigade, Schaeffer's brigade.

Cavalry *Division*, Stanley. Zahn's brigade, Kennet's brigade, Minty's brigade.

Engineer brigade, Morton.

Artillery, Colonel Barnett.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Commander-in-chief, GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG.

HARDEE'S CORPS, Lieutenant-general Hardee.

Division, Cleburne. Johnson's brigade, Polk's brigade, Liddell's brigade.

Division, Breckenridge. Adams' brigade, Preston's brigade, Hanson's brigade, Palmer's brigade.

Independent brigade, K. Jackson.

Cavalry, Wheeler's brigade.

* The figures in parenthesis indicate the permanent numbers of divisions and brigades in the general enumeration of the armies of the West.

POLK'S CORPS, Lieutenant-general Leonidas Polk.

Division, Cheatham. Vaughn's brigade, Maney's brigade, A. P. Stewart's brigade, Donelson's brigade.

Division, Withers. Loomis' brigade, Manigault's brigade, Patton Anderson's brigade, Chalmers' brigade.

Cavalry, Wharton's brigade, Pegram's brigade, Buford's brigade.

Army of East Tennessee, Lieutenant-general Kirby Smith.

Division, McCown. Rains' brigade, Eaton's brigade, McNair's brigade.

Division, Stevenson. Brigade,; brigade,

Independent cavalry. Forest's brigade, Waggoner's brigade, Morgan's brigade.

IV. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

FEDERAL ARMY.

Commander-in-chief, MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE.

RIGHT GRAND DIVISION, Major-general Sumner. 22,736 men, 60 guns.

2d CORPS, Couch.

Division, French. Kimball's brigade, Andrews' brigade; brigade,

Division, Hancock. Meagher's brigade, Zook's brigade, Caldwell's brigade.

Division, Howard. Sully's brigade; brigade,; brigade,

9th CORPS, Wilcox.

Division, Getty. Hawkins' brigade, Harland's brigade; brigade,

Division, Sturgis. Naglee's brigade, Ferrero's brigade; brigade,

Division, Burns. Brigade,; brigade,; brigade,

LEFT GRAND DIVISION, Major-general Franklin. 46,892 men, 116 guns.

1st CORPS, Reynolds.

Division, Meade. Sinclair's brigade, Magilton's brigade, Jackson's brigade.

Division, Gibbons. Taylor's brigade; brigade,; brigade,

Division, Doubleday. Brigade,; brigade,; brigade,

6th CORPS, W. F. Smith.

Division, Newton. Brigade, ; brigade, ; brigade,

Division, Brook. Brigade, ; brigade, ; brigade,

Division, Howe. Vinton's brigade ; brigade, ; brigade,

GRAND DIVISION OF THE CENTRE, Major-general Hooker. 39,984 men, 100 guns.

5th CORPS, Butterfield.

Division, Sykes. Brigade, ; brigade, ; brigade,

Division, Humphreys. Brigade, ; brigade, ; brigade,

Division, Griffin. Brigade, ; brigade, ; brigade,

3d CORPS, Stoneman.

Division, Sickles. Brigade, ; brigade, ; brigade,

Division, Birney. Ward's brigade, Berry's brigade ; brigade,

Division, Whipple. Carroll's brigade ; brigade, ; brigade,

Cavalry, Pleasonton's *Division*. Brigade, ; brigade,

Bayard's *Division*. Brigade, ; brigade,

Reserve Artillery, Hunt.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Commander-in-chief, GENERAL R. E. LEE.

1st CORPS, Longstreet.

1st *Division*, R. H. Anderson. Wright's brigade, Armistead's brigade, Wilcox's brigade, Perry's brigade, Featherstone's brigade, Mahone's brigade.

2d *Division*, Pickett. Kemper's brigade, Jenkins' brigade, Walker's brigade.

3d *Division*, Ransom. Brigade, (formerly Ransom's) ; Cook's brigade.

4th *Division*, Hood. Law's brigade, Toombs' brigade, G. T. Anderson's brigade, Robertson's brigade, Evans' brigade.

5th *Division*, McLaws. Howell Cobb's brigade, Barksdale's brigade, Kershaw's brigade, Semmes' brigade, Drayton's brigade.

Artillery, Walton.

2d CORPS, Jackson.

1st *Division*, A. P. Hill. Field's brigade, Gregg's brigade, Thomas' brigade, Lane's brigade, Archer's brigade, Pender's brigade.

2d *Division*, D. H. Hill. Rodes' brigade, Iverson's brigade, Doles' brigade (formerly Ripley's), Colquitt's brigade, Grimes' brigade (formerly Anderson's).

3d *Division*, Ewell. Hay's brigade, Trimble's brigade, Early's brigade, Lawton's brigade.

4th *Division*, Taliaferro. Paxton's brigade (formerly Winder's), Jones' brigade, Warren's brigade, Pendleton's brigade (formerly Starke's).

Artillery, Walker.

Cavalry Division, Stuart. W. F. Lee's brigade, Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, Hampton's brigade.

Reserve Artillery, Alexander.

NOTE.—These tables are sometimes incomplete, for they have been prepared from information gathered here and there in the reports of different generals, there being no official records in relation to the subject, except for Lee's army at Fredericksburg.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

To the works mentioned at the end of the first volume as having been particularly consulted by the author it is proper to add the following for the second volume:

Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, by Colonel Chesney, London, 1863 and 1865, 2 vols.; *War Pictures of the South*, by Estvan, London, 1863, 2 vols.; *A Rebel War-clerk's Diary*, by Jones, Philadelphia, 1866, 2 vols.; *Memoirs of the Confederate War*, by Heros Von Borecke, London, 1866, 2 vols.; *Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac*, by Chief Surgeon Letterman, New York, 1866, 1 vol.; *Four Years of Fighting*, by Coffin, Boston, 1866, 1 vol.; *Partisan Life with Mosby*, by Scott, London, 1867, 1 vol.; *General Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps*, by Woodbury, Providence, 1867, 1 vol.; *Three Years in the Sixth Corps*, by Stevens, 2d edition, New York, 1870, 1 vol.; *General Lee*, by Edward Lee-Childe, Paris, 1874, 1 vol.; *Narrative of Military Operations*, by General J. E. Johnston, New York, 1874, 1 vol. This last-named work, which has just appeared, possesses an especial interest, being written by the principal survivor of the Confederate generals, nine years after the close of the war, with all the care and moderation to be expected from a writer who relates events in which he has himself played the most conspicuous part.

